Limitation Act 1980

Part I — Ordinary Time Limits for Different Classes of Action

Time limits under Part I subject to extension or exclusion under Part II

Time limits under Part I subject to extension or exclusion under Part II

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• (1) This Part of this Act gives the ordinary time limits for bringing actions of the various classes mentioned in the following provisions of this Part.

• (2) The ordinary time limits given in this Part of this Act are subject to extension or exclusion in accordance with the provisions of Part II of this Act.

Actions founded on tort

Time limit for actions founded on tort

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An action founded on tort shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

Time limit in case of successive conversions and extinction of title of owner of converted goods

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• (1) Where any cause of action in respect of the conversion of a chattel has accrued to any person and, before he recovers possession of the chattel, a further conversion takes place, no action shall be brought in respect of the further conversion after the expiration of six years from the accrual of the cause of action in respect of the original conversion.

• (2) Where any such cause of action has accrued to any person and the period prescribed for bringing that action has expired and he has not during that period recovered possession of the chattel, the title of that person to the chattel shall be extinguished.

Discretionary exclusion of time limit for actions in respect of personal injuries or death.

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• (1) The right of any person from whom a chattel is stolen to bring an action in respect of the theft shall not be subject to the time limits under sections 2 and 3(1) of this Act, but if his title to the chattel is extinguished under section 3(2) of this Act he may not bring an action in respect of a theft preceding the loss of his title, unless the theft in question preceded the conversion from which time began to run for the purposes of section 3(2).

• (2) Subsection (1) above shall apply to any conversion related to the theft of a chattel as it applies to the theft of a chattel; and, except as provided below, every conversion following the theft of a chattel before the person from whom it is stolen recovers possession of it shall be regarded for the purposes of this section as related to the theft.

If anyone purchases the stolen chattel in good faith neither the purchase nor any conversion following it shall be regarded as related to the theft.

• (3) Any cause of action accruing in respect of the theft or any conversion related to the theft of a chattel to any person from whom the chattel is stolen shall be disregarded for the purpose of applying section 3(1) or (2) of this Act to his case.

• (4) Where in any action brought in respect of the conversion of a chattel it is proved that the chattel was stolen from the plaintiff or anyone through whom he claims it shall be presumed that any conversion following the theft is related to the theft unless the contrary is shown.

• (5) In this section “theft” includes—

• (a) any conduct outside England and Wales which would be theft if committed in England and Wales; and

• (b) obtaining any chattel (in England and Wales or elsewhere) by—

• (i) blackmail (within the meaning of section 21 of the Theft Act 1968), or

• (ii) fraud (within the meaning of the Fraud Act 2006);

and references in this section to a chattel being “stolen” shall be construed accordingly.

Actions founded on simple contract

Time limit for actions founded on simple contract

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An action founded on simple contract shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

Special time limit for actions in respect of certain loans

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• (1) Subject to subsection (3) below, section 5 of this Act shall not bar the right of action on a contract of loan to which this section applies.

• (2) This section applies to any contract of loan which—

• (a) does not provide for repayment of the debt on or before a fixed or determinable date; and

• (b) does not effectively (whether or not it purports to do so) make the obligation to repay the debt conditional on a demand for repayment made by or on behalf of the creditor or on any other matter;

except where in connection with taking the loan the debtor enters into any collateral obligation to pay the amount of the debt or any part of it (as, for example, by delivering a promissory note as security for the debt) on terms which would exclude the application of this section to the contract of loan if they applied directly to repayment of the debt.

• (3) Where a demand in writing for repayment of the debt under a contract of loan to which this section applies is made by or on behalf of the creditor (or, where there are joint creditors, by or on behalf of any one of them) section 5 of this Act shall thereupon apply as if the cause of action to recover the debt had accrued on the date on which the demand was made.

• (4) In this section “promissory note” has the same meaning as in the Bills of Exchange Act 1882.

Time limit for actions to enforce certain awards

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An action to enforce an award, where the submission is not by an instrument under seal, shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

General rule for actions on a specialty

Time limit for actions on a specialty

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• (1) An action upon a specialty shall not be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

• (2) Subsection (1) above shall not affect any action for which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act.

Actions for sums recoverable by statute

Time limit for actions for sums recoverable by statute

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• (1) An action to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

• (2) Subsection (1) above shall not affect any action to which section 10 or 10A of this Act applies.

Special time limit for claiming contribution

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• (1) Where under section 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 any person becomes entitled to a right to recover contribution in respect of any damage from any other person, no action to recover contribution by virtue of that right shall be brought after the expiration of two years from the date on which that right accrued.

• (2) For the purposes of this section the date on which a right to recover contribution in respect of any damage accrues to any person (referred to below in this section as “the relevant date”) shall be ascertained as provided in subsections (3) and (4) below.

• (3) If the person in question is held liable in respect of that damage—

• (a) by a judgment given in any civil proceedings; or

• (b) by an award made on any arbitration;

the relevant date shall be the date on which the judgment is given, or the date of the award (as the case may be).

For the purposes of this subsection no account shall be taken of any judgment or award given or made on appeal in so far as it varies the amount of damages awarded against the person in question.

• (4) If, in any case not within subsection (3) above, the person in question makes or agrees to make any payment to one or more persons in compensation for that damage (whether he admits any liability in respect of the damage or not), the relevant date shall be the earliest date on which the amount to be paid by him is agreed between him (or his representative) and the person (or each of the persons, as the case may be) to whom the payment is to be made.

• (5) An action to recover contribution shall be one to which sections 28, 32... and 35 of this Act apply, but otherwise Parts II and III of this Act (except sections 34, 37 and 38) shall not apply for the purposes of this section.

Actions in respect of wrongs causing personal injuries or death etc

Special time limit for actions in respect of personal injuries

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• (1) This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person.

• (1A) This section does not apply to any action brought for damages under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

• (2) None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act shall apply to an action to which this section applies.

• (3) An action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period applicable in accordance with subsection (4) or (5) below.

• (4) Except where subsection (5) below applies, the period applicable is three years from—

• (a) the date on which the cause of action accrued; or

• (b) the date of knowledge (if later) of the person injured.

• (5) If the person injured dies before the expiration of the period mentioned in subsection (4) above, the period applicable as respects the cause of action surviving for the benefit of his estate by virtue of section 1 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 shall be three years from—

• (a) the date of death; or

• (b) the date of the personal representative’s knowledge;

whichever is the later.

• (6) For the purposes of this section “personal representative” includes any person who is or has been a personal representative of the deceased, including an executor who has not proved the will (whether or not he has renounced probate) but not anyone appointed only as a special personal representative in relation to settled land; and regard shall be had to any knowledge acquired by any such person while a personal representative or previously.

• (7) If there is more than one personal representative, and their dates of knowledge are different, subsection (5)(b) above shall be read as referring to the earliest of those dates.

Special time limit for actions under Fatal Accidents legislation

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• (1) An action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 shall not be brought if the death occurred when the person injured could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury (whether because of a time limit in this Act or in any other Act, or for any other reason).

Where any such action by the injured person would have been barred by the time limit in section 11 , 11A or 11B of this Act, no account shall be taken of the possibility of that time limit being overridden under section 33 of this Act.

• (2) None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act shall apply to an action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, but no such action shall be brought after the expiration of three years from—

• (a) the date of death; or

• (b) the date of knowledge of the person for whose benefit the action is brought;

whichever is the later.

• (3) An action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 shall be one to which sections 28, 33 ..., 33B and 35 of this Act apply, and the application to any such action of the time limit under subsection (2) above shall be subject to section 39; but otherwise Parts II and III of this Act shall not apply to any such action.

Operation of time limit under section 12 in relation to different dependants

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• (1) Where there is more than one person for whose benefit an action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 is brought, section 12(2)(b) of this Act shall be applied separately to each of them.

• (2) Subject to subsection (3) below, if by virtue of subsection (1) above the action would be outside the time limit given by section 12(2) as regards one or more, but not all, of the persons for whose benefit it is brought, the court shall direct that any person as regards whom the action would be outside that limit shall be excluded from those for whom the action is brought.

• (3) The court shall not give such a direction if it is shown that if the action were brought exclusively for the benefit of the person in question it would not be defeated by a defence of limitation (whether in consequence of section 28 of this Act or an agreement between the parties not to raise the defence, or otherwise).

Definition of date of knowledge for purposes of sections 11 and 12

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• (1) Subject to subsections (1A) and (1B) below, in sections 11 and 12 of this Act references to a person’s date of knowledge are references to the date on which he first had knowledge of the following facts—

• (a) that the injury in question was significant; and

• (b) that the injury was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty; and

• (c) the identity of the defendant; and

• (d) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant;

and knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach of duty is irrelevant.

• (1A) In section 11A of this Act and in section 12 of this Act so far as that section applies to an action by virtue of section 6(1)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (death caused by defective product) references to a person’s date of knowledge are references to the date on which he first had knowledge of the following facts—

• (a) such facts about the damage caused by the defect as would lead a reasonable person who had suffered such damage to consider it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment; and

• (b) that the damage was wholly or partly attributable to the facts and circumstances alleged to constitute the defect; and

• (c) the identity of the defendant;

but, in determining the date on which a person first had such knowledge there shall be disregarded both the extent (if any) of that person’s knowledge on any date of whether particular facts or circumstances would or would not, as a matter of law, constitute a defect and, in a case relating to loss of or damage to property, any knowledge which that person had on a date on which he had no right of action by virtue of Part I of that Act in respect of the loss or damage.

• (1B) In section 11B of this Act and in section 12 of this Act so far as that section applies to an action by virtue of section 6(1)(a) of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 (“the 2018 Act”) (death caused by automated vehicle) references to a person's date of knowledge are references to the date on which he first had knowledge of the following facts—

• (a) that the injury in question was significant; and

• (b) that the injury was attributable in whole or in part to an accident caused by an automated vehicle when driving itself; and

• (c) the identity of the insurer of the vehicle (in the case of an action under section 2(1) of the 2018 Act) or the owner of the vehicle (in the case of an action under section 2(2) of that Act).

Expressions used in this subsection that are defined for the purposes of Part 1 of the 2018 Act have the same meaning in this subsection as in that Part.

• (2) For the purposes of this section an injury is significant if the person whose date of knowledge is in question would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.

• (3) For the purposes of this section a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—

• (a) from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or

• (b) from facts ascertainable by him with the help of medical or other appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek;

but a person shall not be fixed under this subsection with knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.

Actions to recover land and rent

Time limit for actions to recover land

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• (1) No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person.

• (2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, where—

• (a) the estate or interest claimed was an estate or interest in reversion or remainder or any other future estate or interest and the right of action to recover the land accrued on the date on which the estate or interest fell into possession by the determination of the preceding estate or interest; and

• (b) the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest (not being a term of years absolute) was not in possession of the land on that date;

no action shall be brought by the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest or six years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest, whichever period last expires.

• (3) Subsection (2) above shall not apply to any estate or interest which falls into possession on the determination of an entailed interest and which might have been barred by the person entitled to the entailed interest.

• (4) No person shall bring an action to recover any estate or interest in land under an assurance taking effect after the right of action to recover the land had accrued to the person by whom the assurance was made or some person through whom he claimed or some person entitled to a preceding estate or interest, unless the action is brought within the period during which the person by whom the assurance was made could have brought such an action.