§ 1701. Unusual and extraordinary threat; declaration of national emergency; exercise of Presidential authorities

Pub. L. 109–344, Oct. 13, 2006, 120 Stat. 1869, as amended by Pub. L. 116–283, div. A, title XII, § 1270D, Jan. 1, 2021, 134 Stat. 3978, provided that: “SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.“(a) Short Title.—This Act may be cited as the ‘Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006’. “(b) Table of Contents.— [Omitted.] “SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.“In this Act:“(1) AMIS.—The term ‘AMIS’ means the African Union Mission in Sudan. “(2) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations [now Committee on Foreign Affairs] of the House of Representatives. “(3) Comprehensive peace agreement for sudan.—The term ‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan’ means the peace agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 9, 2005. “(4) Darfur peace agreement.—The term ‘Darfur Peace Agreement’ means the peace agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and by Minni Minnawi, leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army Faction, in Abuja, Nigeria, on May 5, 2006. “(5) Government of sudan.—The term ‘Government of Sudan’—“(A) means—“(i) the government in Khartoum, Sudan, which is led by the National Congress Party (formerly known as the National Islamic Front); or “(ii) any successor government formed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 13, 2006] (including the coalition National Unity Government agreed upon in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan); and “(B) does not include the regional government of Southern Sudan. “(6) Officials of the government of sudan.—The term ‘official of the Government of Sudan’ does not include any individual—“(A) who was not a member of such government before July 1, 2005; or “(B) who is a member of the regional government of Southern Sudan. “(7) SPLM/A.—The term ‘SPLM/A’ means the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. “SEC. 3. FINDINGS.“Congress makes the following findings:“(1) On July 23, 2004, Congress declared, ‘the atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide’. “(2) On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell stated before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, ‘genocide has occurred and may still be occurring in Darfur’, and ‘the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility’. “(3) On September 21, 2004, in an address before the United Nations General Assembly, President George W. Bush affirmed the Secretary of State’s finding and stated, ‘[a]t this hour, the world is witnessing terrible suffering and horrible crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my government has concluded are genocide’. “(4) On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), calling upon the Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed militias and to apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and establishing a ban on the sale or supply of arms and related materiel of all types, including the provision of related technical training or assistance, to all nongovernmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed. “(5) On September 18, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004), determining that the Government of Sudan had failed to meet its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), calling for a military flight ban in and over the Darfur region, demanding the names of Janjaweed militiamen disarmed and arrested for verification, establishing an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to investigate violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws, and threatening sanctions should the Government of Sudan fail to fully comply with Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1564 (2004), including such actions as to affect Sudan’s petroleum sector or individual members of the Government of Sudan. “(6) The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General on January 25, 2005, established that the ‘Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law,’ that ‘these acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity,’ and that officials of the Government of Sudan and other individuals may have acted with ‘genocidal intent’. “(7) On March 24, 2005, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005), establishing the United Nations Mission in Sudan (referred to in this section as the ‘UNMIS’), consisting of up to 10,000 military personnel and 715 civilian police tasked with supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and to ‘closely and continuously liaise and coordinate at all levels with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)’, which had been established by the African Union on May 24, 2004, to monitor the implementation of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, signed on April 8, 2004, ‘with a view towards expeditiously reinforcing the effort to foster peace in Darfur’. “(8) On March 29, 2005, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005), extending the military embargo established by Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004) to all the parties to the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April 8, 2004, and any other belligerents in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur, calling for an asset freeze and travel ban against those individuals who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, are responsible for offensive military overflights, or violate the military embargo, and establishing a Committee of the Security Council and a panel of experts to assist in monitoring compliance with Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005). “(9) On March 31, 2005, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), referring the situation in Darfur since July 1, 2002, to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and calling on the Government of Sudan and all parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the Court. “(10) On July 30, 2005, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the newly appointed Vice President of Sudan and the leader of the SPLM/A for the past 21 years, was killed in a tragic helicopter crash in Southern Sudan, sparking riots in Khartoum and challenging the commitment of all Sudanese to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan. “(11) On January 12, 2006, the African Union Peace and Security Council issued a communique endorsing, in principle, a transition from AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation and requested the Chairperson of the Council to initiate consultations with the United Nations and other stakeholders toward this end. “(12) On February 3, 2006, the United Nations Security Council issued a Presidential Statement authorizing the initiation of contingency planning for a transition from AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. “(13) On March 10, 2006, the African Union Peace and Security Council extended the mandate of AMIS, which had reached a force size of 7,000, to September 30, 2006, while simultaneously endorsing the transition of AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation and setting April 30, 2006 as the deadline for reaching an agreement to resolve the crisis in Darfur. “(14) On March 24, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1663 (2006), which—“(A) welcomes the African Peace and Security Council’s March 10, 2006 communique; and “(B) requests that the United Nations Secretary-General, jointly with the African Union and in consultation with the parties to the Abuja Peace Talks, expedite planning for the transition of AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. “(15) On March 29, 2006, during a speech at Freedom House, President Bush called for a transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation and ‘additional forces with a NATO overlay . . . to provide logistical and command-and-control and airlift capacity, but also to send a clear signal to parties involved that the west is determined to help effect a settlement.’. “(16) On April 25, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1672 (2006), unanimously imposing targeted financial sanctions and travel restrictions on 4 individuals who had been identified as those who, among other acts, ‘impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities’, including the Commander of the Western Military Region for the armed forces of Sudan, the Paramount Chief of the Jalul Tribe in North Darfur, the Commander of the Sudan Liberation Army, and the Field Commander of the National Movement for Reform and Development. “(17) On May 5, 2006, under the auspices of African Union mediation and the direct engagement of the international community, including the United States, the Government of Sudan and the largest rebel faction in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Minni Minnawi, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, which addresses security, power sharing, and wealth sharing issues between the parties. “(18) In August 2006, the Sudanese government began to amass military forces and equipment in the Darfur region in contravention of the Darfur Peace Agreement to which they are signatories in what appears to be preliminary to full scale war. “(19) On August 30, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), without dissent and with abstentions by China, Russian Federation, and Qatar, thereby asserting that the existing United Nations Mission in Sudan ‘shall take over from AMIS responsibility for supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement upon the expiration of AMIS’ mandate but in any event no later than 31 December 2006’, and that UNMIS ‘shall be strengthened by up to 17,300 military personnel . . . 3,300 civilian police personnel and up to 16 Formed Police Units’, which ‘shall begin to be deployed [to Darfur] no later than 1 October 2006’. “(20) Between August 30 and September 3, 2006, President Bashir and other senior members of his administration have publicly rejected United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), calling it illegal and a western invasion of his country, despite the current presence of 10,000 United Nations peacekeepers under the UNMIS peacekeeping force. “(21) Since 1993, the Secretary of State has determined, pursuant to [former] section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 App. U.S.C. 2405(j)) [former 50 U.S.C. 4605(j)], that Sudan is a country, the government of which has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, thereby restricting United States assistance, defense exports and sales, and financial and other transactions with the Government of Sudan. “SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.“It is the sense of Congress that—“(1) the genocide unfolding in the Darfur region of Sudan is characterized by acts of terrorism and atrocities directed against civilians, including mass murder, rape, and sexual violence committed by the Janjaweed and associated militias with the complicity and support of the National Congress Party-led faction of the Government of Sudan; “(2) all parties to the conflict in the Darfur region have continued to violate the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April 8, 2004, and the Abuja Protocols of November 9, 2004, and violence against civilians, humanitarian aid workers, and personnel of AMIS is increasing; “(3) the African Union should immediately make all necessary preparations for an orderly transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, which will maintain an appropriate level of African participation, with a mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, assist in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and deter violence in the Darfur region; “(4) the international community, including the United States and the European Union, should immediately act to mobilize sufficient political, military, and financial resources through the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to support the transition of AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation with the size, strength, and capacity necessary to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, to assist with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and to end the continued violence in the Darfur region; “(5) if an expanded and reinforced AMIS or subsequent United Nations peacekeeping operation fails to stop genocide in the Darfur region, the international community should take additional measures to prevent and suppress acts of genocide in the Darfur region; “(6) acting under article 5 of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council should call for suspension of the Government of Sudan’s rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly until such time as the Government of Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks upon civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, and grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region; “(7) the President should use all necessary and appropriate diplomatic means to ensure the full discharge of the responsibilities of the Committee of the United Nations Security Council and the panel of experts established pursuant to section 3(a) of Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005); “(8) the President should direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge the adoption of a resolution by the United Nations Security Council that—“(A) extends the military embargo established by United Nations Security Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005) to include a total ban on the sale or supply of offensive military equipment to the Government of Sudan, except for use in an internationally recognized demobilization program or for nonlethal assistance necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan or the Darfur Peace Agreement; and “(B) calls upon those member states of the United Nations that continue to undermine efforts to foster peace in Sudan by providing military assistance to the Government of Sudan, government supported militias, or any rebel group operating in Darfur in violation of the embargo on such assistance and equipment, as called for in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005), to immediately cease and desist. “(9) the United States should not provide assistance to the Government of Sudan, other than assistance necessary for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement, the support of the regional Government of Southern Sudan, the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, and marginalized areas in Northern Sudan (including the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei, Eastern Sudan (Beja), Darfur, and Nubia), or for humanitarian purposes in Sudan, until the Government of Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks upon civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons; “(10) the President should seek to assist members of the Sudanese diaspora in the United States by establishing a student loan forgiveness program for those individuals who commit to return to Southern Sudan for a period of not less than 5 years for the purpose of contributing professional skills needed for the reconstruction of Southern Sudan; “(11) the Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan should be provided with appropriate resources and a clear mandate to—“(A) provide stewardship of efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement; “(B) seek ways to bring stability and peace to the Darfur region; “(C) address instability elsewhere in Sudan, Chad, and northern Uganda; and “(D) pursue a truly comprehensive peace throughout the region; “(12) the international community should strongly condemn attacks against humanitarian workers and African Union personnel, and the forcible recruitment of refugees and internally displaced persons from camps in Chad and Sudan, and demand that all armed groups in the region, including the forces of the Government of Sudan, the Janjaweed, associated militias, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, the Justice and Equality Movement, the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD), and all other armed groups refrain from such activities; “(13) the United States should fully support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement and urge rapid implementation of their terms; “(14) the May 5, 2006[,] signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement was a positive development in a situation that has seen little political progress in 2 years and should be seized upon by all sides to begin the arduous process of post-conflict reconstruction, restitution, justice, and reconciliation; and “(15) the new leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (referred to in this paragraph as ‘SPLM’) should—“(A) seek to transform SPLM into an inclusive, transparent, and democratic body; “(B) reaffirm the commitment of SPLM to—“(i) bring peace to Southern Sudan, the Darfur region, and Eastern Sudan; and “(ii) eliminate safe haven for regional rebel movements, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army; and “(C) remain united in the face of efforts to undermine SPLM. “SEC. 5. SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PEACE IN DARFUR.“(a) Blocking of Assets and Restriction on Visas.— [Amended Pub. L. 108–497, formerly set out below.] “(b) Waiver.— [Amended Pub. L. 108–497, formerly set out below.] “(c) Sanctions Against Janjaweed Commanders and Coordinators or Other Individuals.—It is the sense of Congress, that the President should immediately impose the sanctions described in section 6(c) of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 [Pub. L. 108–497, formerly set out below], as added by subsection (a), against any individual, including the Janjaweed commanders and coordinators, identified as those who, among other acts, ‘impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities’. “SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO DETER AND SUPPRESS GENOCIDE IN DARFUR.“(a) Presidential Assistance To Support AMIS.—Subject to subsection (b) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to provide AMIS with—“(1) assistance for any expansion of the mandate, size, strength, and capacity to protect civilians and humanitarian operations in order to help stabilize the Darfur region of Sudan and dissuade and deter air attacks directed against civilians and humanitarian workers; and “(2) assistance in the areas of logistics, transport, communications, material support, technical assistance, training, command and control, aerial surveillance, and intelligence. “(b) Conditions.—“(1) In general.—Assistance provided under subsection (a)—“(A) shall be used only in the Darfur region; and “(B) shall not be provided until AMIS has agreed not to transfer title to, or possession of, any such assistance to anyone not an officer, employee or agent of AMIS (or subsequent United Nations peacekeeping operation), and not to use or to permit the use of such assistance for any purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished, unless the consent of the President has first been obtained, and written assurances reflecting all of the forgoing have been obtained from AMIS by the President. “(2) Consent.—If the President consents to the transfer of such assistance to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of AMIS (or subsequent United Nations peacekeeping operation), or agrees to permit the use of such assistance for any purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished, the President shall immediately notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations [now Committee on Foreign Affairs] of the House of Representatives in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1). “(c) NATO Assistance To Support AMIS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue to instruct the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred to in this section as ‘NATO’) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at NATO to—“(1) advocate NATO reinforcement of the AMIS and its orderly transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, as appropriate; “(2) provide assets to help dissuade and deter air strikes directed against civilians and humanitarian workers in the Darfur region of Sudan; and “(3) provide other logistical, transportation, communications, training, technical assistance, command and control, aerial surveillance, and intelligence support. “(d) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this Act, or any amendment made by this Act, shall be construed as a provision described in section 5(b)(1) or 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93–148; 50 U.S.C. 1544(b), 1546(a)(1) [1547(a)(1)]). “(e) Denial of Entry at United States Ports to Certain Cargo Ships or Oil Tankers.—“(1) In general.—The President should take all necessary and appropriate steps to deny the Government of Sudan access to oil revenues, including by prohibiting entry at United States ports to cargo ships or oil tankers engaged in business or trade activities in the oil sector of Sudan or involved in the shipment of goods for use by the armed forces of Sudan until such time as the Government of Sudan has honored its commitments to cease attacks on civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons. “(2) Exception.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to cargo ships or oil tankers involved in—“(A) an internationally-recognized demobilization program; “(B) the shipment of non-lethal assistance necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan or the Darfur Peace Agreement; or “(C) the shipment of military assistance necessary to carry out elements of an agreement referred to in subparagraph (B) if the President has made the determination set forth in section 8(c)(2). “(f) Prohibition on Assistance to Countries in Violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1591.—“(1) Prohibition.—Amounts made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) may not be used to provide assistance (other than humanitarian assistance) to the government of a country that is in violation of the embargo on military assistance with respect to Sudan imposed pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005). “(2) Waiver.—The President may waive the application of paragraph (1) if the President determines, and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, that such waiver is in the national interests of the United States. “SEC. 7. CONTINUATION OF RESTRICTIONS.“(a) In General.—Restrictions against the Government of Sudan that were imposed pursuant to Executive Order No. 13067 of November 3, 1997 (62 Federal Register 59989) [listed in a table below], title III and sections 508, 512, 527, and 569 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (Public Law 109–102) [119 Stat. 2191, 2197, 2199, 2205, 2228], or any other similar provision of law, shall remain in effect, and shall not be lifted pursuant to such provisions of law, until the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Sudan is acting in good faith to—“(1) implement the Darfur Peace Agreement; “(2) disarm, demobilize, and demilitarize the Janjaweed and all militias allied with the Government of Sudan; “(3) adhere to all associated United Nations Security Council Resolutions, including Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004), 1564 (2004), 1591 (2005), 1593 (2005), 1663 (2006), 1665 (2006), and 1706 (2006); “(4) negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis in eastern Sudan; “(5) fully cooperate with efforts to disarm, demobilize, and deny safe haven to members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan; and “(6) fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan without manipulation or delay, by—“(A) implementing the recommendations of the Abyei Boundaries Commission Report; “(B) establishing other appropriate commissions and implementing and adhering to the recommendations of such commissions consistent with the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan; “(C) adhering to the terms of the Wealth Sharing Agreement; and “(D) withdrawing government forces from Southern Sudan consistent with the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan. “(b) Waiver.—The President may waive the application of subsection (a) if the President determines, and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, that such waiver is in the national interests of the United States. “SEC. 8. ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN SUDAN.“(a) Assistance for International Malaria Control Act.— [Repealed section 501 of Pub. L. 106–570, formerly set out below.] “(b) Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act.— [Amended Pub. L. 108–497, formerly set out below.] “(c) Economic Assistance.—“(1) In general.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to provide economic assistance for Sudan in an effort to provide emergency relief, to promote economic self-sufficiency, to build civil authority, to provide education, to enhance rule of law and the development of judicial and legal frameworks, and to support people to people reconciliation efforts, or to implement any nonmilitary program in support of any viable peace agreement in Sudan, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement. “(2) Congressional notification.—Assistance may not be obligated under this subsection until 15 days after the date on which the Secretary of State notifies the congressional committees specified in section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1) of such obligation in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under such section. “(d) Authorized Military Assistance.—“(1) In general.—If the President has not made a certification under section 12(a)(3) of the Sudan Peace Act [Pub. L. 107–245, formerly set out below] (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) regarding the noncompliance of the SPLM/A or the Government of Southern Sudan with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan, the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law, may authorize, for each of fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, the provision of the following assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan for the purpose of constituting a professional military force—“(A) non-lethal military equipment and related defense services, including training, controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 C.F.R. 120.1 et seq.) if the President—“(i) determines that the provision of such items is in the national security interest of the United States; and “(ii) not later than 15 days before the provision of any such items, notifies the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations [now Committee on Foreign Affairs] of the House of Representatives of such determination; and “(B) small arms and ammunition under categories I and III of the United States Munitions List (22 C.F.R. 121.1 et seq.) if the President—“(i) determines that the provision of such equipment is essential to the national security interests of the United States; and “(ii) consistent with the procedures set forth in section 614(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364(a)(3)), notifies the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations [now Committee on Foreign Affairs] of the House of Representatives of such determination. “(2) End use assurances.—For each item exported pursuant to this subsection or subsection (c), the President shall include with the notification to Congress under subparagraphs (A)(ii) and (B)(ii) of paragraph (1)—“(A) an identification of the end users to which the provision of assistance is being made; “(B) the dollar value of the items being provided; “(C) a description of the items being provided; and “(D) a description of the end use verification procedures that will be applied to such items, including—“(i) any special assurances obtained from the Government of Southern Sudan or other authorized end users regarding such equipment; and “(ii) the end use or retransfer controls that will be applied to any items provided under this subsection. “(3) Waiver authority.—Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) shall not apply to assistance provided under paragraph (1). “(e) Exception to Prohibitions in Executive Order Number 13067.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the prohibitions set forth with respect to Sudan in Executive Order No. 13067 (62 Fed. Reg. 59989) [listed in a table below] shall not apply to activities or related transactions with respect to Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, Abyei, Darfur, or marginalized areas in and around Khartoum. “SEC. 9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. “[Amended Pub. L. 107–245, set out below.]”

[Functions of President under section 6(a), (b), (f) of Pub. L. 109–344, set out above, assigned to Secretary of State by Memorandum of President of the United States, Jan. 25, 2007, 72 F.R. 5149.]

[Functions of President under sections 7 and 8 of Pub. L. 109–344, set out above, assigned to Secretary of State by section 4(e) of Ex. Ord. No. 13412, Oct. 13, 2006, 71 F.R. 61370, listed in a table below.]

[Effective July 12, 2017, and subject to certain conditions, function of President under section 8 of Pub. L. 109–344, set out above, assigned to Secretary of State by sections 6 and 12(b) of Ex. Ord. No. 13761, Jan. 13, 2017, 82 Stat. 5331, 5333, set out below.]

Codification of Sanctions Against Iran

Pub. L. 109–293, title I, § 101, Sept. 30, 2006, 120 Stat. 1344, provided that: “(a) Codification of Sanctions.—Except as otherwise provided in this section, United States sanctions with respect to Iran imposed pursuant to sections 1 and 3 of Executive Order No. 12957 [listed in a table below], sections 1(e), (1)(g), and (3) of Executive Order No. 12959 [listed in a table below], and sections 2, 3, and 5 of Executive Order No. 13059 [listed in a table below] (relating to exports and certain other transactions with Iran) as in effect on January 1, 2006, shall remain in effect. The President may terminate such sanctions, in whole or in part, if the President notifies Congress at least 15 days in advance of such termination. In the event of exigent circumstances, the President may exercise the authority set forth in the preceding sentence without regard to the notification requirement stated therein, except that such notification shall be provided as early as practicable, but in no event later than three working days after such exercise of authority. “(b) No Effect on Other Sanctions Relating to Support for Acts of International Terrorism.—Nothing in this Act [see Short Title of 2006 Amendment note above] shall affect any United States sanction, control, or regulation as in effect on January 1, 2006, relating to a determination under [former] section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)) [former 50 U.S.C. 4605(j)(1)(A)], section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)) that the Government of Iran has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.”

Burmese Freedom and Democracy

Pub. L. 112–192, Oct. 5, 2012, 126 Stat. 1441, as amended by Pub. L. 113–235, div. J, title VII, § 7043(b)(8)(A), Dec. 16, 2014, 128 Stat. 2648, provided that: “SECTION 1. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.“Upon a determination by the President that it is in the national interest of the United States to support assistance for Burma, the Secretary of the Treasury may instruct the United States Executive Director at any international financial institution to vote in favor of the provision of assistance for Burma by the institution, notwithstanding any other provision of law. The President shall provide the appropriate congressional committees with a written notice of any such determination. “SEC. 2. CONSULTATION AND NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.“(a) Prior to making the determination contained in section 1, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury each shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees on assistance to be provided to Burma by an international financial institution, and the national interests served by such assistance. “(b) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each international financial institution that the United States Executive Director may not vote in favor of any provision of assistance by the institution to Burma until at least 15 days has elapsed from the date on which the President has provided notice pursuant to section 1. “SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.“In this Act:“(1) The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Foreign Relations, Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committees on Financial Services, Foreign Affairs, and Appropriations of the House of Representatives. “(2) The term ‘assistance’ means any loan or financial or technical assistance, or any other use of funds. “(3) The term ‘international financial institution’ shall have the same meaning as contained in section 7029(d) of division I of Public Law 112–74 [125 Stat. 1209] and shall also include the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.”

[Pub. L. 113–235, div. J, title VII, § 7043(b)(8)(B), Dec. 16, 2014, 128 Stat. 2648, provided that: “The amendment made in subparagraph (A) [amending section 3(3) of Pub. L. 112–192, set out above, by inserting ‘and shall also include the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’ after ‘Public Law 112–74’] shall only take effect if the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the Committees on Appropriations by September 30, 2015 that the Government of Burma has implemented reforms, in consultation with Burma’s political opposition and ethnic groups, providing for free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections.” ]

[Functions of President under section 1 of Pub. L. 112–192, set out above, delegated to Secretary of State by Memorandum of President of the United States, Oct. 10, 2012, 77 F.R. 65455.]

Pub. L. 110–286, July 29, 2008, 122 Stat. 2632, as amended by Pub. L. 117–81, div. E, title LI, § 5106, Dec. 27, 2021, 135 Stat. 2347, provided that: “SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.“This Act may be cited as the ‘Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008’. “SEC. 2. FINDINGS.“Congress makes the following findings:“(1) Beginning on August 19, 2007, hundreds of thousands of citizens of Burma, including thousands of Buddhist monks and students, participated in peaceful demonstrations against rapidly deteriorating living conditions and the violent and repressive policies of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the ruling military regime in Burma—“(A) to demand the release of all political prisoners, including 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi; and “(B) to urge the regime to engage in meaningful dialogue to pursue national reconciliation. “(2) The Burmese regime responded to these peaceful protests with a violent crackdown leading to the reported killing of approximately 200 people, including a Japanese photojournalist, and hundreds of injuries. Human rights groups further estimate that over 2,000 individuals have been detained, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, tortured, or otherwise intimidated as part of this crackdown. Burmese military, police, and their affiliates in the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA) perpetrated almost all of these abuses. The Burmese regime continues to detain, torture, and otherwise intimidate those individuals whom [sic] it believes participated in or led the protests and it has closed down or otherwise limited access to several monasteries and temples that played key roles in the peaceful protests. “(3) The Department of State’s 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices found that the SPDC—“(A) routinely restricts freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and movement; “(B) traffics in persons; “(C) discriminates against women and ethnic minorities; “(D) forcibly recruits child soldiers and child labor; and “(E) commits other serious violations of human rights, including extrajudicial killings, custodial deaths, disappearances, rape, torture, abuse of prisoners and detainees, and the imprisonment of citizens arbitrarily for political motives. “(4) Aung San Suu Kyi has been arbitrarily imprisoned or held under house arrest for more than 12 years. “(5) In October 2007, President Bush announced a new Executive Order to tighten economic sanctions against Burma and block property and travel to the United States by certain senior leaders of the SPDC, individuals who provide financial backing for the SPDC, and individuals responsible for human rights violations and impeding democracy in Burma. Additional names were added in updates done on October 19, 2007, and February 5, 2008. However, only 38 discrete individuals and 13 discrete companies have been designated under those sanctions, once aliases and companies with similar names were removed. By contrast, the Australian Government identified more than 400 individuals and entities subject to its sanctions applied in the wake of the 2007 violence. The European Union’s regulations to implement sanctions against Burma have identified more than 400 individuals among the leadership of government, the military, and the USDA, along with nearly 1300 state and military-run companies potentially subject to its sanctions. “(6) The Burmese regime and its supporters finance their ongoing violations of human rights, undemocratic policies, and military activities in part through financial transactions, travel, and trade involving the United States, including the sale of petroleum products, gemstones and hardwoods. “(7) In 2006, the Burmese regime earned more than $500 million from oil and gas projects, over $500 million from sale of hardwoods, and in excess of $300 million from the sale of rubies and jade. At least $500 million of the $2.16 billion earned in 2006 from Burma’s two natural gas pipelines, one of which is 28 percent owned by a United States company, went to the Burmese regime. The regime has earned smaller amounts from oil and gas exploration and non-operational pipelines but United States investors are not involved in those transactions. Industry sources estimate that over $100 million annually in Burmese rubies and jade enters the United States. Burma’s official statistics report that Burma exported $500 million in hardwoods in 2006 but NGOs estimate the true figure to exceed $900 million. Reliable statistics on the amount of hardwoods imported into the United States from Burma in the form of finished products are not available, in part due to widespread illegal logging and smuggling. “(8) The SPDC seeks to evade the sanctions imposed in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 [Pub. L. 108–61, set out below]. Millions of dollars in gemstones that are exported from Burma ultimately enter the United States, but the Burmese regime attempts to conceal the origin of the gemstones in an effort to evade sanctions. For example, according to gem industry experts, over 90 percent of the world’s ruby supply originates in Burma but only 3 percent of the rubies entering the United States are claimed to be of Burmese origin. The value of Burmese gemstones is predominantly based on their original quality and geological origin, rather than the labor involved in cutting and polishing the gemstones. “(9) According to hardwood industry experts, Burma is home to approximately 60 percent of the world’s native teak reserves. More than ¼ of the world’s internationally traded teak originates from Burma, and hardwood sales, mainly of teak, represent more than 11 percent of Burma’s official foreign exchange earnings. “(10) The SPDC owns a majority stake in virtually all enterprises responsible for the extraction and trade of Burmese natural resources, including all mining operations, the Myanmar Timber Enterprise, the Myanmar Gems Enterprise, the Myanmar Pearl Enterprise, and the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise. Virtually all profits from these enterprises enrich the SPDC. “(11) On October 11, 2007, the United Nations Security Council, with the consent of the People’s Republic of China, issued a statement condemning the violence in Burma, urging the release of all political prisoners, and calling on the SPDC to enter into a United Nations-mediated dialogue with its political opposition. “(12) The United Nations special envoy Ibrahim Gambari traveled to Burma from September 29, 2007, through October 2, 2007, holding meetings with SPDC leader General Than Shwe and democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi in an effort to promote dialogue between the SPDC and democracy advocates. “(13) The leaders of the SPDC will have a greater incentive to cooperate with diplomatic efforts by the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the People’s Republic of China if they come under targeted economic pressure that denies them access to personal wealth and sources of revenue. “(14) On the night of May 2, 2008, through the morning of May 3, 2008, tropical cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Burma, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of Burmese. “(15) The response to the cyclone by Burma’s military leaders illustrates their fundamental lack of concern for the welfare of the Burmese people. The regime did little to warn citizens of the cyclone, did not provide adequate humanitarian assistance to address basic needs and prevent loss of life, and continues to fail to provide life-protecting and life-sustaining services to its people. “(16) The international community responded immediately to the cyclone and attempted to provide humanitarian assistance. More than 30 disaster assessment teams from 18 different nations and the United Nations arrived in the region, but the Burmese regime denied them permission to enter the country. Eventually visas were granted to aid workers, but the regime continues to severely limit their ability to provide assistance in the affected areas. “(17) Despite the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis, the junta went ahead with its referendum on a constitution drafted by an illegitimate assembly, conducting voting in unaffected areas on May 10, 2008, and in portions of the affected Irrawaddy region and Rangoon on May 26, 2008. “SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.“In this Act:“(1) Account; correspondent account; payable-through account.—The terms ‘account’, ‘correspondent account’, and ‘payable-through account’ have the meanings given the terms in section 5318A(e)(1) of title 31, United States Code. “(2) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—“(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; “(B) the Committee on Finance of the Senate; “(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and “(D) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. “(3) ASEAN.—The term ‘ASEAN’ means the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “(4) Person.—The term ‘person’ means—“(A) an individual, corporation, company, business association, partnership, society, trust, any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group; and “(B) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any person described in subparagraph (A). “(5) SPDC.—The term ‘SPDC’ means the State Peace and Development Council, the ruling military regime in Burma. “(6) United states person.—The term ‘United States person’ means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, juridical person organized under the laws of the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States. “SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.“It is the policy of the United States to—“(1) condemn the continued repression carried out by the SPDC; “(2) work with the international community, especially the People’s Republic of China, India, Thailand, and ASEAN, to foster support for the legitimate democratic aspirations of the people of Burma and to coordinate efforts to impose sanctions on those directly responsible for human rights abuses in Burma; “(3) provide all appropriate support and assistance to aid a peaceful transition to constitutional democracy in Burma; “(4) support international efforts to alleviate the suffering of Burmese refugees and address the urgent humanitarian needs of the Burmese people; and “(5) identify individuals responsible for the repression of peaceful political activity in Burma and hold them accountable for their actions. “SEC. 5. SANCTIONS.“(a) Visa Ban.—“(1) In general.—The following persons shall be ineligible for a visa to travel to the United States:“(A) Former and present leaders of the SPDC, the Burmese military, or the USDA. “(B) Officials of the SPDC, the Burmese military, or the USDA involved in the repression of peaceful political activity or in other gross violations of human rights in Burma or in the commission of other human rights abuses, including any current or former officials of the security services and judicial institutions of the SPDC. “(C) Any other Burmese persons who provide substantial economic and political support for the SPDC, the Burmese military, or the USDA. “(D) The immediate family members of any person described in subparagraphs (A) through (C). “(2) Waiver.—The President may waive the visa ban described in paragraph (1) only if the President determines and certifies in writing to Congress that travel by the person seeking such a waiver is in the national interests of the United States. “(3) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to conflict with the provisions of section 694 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110–161) [121 Stat. 2366], nor shall this subsection be construed to make ineligible for a visa members of ethnic groups in Burma now or previously opposed to the regime who were forced to provide labor or other support to the Burmese military and who are otherwise eligible for admission into the United States. “(b) Financial Sanctions.—“(1) Blocked property.—No property or interest in property belonging to a person described in subsection (a)(1) may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt with if—“(A) the property is located in the United States or within the possession or control of a United States person, including the overseas branch of a United States person; or “(B) the property comes into the possession or control of a United States person after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 29, 2008]. “(2) Financial transactions.—Except with respect to transactions authorized under Executive Orders 13047 (May 20, 1997) and 13310 (July 28, 2003) [listed in a table below], no United States person may engage in a financial transaction with the SPDC or with a person described in subsection (a)(1). “(3) Prohibited activities.—Activities prohibited by reason of the blocking of property and financial transactions under this subsection shall include the following:“(A) Payments or transfers of any property, or any transactions involving the transfer of anything of economic value by any United States person, including any United States financial institution and any branch or office of such financial institution that is located outside the United States, to the SPDC or to an individual described in subsection (a)(1). “(B) The export or reexport directly or indirectly, of any goods, technology, or services by a United States person to the SPDC, to an individual described in subsection (a)(1) or to any entity owned, controlled, or operated by the SPDC or by an individual described in such subsection. “(c) Authority for Additional Banking Sanctions.—“(1) In general.—The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General of the United States, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, may prohibit or impose conditions on the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or payable-through account by any financial institution (as that term is defined in section 5312 of title 31, United States Code) or financial agency that is organized under the laws of a State, territory, or possession of the United States, for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution, if the Secretary determines that the account might be used—“(A) by a foreign banking institution that holds property or an interest in property belonging to the SPDC or a person described in subsection (a)(1); or “(B) to conduct a transaction on behalf of the SPDC or a person described in subsection (a)(1). “(2) Authority to define terms.—The Secretary of the Treasury may, by regulation, further define the terms used in paragraph (1) for purposes of this section, as the Secretary considers appropriate. “(d) List of Sanctioned Officials.—“(1) In general.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 29, 2008], the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of—“(A) former and present leaders of the SPDC, the Burmese military, and the USDA; “(B) officials of the SPDC, the Burmese military, or the USDA involved in the repression of peaceful political activity in Burma or in the commission of other human rights abuses, including any current or former officials of the security services and judicial institutions of the SPDC; “(C) any other Burmese persons or entities who provide substantial economic and political support for the SPDC, the Burmese military, or the USDA; and “(D) the immediate family members of any person described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) whom [sic] the President determines effectively controls property in the United States or has benefitted from a financial transaction with any United States person. “(2) Consideration of other data.—In preparing the list required under paragraph (1), the President shall consider the data already obtained by other countries and entities that apply sanctions against Burma, such as the Australian Government and the European Union. “(3) Updates.—The President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees updated lists of the persons described in paragraph (1) as new information becomes available. “(4) Identification of information.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall devote sufficient resources to the identification of information concerning potential persons to be sanctioned to carry out the purposes described in this Act. “(e) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit any contract or other financial transaction with any nongovernmental humanitarian organization in Burma. “(f) Exceptions.—“(1) In general.—The prohibitions and restrictions described in subsections (b) and (c) shall not apply to medicine, medical equipment or supplies, food or feed, or any other form of humanitarian assistance provided to Burma. “(2) Regulatory exceptions.—For the following purposes, the Secretary of State may, by regulation, authorize exceptions to the prohibition and restrictions described in subsection (a), and the Secretary of the Treasury may, by regulation, authorize exceptions to the prohibitions and restrictions described in subsections (b) and (c)—“(A) to permit the United States and Burma to operate their diplomatic missions, and to permit the United States to conduct other official United States Government business in Burma; “(B) to permit United States citizens to visit Burma; and “(C) to permit the United States to comply with the United Nations Headquarters Agreement and other applicable international agreements. “(g) Penalties.—Any person who violates any prohibition or restriction imposed pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) shall be subject to the penalties under section 6 [probably means section 206] of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as for a violation under that Act [50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.]. “(h) Termination of Sanctions.—The sanctions imposed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) shall apply until the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the SPDC has—“(1) unconditionally released all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of the National League for Democracy; “(2) entered into a substantive dialogue with democratic forces led by the National League for Democracy and the ethnic minorities of Burma on transitioning to democratic government under the rule of law; and “(3) allowed humanitarian access to populations affected by armed conflict in all regions of Burma. “(i) Waiver.—The President may waive the sanctions described in subsections (b) and (c) if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is in the national interest of the United States. “SEC. 6. AMENDMENTS TO THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003.“(a) In General.— [Amended Pub. L. 108–61, set out below.] “(b) Duration of Sanctions.—“(1) Continuation of import sanctions.— [Amended Pub. L. 108–61, set out below.] “(2) Renewal resolutions.— [Amended Pub. L. 108–61, set out below.] “(3) Effective date.—“(A) In general.—The amendments made by this subsection take effect on the day after the date of the enactment of 5th [sic] renewal resolution enacted into law after the date of the enactment of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 [July 28, 2003], or the date of the enactment of this Act [July 29, 2008], whichever occurs later. “(B) Renewal resolution defined.—In this paragraph, the term ‘renewal resolution’ means a renewal resolution described in section 9(c) of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 [Pub. L. 108–61, set out below] that is enacted into law in accordance with such section. “(c) Conforming Amendment.— [Amended Pub. L. 108–61, set out below.] “[SEC. 7. Repealed. Pub. L. 117–81, div. E, title LI, § 5106, Dec. 27, 2021, 135 Stat. 2347.] “SEC. 8. SUPPORT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN BURMA.“(a) In General.—The President is authorized to assist Burmese democracy activists who are dedicated to nonviolent opposition to the SPDC in their efforts to promote freedom, democracy, and human rights in Burma. “(b) Authorization of Appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 to the Secretary of State for fiscal year 2008 to—“(1) provide aid to democracy activists in Burma; “(2) provide aid to individuals and groups conducting democracy programming outside of Burma targeted at a peaceful transition to constitutional democracy inside Burma; and “(3) expand radio and television broadcasting into Burma. “SEC. 9. SUPPORT FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ADDRESSING THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE BURMESE PEOPLE.“(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the international community should increase support for nongovernmental organizations attempting to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of the Burmese people. “(b) Licenses for Humanitarian or Religious Activities in Burma.— [Amended Pub. L. 108–61, set out below.] “(c) Authorization of Appropriations.—“(1) In general.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, there are authorized to be appropriated $11,000,000 to the Secretary of State for fiscal year 2008 to support operations by nongovernmental organizations, subject to paragraph (2), designed to address the humanitarian needs of the Burmese people inside Burma and in refugee camps in neighboring countries. “(2) Limitation.—“(A) In general.—Except as provided under subparagraph (B), amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be provided to—“(i) SPDC-controlled entities; “(ii) entities run by members of the SPDC or their families; or “(iii) entities providing cash or resources to the SPDC, including organizations affiliated with the United Nations. “(B) Waiver.—The President may waive the funding restriction described in subparagraph (A) if—“(i) the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is in the national interests of the United States; “(ii) a description of the national interests need for the waiver is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees; and “(iii) the description submitted under clause (ii) is posted on a publicly accessible Internet Web site of the Department of State. “SEC. 10. REPORT ON MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE AID TO BURMA.“(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 29, 2008] and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report containing a list of countries, companies, and other entities that provide military or intelligence aid to the SPDC and describing such military or intelligence aid provided by each such country, company, and other entity. “(b) Military or Intelligence Aid Defined.—For the purpose of this section, the term ‘military or intelligence aid’ means, with respect to the SPDC—“(1) the provision of weapons, weapons parts, military vehicles, or military aircraft; “(2) the provision of military or intelligence training, including advice and assistance on subject matter expert exchanges; “(3) the provision of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, capabilities, and technology, including nuclear, chemical, or dual-use capabilities; “(4) conducting joint military exercises; “(5) the provision of naval support, including ship development and naval construction; “(6) the provision of technical support, including computer and software development and installations, networks, and infrastructure development and construction; or “(7) the construction or expansion of airfields, including radar and anti-aircraft systems. “(c) Form.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex and the unclassified form shall be placed on the Department of State’s website. “SEC. 11. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL ARMS SALES TO BURMA.“It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead efforts in the United Nations Security Council to impose a mandatory international arms embargo on Burma, curtailing all sales of weapons, ammunition, military vehicles, and military aircraft to Burma until the SPDC releases all political prisoners, restores constitutional rule, takes steps toward inclusion of ethnic minorities in political reconciliation efforts, and holds free and fair elections to establish a new government. “SEC. 12. REDUCTION OF SPDC REVENUE FROM TIMBER.“(a) Report.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 29, 2008] and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, and other Federal officials, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on Burma’s timber trade containing information on the following:“(1) Products entering the United States made in whole or in part of wood grown and harvested in Burma, including measurements of annual value and volume and considering both legal and illegal timber trade. “(2) Statistics about Burma’s timber trade, including raw wood and wood products, in aggregate and broken down by country and timber species, including measurements of value and volume and considering both legal and illegal timber trade. “(3) A description of the chains of custody of products described in paragraph (1), including direct trade streams from Burma to the United States and via manufacturing or transshipment in third countries. “(4) Illegalities, abuses, or corruption in the Burmese timber sector. “(5) A description of all common consumer and commercial applications unique to Burmese hardwoods, including the furniture and marine manufacturing industries. “(b) Recommendations.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include recommendations on the following:“(1) Alternatives to Burmese hardwoods for the commercial applications described in paragraph (5) of subsection (a), including alternative species of timber that could provide the same applications. “(2) Strategies for encouraging sustainable management of timber in locations with potential climate, soil, and other conditions to compete with Burmese hardwoods for the consumer and commercial applications described in paragraph (5) of subsection (a). “(3) The appropriate United States and international customs documents and declarations that would need to be kept and compiled in order to establish the chain of custody concerning products described in paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (a). “(4) Strategies for strengthening the capacity of Burmese civil society, including Burmese society in exile, to monitor and report on the SPDC’s trade in timber and other extractive industries so that Burmese natural resources can be used to benefit the majority of Burma’s population. “SEC. 13. REPORT ON FINANCIAL ASSETS HELD BY MEMBERS OF THE SPDC.“(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 29, 2008] and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of the [sic] Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate a report containing a list of all countries and foreign banking institutions that hold assets on behalf of senior Burmese officials. “(b) Definitions.—For the purpose of this section:“(1) Senior burmese officials.—The term ‘senior Burmese officials’ shall mean individuals covered under section 5(d)(1) of this Act. “(2) Other terms.—Other terms shall be defined under the authority of and consistent with section 5(c)(2) of this Act. “(c) Form.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. The report shall also be posted on the Department of Treasury’s website not later than 30 days of the submission to Congress of the report. To the extent possible, the report shall include the names of the senior Burmese officials and the approximate value of their holdings in the respective foreign banking institutions and any other pertinent information. “SEC. 14. UNOCAL PLAINTIFFS.“(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the Sense of Congress that the United States should work with the Royal Thai Government to ensure the safety in Thailand of the 15 plaintiffs in the Doe v. Unocal case, and should consider granting refugee status or humanitarian parole to these plaintiffs to enter the United States consistent with existing United States law. “(b) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 29, 2008], the President shall submit to the appropriate Congressional committees a report on the status of the Doe vs. Unocal plaintiffs and whether the plaintiffs have been granted refugee status or humanitarian parole. “SEC. 15. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTMENTS IN BURMA’S OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY.“(a) Findings and Declarations.—Congress finds the following:“(1) Currently United States, French, and Thai investors are engaged in the production and delivery of natural gas in the pipeline from the Yadana and Sein fields (Yadana pipeline) in the Andaman Sea, an enterprise which falls under the jurisdiction of the Burmese Government, and United States investment by Chevron represents approximately a 28 percent nonoperated, working interest in that pipeline. “(2) The Congressional Research Service estimates that the Yadana pipeline provides at least $500,000,000 in annual revenue for the Burmese Government. “(3) The natural gas that transits the Yadana pipeline is delivered primarily to Thailand, representing about 20 percent of Thailand’s total gas supply. “(4) The executive branch has in the past exempted investment in the Yadana pipeline from the sanctions regime against the Burmese Government. “(5) Congress believes that United States companies ought to be held to a high standard of conduct overseas and should avoid as much as possible acting in a manner that supports repressive regimes such as the Burmese Government. “(6) Congress recognizes the important symbolic value that divestment of United States holdings in Burma would have on the international sanctions effort, demonstrating that the United States will continue to lead by example. “(b) Statement of Policy.—“(1) Congress urges Yadana investors to consider voluntary divestment over time if the Burmese Government fails to take meaningful steps to release political prisoners, restore civilian constitutional rule and promote national reconciliation. “(2) Congress will remain concerned with the matter of continued investment in the Yadana pipeline in the years ahead. “(3) Congress urges the executive branch to work with all firms invested in Burma’s oil and gas sector to use their influence to promote the peaceful transition to civilian democratic rule in Burma. “(c) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that so long as Yadana investors remain invested in Burma, such investors should—“(1) communicate to the Burmese Government, military and business officials, at the highest levels, concern about the lack of genuine consultation between the Burmese Government and its people, the failure of the Burmese Government to use its natural resources to benefit the Burmese people, and the military’s use of forced labor; “(2) publicly disclose and deal with in a transparent manner, consistent with legal obligations, its role in any ongoing investment in Burma, including its financial involvement in any joint production agreement or other joint ventures and the amount of their direct or indirect support of the Burmese Government; and “(3) work with project partners to ensure that forced labor is not used to construct, maintain, support, or defend the project facilities, including pipelines, offices, or other facilities.”

[Ex. Ord. No. 13651, § 8, Aug. 6, 2013, 78 F.R. 48794, determined and certified under section 5(i) of Pub. L. 110–286, set out above, that it was in the national interest of the United States to waive, and did waive, the sanctions described in section 5(b) of Pub. L. 110–286, subject to an exception continuing the prohibition of certain transactions.]

[Memorandum of President of the United States, Aug. 29, 2012, 77 F.R. 57479, delegated to the Secretary of State the functions and authority conferred upon the President by section 5(a)(2) of Pub. L. 110–286, set out above, to waive the visa ban under section 5(a)(1) of that Act, and to make the specified certification to Congress.]