Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/801 of 9 April 2026 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of terephthalic acid originating in the Republic of Korea and the United Mexican States

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 7 thereof,

After consulting the Member States,

Whereas:

(1) On 13 August 2025, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of terephthalic acid (‘TA’) originating in the Republic of Korea (‘Korea’) and the United Mexican States (‘Mexico’), (collectively referred to as ‘the countries concerned’), on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’).

(2) The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 30 June 2025. The complaint was made by one Union producer located in Belgium, INEOS Aromatics (‘INEOS’ or ‘the complainant’) representing more than [27 %–47 %] of the Union industry’s production of TA in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.

(3) The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2013 (3) (‘the registration Regulation’).

(4) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainants, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers, known importers, suppliers and users, traders, the Korean and Mexican authorities as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate.

(5) Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.

(6) The Korean government and several interested parties submitted comments on the initiation of the investigation namely: Mexican exporting producers Akra Polyester, S.A. de C.V. (‘Akra’) and Tereftalatos Mexicanos S.A. de C.V. (‘Temex’), together referred to as ‘Alpek’, and Korean Chemical Industry Association (‘KCIA’) on behalf of Korean exporting producers.

(7) First, the Korean Government and these parties claimed that the non-confidential version of the complaint did not meet the standards under Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation as it did not contain sufficiently detailed data, with ranges being too broad to permit reasonable understanding and analysis of the principle arguments in the complaint and requested an updated non-confidential version of the complaint using narrower ranges or indexed figures.

(8) Second, KCIA claimed that it could not be considered that the complaint was lodged ‘by or on behalf of the Union industry’, given that it was not shown that it is supported by Union producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 % of the total production of the like product produced by the portion of the Union industry which expressed either support for or opposition to the complaint, since the open version of the complaint stated that the ‘Complainant accounts for approximately [Percentage well over the 25 % threshold] % of the total production of terephthalic acid in the EU during the [C]IP’, thus not showing that the 50 % threshold was met.

(9) The complainant opposed this interpretation of the 50 % threshold, arguing that this applies exclusively to assessing whether an eventual opposition by the Union industry outweighs support or neutrality among producers who have formally expressed a position on the complaint.

(10) Third, Alpek, KCIA and the Korean government also claimed that the investigation should not have been initiated, arguing that the complaint did not contain sufficient evidence of material injury and causal link. Alpek also claimed that imports from Mexico could not have been the cause of injury and that they should not have been assessed cumulatively with Korean imports.

(11) Specifically, these parties claimed that the period selected in the complaint was not representative as 2021, the starting point for the injury analysis was heavily impacted by disruptions in global maritime commerce and COVID-19 lockdowns, which reduced volumes of imports into the Union creating unusually favourable market conditions, distorting the injury picture, and that the trends observed are just a return to a normal market. The parties also claimed that the complainant itself increased its market share in the Union, improved export volumes, profit figures, and production volumes, which runs contrary to the claim of a systemic injury to the Union industry.

(12) The complainant countered these claims, highlighting that the situation in the market before the COVID-19 pandemic was not one of a normal, non-injurious market, and pointing to the fact that it already successfully lodged an anti-dumping complaint in 2016.

(13) With regard to the claims that the non-confidential version of the complaint does not permit an understanding of trends and patterns, the Commission found that the version open for inspection by interested parties of the complaint contained sufficient essential evidence and non-confidential summaries of data to allow interested parties to sufficiently understand the development of the injury indicators on which the complaint was based and to exercise their rights of defence throughout the proceeding and complied with the requirements of Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation.

(14) The Commission concluded that there was good cause for the confidential treatment by giving ranges, as there was just one complainant, INEOS, meaning that majority of the figures are company specific data.

(15) The Commission also noted that these parties themselves made substantial arguments and observations on trends on the basis of this, allegedly insufficient data. This also suggests that the non-confidential summaries in the open version of the complaint did, in fact, provide a meaningful understanding of the underlying sensitive information.

(16) As concerns KCIA’s claims on lack of standing to lodge the complaint, the Commission pointed out that, in accordance with Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation, the complaint is deemed to be made ‘by or on behalf of the Union industry’, if the members of the Union industry who expressly support the complaint account for at least 25 % of total production of the Union industry and if those supporting represent a higher production than those opposing.

(17) The Commission carried out a standing examination before initiation. For this purpose, all Union producers mentioned in the complaint and otherwise known to the Commission before initiation have been contacted and taken into consideration in the calculation of representativeness of the complainants. A Note on standing was put on the open case file on the day of initiation of the investigation, showing that the complainant acted on behalf of more than [27 %–47 %] of the total Union production, that one producer expressed a neutral position, and that no producers opposed the initiation of the investigation.

(18) The relevant thresholds from Article 5(4) of the basic regulation were thus shown to have been met and Commission rejected this claim as unfounded.

(19) Regarding Alpek’s claims on cumulative assessment, the Commission found that the conditions for cumulative assessment of imports from the countries concerned at the stage of the complaint were met on the basis of the available information and statistics.

(20) In particular, the dumping margins were found to be above de minimis. As shown by available official import statistics, dumped imports were not negligible (above de minimis) in terms of volumes for both countries concerned. Furthermore, the conditions of competition were considered similar. Cumulative assessment was, therefore, justified.

(21) The legal standard of evidence required for a complaint under Article 5 of the basic Regulation (‘sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation’) makes it clear that the quantity and quality of information in the complaint is not the same as the one on which the Commission bases its findings at the end of an investigation. In fact, the complaint needs to include sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link which is reasonably available to the complainant.

(22) Further to that, Article 5 of the basic Regulation does not require that all injury factors mentioned in Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation are analysed in a complaint or show deterioration to establish sufficient evidence of material injury. Indeed, the wording of Article 5(2) of the Basic Regulation states that the complaint must contain information on changes in the volume of the allegedly dumped imports, the effect of those imports on prices of the like product on the Union market and the consequent impact of the imports on the Union industry, as demonstrated by relevant (but not necessarily all) factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry, such as those listed in Articles 3(3) and 3(5).

(23) In the present case, the Commission’s analysis of the evidence provided by the complainant, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation, has shown that the complaint contained sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link between the allegedly dumped imports and the alleged injury. Therefore, this claim was dismissed.

(24) In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

Sampling of Union producers

(25) In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. However, since all three known Union producers came forward, it was ultimately decided that sampling was not necessary as they could all be investigated. These three Union producers represented 100 % of Union production of the product concerned in the investigation period.

Sampling of unrelated importers

(26) To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation.

(27) No unrelated importers provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. Sampling was, therefore, not necessary.

Sampling of exporting producers

(28) To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in Korea to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the Republic of Korea to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.

(29) Three exporting producers in Korea provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of two exporting producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, all known exporting producers concerned and the authorities of Korea were consulted on the selection of the sample. No comments were received.

(30) Given that there was only one known exporting producer in Mexico and no other exporting producers from Mexico came forward after the initiation, there was no need for sampling with regard to Mexico.

(31) The Commission made available online (4) the questionnaires for the exporting producers on the day of initiation.

(33) No Mexican exporting producer provided a questionnaire reply. Furthermore, ten users provided questionnaire replies, but these have not been verified at this stage of the investigation.

(34) The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2022 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).

(35) The product under investigation is terephthalic acid of a purity by weight of 99,5 % or more, usually falling under Chemical Abstracts Service (‘CAS’) number 100-21-0 and usually corresponding to the Customs and Statistics (‘CUS’) number 0023865-3, currently falling under CN code ex 2917 36 00 (TARIC code 2917 36 00 11) (‘the product under investigation’).

(36) TA is primarily used in the production of polyethylene terephthalate (‘PET’), which has applications in bottles, packaging, fibres, films, and chips. Smaller quantities are also used in plasticisers, coatings, and other specialty applications.

(37) The product concerned is terephthalic acid originating in Republic of Korea and the United Mexican States, currently falling under CN code ex 2917 36 00 (TARIC code 2917 36 00 11) (‘the product concerned’).

(39) The Commission decided at this stage that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.

(41) UAB NEO Group elaborated that although QTA can be used in the production of bottle-grade PET chips, it cannot fully substitute PTA. Consequently, PTA must be incorporated into the process together with QTA at a specific ratio.

(42) The complainant countered by asserting that QTA shares the same physical and chemical characteristics as PTA and is largely interchangeable in most downstream applications, thereby effectively competing with PTA in polyester production market.

(43) The Commission provisionally concluded that both product types share the same physical and chemical characteristics and uses. Furthermore, any differences in the purity levels of QTA and PTA did not warrant an exclusion of QTA from the product scope. Moreover, it was found that QTA effectively competes with PTA in the production of downstream product PET across all grades of PET. The evidence collected showed that at least some users effectively use both PTA and QTA in their production interchangeably. Also, there was not found to be a clear price difference between QTA and PTA that would justify an adjustment to the cost/price of QTA. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

(44) The Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales for each sampled cooperating exporting producer was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales are representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represented at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the total sales by each sampled exporting producer of the like product on the domestic market were representative.

(45) The Commission subsequently identified the product types sold domestically that were identical or comparable with the product types sold for export to the Union for the exporting producers with representative domestic sales.

(46) The Commission then examined whether the domestic sales by each sampled exporting producer on its domestic market for each product type that is identical or comparable with a product type sold for export to the Union were representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales of a product type are representative if the total volume of domestic sales of that product type to independent customers during the investigation period represents at least 5 % of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. On this basis, the sales for each product type by each sampled exporting producer of the like product on the domestic market were representative.

(47) The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market for each product type during the investigation period in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation.

(49) In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the IP.

(51) The analysis of domestic sales showed for both sampled exporting producers that less than 80 % of all domestic sales were profitable. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the profitable sales during the IP.

(52) Both sampled exporting producers sold to the Union exclusively via unrelated traders established outside the Union, including traders located in Korea and in third countries. The investigation confirmed that the product concerned was shipped directly by the producers to the the Union and the invoice/payment flow went via the unrelated traders.

(53) Therefore, the export price at ex-works level was established on the basis of Article 2(8) of the basic Regualtion.

(54) Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price at the same level of trade and to make allowances for differences in factors which affect prices and price comparability. In the case at hand the Commission chose to compare the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers at the ex-works level of trade. As further explained below, where appropriate, the normal value and the export price were adjusted in order to: (i) net them back to the ex-works level; and (ii) make allowances for differences in factors which were claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability.

(55) In order to net the normal value back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of inland transportation costs, handling and loading and packaging.

(56) Allowances were made for the following factor affecting prices and price comparability: credit costs.

(57) In order to net the export price back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of inland transportation costs, handling and loading and packaging.

(58) Allowances were made for the following factors affecting prices and price comparability: credit costs and bank charges.

(59) For the sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.