Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1915 of 11 July 2024 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of mobile access equipment originating in the People’s Republic of China

• (134) These aims were made more specific in the Notice on an Implementing Opinion on Raising the Reliability of Manufacturing Industry released by MIIT in 2023, setting the ‘strategic goals of becoming a manufacturing power and quality power, focusing on key industries such as machinery [... so as to] form a group of manufacturing enterprises with high product reliability, strong market competitiveness and strong brand influence’ and giving specific indications as to the upstream industries that are to be supported as a matter of priority: ‘[e]ngine fuel injection system, tractor power shift system, exhaust gas after-treatment system, digital hydraulic components and integrated electric drive system for construction machinery […] and general basic components such as high-end bearings, precision gears, high-strength fasteners, high-performance seals’ ⁴⁷.

• (135) Additionally, the MIIT further detailed the GOC’s actions in a Notice on a Work Plan for the Sustained Growth of the Machinery Industry 2023-2024 ⁴⁸. According to this work plan, the GOC intends to ‘strengthen quality brand building, [c]arry out actions to improve the reliability of mechanical products, [i]mplement the foundation building projects for basic product reliability [and] organize special activities for the upward development of Chinese brands, strengthen brand publicity and cultivation in key industries such as industrial machinery […] and enhance the competitiveness of Chinese brands’. More specifically, as to construction machinery, the GOC indicates that ‘efforts will be made to improve the basic capabilities of the industry, ensure breakthroughs in’ ⁴⁹ and that it intends to ‘[g]uide enterprises to strengthen research and large-scale application of key core components such as batteries, motors, and electronic controls for new energy construction machinery.’ Finally, the GOC intends to support demand for construction machinery by developing ‘promotion support policies [and] explor[ing] the exit mechanism for old construction machinery, and support[ing] qualified regions to take the lead in implementing construction machinery registration management and exit mechanisms’ ⁵⁰.

• (136) To provide additional examples on the province level, in the Zhejiang 14th FYP on Developing High-End Manufacturing ⁵¹ the government authorities have defined a number of ‘key tasks’, one of them being to support the sector of ‘smart special equipment’, and more specifically ‘smart aerial work platforms’ ⁵².

• (137) Still on the province level, the Commission observed that Hunan has introduced specific measures to support the MAE industry and its relevant suppliers ⁵³.

• (138) On the municipal level, the Xuzhou (Jiangsu) Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government, in addition to formulating the Xuzhou Construction Machinery Development Plan (2021-2030) ⁵⁴, have set up a specific support project ‘333’ Innovation Ecosystem to Make Construction Machinery ‘No 1 Industry’ ⁵⁵. This municipal project has also been selected by the provincial authorities as a typical ‘case for reform and innovation for the construction of a strong manufacturing province’ ⁵⁶. The project aims at making Xuzhou the ‘capital of construction machinery’ by organising industry clusters through bringing together and supporting companies, including XCMG ⁵⁷, as also confirmed by the Xuzhou Municipality Party Committee Secretary: ‘Xuzhou will develop and expand the construction machinery industry with greater determination, a larger pattern and more practical measures, and strive to build an advanced manufacturing cluster with international competitiveness, providing strong support for Jiangsu to demonstrate new achievements in strengthening, supplementing and extending the industrial chain’ ⁵⁸.

• (139) Through these and other means, the GOC therefore directs and controls virtually every aspect in the development and functioning of the sector, as well as the upstream inputs.

• (140) In sum, the GOC has measures in place to induce operators to comply with the public policy objectives concerning the sector. Such measures impede market forces from operating freely.

3.3.5.   Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation: the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws

• (141) According to the information on file, the Chinese bankruptcy system delivers inadequately on its own main objectives such as to fairly settle claims and debts and to safeguard the lawful rights and interests of creditors and debtors. This appears to be rooted in the fact that while the Chinese bankruptcy law formally rests on principles that are similar to those applied in corresponding laws in countries other than China, the Chinese system is characterised by systematic under-enforcement.

• (142) The number of bankruptcies remains notoriously low in relation to the size of the country’s economy, not least because the insolvency proceedings suffer from a number of shortcomings, which effectively function as a disincentive for bankruptcy filings. Moreover, the role of the state in the insolvency proceedings remains strong and active, often having direct influence on the outcome of the proceedings ⁵⁹.

• (143) In addition, the shortcomings of the system of property rights are particularly obvious in relation to ownership of land and land-use rights in China ⁶⁰. All land is owned by the state (collectively owned rural land and State-owned urban land) and its allocation remains solely dependent on the state. There are legal provisions that aim at allocating land use rights in a transparent manner and at market prices, for instance by introducing bidding procedures. However, these provisions are regularly not respected, with certain buyers obtaining their land for free or below market rates ⁶¹. Moreover, authorities often pursue specific political goals including the implementation of the economic plans when allocating land ⁶².

• (144) Much like other sectors in the Chinese economy, the producers of the product concerned are subject to the ordinary rules on Chinese bankruptcy, corporate, and property laws. That has the effect that these companies, too, are subject to the top-down distortions arising from the discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy and property laws. Those considerations, on the basis of the evidence available, appear to be fully applicable also in the construction machinery, and therefore MAE, sector. This is illustrated by the example of XCMG in Xuzhou: ‘in order to help XCMG expand its industrial “tonnage”, since 2018, the Xuzhou Municipality has secured more than 2 000 mu of land for the construction machinery industry […] through approvals and requisitions’ ⁶³. The present investigation revealed nothing that would call those findings into question.

• (145) In light of the above, the Commission concluded that there was discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy and property laws in the sector of the product concerned.

3.3.6.   Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation: wage costs being distorted

• (146) A system of market-based wages cannot fully develop in China as workers and employers are impeded in their rights to collective organisation. China has not ratified a number of essential conventions of the International Labour Organisation, in particular those on freedom of association and on collective bargaining ⁶⁴.

• (147) Under national law, only one trade union organisation is active. However, this organisation lacks independence from the state authorities and its engagement in collective bargaining and protection of workers’ rights remains rudimentary ⁶⁵. Moreover, the mobility of the Chinese workforce is restricted by the household registration system, which limits access to the full range of social security and other benefits to local residents of a given administrative area.

• (148) This typically results in workers who are not in possession of the local residence registration finding themselves in a vulnerable employment position and receiving lower income than the holders of the residence registration ⁶⁶. Those findings lead to the distortion of wage costs in China.

• (149) No evidence was submitted to the effect that the MAE sector would not be subject to the Chinese labour law system. The sector is thus affected by the distortions of wage costs both directly (when making the product concerned or the main raw material for its production) as well as indirectly (when having access to capital or inputs from companies subject to the same labour system in China).

3.3.7.   Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation: access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise not acting independently of the state

• (150) Access to capital for corporate actors in China is subject to various distortions.

• (151) First, the Chinese financial system is characterised by the strong position of state-owned banks ⁶⁷, which, when granting access to finance, take into consideration criteria other than the economic viability of a project. Similar to non-financial SOEs, the banks remain connected to the state not only through ownership but also via personal relations (the top executives of large state-owned financial institutions are ultimately appointed by the CCP) ⁶⁸ and they regularly implement public policies designed by the GOC.

• (152) In doing so, the banks comply with an explicit legal obligation to conduct their business in accordance with the needs of the national economic and social development and under the guidance of the industrial policies of the state ⁶⁹. While it is acknowledged that various legal provisions refer to the need to respect normal banking behaviour and prudential rules such as the need to examine the creditworthiness of the borrower, the overwhelming evidence, including findings made in trade defence investigations, suggests that these provisions play only a secondary role in the application of the various legal instruments.

• (153) For example, the GOC has clarified that even private commercial banking decisions must be overseen by the CCP and remain in line with national policies. One of the state’s three overarching goals in relation to banking governance is now to strengthen the Party’s leadership in the banking and insurance sector, including in relation to operational and management issues ⁷⁰. Also, the performance evaluation criteria of commercial banks have now to, notably, take into account how entities ‘serve the national development objectives and the real economy’, and in particular how they ‘serve strategic and emerging industries’ ⁷¹.

• (154) Furthermore, bond and credit ratings are often distorted for a variety of reasons including the fact that the risk assessment is influenced by the firm’s strategic importance to the GOC and the strength of any implicit guarantee by the government ⁷². This is compounded by additional existing rules, which direct finances into sectors designated by the government as encouraged or otherwise important ⁷³. This results in a bias in favour of lending to SOEs, large well-connected private firms and firms in key industrial sectors, which implies that the availability and cost of capital is not equal for all players on the market.

• (155) Second, borrowing costs have been kept artificially low to stimulate investment growth. This has led to the excessive use of capital investment with ever lower returns on investment. This is illustrated by the growth in corporate leverage in the state sector despite a sharp fall in profitability, which suggests that the mechanisms at work in the banking system do not follow normal commercial responses.

• (156) Thirdly, although nominal interest rate liberalization was achieved in October 2015, price signals are still not the result of free market forces but are influenced by government-induced distortions. The share of lending at or below the benchmark rate still represented at least one-third of all lending as of the end of 2018 ⁷⁴. Official media in China have recently reported that the CCP called for ‘guiding the loan market interest rate downwards’ ⁷⁵. Artificially low interest rates result in under-pricing, and consequently, the excessive utilisation of capital.

• (157) Overall credit growth in the China indicates a worsening efficiency of capital allocation without any signs of credit tightening that would be expected in an undistorted market environment. As a result, non-performing loans have increased rapidly, with the GOC a number of times opting to either avoid defaults, thus creating so called ‘zombie’ companies, or to transfer the ownership of the debt (e.g. via mergers or debt-to-equity swaps), without necessarily removing the overall debt problem or addressing its root causes.

• (158) In essence, despite the steps that have been taken to liberalize the market, the corporate credit system in China is affected by significant distortions resulting from the continuing pervasive role of the state in the capital markets. Therefore, the substantial government intervention in the financial system leads to the market conditions being severely affected at all levels.

• (159) No evidence was submitted in the present investigation demonstrating that the sector of the product concerned is not affected by the government intervention in the financial system in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the substantial government intervention in the financial system leads to the market conditions being severely affected at all levels.

3.3.8.   Systemic nature of the distortions described

• (160) The Commission noted that the distortions described in the updated Report are characteristic for the Chinese economy. The evidence available shows that the facts and features of the Chinese system as described above as well as in Part I of the updated Report apply throughout the country and across the sectors of the economy. The same holds true for the description of the factors of production as set out above and in Part II of the updated Report.

• (161) The Commission recalls that in order to produce the product concerned, certain inputs are needed. When the producers of the product concerned purchase/contract these inputs, the prices they pay (and which are recorded as their costs) are clearly exposed to the same systemic distortions mentioned before. For instance, suppliers of inputs employ labour that is subject to the distortions. They may borrow money that is subject to the distortions on the financial sector/capital allocation. In addition, they are subject to the planning system that applies across all levels of government and sectors. These distortions were described in detail above, in particular in Sections 3.3.1–3.3.7. The Commission pointed out that the regulatory setup underpinning those distortions is generally applicable, MAE producers being subject to those rules as any other economic operator in China. The distortions have therefore a direct bearing on the cost structure of the product concerned.

• (162) As a consequence, not only the domestic sales prices of the product concerned are not appropriate for use within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, but all the input costs (including raw materials, energy, land, financing, labour, etc.) are also affected because their price formation is affected by substantial government intervention, as described in Parts I and II of the updated Report.

• (163) Indeed, the government interventions described in relation to the allocation of capital, land, labour, energy and raw materials are present throughout China. This means, for instance, that an input that in itself was produced in China by combining a range of factors of production is exposed to significant distortions. The same applies for the input to the input and so forth.

• (164) Sinoboom, in their observations submitted on 3 January 2024, expressed its general position that Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation should not be applied due to a lack of evidence of significant distortions in the Chinese MAE industry and it requested the Commission to accept the domestic prices and costs duly reported by Sinoboom. Other than that, Sinoboom referred to the CCCME comments concerning the existence of significant distortions. Accordingly, the Commission arguments concerning (the alleged lack of) evidence of significant distortions are listed below in response to the CCCME’s arguments.

• (165) On 3 and on 22 January 2024, the CCCME provided a number of comments, concluding that no sufficient evidence exists that significant distortions as described in Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation exist in relation to Chinese MAE sector, as well as all the input materials. Therefore, the CCCME requested the Commission to use domestic prices and costs in China, as they reflect, in the CCCME’s view, undistorted prices. To support its position the CCCME raised the following arguments.

• (166) First, the CCCME claimed that no evidence would reveal that the market of MAE in China is under significant distortions. In particular, the Report is updated and MAE is not mentioned in it, nor is it referred to in the 14th FYP or in the Notice to the 14th FYP; China opened up its financial system over the last seven years and welcomed foreign investments on its territory; China made significant progress in strengthening its IP protection; China has also added important reforms to the framework of SOEs, reducing overcapacities, increasing their competitiveness, which greatly decreased the number of allegedly ‘zombie’ companies.

• (167) This argument could not be accepted. The Commission published and placed on the file the updated Report which largely confirms the types and extent of distortions described in the Report and provides additional details on how the distortions developed and how they continue. The Commission noted in this respect, that the Chinese financial system shows the same distortive characteristics observed already at the time of publication of the original Report (see Section 3.3.7 above). The same applies to the SOE sector (see Section 3.3.2 above) where the Commission observed for instance that any alleged increased competitiveness would have frequently resulted from policy-driven corporate restructurings.

• (168) Second, construction machinery sector being part of the Chinese ‘green development’ and ‘quality of industrial products’ policy agendas does not mean that the MAE sector falls within these policies. The MAE sector in fact belongs to the industrial equipment sector.

• (169) The Commission disagreed with this view. First, MAE is frequently used in the context of construction works, in contradiction to the CCCME’s distinction between construction machinery and industrial equipment. Moreover, the Commission pointed out that the greening and industrial adjustment ambitions of the 14th FYP applies to the entirety of the Chinese economy, as apparent for example from Articles VIII or XXXIX of the 14th FYP.

• (170) Third, the CCCME questions the SOE presence in the sector. In particular, the CCCME opposes qualifying XCMG as an SOE since its shares are publicly traded and some foreign shareholders are among its shareholders. As to Liugong, the CCCME submitted that the company is not an SOE but a public company traded at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In this connection, the CCCME urged the Commission to exercise extreme care about the sources and warned against the use of unreliable information sources, such as the website seetao.com.

• (171) This argument could not be accepted. First, the Commission made reference to the observations in recitals (107)–(110) concerning the state ownership in XCMG, as well as Liugong and other MAE producers, as well as concerning other types of government control. In addition, the Commission recalled that both XCMG and Liugong, are members (XCMG even vice-president) of the CCMA which explicitly adheres to the CCP leadership and accepts business guidance and supervision by the State authorities (see recitals (110)–(111)). Consequently, irrespective of the nominal State ownership stake in these enterprises or the fact that a portion of their shares is held by foreign shareholders, they operate under the control or policy supervision or guidance of PRC’s authorities and the State is in position to interfere with their prices or costs. As to sources used to support arguments concerning the existence or absence of significant distortions, the Commission noted that while the CCCME invited the Commission use reliable sources, the CCCME itself referred repeatedly to sources which cannot be considered as reliable, such as a newspaper owned by the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP.

• (172) Fourth, irrespective of XCMG’s and Liugong’s ownership type, the CCCME argued that their limited exports to the EU would not enable any distortions to permeate into total Chinese MAE exports into the EU, as neither company is price setting player at EU level. The sampled Chinese producers, which incidentally happen to be fully US owned companies, exert a stronger influence over the price-setting in the EU.

• (173) This argument is misplaced. Under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission does not assess whether significant distortions affect price setting in the US but whether it is appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions. Consequently, this argument was rejected.

• (174) Fifth, the CCCME claimed that there is no state presence in firms allowing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs. In particular, there is no evidence that the management personnel of XCMG and/or Liugong would act under the interference of the State. Similarly, Zoomlion is a public listed company too, with private ownership including oversea investors and with Hunan SASAC owning only 14,4 % of shares, insufficient to exert any type of meaningful control able to create distortions.

• (175) This argument is based on misrepresentation, namely that ownership below the nominal majority of shares precludes the State from interfering with the business operation of an enterprise. The Commission rejected it for reasons laid out in great detail in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. above, in particular in recitals (109) to (111) and (120) to (129).

• (176) Sixth, the CCCME pointed out that participation of government officials to the inaugural ceremonies or meetings between a company’s management board and government officials do not bear the evidentiary value of any state interference. Such practices are a custom not only in China but for instance also in France.

• (177) The Commission could not accept this argument. While references to third countries, such as France, are of no relevance in the present context, the Commission noted that the links between the companies’ management in the MAE sector and between Chinese government and/or CCP members go well beyond participation in ceremonies, as detailed in Section 3.3.3 above.

• (178) Seventh, concerning significant distortions in the upstream markets, the CCCME pointed out the specifics of US investigations in which ‘adverse facts available’ are used, beside noting that the US assessment took place more than three years ago. Moreover, the CCCME contested the distortive potential of the 14th FYP by quoting its Article XXXIX and stating that the provision refers to environmental ambitions in the mining industry, as opposed to economic distortions. In this context, the CCCME emphasised that Europe is also pursuing green ambitions through its Green Deal and Fit for 55 frameworks. Penalizing environmental initiatives in a state of climate crisis would discourage such ambitions and have grave consequences for the world.

• (179) This argument could not be accepted. The Commission complemented the arguments presented by the complainant by its own research (see Sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.7) thereby demonstrating the presence of significant distortions, irrespective of the evidentiary value of the US assessment. Similarly, the distortive potential of the 14th FYP as the document in the centre of China’s complex system of government industrial planning was explained in detail in the updated Report (see in particular recitals (97) to (100) above). Taking a single quote from the 14th FYP out of that industrial policy planning system cannot change that distortive effect of the planning system. The Commission noted further that Europe’s green ambitions have no relevance in the context of an assessment carried out pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation.

• (180) Eight, the CCCME contests any connection between specific EV battery producers and/or projects with the MAE sector, pointing also out that those of XCMG’s MAE models equipped with engines by the Chinese state-owned manufacturer Yuchai are destined for internal consumption, as the engine does not meet the high standard requirements of third countries. Similarly, the CCCME submitted that the agreement between Zoomlion and the state-owned Dongfeng Motor Corporation already expired and the transaction under that agreement were in any event made at arms’ length. The CCCME further recalled that Chinese producers use various MAE parts manufactured by Western manufacturers while EU MAE producers purchase a number of parts from China.

• (181) The Commission did not accept this argument. In the context of establishing presence of state-owned companies in the upstream sectors, the specific contractual conditions between Zoomlion and Dongfeng Motor Corporation are of secondary importance. Similarly, the alleged fact that certain engines provided by Yuchai were incorporated into MAE models for the domestic market does not call into question the significant presence of SOEs among the MAE engines manufacturers. The Commission also noted that the CCCME does not dispute the complainant’s reference to strong State presence in further input markets, such as for mining and processing of ferrous metal ores (60 %), support activities for mining (97 %) or smelting and processing of ferrous metals (72 %). The Commission failed to see the relevance of the fact that Chinese producers allegedly use various MAE parts manufactured by Western manufacturers or that EU MAE producers purchase a number of parts from China.

• (182) Ninth, the CCCME argued that no evidence would exist indicating that the MAE sector benefits from public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers. The CCCME submitted in this respect that the reference in the 14th FYP to ‘emergence industries’ could in no way be translated into the existence of discrimination or distortions, not least because MAE do not represent high-end equipment. Moreover, the MAE sector does not benefit from the Belt and Road Initiative which is not aimed at industrial equipment – to which MAE belongs – but at construction sector, a sector in which there are no distortions in the CCCME’s view and the development of which is in any event independent from the MAE sector. The CCCME stated that the Chinese authorities are rather deregulating the construction sector and that while government interventions are a necessity in the sector, loans to developers are being granted at market value.

• (183) The Commission was not persuaded by this argument. As explained in detail in Section 3.3.4, the MAE sector benefits from numerous public policies, whether directly, or as part of a larger sector in which the MAE manufacturers operate (see in particular recitals (133)–(137)). Moreover, the Commission found the CCCME’s reference to the construction sector as an area in which market principles prevail highly implausible, not least given that the Chinese housing sector, i.e. a sector directly related to the construction sector, remains the focus of the regulatory action by the Chinese authorities ⁷⁶. Consequently, the Commission rejected the CCCME’s argument.

• (184) Lastly, the CCCME claimed that China made significant progress in the bankruptcy sector, as well as that China has implemented important reforms to the framework of SOEs, reducing overcapacities, increasing their competitiveness, which greatly decreased the number of ‘zombie’ companies, reducing distortions on the market.

• (185) This argument is essentially a repetition of the one addressed already in recital (167) above. The Commission noted further that rather than providing factual information concerning the alleged market-oriented reforms, the CCCME referred to a GOC statement originating from 2017, as well as to third parties’ articles which actually confirm the existence of distortions. Therefore, this argument was rejected.

3.4.   Representative country

3.4.1.   General remarks

• (186) The choice of the representative country was based on the following criteria pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation:

• — A level of economic development similar to the PRC. For this purpose, the Commission used countries with a gross national income per capita similar to the PRC on the basis of the database of the World Bank ⁷⁷;

• — Production of the product under investigation in that country;

• — Availability of relevant data in the representative country;

• — Where there is more than one possible representative country, preference was given, where appropriate, to the country with an adequate level of social and environmental protection.

• (187) As explained in recitals (57) to (58) above, the Commission issued two notes for the file on the sources for the determination of the normal value: the First Note on production factors of 21 December 2023 and the Second Note on production factors of 17 May 2024. These notes described the facts and evidence underlying the relevant criteria, and also addressed the comments received by the parties on these elements and on the relevant sources. In the Second Note on production factors, the Commission informed interested parties of its intention to select Brazil as an appropriate representative country in the present case if the existence of significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation would be confirmed.

3.4.2.   Availability of relevant public data in the representative country

• (188) The Commission could not identify a country having the same level of economic development as China having production of the product under investigation and relevant financial information readily available. As a consequence, the Commission looked for possible representative countries with production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under investigation.

• (189) The Commission identified a product in the same general category as MAE in order to select a representative country. The product is truck mounted mobile platforms. Truck mounted mobile platforms share their main components with several categories of MAEs but are built on the tailgate of a truck. The vehicles are purchased by the manufacturers and have minimal impact on the composition of the lifting part of the platform. Truck mounted mobile access equipment were sufficiently close in terms of end use, production process and input materials, and as a result SGA and profit, to be considered a product in the same general category as the product under investigation.

• (190) Sinoboom proposed to use mobile and crawler cranes produced by Liebherr-International AG in Brazil as the product in the same general category as MAE.

• (191) The Commission dismissed this proposal because cranes are material handlers, used for lifting goods instead of persons. The former are explicitly excluded from the scope of the PUI.

• (192) The Commission identified production of truck mounted mobile platforms in two countries with a similar level of economic development to China: Brazil and Serbia.

• (193) The manufacturing facility in Serbia was not operational in the IP. The Commission, therefore, selected Brazil as appropriate representative country as the country was producing truck mounted mobile platforms. The Commission examined then the availability of financial data.

• (194) With regard to Brazil, Madal Palfinger Brazil, a 100 % owned subsidiary of Palfinger GmbH, a manufacturer of MAE headquartered in Austria, produced truck mounted platforms. Financial data was available for 2022 and 2023 covering the entire IP.

• (195) Dingli and the CCCME argued that the Brazilian company, Madal Palfinger, was not a proper source for profit and SG&A because it does not produce the PUI.

• (196) Dingli also argued that Madal Palfinger was a 100 % owned subsidiary of an EU corporation.

• (197) The Commission dismissed these arguments on the grounds that there was no production of the product under investigation in any suitable country with a similar level of economic development other than Mexico and Türkiye. The EU ownership of the Brazilian manufacturer was considered irrelevant because Madal Palfinger is an integral part of the domestic industrial complex in Brazil and Latin America.

• (198) In its comments to the Second Note, the CCCME noted that if a significant part of Madal Palfinger’s business corresponded to intra-group transactions and operations, the company’s costs and profits cannot be considered reliable for the purposes of constructing normal value as these transactions were not made in the ordinary course of trade.

• (199) The Commission dismissed this argument because upon examining the detailed accounts of Madal Palfinger for the IP, it found no sign of ‘unreliable intra-group transactions’. Also, no evidence was provided by CCCME showing that a significant part of Madal Palfinger’s business consisted of this type of transactions.

• (200) The CCCME argued that Brazil currently applies anti-dumping and/or countervailing measures on hot-rolled steel, heavy plates, steel wire, steel flat bar, carbon steel tubes, stainless steel tubes, copper tubes and cold-rolled stainless-steel sheet. As steel materials represent the most fundamental MAE inputs, including hot-rolled steel sheet and plate, steel bars and hollow structural shapes, the import restrictive measures distorted the Brazilian domestic market price of these steel inputs.

• (201) The Commission dismissed this argument, as trade defence measures are not considered to distort the markets where they are applied. On the contrary, these measures are meant to restore level playing field. The mere existence of these measures cannot be a reason for the exclusion of the country as a representative country.

3.4.3.   Level of social and environmental protection

• (202) Having established that Brazil may be considered as an appropriate representative country in terms of similar level of development as China and of availability of relevant financial data, the Commission did not consider it necessary to assess the level of social and environmental protection of the other potential representative countries.

3.4.4.   Conclusion

• (203) In view of the above analysis, Brazil met the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to be considered as an appropriate representative country.

3.5.   Sources used to establish undistorted costs

• (204) In the First Note, the Commission listed the factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under investigation by the exporting producers and invited the interested parties to comment and propose readily available information on undistorted values for each of the factors of production mentioned in that note.

• (205) Subsequently, in the Second Note, the Commission stated that, in order to construct the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, it would use GTA to establish the undistorted cost of most of the factors of production, notably the raw materials. In addition, the Commission stated that it would use the statistics published by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) for establishing undistorted costs of labour ⁷⁸ and the electricity price statistics published by the Government of Brazil in the Monthly Energy Bulletin for electricity ⁷⁹ and the price of gas for industrial users in Brazil as published by the Ministry of Mines and Energy ⁸⁰.

• (206) The CCCME and Sinoboom submitted that the Commission solely provided final duty paid prices and failed to disclose the ‘raw data’ on the basis of which it established the final undistorted value.

• (207) The Commission dismissed this argument because it informed parties that it relied on GTA, a readily available source of information containing duty paid prices. Also, it was not clear what was meant by ‘raw data’ as argued by CCCME and Sinoboom.

• (208) In the Second Note, the Commission also informed the interested parties that due to the unusually large number of factors of production of the sampled exporting producers that provided complete information and the negligible weight of some of the raw materials in the total cost of production, items having negligible weight in terms of value were grouped under ‘consumables’. Further, the Commission informed that it will calculate the percentage of the consumables on the total cost of raw materials and apply this percentage to the recalculated cost of raw materials

• (209) The CCCME argued that the grouping of costs under 1 % of the total into the category of consumables is unacceptable because these are individual cost items.

• (210) The Commission dismissed this argument because in view of the unusually large number of FOPs in this case the grouping of insignificant inputs was found to be appropriate. As it concerned insignificant cost, the impact on the dumping margin calculation was considered to be minor.

3.6.   Undistorted costs and benchmarks

3.6.1.   Factors of production

• (211) Considering all the information submitted by the interested parties and collected during the verification visits, the following factors of production and their sources have been identified in order to determine the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation:

Table 1

Factors of production of Mobile Access Equipment

Factor of Production	Commodity code	Undistorted value	Unit
Raw materials	Raw materials	Raw materials	Raw materials
tyres	4011 80 10 , 4011 80 20 , 4011 80 90	7 270,47	CNY/No
other articles of cement, of concrete/of artificial stone	6810 99	12,21	CNY/kg
other hydraulic power motors	8412 29	3 580,21	CNY/No
elliptical steel with nickel hubcaps used to produce re	7326 90 10	590,03	CNY/kg
other diesel engines, stationary, P ≥ 337,5 kW, Rpm > 1 000	8408 90 10	185 696,71	CNY/No
other diesel engines/semi-diesel	8408 90 90	82 558,74	CNY/No
hydraulic cylinders	8412 21 10	2 915,39	CNY/No
parts of other fork-lift trucks	8431 20 19	65,48	CNY/kg
taps and other appliances for pipes, etc.	8481 80 99	50,88	CNY/No
transmission boxes, reducers, etc. of speed	8483 40 10	1 204,16	CNY/No
electric generators of continuous current, Pot ≤ 750 W	8501 31 20	3 904,53	CNY/No
electric motor of continuous current, 750 W < Pot ≤ 75 kW	8501 32 10	1 917,83	CNY/No
ot.elect.motor altern.cur.poli-phase 750 W < P ≤ 75 kW	8501 52 90	5 247,16	CNY/No
other elect.accumulators, of lead, weig ≤ 1 000 kg	8507 20 10	164,80	CNY/No
boards with programmable control apparatus, T ≤ 1 kV	8537 10 20	662,95	CNY/No
insulated copper wire F/winding, F/elect.use	8544 11	125,14	CNY/kg
other tubes of vulc.rubber, N/Hard.N/reinf.with fittin.	4009 12 90	216,13	CNY/kg
oth.rubber tubes vulc.reinfor. text. mat.with fitt.	4009 32 90	162,20	CNY/kg
protecting, bands wheelwork, etc. for tires of rubber	4012 90 90	25,56	CNY/kg
hot-rolled iron/steel, W ≥ 60 cm, N/Coils, E > 10 mm	7208 51	7,55	CNY/kg
hot-rolled iron/steel, W ≥ 60 cm, N/Coils, 4,75 ≤ T ≤ 10 mm	7208 52	27,62	CNY/kg
hot-rolled iron/steel, W ≥ 60 cm, N/Coils, 3 mm ≤ T < 4,75 mm	7208 53	24,52	CNY/kg
hot-rolled iron/steel, W ≥ 60 cm, Coils, 4,75 mm < T ≤ 10 mm	7208 37	4,96	CNY/kg
tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, of cast iron	7303	15,28	CNY/kg
pipes of N/alloy steel, seamless, F/coated of wells, et	7304 29 10	19,90	CNY/kg
doors, windows, etc. of cast iron/iron/steel	7308 30	131,16	CNY/kg
oth. structures and their parts, of fused iron/iron/steel	7308 90 90	31,03	CNY/kg
oth. tanks of iron/steel, 50 L ≤ C ≤ 300 L, N/Thermal Disp.	7310 10 90	48,95	CNY/kg
other tanks, etc. of iron/steel, C < 50 L	7310 29 90	63,01	CNY/kg
oth. cans of iron/steel, closed F/sold.crimp. C < 50 L	7310 21 90	47,73	CNY/kg
cotters/cotter-pins, etc. of cast iron, iron or steel	7318 24	120,22	CNY/Kg
other moulded articles, of steel	7325 99 10	81,98	CNY/kg
other moulded articles, of cast iron or iron	7325 99 90	18,15	CNY/kg
rotary positive displac.pumps, flow ≤ 300 L/min. of gear	8413 60 11	1 343,94	CNY/No
parts of self-propelled fork-lift trucks	8431 20 11	61,91	CNY/kg
parts of oth.vehic.f/mov.load, with lifts dispostive	8431 20 90	49,60	CNY/kg
rotative valves, of boxes of hydraulic direction, with pine cone	8481 20 11	990,15	CNY/No
transmission boxes, reducers, etc. of speed	8483 40 10	1 204,16	CNY/No
parts of transmis.shafts, cranks, bearings housing, etc.	8483 90	113,13	CNY/kg
electric motor of continuous current, 37,5 W < Pot ≤ 750 W	8501 31 10	162,38	CNY/No
ot. elect.motor altern.cur.poli-phase 750 W < P ≤ 75 kW	8501 52 90	5 247,16	CNY/No
accumulator chargers (electric converters)	8504 40 10	124,20	CNY/No
other static converters electric	8504 40 90	504,74	CNY/No
electric storage batteries lithium ion	8507 60	123,93	CNY/No
support with apparatus of cnc, T ≤ 1 kV, C/Proc/Bus ≥ 32 bits	8537 10 11	992,20	CNY/kg
oth.boards,panels,etc. with appar. com. num.comp.T ≤ 1 kV	8537 10 19	2 039,73	CNY/kg
oth. boards, etc. with elect. circuit switches appar.T ≤ 1 kV	8537 10 90	900,57	CNY/kg
oth.parts f/elec.circuit switches apparatus	8538 90 90	270,98	CNY/kg
ignition wiring sets and other wiring sets used in vehicles.	8544 30	220,62	CNY/kg
other electric conductors F/Tension ≤ 1 000 V, fitted with connectors	8544 42	407,62	CNY/kg
other electric conductors F/Tension ≤ 80 V	8544 49	135,35	CNY/kg
other wheels, their parts and accessories f/motor vehicles	8708 70 90	46,72	CNY/No
Consumables	Consumables	Consumables	Consumables
The Commission grouped all inputs below 1 % of the cost of production into consumables.	The Commission grouped all inputs below 1 % of the cost of production into consumables.	The Commission grouped all inputs below 1 % of the cost of production into consumables.	The Commission grouped all inputs below 1 % of the cost of production into consumables.
Labour	Labour	Labour	Labour
Hourly rate of labour81	N.A.	61,93	CNY/hour
Energy	Energy	Energy	Energy
Price of electricity, industrial use82	N.A	1,04	CNY/kWh
Price of gas, industrial use83	N.A	0,532	CNY/kWh

• (212) For some factors of production in Brazil that were reported in CNY/piece in GTA, for the calculation of the normal value the Commission used the duty paid price in kilograms, as reported as a secondary price in GTA, as this was considered to be more accurate because these FOPs vary in size, i.e. their weight can be significantly different. Prices reported in pieces did not accurately capture these differences.

• (213) The Commission included a value for manufacturing overhead costs in order to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above. To establish this amount, the Commission relied on data from the sampled exporting producers.

• (214) Following comments of Dingli, the CCCME and Sinoboom that the benchmark for engines published in the Second Note is incorrect, the Commission accepted the argument and used either the duty paid price in kilograms or the duty paid price in pieces, as reported as a secondary price in GTA.

• (215) Due to the partial application of Article 18 to Sinoboom, see recital (25), the Commission allocated costs of one reported COM Type to other COM Types using a calculated allocation ratio. Some of the costs were considered consumables.

3.6.1.1.   Raw materials and inputs

• (216) In order to establish the undistorted price of raw materials as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer (ex-works), the Commission used as a basis the weighted average import price to the representative country as reported in the GTA to which import duties were added. Transport costs were added to this price using the methodology described in recital (218). An import price in the representative country was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries excluding the PRC and countries which are not members of the WTO, listed in Annex 1 of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and the Council ⁸⁴. The Commission decided to exclude imports from the PRC into the representative country as it concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices. The remaining volumes were considered to be representative.

• (217) For a number of factors of production, the actual costs incurred by the cooperating exporting producers represented a negligible share of the total raw material costs in the investigation period- The Commission decided to include those costs into consumables as shown in Table 1.

• (218) The Commission expressed the transport cost for the supply of raw materials of the sampled exporters as a percentage of the actual cost of each raw material and then applied the same percentage to the undistorted cost of the same raw material in Brazil, in order to obtain the undistorted transport cost. This cost was added to the import price inclusive of import duties in order to establish the undistorted price of raw materials as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer.

3.6.1.2.   Labour

• (219) The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) publishes detailed information on wages in different economic sectors in Brazil. The Commission used the latest available statistics covering the year 2021 for average labour cost in the sector of manufacturing of machines, equipment and equipment for transporting and lifting loads and people.

• (220) The CCCME and Dingli requested the use of ILO statistics claiming that IBGE data is based on the results of a voluntary survey.

• (221) The Commission rejected the request because the ILO does not distinguish salary based on specific business categories; manufacturing is the most specific category that can be used. In addition, in ILO data there is no distinction based on the size of companies The IBGE survey also serves as the source of the ILO database.

• (222) The CCCME and Dingli requested the use of PIA Table 1.1 ⁸⁵ for the calculation of labour costs. claiming that Table 1.1 provides data showing headcounts of employees related to production and their salary, whereas, Table 2.2 provides general data for local units of industrial companies, including all employees beyond production related staff.

• (223) The Commission rejected the request because PIA Table 2.2 ⁸⁶ that was used for the calculation provides data on much more business specific categories, specifically in the sector of manufacturing lifting equipment.

• (224) The CCCME argued in their comments related to labour cost that in the calculation of social security contribution the Commission should only include contributions to the Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS) and the Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço (FGTS).

• (225) This claim was not substantiated. The Commission provisionally rejected the argument because there was no sufficient evidence submitted by the CCCME for limiting the relevant part of the labour costs to the contributions mentioned above, according to Commission research, there are additional contributions in Brazil ⁸⁷.

• (226) The CCCME and Dingli requested the use of exchange rates for 2021 not the exchange rates during the IP for the calculation of labour costs. The Commission relied on the exchange rate in the IP for the conversion of labour costs from Brazilian reais to Chinese yuan incurred in 2021.

• (227) The Commission adjusted the calculations accordingly.

• (228) The Commission based its calculation on labour costs from 2021, the only available data, and, in order to bring these costs to actual values in the IP, the Commission applied the labour costs index for 2016-2021, 106,24 %. The CCCME and Dingli proposed the use of a more recent indexation, covering the period from 2021 to the investigation period. Such average income index according to IBGE data is 103,1 %. The Commission accepted the proposal and adjusted the values.

3.6.1.3.   Electricity

• (229) The price of electricity for industrial users in Brazil is published by the Government of Brazil in the Monthly Energy Bulletin. The Commission used the data on the industrial electricity prices in the corresponding consumption band in CNY/kWh as published for the period October 2022–September 2023.

• (230) In their comments on the second FOP Note, the CCCME and Dingli pointed out a clerical error in the use of the exchange rate for the calculation of the electricity and gas price. The error was corrected by the Commission.

• (231) Dingli and the CCCME argued that a deduction 17,5 % VAT should be subtracted from the price of electricity and gas.

• (232) The Commission rejected this argument as VAT is a genuine cost paid by Madal Palfinger in the representative country.

3.6.1.4.   Natural gas

• (233) The price of natural gas for the industrial sector in Brazil is published by the Ministry of Mines and Energy. The Commission used the industrial electricity prices in CNY/kWh as published for the period October 2022–September 2023.

3.6.1.5.   Manufacturing overhead costs, SG&A, profits and depreciation

• (234) According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above.

• (235) The manufacturing overheads incurred by the cooperating exporting producers were expressed as a share of the costs of manufacturing actually incurred by the exporting producers. This percentage was applied to the undistorted costs of manufacturing.

• (236) The CCCME argued that the Commission should use data in the accounts of Madal Palfinger to identify the share of manufacturing overheads based on the available data.

• (237) The Commission rejected the argument and used the percentage of overheads incurred by sampled exporting producers, verified during the verification visits, for the calculation of individual margins, as this, despite of the distortions, led to much more precise results per company than relying on the general overhead costs extracted from the accounts of Madal Palfinger.

• (238) In the second FOP Note, in order to establish an undistorted and reasonable amount for manufacturing overheads, SG&A, profit and depreciation, the Commission relied on the financial data for 2023 for Madal Palfinger S.A. as published in the periodical Pioneiro ⁸⁸.

• (239) Dingli commented that the Commission should calculate the weighted average of the SG&A and profit concerning the IP using 2022 data in addition to 2023 data. The Commission accepted the claim and recalculated the SG&A and profit accordingly by using a weighted average of financial data for 2022 and 2023, in order to properly reflect the IP. Financial data covering exclusively the last quarter of 2022 and Q1–Q3 of 2023 was not available.

• (240) Sinoboom and Dingli suggested the exclusion of sales revenue relating to exports for the purposes of calculating the SG&A.

• (241) The Commission rejected the argument because it could not identify the profit and loss account related to export and domestic sales. As a consequence, the cost of domestic and export sales could not be separated.

• (242) The CCCME and Dingli argued that the Commission adjusted financial expenses of Madal Palfinger by removing the value of ‘present value adjustments’, whereas left financial income unadjusted for the value of the item of identical nature and requested that the Commission adjusts financial income of the Brazilian company by the value of ‘present value adjustments’, amounting to 11 526 thousand BRL as indicated in note 19 to the financial statements.

• (243) This claim was not substantiated. The Commission provisionally rejected it because it was considered that ‘present value adjustments’ for financial income were in the ordinary course of trade, therefore, it was lacking a sufficiently clear basis to remove them.

• (244) Dingli and the CCCME claimed that shipping costs, shipping insurance and commissions should be removed from the SG&A calculation.

• (245) The Commission rejected the proposal because it did not have sufficient information on identifying revenue and costs related to shipping, shipping insurance and commissions allowing for the separation of export and domestic sales related costs.

3.7.   Calculation

3.7.1.   Normal value

• (246) On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on the ex-works level of trade in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.

• (247) First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. The Commission applied the undistorted unit costs to the actual consumption of the individual factors of production of the cooperating exporting producers. The consumption rates provided by the sampled exporting producers were verified during the verification visit. The Commission multiplied the usage factors by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country.

• (248) Once the undistorted manufacturing cost established, the Commission applied the manufacturing overheads, SG&A and profit as noted in recitals (234)–(238). They were determined on the basis of the financial statements of Madal Palfinger S.A. as explained in recital (238).

• (249) To the costs of production established as described in the previous recitals, the Commission applied the SG&A and profit of Madal Palfinger S.A.. The SG&A, expressed as a percentage of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’) and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 21,61 %. Profit, expressed as a percentage of the COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production, amounted to 10,86 %. The Commission considered these amounts to be reasonable within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the ex-works level of trade.

• (250) Terex’s claimed that eight COM_types used were undistorted. The Commission rejected these because they were purchased through domestic channels or an intragroup sale. Further, Terex claimed that thirteen other raw materials were also undistorted. The Commission found that these were below 1 % of the cost of production, respectively, and as a consequence grouped them into consumables.

• (251) Due to the partial application of Article 18 to JLG, see recitals (24)–(28), the normal value for JLG was constructed based on information from other cooperating sampled exporting producers with regard to a number of representative product types that were sold both by other exporting producers and JLG. The Commission relied on the usage rates of these exporters together with benchmarks for Brazil.

3.7.2.   Export price

• (252) The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union through related companies. The export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits of 5 % accruing, taking into account the provisional rejection of the claim of Terex that it was operating as a singly economic entity, as set out above.

3.7.3.   Comparison

• (253) Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price at the same level of trade and to make allowances for differences in factors which affect prices and price comparability. In the case at hand the Commission chose to compare the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers at the ex-works level of trade. As further explained below, where appropriate, the normal value and the export price were adjusted in order to: (i) net them back to the ex-works level; and (ii) make allowances for differences in factors which were claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability.

3.7.3.1.   Adjustments made to the normal value

• (254) As explained in recital (246), the normal value was established at the ex-works level of trade by using costs of production together with amounts for SG&A and for profit, which were considered to be reasonable for that level of trade. Therefore, no adjustments were necessary to net the normal value back to the ex-works level.

3.7.3.2.   Adjustments made to the export price

• (255) In order to net the export price back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of customs duty, other import charges, freight, handling loading and ancillary expenses, as well as packing expenses,

• (256) Allowances were made for the following factors affecting prices and price comparability: credit cost, warranty and guarantee expenses, expenses for technical assistance and services, bank charges and commissions.

• (257) The Commission, where appropriate, also deducted, in accordance with Article 2(9), SG&A and a profit of 5 %, which was considered reasonable for unrelated importers (see recital (252) above).

• (258) Terex China claimed that it should be treated as a single economic entity together with other entities pertaining to the same corporate group (‘Terex Corporation’), as far as the calculation of the normal value is concerned. According to the company, Terex China serves as the contract manufacturer of Terex Global Gmbh (TGG), registered in Switzerland. Terex China procuring the raw materials and manufacturing products on behalf of TGG. The group applies Cost Plus Appropriate Mark-up in lieu of profits to contract manufacturers, the mark-up rate is 6 %. According to TGG, companies of the various Terex entities involved in the production and sale of MAE operate as a single economic entity, despite being legally distinct.

• (259) The group manages its global production centrally based on the sales forecast input from the various affiliates responsible for regional sales. Further, Terex China has no selling expenses related to EU sales because the group affiliates in the Union, operate as the sales department for EU sales. Finally, Terex China has no direct contacts with EU customers since the sales in the Union are organised and executed by its group affiliates.

• (260) The Commission reviewed the claim and the evidence on file. According to the Manufacturing Services and Supply Agreement between Terex China and TGG, Terex China refunds TGG in case of products not meeting the necessary specifications. Moreover, any disputes arising out of or in connection to the Agreement, shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, USA. Further, the purchase price for the products supplied by Terex to TGG or its affiliates are based on arm’s length amount as agreed to between the Parties from time to time. The Commission considered that these elements show competing interests.

• (261) In addition, the Commission found that other producers than Terex China also sold via TGG.

• (262) With regard to the relationship between Terex China and TGG on one hand, and Genie France, a related company, and Terex Italia on the other hand, their contracts contain payment of an arm’s length mark-up in the range of 5–10 %, a clause providing that the parties are acting as independent contractors, a clause for choice of law and jurisdiction in case of dispute and a clause defining the relationship between the parties as ‘seller and buyer’.

• (263) In view of the above elements, the claim of the various Terex entities involved in the production and sale of MAE operating as a single economic entity was provisionally rejected.

3.7.4.   Dumping margins

• (264) For the sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

• (265) On this basis, the provisional weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company	Provisional dumping margin
Hunan Sinoboom Intelligent Equipment Co., Ltd.	55,3  %
Oshkosh JLG (Tianjin) Equipment Technology Co., Ltd.	54,5  %
Terex (Changzhou) Machinery Co., Ltd.	41,1  %
Zhejiang Dingli Machinery Co., Ltd.	45,1  %

• (266) As explained in recitals (24) to (27), in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, for Sinoboom and JLG, the Commission made use of the facts available. For Sinoboom, as regards their purchased input materials, the corresponding benchmark prices of these input materials were used to determine the normal value.

• (267) Regarding JLG, the due to the partial application of Article 18, as illustrated in recital (24) above, the normal value was constructed based on information calculated for other cooperating sampled exporting producers. The Commission relied on the usage rates of these exporters together with benchmarks for Brazil. The constructed normal value was then compared with the export prices of JLG. In the case of Sinoboom, due to the partial application of Article 18 (recitals (25) and (26) above), the costs of one COM Type reported by the company were allocated to other COM Types using a calculated allocation ratio (please refer to recital (215)). Thus, the calculated dumping margins for JLG and Sinoboom amounted to 54,5 % and 55,3 % respectively. The Commission calculated the weighted average dumping margin, in accordance with Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation on the basis of the margins of the sampled exporting producers, but disregarding the margins established in the circumstances referred to in Article 18 of the basic Regulation.

• (268) On this basis, the provisional dumping margin of the cooperating exporting producers outside the sample is 42 %.

• (269) For all other exporting producers in the PRC, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total imports from the country concerned to the Union in the IP, that were established on the basis of Eurostat.

• (270) The level of cooperation in this case is high because the exports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted more than 90 % of the total imports during the IP. On this basis, the Commission decided to establish the dumping margin for non-cooperating exporting producers at the level of the sampled company with the highest dumping margin.

• (271) The provisional dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company	Provisional dumping margin
Other cooperating companies	42 %
All other companies	55,3  %

4. INJURY

4.1.   Units and sections of the units

• (272) The product under investigation defined in Section 2 includes both units (whole machines) and sections of the units. However, the below analysis of the different injury indicators only focuses on units, and not on individual sections. Although the Union industry produced both units and sections during the period considered, it did not sell nor purchase sections separately. The sections produced are always used for a specific machine type, normally produced on order. Hence, the injury analysis was provisionally only based on units.

4.2.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

• (273) According to the complainant, during the investigation period, the like product was manufactured by 22 producers in the Union. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

• (274) The total Union production during the investigation period was established at around 35 000 units (complete machines). The Commission established the figure on basis of all the available information concerning the Union industry, namely the verified questionnaire reply received from the complainant, where possible crosschecked with the questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.

• (275) As indicated in Section 1.5.1, three Union producers were selected for the sample, representing 56 % of the total Union production of the like product.

4.3.   Union consumption

• (276) The Commission established the Union consumption on basis of:

• — the sales data concerning the Union industry’s sales on the Union market, provided by CMAE, crosschecked with the verified data of the sampled Union producers;

• — the sales quantities provided by the cooperating exporting producers for imports from the PRC ⁸⁹; and

• — the imports from all other third countries, as recorded in the Comext database of Eurostat ⁹⁰.

• (277) Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 2

Union consumption (in units)

	2020	2021	2022	IP
Total Union consumption	28 481	45 725	58 226	63 086
Index	100	161	204	222
Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers, data provided by the cooperating exporting producers, Eurostat.	Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers, data provided by the cooperating exporting producers, Eurostat.	Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers, data provided by the cooperating exporting producers, Eurostat.	Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers, data provided by the cooperating exporting producers, Eurostat.	Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers, data provided by the cooperating exporting producers, Eurostat.

• (278) In the period considered, the Union consumption increased by 122 %.

4.4.   Imports from the country concerned

4.4.1.   Volume and market share of the imports from the country concerned