§ 6901. Findings

§ 6901. Findings

(1) In 1980, the United States opened trade relations with the People’s Republic of China by entering into a bilateral trade agreement, which was approved by joint resolution enacted pursuant to section 2435(c) of title 19.

(2) Since 1980, the President has consistently extended nondiscriminatory treatment to products of the People’s Republic of China, pursuant to his authority under section 2434 of title 19.

(3) Since 1980, the United States has entered into several additional trade-related agreements with the People’s Republic of China, including a memorandum of understanding on market access in 1992, two agreements on intellectual property rights protection in 1992 and 1995, and an agreement on agricultural cooperation in 1999.

(4) Trade in goods between the People’s Republic of China and the United States totaled almost $95,000,000,000 in 1999, compared with approximately $18,000,000,000 in 1989, representing growth of approximately 428 percent over 10 years.

(5) The United States merchandise trade deficit with the People’s Republic of China has grown from approximately $6,000,000,000 in 1989 to over $68,000,000,000 in 1999, a growth of over 1,000 percent.

(6) The People’s Republic of China currently restricts imports through relatively high tariffs and nontariff barriers, including import licensing, technology transfer, and local content requirements.

(7) United States businesses attempting to sell goods to markets in the People’s Republic of China have complained of uneven application of tariffs, customs procedures, and other laws, rules, and administrative measures affecting their ability to sell their products in the Chinese market.

(8) On November 15, 1999, the United States and the People’s Republic of China concluded a bilateral agreement concerning terms of the People’s Republic of China’s eventual accession to the World Trade Organization.

(9) The commitments that the People’s Republic of China made in its November 15, 1999, agreement with the United States promise to eliminate or greatly reduce the principal barriers to trade with and investment in the People’s Republic of China, if those commitments are effectively complied with and enforced.

(10) The record of the People’s Republic of China in implementing trade-related commitments has been mixed. While the People’s Republic of China has generally met the requirements of the 1992 market access memorandum of understanding and the 1992 and 1995 agreements on intellectual property rights protection, other measures remain in place or have been put into place which tend to diminish the benefit to United States businesses, farmers, and workers from the People’s Republic of China’s implementation of those earlier commitments. Notably, administration of tariff-rate quotas and other trade-related laws remains opaque, new local content requirements have proliferated, restrictions on importation of animal and plant products are not always supported by sound science, and licensing requirements for importation and distribution of goods remain common. Finally, the Government of the People’s Republic of China has failed to cooperate with the United States Customs Service in implementing a 1992 memorandum of understanding prohibiting trade in products made by prison labor.

(11) The human rights record of the People’s Republic of China is a matter of very serious concern to the Congress. The Congress notes that the Department of State’s 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for the People’s Republic of China finds that “[t]he Government’s poor human rights record deteriorated markedly throughout the year, as the Government intensified efforts to suppress dissent, particularly organized dissent.”.

(12) The Congress deplores violations by the Government of the People’s Republic of China of human rights, religious freedoms, and worker rights that are referred to in the Department of State’s 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for the People’s Republic of China, including the banning of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, denial in many cases, particularly politically sensitive ones, of effective representation by counsel and public trials, extrajudicial killings and torture, forced abortion and sterilization, restriction of access to Tibet and Xinjiang, perpetuation of “reeducation through labor”, denial of the right of workers to organize labor unions or bargain collectively with their employers, and failure to implement a 1992 memorandum of understanding prohibiting trade in products made by prison labor.

(Pub. L. 106–286, div. B, title II, § 202, Oct. 10, 2000, 114 Stat. 892.)

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

Short Title of 2024 Amendment

Pub. L. 118–70, § 1, July 12, 2024, 138 Stat. 1487, provided that: “This Act [enacting and amending provisions set out as notes under this section] may be cited as the ‘Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act’.”

Short Title of 2020 Amendment

Pub. L. 116–145, § 1(a), June 17, 2020, 134 Stat. 648, provided that: “This Act [enacting provisions set out as a note under this section] may be cited as the ‘Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020’.”

Short Title of 2003 Amendment

Pub. L. 108–7, div. P, § 1, Feb. 20, 2003, 117 Stat. 552, provided that: “This division [amending section 7002 of this title and enacting provisions set out as notes under section 7002 of this title] may be cited as the ‘United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission’.”

Short Title

Pub. L. 106–286, div. B, title II, § 201(a), Oct. 10, 2000, 114 Stat. 891, provided that: “This division [enacting this chapter] may be cited as the ‘U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000’.”

Transfer of Functions

For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 203(1), 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under section 542 of Title 6. For establishment of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the Department of Homeland Security, treated as if included in Pub. L. 107–296 as of Nov. 25, 2002, see section 211 of Title 6, as amended generally by Pub. L. 114–125, and section 802(b) of Pub. L. 114–125, set out as a note under section 211 of Title 6.

Countering PRC Influence Fund Unit

Pub. L. 119–60, div. E, title I, § 5148, Dec. 18, 2025, 139 Stat. 1576, provided that: “(a) Establishment.—The Secretary [of State] shall establish and maintain a Countering the PRC Influence Fund Unit (in this section referred to as the ‘CPIF Unit’) in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. “(b) Personnel.—“(1) Composition.—The CPIF Unit may be comprised of a Director, Deputy Director, and additional staff as appropriate, including a Budget Analyst, a Grant Officer, a Program Assistant, and a Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Specialist. “(2) Staffing.—The CPIF Unit shall be comprised of personnel with expertise or experience in performing the following functions:“(A) Grants Officer. “(B) Program Assistant. “(C) Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Specialist. “(3) Director.—The Director of the CPIF Unit shall fulfill the following responsibilities:“(A) Identify on an annual basis specific strategic priorities for the CPIF Unit consistent with United States national security priorities and objectives. “(B) In coordination with the head of the Office of Foreign Assistance and other relevant officials of the Department [of State], coordinate, select, and approve all CPIF Unit programming, such as geographic and functional areas of focus, based on criteria that the program directly counters malign activities by the People’s Republic of China. “(C) Ensure that all CPIF Unit programming advances United States foreign policy and national security interests. “(D) Conduct oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the effectiveness of all CPIF Unit programming to ensure that it advances United States foreign policy and national security interests and degrades the ability of the People’s Republic of China or entities acting on the behalf of the People’s Republic of China to conduct malign influence operations. “(E) Ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all CPIF Unit programming is carried out in coordination with other Federal activities to counter PRC malign influence. “(F) On a quarterly basis, brief the appropriate congressional committees [Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives] on the development of annual strategic priorities and CPIF Unit project selection and implementation. “(G) Provide a written list of CPIF Unit projects approved for each fiscal year to—“(i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and “(ii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. “(4) Deputy director.—The Deputy Director of the CPIF Unit may have responsibility for policy and programming to assist the Director, particularly with respect to CPIF Unit activities handled by other United States departments and agencies. “(c) Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Activities.—The Director of the CPIF Unit may—“(1) direct monitoring, evaluation, and learning activities to assess programmatic outcomes, maximize government efficiency, and reduce the risks of fraud and waste; “(2) conduct regular research and evaluation of CPIF Unit programs and activities to improve ongoing and future activities, including by implementing a process to ensure monitoring, evaluation, and learning results are considered in funding decisions; and “(3) make available to the appropriate congressional committees the findings of any research or evaluation conducted under paragraph (2). “(d) PRC Malign Influence Defined.—In this section, the term ‘PRC malign influence’ means activities by the Government of the People’s Republic of China or an entity acting on the behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China that—“(1) undermines a free and open international order; “(2) utilizes covert or overt information operations, corruption, political interference, cultural pressure, or economic coercion and dependency to influence the political, military, economic, or other policies of a foreign country to advance the strategic objectives of the People’s Republic of China; “(3) undermines the national security, territorial integrity, or sovereignty of the United States or other country; or “(4) undermines the political and economic security of the United States or other country, including by facilitating corruption or elite capture, distorting markets, and advancing coercive economic practices, including theft of intellectual property, and engaging in foreign information operations. “(e) Termination.—The CPIF Unit established under this section shall terminate on the date that is four years after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 18, 2025].”

Ending China’s Developing Nation Status