§ 1928. North Atlantic Treaty Organization
§ 1928. North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(a) Authorization for expenses In order to provide for United States participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there is authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary from time to time for the payment by the United States of its share of the expenses of the Organization and all necessary salaries and expenses of the United States permanent representative to the Organization, of such persons as may be appointed to represent the United States in the subsidiary bodies of the Organization or in any multilateral organization which participates in achieving the aims of the North Atlantic Treaty, and of their appropriate staffs, and the expenses of participation in meetings of such organizations, including salaries, expenses, and allowances of personnel and dependents as authorized by the Foreign Service Act of 1980 [22 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.], and allowances and expenses as provided in section 287r of this title.
(b) Appointment of personal representative The United States permanent representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall hold office at the pleasure of the President. Such representative shall have the rank and status of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary and shall be a chief of mission under the Foreign Service Act of 1980 [22 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.].
(c) Duration of staff service Persons detailed to the international staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in accordance with section 2388 of this title who are members of the Foreign Service serving under limited appointments may serve for periods of more than five years notwithstanding the limitation in section 309 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 [22 U.S.C. 3949].
(Aug. 26, 1954, ch. 937, title IV, § 408, 68 Stat. 845; Pub. L. 85–141, § 8(h), Aug. 14, 1957, 71 Stat. 361; Pub. L. 86–108, ch. II, § 205(h), July 24, 1959, 73 Stat. 250; Pub. L. 96–465, title II, § 2206(a)(6), Oct. 17, 1980, 94 Stat. 2161.)
Editorial Notes
References in Text
The Foreign Service Act of 1980, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (b), is Pub. L. 96–465, Oct. 17, 1980, 94 Stat. 2071, which is classified principally to chapter 52 (§ 3901 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 3901 of this title and Tables.
Amendments
1980—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 96–465, § 2206(a)(6)(A), substituted “Foreign Service Act of 1980” for “Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended (22 U.S.C. 801),”.
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 96–465, § 2206(a)(6)(B), substituted “chief of mission under the Foreign Service Act of 1980” for “chief of mission, class 1, within the meaning of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended (22 U.S.C. 801)”.
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 96–465, § 2206(a)(6)(C), among other changes, substituted references to sections 2388 and 3949 of this title for references to sections 1789 and 922 of this title, respectively, and reference to members of the Foreign Service for reference to Foreign Service Reserve officers.
1959—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 86–108 substituted “five years” for “four years”.
1957—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 85–141 struck out provisions authorizing appropriations of not more than $3,200,000 for the fiscal year 1955.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Effective Date of 1980 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 96–465 effective Feb. 15, 1981, except as otherwise provided, see section 2403 of Pub. L. 96–465, set out as an Effective Date note under section 3901 of this title.
Annual Appropriations
Annual appropriations to meet the obligations of membership in various international organizations were contained in acts listed in a note set out under section 269a of this title.
Annual Report Regarding NATO Special Operations Headquarters
Pub. L. 111–84, div. A, title XII, § 1244(d), as added by Pub. L. 112–239, div. A, title XII, § 1272(b), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2023, which mandated an annual report, with specified details, to Congress regarding support for NATO Special Operations Headquarters, was repealed by Pub. L. 115–232, div. A, title VIII, § 813(d), Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 1851.
Report on Host Countries Assuming Greater Share of Common Defense Burden
Pub. L. 111–117, div. E, title I, § 118, Dec. 16, 2009, 123 Stat. 3293, provided that: “(a) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of Congress, by February 15 of each year, an annual report in unclassified and, if necessary, classified form, on actions taken by the Department of Defense and the Department of State during the previous fiscal year to encourage host countries to assume a greater share of the common defense burden of such countries and the United States. “(b) The report under subsection (a) shall include a description of—“(1) attempts to secure cash and in-kind contributions from host countries for military construction projects; “(2) attempts to achieve economic incentives offered by host countries to encourage private investment for the benefit of the United States Armed Forces; “(3) attempts to recover funds due to be paid to the United States by host countries for assets deeded or otherwise imparted to host countries upon the cessation of United States operations at military installations; “(4) the amount spent by host countries on defense, in dollars and in terms of the percent of gross domestic product (GDP) of the host country; and “(5) for host countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the amount contributed to NATO by host countries, in dollars and in terms of the percent of the total NATO budget. “(c) In this section, the term ‘host country’ means other member countries of NATO, Japan, South Korea, and United States allies bordering the Arabian Sea.”
Similar provisions were contained in the following prior appropriation acts:
Pub. L. 110–329, div. E, title I, § 118, Sept. 30, 2008, 122 Stat. 3698.
Pub. L. 110–161, div. I, title I, § 118, Dec. 26, 2007, 121 Stat. 2259.
NATO Freedom Consolidation
Pub. L. 110–17, Apr. 9, 2007, 121 Stat. 73, provided that: “SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.“This Act may be cited as the ‘NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007’. “SEC. 2. FINDINGS.“Congress makes the following findings:“(1) The sustained commitment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to mutual defense has made possible the democratic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can and should play a critical role in addressing the security challenges of the post-Cold War era in creating the stable environment needed for those emerging democracies in Europe. “(2) Lasting stability and security in Europe requires the military, economic, and political integration of emerging democracies into existing European structures. “(3) In an era of threats from terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is increasingly contributing to security in the face of global security challenges for the protection and interests of its member states. “(4) In the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of Public Law 103–447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), Congress declared that ‘full and active participants in the Partnership for Peace in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area should be invited to become full NATO members in accordance with Article 10 of such Treaty at an early date …’. “(5) In the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (title VI of section 101(c) of title I of division A of Public Law 104–208; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), Congress called for the prompt admission of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and declared that ‘in order to promote economic stability and security in Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine . . . the process of enlarging NATO to include emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should not be limited to consideration of admitting Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia as full members of the NATO Alliance’. “(6) In the European Security Act of 1998 (title XXVII of division G of Public Law 105–277; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), Congress declared that ‘Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should not be the last emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe invited to join NATO’ and that ‘Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria . . . would make an outstanding contribution to furthering the goals of NATO and enhancing stability, freedom, and peace in Europe should they become NATO members [and] upon complete satisfaction of all relevant criteria should be invited to become full NATO members at the earliest possible date’. “(7) In the Gerald B. H. Solomon Freedom Consolidation Act of 2002 (Public Law 107–187; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), Congress endorsed ‘… the vision of further enlargement of the NATO Alliance articulated by President George W. Bush on June 15, 2001, and by former President William J. Clinton on October 22, 1996’. “(8) At the Madrid Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in July 1997, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited to join the Alliance, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization heads of state and government issued a declaration stating ‘[t]he alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership . . . [n]o European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the [North Atlantic] Treaty will be excluded from consideration’. “(9) At the Washington Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization heads of state and government issued a communiqué declaring ‘[w]e pledge that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the [North Atlantic] Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area . . . [t]he three new members will not be the last . . . [n]o European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its geographic location …’. “(10) In May 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, the foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia issued a statement (later joined by Croatia) declaring that—“(A) their countries will cooperate in jointly seeking membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the next round of enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; “(B) the realization of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by one or more of these countries would be a success for all; and “(C) eventual membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for all of these countries would be a success for Europe and for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “(11) On June 15, 2001, in a speech in Warsaw, Poland, President George W. Bush stated ‘[a]ll of Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom—and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe—as Europe’s old democracies have . . . I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings . . . [a]s we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the agenda of others . . . [w]e will not trade away the fate of free European peoples . . . [n]o more Munichs . . . [n]o more Yaltas . . . [a]s we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom’. “(12) On October 22, 1996, in a speech in Detroit, Michigan, former President William J. Clinton stated ‘NATO’s doors will not close behind its first new members . . . NATO should remain open to all of Europe’s emerging democracies who are ready to shoulder the responsibilities of membership . . . [n]o nation will be automatically excluded . . . [n]o country outside NATO will have a veto . . . [a] gray zone of insecurity must not reemerge in Europe’. “(13) At the Prague Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in November 2002, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited to join the Alliance in the second round of enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since the end of the Cold War, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization heads of state and government issued a declaration stating ‘NATO’s door will remain open to European democracies willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty’. “(14) On May 8, 2003, the United States Senate unanimously approved the Resolution of Ratification to Accompany Treaty Document No. 108–4, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, inviting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “(15) At the Istanbul Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in June 2004, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization heads of state and government issued a communiqué reaffirming that NATO’s door remains open to new members, declaring ‘[w]e celebrate the success of NATO’s Open Door Policy, and reaffirm tody [sic] that our seven new members will not be the last. The door to membership remains open. We welcome the progress made by Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1) [sic] in implementing their Annual National Programmes under the Membership Action Plan, and encourage them to continue pursuing the reforms necessary to progress toward NATO membership. We also commend their contribution to regional stability and cooperation. We want all three countries to succeed and will continue to assist them in their reform efforts. NATO will continue to assess each country’s candidacy individually, based on the progress made towards reform goals pursued through the Membership Action Plan, which will remain the vehicle to keep the readiness of each aspirant for membership under review. We direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep the enlargement process, including the implementation of the Membership Action Plan, under continual review and report to us. We will review at the next Summit progress by aspirants towards membership based on that report’. “(16) Georgia and Ukraine have stated their desire to join the Euro-Atlantic community, and in particular, are seeking to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Georgia and Ukraine are working closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its members to meet criteria for eventual membership in NATO. “(17) At a press conference with President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia in Washington, D.C. on July 5, 2006, President George W. Bush stated that ‘… I believe that NATO would benefit with Georgia being a member of NATO, and I think Georgia would benefit. And there’s a way forward through the Membership Action Plan . . . And I’m a believer in the expansion of NATO. I think it’s in the world’s interest that we expand NATO’. “(18) Following a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in New York on September 21, 2006, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced the launching of an Intensified Dialogue on membership between the Alliance and Georgia. “(19) At the NATO-Ukraine Commission Summit in Brussels in February 2005, President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko declared membership in NATO as the ultimate goal of Ukraine’s cooperation with the Alliance and expressed Ukraine’s desire to conclude a Membership Action Plan. “(20) At the NATO-Ukraine Commission Foreign Ministerial meeting in Vilnius in April 2005, NATO and Ukraine launched an Intensified Dialogue on the potential membership of Ukraine in NATO. “(21) At the Riga Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in November 2006, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of NATO issued a declaration reaffirming that NATO’s door remains open to new members, declaring that ‘all European democratic countries may be considered for MAP (Membership Action Plan) or admission, subject to decision by the NAC (North Atlantic Council) at each stage, based on the performance of these countries towards meeting the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty. We direct that NATO Foreign Ministers keep that process under continual review and report to us. We welcome the efforts of Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to prepare themselves for the responsibilities and obligations of membership. We reaffirm that the Alliance will continue with Georgia and Ukraine its Intensified Dialogues which cover the full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to those countries’ aspirations to membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision. We reaffirm the importance of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership, which has its 10th anniversary next year and welcome the progress that has been made in the framework of our Intensified Dialogue. We appreciate Ukraine’s substantial contributions to our common security, including through participation in NATO-led operations and efforts to promote regional cooperation. We encourage Ukraine to continue to contribute to regional security. We are determined to continue to assist, through practical cooperation, in the implementation of far-reaching reform efforts, notably in the fields of national security, defence, reform of the defence-industrial sector and fighting corruption. We welcome the commencement of an Intensified Dialogue with Georgia as well as Georgia’s contribution to international peacekeeping and security operations. We will continue to engage actively with Georgia in support of its reform process. We encourage Georgia to continue progress on political, economic and military reforms, including strengthening judicial reform, as well as the peaceful resolution of outstanding conflicts on its territory. We reaffirm that it is of great importance that all parties in the region should engage constructively to promote regional peace and stability.’. “(22) Contingent upon their continued implementation of democratic, defense, and economic reform, and their willingness and ability to meet the responsibilities of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a clear expression of national intent to do so, Congress calls for the timely admission of Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia (FYROM), and Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to promote security and stability in Europe. “SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.“Congress—“(1) reaffirms its previous expressions of support for continued enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization contained in the NATO Participation Act of 1994 [title II of Pub. L. 103–447, set out as a note below], the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 [section 101(c) [title VI] of div. A of Pub. L. 104–208, set out as a note below], the European Security Act of 1998 [title XXVII of div. G of Pub. L. 105–277, set out as a note below], and the Gerald B. H. Solomon Freedom Consolidation Act of 2002 [Pub. L. 107–187, set out as a note below]; “(2) supports the commitment to further enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include European democracies that are able and willing to meet the responsibilities of Membership, as expressed by the Alliance in its Madrid Summit Declaration of 1997, its Washington Summit Communiqué of 1999, its Prague Summit Declaration of 2002, its Istanbul Summit Communiqué of 2004, and its Riga Summit Declaration of 2006; and “(3) endorses the vision of further enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization articulated by President George W. Bush on June 15, 2001, and by former President William J. Clinton on October 22, 1996, and urges our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to work with the United States to realize a role for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in promoting global security, including continued support for enlargement to include qualified candidate states, specifically by entering into a Membership Action Plan with Georgia and recognizing the progress toward meeting the responsibilities and obligations of NATO membership by Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia (FYROM), and Ukraine. “SEC. 4. DESIGNATION OF ALBANIA, CROATIA, GEORGIA, MACEDONIA (FYROM), AND UKRAINE AS ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE NATO PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994.“(a) Designation.—“(1) Albania.—The Republic of Albania is designated as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of Public Law 103–447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), and shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to section 203(d)(1) of such Act. “(2) Croatia.—The Republic of Croatia is designated as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994, and shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to section 203(d)(1) of such Act. “(3) Georgia.—Georgia is designated as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994, and shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to section 203(d)(1) of such Act. “(4) Macedonia (fyrom).—The Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is designated as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994, and shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to section 203(d)(1) of such Act. “(5) Ukraine.—Ukraine is designated as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994, and shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to section 203(d)(1) of such Act. “(b) Rule of Construction.—The designation of the Republic of Albania, the Republic of Croatia, Georgia, the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Ukraine pursuant to subsection (a) as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994—“(1) is in addition to the designation of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia pursuant to section 606 of the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (title VI of section 101(c) of title I of division A of Public Law 104–208; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), the designation of Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria pursuant to section 2703(b) of the European Security Act of 1998 (title XXVII of division G of Public Law 105–277; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), and the designation of Slovakia pursuant to section 4(a) of the Gerald B. H. Solomon Freedom Consolidation Act of 2002 (Public Law 107–187; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note) as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994; and “(2) shall not preclude the designation by the President of other countries pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of such Act. “SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR COUNTRIES DESIGNATED UNDER THE NATO PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994.“Of the amounts made available for fiscal year 2008 under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) such sums as may be necessary are authorized to be appropriated for assistance to the Republic of Albania, the Republic of Croatia, Georgia, the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Ukraine.”
Annual Report on the NATO Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force
Pub. L. 108–136, div. A, title XII, § 1231, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1654, provided that: “(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:“(1) At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Prague in November 2002, the heads of states and governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched a Prague Capabilities Commitment and decided to create a NATO Response Force. “(2) The Prague Capabilities Commitment is part of the continuing NATO effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high-threat environment. As part of this commitment, individual NATO allies have made firm and specific political commitments to improve their capabilities in the areas of—“(A) chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; “(B) intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; “(C) air-to-ground surveillance; “(D) command, control, and communications; “(E) combat effectiveness, including precision guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses; “(F) strategic air and sea lift; “(G) air-to-air refueling; and “(H) deployable combat support and combat service support units. “(3) The NATO Response Force is envisioned to be a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable force that includes land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as determined by the North Atlantic Council. The NATO Response Force is also intended to be a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in NATO’s military capabilities. It is expected to have initial operational capability by October 2004, and full operational capability by October 2006. “(b) Annual Report.—(1) Not later than January 31 of each year through 2008, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional committees specified in paragraph (5) a report, to be prepared in consultation with the Secretary of State, on implementation of the Prague Capabilities Commitment and development of the NATO Response Force by the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). “(2) The annual report under this subsection shall include the following matters:“(A) A description of the actions taken by NATO as a whole and by each member nation of NATO other than the United States to further the Prague Capabilities Commitment, including any actions taken to improve capability shortfalls in the areas identified for improvement. “(B) A description of the actions taken by NATO as a whole and by each member nation of NATO, including the United States, to create the NATO Response Force. “(C) A discussion of the relationship between NATO’s efforts to improve capabilities through the Prague Capabilities Commitment and those of the European Union to enhance European capabilities through the European Capabilities Action Plan, including the extent to which they are mutually reinforcing. “(D) A discussion of NATO decisionmaking on the implementation of the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the development of the NATO Response Force, including—“(i) an assessment of whether the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force are the sole jurisdiction of the Defense Planning Committee, the North Atlantic Council, or the Military Committee; “(ii) a description of the circumstances which led to the defense, military, security, and nuclear decisions of NATO on matters such as the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force being made in bodies other than the Defense Planning Committee; “(iii) a description of the extent to which any member that does not participate in the integrated military structure of NATO contributes to each of the component committees of NATO, including any and all committees relevant to the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the NATO Response Force; “(iv) a description of the extent to which any member that does not participate in the integrated military structure of NATO participates in deliberations and decisions of NATO on resource policy, contribution ceilings, infrastructure, force structure, modernization, threat assessments, training, exercises, deployments, and other issues related to the Prague Capabilities Commitment or the NATO Response Force; “(v) a description and assessment of the impediments, if any, that would preclude or limit NATO from conducting deliberations and making decisions on matters such as the Prague Capabilities Commitment or the NATO Response Force solely in the Defense Planning Committee; and “(vi) the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense on streamlining defense, military, and security decisionmaking within NATO relating to the Prague Capabilities Commitment, the NATO Response Force, and other matters, including an assessment of the feasibility and advisability of the greater utilization of the Defense Planning Committee for such purposes. “(3) In the case of a report under this subsection after the first such report, the information submitted in such report under any of clauses (i) through (vi) of subparagraph (D) of paragraph (2) may consist solely of an update of any information previously submitted under that clause in a preceding report under this subsection. “(4) Each report under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may also be submitted in classified form if necessary. “(5) The committees specified in this paragraph are—“(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and “(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations [now Committee on Foreign Affairs] of the House of Representatives.”
Sense of Congress on Cooperation by United States and NATO With Russia on Ballistic Missile Defenses
Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXVI, § 3623, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1824, provided that: “(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should, in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, encourage appropriate cooperative relationships between the Russian Federation and the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization with respect to the development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses. “(b) Report to Congress.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 24, 2003], the Secretary of Defense shall transmit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report (in unclassified or classified form as necessary) on the feasibility of increasing cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the subject of ballistic missile defense. The report shall include—“(1) the recommendations of the Secretary; “(2) a description of the threat such cooperation is intended to address; and “(3) an assessment of possible benefits to ballistic missile defense programs of the United States.”
Gerald B. H. Solomon Freedom Consolidation Act
Pub. L. 107–187, June 10, 2002, 116 Stat. 590, provided that: “SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.“This Act may be cited as the ‘Gerald B. H. Solomon Freedom Consolidation Act of 2002’. “SEC. 2. FINDINGS.“The Congress makes the following findings:“(1) In the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of Public Law 103–447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), Congress declared that ‘full and active participants in the Partnership for Peace in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area should be invited to become full NATO members in accordance with Article 10 of such Treaty at an early date …’. “(2) In the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (title VI of section 101(c) of title I of division A of Public Law 104–208; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), Congress called for the prompt admission of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia to NATO, and declared that ‘in order to promote economic stability and security in Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine . . . the process of enlarging NATO to include emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should not be limited to consideration of admitting Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia as full members of the NATO Alliance’. “(3) In the European Security Act of 1998 (title XXVII of division G of Public Law 105–277; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), Congress declared that ‘Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should not be the last emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe invited to join NATO’ and that ‘Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria . . . would make an outstanding contribution to furthering the goals of NATO and enhancing stability, freedom, and peace in Europe should they become NATO members [and] upon complete satisfaction of all relevant criteria should be invited to become full NATO members at the earliest possible date’. “(4) At the Madrid Summit of the NATO Alliance in July 1997, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited to join the Alliance in the first round of NATO enlargement, and the NATO heads of state and government issued a declaration stating ‘[t]he Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership . . . [n]o European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the [North Atlantic] Treaty will be excluded from consideration’. “(5) At the Washington Summit of the NATO Alliance in April 1999, the NATO heads of state and government issued a communique declaring ‘[w]e pledge that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the [North Atlantic] Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area . . . [t]he three new members will not be the last . . . [n]o European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its geographic location …’. “(6) In late 2002, NATO will hold a summit in Prague, the Czech Republic, at which it will decide which additional emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to invite to join the Alliance in the next round of NATO enlargement. “(7) In May 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, the foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia issued a statement (later joined by Croatia) declaring that their countries will cooperate in jointly seeking NATO membership in the next round of NATO enlargement, that the realization of NATO membership by one or more of these countries would be a success for all, and that eventual NATO membership for all of these countries would be a success for Europe and NATO. “(8) On June 15, 2001, in a speech in Warsaw, Poland, President George W. Bush stated ‘[a]ll of Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom—and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe—as Europe’s old democracies have . . . I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings . . . [a]s we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the agenda of others . . . [w]e will not trade away the fate of free European peoples . . . [n]o more Munichs . . . [n]o more Yaltas . . . [a]s we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom’. “(9) On October 22, 1996, in a speech in Detroit, Michigan, former President William J. Clinton stated ‘NATO’s doors will not close behind its first new members . . . NATO should remain open to all of Europe’s emerging democracies who are ready to shoulder the responsibilities of membership . . . [n]o nation will be automatically excluded . . . [n]o country outside NATO will have a veto . . . [a] gray zone of insecurity must not reemerge in Europe’. “SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.“Congress—“(1) reaffirms its previous expressions of support for continued enlargement of the NATO Alliance contained in the NATO Participation Act of 1994 [title II of Pub. L. 103–447, set out as a note below], the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 [section 101(c) [title VI] of div. A of Pub. L. 104–208, set out as a note below], and the European Security Act of 1998 [title XXVII of div. G of Pub. L. 105–277, set out as a note below]; “(2) supports the commitment to further enlargement of the NATO Alliance expressed by the Alliance in its Madrid Declaration of 1997 and its Washington Summit Communique of 1999; and “(3) endorses the vision of further enlargement of the NATO Alliance articulated by President George W. Bush on June 15, 2001, and by former President William J. Clinton on October 22, 1996, and urges our NATO allies to work with the United States to realize this vision at the Prague Summit in 2002. “SEC. 4. DESIGNATION OF SLOVAKIA TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE NATO PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994.“(a) In General.—Slovakia is designated as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of Public Law 103–447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note) and shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to section 203(d)(1) of such Act. “(b) Rule of Construction.—The designation of Slovakia pursuant to subsection (a) as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994—“(1) is in addition to the designation of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia pursuant to section 606 of the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (title VI of section 101(c) of title I of division A of Public Law 104–208; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note) and the designation of Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria pursuant to section 2703(b) of the European Security Act of 1998 (title XXVII of division G of Public Law 105–277; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note) as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994; and “(2) shall not preclude the designation by the President of other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of such Act. “SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR COUNTRIES DESIGNATED UNDER THE NATO PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994.“(a) Authorization of Foreign Military Financing.—Of the amounts made available for fiscal year 2002 under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763)—“(1) $6,500,000 is authorized to be available on a grant basis for Estonia; “(2) $7,000,000 is authorized to be available on a grant basis for Latvia; “(3) $7,500,000 is authorized to be available on a grant basis for Lithuania; “(4) $8,500,000 is authorized to be available on a grant basis for Slovakia; “(5) $4,500,000 is authorized to be available on a grant basis for Slovenia; “(6) $10,000,000 is authorized to be available on a grant basis for Bulgaria; and “(7) $11,500,000 is authorized to be available on a grant basis for Romania. “(b) Conforming Amendment.—Subsection (a) of section 515 of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–280) [114 Stat. 858] is amended by striking paragraphs (1), (5), (6), (7), and (8) and redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (9) as paragraphs (1) through (4), respectively.”
Reports on Burdensharing of Future NATO Operations
[Pub. L. 106–398, § 1 [div. A], title XII, § 1221(b)–(d)], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–328, provided that: “(b) Report on Burdensharing of Future NATO Operations.—Whenever the North Atlantic Treaty Organization undertakes a military operation, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report describing—“(1) the contributions to that operation made by each of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during that operation; and “(2) the contributions that each of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are making or have pledged to make during any follow-on operation. “(c) Time for Submission of Report.—A report under subsection (b) shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the completion of the military operation. “(d) Applicability.—Subsection (b) shall apply only with respect to military operations begun after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 30, 2000].”
European Security
Pub. L. 105–277, div. G, subdiv. B, title XXVII, Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681–839, as amended by Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, § 1000(a)(7) [div. A, title II, § 209(d)], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A–423, provided that: “SEC. 2701. SHORT TITLE.“This title may be cited as the ‘European Security Act of 1998’. “SEC. 2702. STATEMENT OF POLICY.“(a) Policy With Respect to NATO Enlargement.—Congress urges the President to outline a clear and complete strategic rationale for the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and declares that—“(1) Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should not be the last emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe invited to join NATO; “(2) the United States should ensure that NATO continues a process whereby all other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that wish to join NATO will be considered for membership in NATO as soon as they meet the criteria for such membership; “(3) the United States should ensure that no limitations are placed on the numbers of NATO troops or types of equipment, including tactical nuclear weapons, to be deployed on the territory of new member states; “(4) the United States should reject all efforts to condition NATO decisions on review or approval by the United Nations Security Council; “(5) the United States should clearly delineate those NATO deliberations, including but not limited to discussions on arms control, further Alliance enlargement, procurement matters, and strategic doctrine, that are not subject to review or discussion in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council; “(6) the United States should work to ensure that countries invited to join the Alliance are provided an immediate seat in NATO discussions; and “(7) the United States already pays more than a proportionate share of the costs of the common defense of Europe and should obtain, in advance, agreement on an equitable distribution of the cost of NATO enlargement to ensure that the United States does not continue to bear a disproportionate burden. “(b) Policy With Respect to Negotiations With Russia.—“(1) Implementation.—NATO enlargement should be carried out in such a manner as to underscore the Alliance’s defensive nature and demonstrate to Russia that NATO enlargement will enhance the security of all countries in Europe, including Russia. Accordingly, the United States and its NATO allies should make this intention clear in negotiations with Russia, including negotiations regarding adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of November 19, 1990. “(2) Limitations on commitments to russia.—In seeking to demonstrate to Russia NATO’s defensive and security-enhancing intentions, it is essential that neither fundamental United States security interests in Europe nor the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance be jeopardized. In particular, no commitments should be made to Russia that would have the effect of—“(A) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO members, including rights or responsibilities with respect to the deployment of nuclear weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other NATO members; “(B) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory of new NATO members by, for example, restricting the construction of defense infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO to deploy necessary reinforcements; “(C) providing any international organization, or any country that is not a member of NATO, with authority to delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of the North Atlantic Council or the implementation of such decisions, including deliberations and decisions with respect to the deployment of NATO forces or the admission of additional members to NATO; “(D) impeding the development of enhanced relations between NATO and other European countries that do not belong to the Alliance; “(E) establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone in Central or Eastern Europe; “(F) requiring NATO to subsidize Russian arms sales, service, or support to the militaries of those former Warsaw Pact countries invited to join the Alliance; or “(G) legitimizing Russian efforts to link concessions in arms control negotiations to NATO enlargement. “(3) Commitments from russia.—In order to enhance security and stability in Europe, the United States should seek commitments from Russia—“(A) to demarcate and respect all its borders with neighboring states; “(B) to achieve the immediate and complete withdrawal of any armed forces and military equipment under the control of Russia that are deployed on the territories of the independent states of the former Soviet Union without the full and complete agreement of those states; “(C) to station its armed forces on the territory of other states only with the full and complete agreement of that state and in strict accordance with international law; and “(D) to take steps to reduce further its nuclear and conventional forces in Kaliningrad. “(4) Consultations.—As negotiations on adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe proceed, the United States should engage in close and continuous consultations not only with its NATO allies, but also with the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and the South Caucasus. “(c) Policy With Respect to Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation.—“(1) In general.—As the United States proceeds with efforts to develop defenses against ballistic missile attack, it should seek to foster a climate of cooperation with Russia on matters related to missile defense. In particular, the United States and its NATO allies should seek to cooperate with Russia in such areas as early warning. “(2) Discussions with nato allies.—The United States should initiate discussions with its NATO allies for the purpose of examining the feasibility of deploying a ballistic missile defense capable of protecting NATO’s southern and eastern flanks from a limited ballistic missile attack. “(3) Constitutional prerogatives.—Even as the Congress seeks to promote ballistic missile defense cooperation with Russia, it must insist on its constitutional prerogatives regarding consideration of arms control agreements with Russia that bear on ballistic missile defense. “SEC. 2703. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO NATO ENLARGEMENT.“(a) Policy of Section.—This section is enacted in order to implement the policy set forth in section 2702(a). “(b) Designation of Additional Countries Eligible for NATO Enlargement Assistance.—“(1) Designation of additional countries.—Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria are each designated as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 [Pub. L. 103–447, title II] (22 U.S.C. 1928 note) and shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to section 203(d)(1) of such Act. “(2) Rule of construction.—The designation of countries pursuant to paragraph (1) as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994—“(A) is in addition to the designation of other countries by law or pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of such Act; and “(B) shall not preclude the designation by the President of other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible to receive assistance under the program established under section 203(a) of such Act. “(3) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria—“(A) are to be commended for their progress toward political and economic reform and meeting the guidelines for prospective NATO members; “(B) would make an outstanding contribution to furthering the goals of NATO and enhancing stability, freedom, and peace in Europe should they become NATO members; and “(C) upon complete satisfaction of all relevant criteria should be invited to become full NATO members at the earliest possible date. “(c) Regional Airspace Initiative and Partnership for Peace Information Management System.—“(1) In general.—Funds described in paragraph (2) are authorized to be made available to support the implementation of the Regional Airspace Initiative and the Partnership for Peace Information Management System, including—“(A) the procurement of items in support of these programs; and “(B) the transfer of such items to countries participating in these programs. “(2) Funds described.—Funds described in this paragraph are funds that are available—“(A) during any fiscal year under the NATO Participation Act of 1994 [Pub. L. 103–447, title II, set out as a note below] with respect to countries eligible for assistance under that Act; or “(B) during fiscal year 1998 under any Act to carry out the Warsaw Initiative. “(d) Extension of Authority Regarding Excess Defense Articles.— [Amended section 105 of Pub. L. 104–164, 110 Stat. 1427.] “(e) Conforming Amendments to the NATO Participation Act of 1994.— [Amended section 203(c) of Pub. L. 103–447, set out in a note below.] “SEC. 2704. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE.“It is the sense of Congress that no revisions to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe will be approved for entry into force with respect to the United States that jeopardize fundamental United States security interests in Europe or the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance by—“(1) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO members, including rights or responsibilities with respect to the deployment of nuclear weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other NATO members; “(2) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory of new NATO members by, for example, restricting the construction of defense infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO to deploy necessary reinforcements; “(3) providing any international organization, or any country that is not a member of NATO, with the authority to delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of the North Atlantic Council or the implementation of such decisions, including deliberations and decisions with respect to the deployment of NATO forces or the admission of additional members to NATO; or “(4) impeding the development of enhanced relations between NATO and other European countries that do not belong to the Alliance. “SEC. 2705. RESTRICTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.“(a) Policy of Section.—This section is enacted in order to implement the policy set forth in section 2702(c). “(b) Restriction on Entry Into Force of ABM/TMD Demarcation Agreements.—An ABM/TMD demarcation agreement shall not be binding on the United States, and shall not enter into force with respect to the United States, unless, after the date of enactment of this Act [Oct. 21, 1998], that agreement is specifically approved with the advice and consent of the United States Senate pursuant to Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution. “(c) Sense of Congress With Respect to Demarcation Agreements.—“(1) Relationship to multilateralization of abm treaty.—It is the sense of Congress that no ABM/TMD demarcation agreement will be considered for advice and consent to ratification unless, consistent with the certification of the President pursuant to condition (9) of the resolution of ratification of the CFE Flank Document, the President submits for Senate advice and consent to ratification any agreement, arrangement, or understanding that would—“(A) add one or more countries as State Parties to the ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; or “(B) change the geographic scope or coverage of the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term ‘national territory’ as used in Article VI and Article IX of the ABM Treaty. “(2) Preservation of united states theater ballistic missile defense potential.—It is the sense of Congress that no ABM/TMD demarcation agreement that would reduce the capabilities of United States theater missile defense systems, or the numbers or deployment patterns of such systems, will be approved for entry into force with respect to the United States. “(d) Report on Cooperative Projects With Russia.—Not later than January 1, 1999, January 1, 2000, and January 1, 2001, the President shall submit to the Committees on International Relations, National Security [now Armed Services], and Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations of the Senate a report on cooperative projects with Russia in the area of ballistic missile defense, including in the area of early warning. Each such report shall include the following:“(1) Cooperative projects.—A description of all cooperative projects conducted in the area of early warning and ballistic missile defense during the preceding fiscal year and the fiscal year during which the report is submitted. “(2) Funding.—A description of the funding for such projects during the preceding fiscal year and the year during which the report is submitted and the proposed funding for such projects for the next fiscal year. “(3) Status of dialogue or discussions.—A description of the status of any dialogue or discussions conducted during the preceding fiscal year between the United States and Russia aimed at exploring the potential for mutual accommodation of outstanding issues between the two nations on matters relating to ballistic missile defense and the ABM Treaty, including the possibility of developing a strategic relationship not based on mutual nuclear threats. “(e) Definitions.—In this section:“(1) ABM/TMD demarcation agreement.—The term ‘ABM/TMD demarcation agreement’ means any agreement that establishes a demarcation between theater ballistic missile defense systems and strategic antiballistic missile defense systems for purposes of the ABM Treaty. “(2) ABM treaty.—The term ‘ABM Treaty’ means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (23 UST 3435), and includes the Protocols to that Treaty, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974 (27 UST 1645).”
[Memorandum of President of the United States, Mar. 3, 2000, 66 F.R. 3851, delegated to the Secretary of Defense the duties and responsibilities of the President under section 2705(d) of div. G of Pub. L. 105–277, set out above, with such duties and responsibilities to be exercised subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State, authorized redelegation not lower than the Under Secretary level of the delegated reporting requirements, and provided that the Department of Defense was to obtain clearance on the report from the Office of Management and Budget prior to its submission to Congress.]
Limitation on United States Share of Costs of NATO Expansion
Pub. L. 105–261, div. A, title XII, § 1221, Oct. 17, 1998, 112 Stat. 2152, provided that: “(a) Limitation.—The United States share of defined NATO expansion costs may not exceed the lesser of—“(1) the amount equal to 25 percent of those costs; or “(2) $2,000,000,000. “(b) Defined NATO Expansion Costs.—For purposes of subsection (a), the term ‘defined NATO expansion costs’ means the commonly funded costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during fiscal years 1999 through 2011 for enlargement of NATO due to the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.”
Reports on Development of European Security and Defense Identity
Pub. L. 105–261, div. A, title XII, § 1223, Oct. 17, 1998, 112 Stat. 2154, as amended by Pub. L. 106–65, div. A, title X, § 1067(3), Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 774, required the submission of reports by the Secretary of Defense on the development of the European Security and Defense Identity within the NATO Alliance, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 108–136, div. A, title X, § 1031(g)(2), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1604.
NATO Enlargement Facilitation
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