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Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1915 of 11 July 2024 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of mobile access equipment originating in the People’s Republic of China

Type Implementing Regulation
Publication 2024-07-12
State In force
Text As published
Department European Commission, TRADE
Source EUR-Lex
articles 4

This is the act as published. Later amendments are not folded into the text below: each one is a separate act in this repository and an entry in this law's history.

Reform history JSON API
  • (279) Imports from the PRC were based on the data provided by the cooperating exporting producers that were considered to represent 100 % of imports to the Union.
  • (280) The market share of the Chinese imports was established by comparing import volumes with the Union market consumption as per Table 2 above.
  • (281) Imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Import volume and market share
2020 2021 2022 IP
Volume of imports from the PRC (units) 10 401 23 124 31 233 33 946
Index 100 222 300 326
Market share (%) 37 51 54 54
Index 100 138 147 147
Source: Data provided by the cooperating exporting producers. Source: Data provided by the cooperating exporting producers. Source: Data provided by the cooperating exporting producers. Source: Data provided by the cooperating exporting producers. Source: Data provided by the cooperating exporting producers.
  • (282) During the period considered, the volume of imports of the product concerned from the PRC increased by 226 % and their market share went from 37 % in 2020 to 54 % in the IP, representing an increase of 47 %.
4.4.2.   Prices of the imports from the country concerned: price undercutting and price suppression
  • (283) The Commission established the prices of imports based on data provided by the cooperating exporting producers that were considered close to 100 % of imports to the Union.
  • (284) The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 4

Import price (in EUR/unit)
2020 2021 2022 IP
Price of imports from the PRC (per unit) 11 149 12 257 17 502 17 879
Index 100 110 157 160
Source: Data provided by the cooperating exporting producers. Source: Data provided by the cooperating exporting producers. Source: Data provided by the cooperating exporting producers. Source: Data provided by the cooperating exporting producers. Source: Data provided by the cooperating exporting producers.
  • (285) In the period considered, the average price of the Chinese imports increased by 60 %, reaching a level of 17 879 EUR/unit in the IP.
  • (286) The Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing:
  • — the weighted average sales prices per product type of the three sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and
  • — the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the sampled Chinese exporting producers to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) basis, with appropriate adjustments for customs duties and post-importation costs.
  • (287) The price comparison was made for the same product type for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ theoretical turnover during the investigation period. On basis of the above, a weighted average undercutting margin of 13,4 % was established for the dumped Chinese imports on the Union market.
  • (288) In any event, regardless of the existence of price undercutting, the Commission provisionally established that the Chinese imports significantly suppressed the prices of the Union industry, which had to sell at below costs during the IP. The underselling margins per sampled exporting producer are significant.

4.5.   Economic situation of the Union industry

4.5.1.   General remarks
  • (289) In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.
  • (290) As mentioned in Section 1.5.1, sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry.
  • (291) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on basis of data contained in the complaint and the complainant’s reply to a specific questionnaire. The data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.
  • (292) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity and magnitude of the dumping margin.
  • (293) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.
4.5.2.   Macroeconomic indicators
4.5.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation
  • (294) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation
2020 2021 2022 IP
Production volume (units) 17 743 26 427 32 349 35 402
Index 100 149 182 200
Production capacity (units) 70 732 70 762 73 152 75 111
Index 100 100 103 106
Capacity utilisation (%) 25 37 44 47
Index 100 149 176 188
Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers.
  • (295) In the period considered, the production of the Union industry increased by 100 % achieving more than 35 000 units in the IP. The increase in the production positively impacted the capacity utilisation, which increased by 88 % over the period considered.
4.5.2.2.   Sales volume and market share
  • (296) The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Sales volume and market share
2020 2021 2022 IP
Sales volume on the Union market (units) 14 675 18 214 22 048 23 794
Index 100 124 150 162
Market share (%) 52 40 38 38
Index 100 77 73 73
Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers.
  • (297) In the period considered, the sales volumes of the Union producers of the product concerned increased by 62 %. However, since they were not able to benefit fully from the increase in Union consumption of 122 % (see Table 2), the market share of the Union producers decreased by 27 %.
4.5.2.3.   Growth
  • (298) In the period considered, the consumption of the product concerned increased 122 %. In the same period, the market share of the Union industry decreased by around 27 %, and the market share of the imports from the PRC of the product concerned increased by 47 %. Although the production and sales of the Union industry increased in absolute terms, they were not able to benefit from the increased Union consumption in terms of market share. To the contrary, the Union industry lost market share and was thus not even able to maintain its position.
4.5.2.4.   Employment and productivity
  • (299) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Employment and productivity
2020 2021 2022 IP
Number of employees 2 215 2 624 3 027 3 099
Index 100 118 137 140
Productivity (unit/FTE) 8 10 11 11
Index 100 126 133 143
Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies by the sampled Union producers.
  • (300) In the period considered, employment in the Union increased by 40 %. In combination with the increase in productivity (of 43 %), the production in the same period increased by 100 % (see Table 5).
4.5.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin
  • (301) All dumping margins provisionally established (see Section 3.6.4) were significantly above de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial given the volume and prices of imports from the country concerned.
4.5.3.   Microeconomic indicators
  • (302) Two of the sampled Union producers were part of the same group. Therefore, the sample consisted of only two different economic operators. The Commission thus accepted the request of the sampled Union producers to provide the information in range for reasons of confidentiality.
4.5.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices
  • (303) The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Sales prices in the Union
2020 2021 2022 IP
Average price in the Union in ranges (EUR/unit) (30 000 –35 000 ) (30 000 –35 000 ) (30 000 –35 000 ) (35 000 –40 000 )
Index 100 102 105 116
Cost of production in ranges (EUR/unit) (30 000 –35 000 ) (30 000 –35 000 ) (35 000 –40 000 ) (35 000 –40 000 )
Index 100 101 114 114
Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.
  • (304) The table above shows the evolution of the unit sales price on the Union market as compared to the corresponding cost of production during the period considered.
  • (305) Over the period considered, the prices of the factors of production increased substantially. The costs increase of more than 30 % concerned mainly the prices of steel, of semi-conductors and of energy. Since the production utilisation increased from a very low level in 2020 (25 %) to 47 % in the IP, and since the fixed costs remained the same, the overall costs increased to a lesser extent.
  • (306) In parallel, the volume of imports of MAE from China increased between 2020 and 2022 by 200 % (see Table 3) at prices significantly below the Union industry prices (see Table 4). This price pressure prevented the Union industry from increasing prices to reflect the increasing costs. As the result, the Union industry was forced to set its prices at an unsustainably low level in order not to lose too much market share. Therefore, although not directly visible from Table 8 because of the ranges, on average, the costs of production were higher than the sales prices throughout the whole period. Accordingly, in the period considered, the Union industry continued operating at losses (see Table 11), even in a situation of a booming market and increasing sales. In normal market conditions, i.e. in the absence of strongly increasing imports at unfairly low prices, the Union industry would have been able to benefit and return to a profitable situation.
  • (307) The Union industry’s average unit sales prices to unrelated customers in the Union increased by 16 % and the average cost of production of the Union industry increased by 14 % over the period considered. The major factor that influenced the increase of the cost of production was the increase in the raw material price over the period considered. On average, the costs of production were higher than the sales prices over the period considered.
4.5.3.2.   Labour costs
  • (308) The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Average labour costs per employee
2020 2021 2022 IP
Average labour costs per employee (EUR) (50 000 –60 000 ) (50 000 –60 000 ) (60 000 –70 000 ) (60 000 –70 000 )
Index 100 98 102 107
Source: Questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers.
  • (309) During the period considered, the average labour costs per employee went up by 7 %.
4.5.3.3.   Inventories
  • (310) Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Inventories
2020 2021 2022 IP
Closing stocks (tonnes) (1 000 –1 500 ) (1 000 –1 500 ) (1 000 –1 500 ) (1 500 –2 000 )
Index 100 78 102 130
Closing stock as a percentage of production (%) 5 –10 0 –5 0 –5 5 –10
Index 100 52 56 65
Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.
  • (311) During the period considered the level of closing stock varied. In the IP, it was 30 % higher compared to 2020. Closing stock as a percentage of production decreased by 35 % over the period considered.
  • (312) Most product types of the like product are produced by the Union industry based on specific orders of the users. Therefore, stocks are not considered to be a meaningful injury indicator for this industry.
4.5.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital
  • (313) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments
2020 2021 2022 IP
Profitability [(–5  %)–0  %] [(–5  %)–0  %] [(–15  %)–(–10  %)] [(–5  %)–0  %]
Index 100 127 –85 141
Cash flow (1 000 ) [40 000 –50 000 ] [20 000 –30 000 ] [(–30 000 )–(–20 000 )] [–30 000 –(–20 000 )]
Index 100 53 –49 –46
Investments (1 000 ) [30 000 –40 000 ] [10 000 –20 000 ] [10 000 –20 000 ] [10 000 –20 000 ]
Index 100 43 42 36
Return on investments [5  %–10  %] [35  %–40  %] [(–45  %)–(–40  %)] [(–35  %)–(–30  %)]
Index 100 408 – 424 – 330
Source: Questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: Questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers.
  • (314) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.
  • (315) In 2020 the financial situation of the Union industry was already affected by the rise in Chinese imports which started in 2018. As explained in Section 4.5.3.1, the price pressure from unfair imports on the Union market prevented the Union industry from increasing prices to reflect the increasing costs. As the result, the Union industry was forced to set its prices at an unsustainably low level to maintain sufficient volume. Since the Union industry could not, under the pressure of the low-priced Chinese imports, increase its production, this reflected in a low-capacity utilisation, which increased from 25 % in 2020 to 47 % in the IP, but remained under 50 % compared to the capacity utilisation of the sampled Chinese exporting producers which was, depending on the company and the year, between 53 % to 99 %.
  • (316) Although in 2021, the profitability improved by 27 %, the Union industry remained loss making. In 2022, the financial situation of the Union industry worsened, as profitability went down by 185 %. The drop in profitability in 2022 was caused by the abnormal increase in costs of production driven by increased raw material prices in combination with the fact that sales prices were based fixed for a certain period of time. Therefore, the sales prices could not be increased accordingly which translated in heavy losses. Therefore, despite the expanding market and the massive increase in consumption, the Union industry was not able to keep up with the continuous cost increase. This situation worsened in 2022. As the result, during the period considered overall profitability increased but it remained negative in the investigation period – between [(– 5 %)–0 %]. Cash flow dropped considerably (by 146 %) and in parallel, the level of yearly investments decreased by 64 % over the period considered. The return on investments followed the same downward trend, it decreased during the period considered by 440 %.
4.5.3.5.   Conclusion on injury
  • (317) The year 2020 which was taken as the reference point for the analysis of trends was according to the complainant strongly impacted by the pandemic situation and the Union industry’s activities were the lowest over the last decade. Therefore, the increase of indicators from 2020 was not an indication for a growing industry but rather meant a recovery back to previous level of activities.
  • (318) Indeed, the data submitted for 2019 by the complainant confirmed that in 2020, the Union industry’s production and sales were exceptionally low – in 2019, the volume of production of the Union producers was similar to the level of the production in the IP, and the sales of the Union industry on the Union market between 2019 and the IP decreased by 14 %. However, as the reference year 2020 was impacted by the pandemic situation, a number of indicators showed an increase in the period considered. In particular, the production of the Union industry increased by 100 % and its sales on the Union market increased by 62 %.
  • (319) Despite the considerable increase in Union consumption of the product concerned during the period considered (by 122 %), the Union industry was not able to increase its sales correspondingly in order to at least maintain its market share. On the contrary, due to the Chinese imports at significant dumped prices during the period considered the market share of the Union industry decreased from 52 % to 38 %. In parallel, the volume of the Chinese imports increased substantially, by 226 %, in the same period and their market share increased from 37 % to 54 %. In addition to the losses incurred by the Union industry throughout the period considered, other injury indicators like cash flow, level of investments and return of investments developed negatively as well.
  • (320) On basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

5. CAUSATION

  • (321) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could, at the same time, have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the country concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. The Commission examined imports from third countries and the export performance of the Union industry. No other factors that could have caused the injury to the Union industry was known to exist.

5.1.   Effects of dumped imports

  • (322) As set out in Section 4.3.1, the import volumes of the product concerned from the PRC increased significantly over the period considered. Prices of imports also undercut the Union industry’s prices by 13,4 % on average. The Union industry was therefore unable to maintain or increase its market share and benefit from the increased consumption of the product concerned on the Union market during the period considered. This situation had a serious impact on the Union industry’s profitability, which was negative throughout the whole period considered.
  • (323) Therefore, the Commission provisionally concluded that those dumped imports had a negative impact on the situation of the Union industry.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

  • (324) The Commission also examined whether other known factors, individually or collectively, were capable of attenuating the causal link established between the dumped imports to the effect that such link would no longer be genuine and substantial.
5.2.1.   Imports from other countries
  • (325) The Commission established the imports from other third countries on basis of Eurostat data. Since the data for these imports under some of the CN codes were only reported in tonnes (and not in units), the Commission could not establish volumes and prices per unit, like it was done for the Union industry and for imports from China, based on data provided by the sampled exporting producers. Therefore, the volumes and prices of imports from other third countries could not be directly compared with those of the Union industry and imports from China and were, hence, only indicative, though the trends based on these volumes and prices over the period considered were accurate. To establish the market shares, however, the Commission used a conversion factor from tonnes into units based on the data of the cooperating Chinese exporting producers 91. As regards prices the Commission did not consider this as accurate, as in view of the differences in product mix the use of a conversion factor would not lead to accurate prices per unit.
  • (326) Apart from the PRC, the product concerned was imported to the Union from several other countries which collectively accounted for 8 % of the market share in the IP:

Table 12

Imports from other countries
Country 2020 2021 2022 IP
United Kingdom Volume (tonnes) 0 5 291 6 827 8 497
Index — 100 129 161
Market share (%) 0 2 2 3
Average price (EUR/tonne) 0 5,90 5,22 5,76
Index — 100 89 98
United States Volume (tonnes) 9 104 8 164 7 985 8 052
Index 100 90 88 88
Market share (%) 7 4 3 3
Average price (EUR/tonne) 2,41 2,18 2,94 2,35
Index 100 122 122 98
Other third countries Volume (tonnes) 7 540 7 986 9 362 9 586
Index 100 106 124 127
Market share (%) 5 4 3 3
Average price (EUR/tonne) 5,76 5,67 5,88 6,01
Index 100 102 102 104
Total of all third countries except the PRC Volume (tonnes) 16 643 21 442 24 174 26 135
Index 100 129 145 157
Market share (%) 12 10 8 8
Average price (EUR/tonne) 3,93 4,40 4,72 4,80
Index 100 120 120 122
Source: Eurostat. Source: Eurostat. Source: Eurostat. Source: Eurostat. Source: Eurostat. Source: Eurostat.
  • (327) Apart from China, the two next biggest importing countries to the Union were the United States and the Union Kingdom, with each having a market share of 3 % in the IP. The rest of the countries (except China) together represented in the IP a market share of around 3 %. The prices of imports from these countries increased during the period considered by 22 %.
  • (328) In absolute terms, the level of imports from total of all third countries except the PRC increased by 57 %, however, due to the increased consumption on the Union market, the market share of all of these countries decreased by 4 percentage points during the period considered, and were far lower than the market share of Chinese imports.
  • (329) The Commission therefore provisionally concluded that imports from other countries have not contributed to the injury suffered by the Union industry.
5.2.2.   Export performance of the Union industry
  • (330) The Commission assessed the export volume based on the information submitted by CMAE. Export prices were determined based on the questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.
  • (331) The volume and prices of exports of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 13

Export performance of the Union industry
2020 2021 2022 IP
Export volume (units) 4 037 8 303 10 127 11 658
Index 100 206 251 288
Average price (EUR/tonne) (30 000 –35 000 ) (35 000 –40 000 ) (30 000 –35 000 ) (30 000 –35 000 )
Index 100 106 103 93
Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers. Source: CMAE, questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers.
  • (332) In the period considered, the Union industry increased its export volume by 188 %. However, as mentioned in Section 4.4.3.5, in 2020 the Union industry was strongly impacted by the pandemic situation which impacted its level of exports. Before the pandemic, their level of exports was similar to the level achieved in 2021.
  • (333) The average export prices decreased, in the period considered, by 7 %, and they were, in the IP, below the average cost of production. However, these export prices per unit varied from around 13 000 EUR/unit to 49 000 EUR/unit.
  • (334) Overall, the investigation revealed that the majority of the export sales of the sampled Union producers were profitable. Hence, it was concluded that the export performance of the Union industry was positive and could not contribute to the injury suffered by the Union industry.
5.2.3.   Electric and hybrid machines
  • (335) As mentioned in Section 2.4.1 above, the CCCME argued that the electrical and hybrid MAE should be excluded from the product scope. It submitted that the Union producers traditionally focused on conventional MAE while the Chinese producers focused on exporting electrical MAE. Furthermore, the CCCME argued that some of the models were not produced by the Union producers (see recital (39)) and, therefore, imports of these MAE models from China and of the electrical MAE in general could not have affected this market segment and could not have caused any injury to the Union producers.
  • (336) The Commission disagreed. The comparison between the product types imported by the sampled exporting producers and the product types sold by the Union industry showed that, in general terms, more than 90 % of the product types sold by the sampled Union producers were comparable with the product types imported from China. Furthermore, in the IP, more than 60 % of the sales of the sampled Union producers on the Union market concerned electrical MAE. The Commission further noted that sales of the hybrid MAE by both the Union industry and the Chinese exporting producers were negligeable. Therefore, the electrical MAE sold by the Union producers competed with the product types sold by the Chinese exporting producers.
  • (337) In addition, the Commission considered that the effect of imports of relatively cheaper electrical machines, such us for instance of electrical scissors, was that it became economically less viable for the Union producers to compete with certain product types. Therefore, the fact that certain product types were produced less could not lead to the conclusion that these product types did not compete with the imports from China but was rather the effect of the dumped imports.
  • (338) Therefore, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports of the electrical MAE from China contributed to the injury caused to the Union industry.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

  • (339) The Commission distinguished and separated the effect of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. The effect of these other factors, if any, on the Union’s industry performance were however limited.
  • (340) In light of the above considerations, the Commission provisionally established a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from China, which was not attenuated by the factors mentioned above.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

  • (341) To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.
  • (342) In the present case, the complainant claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation.
  • (343) At this stage, the Commission provisionally established that the conditions for applying Article 7(2a) are not present. The Commission will continue investigating the matter at definitive stage.
  • (344) Therefore, at the provisional stage, the provisional anti-dumping duties were set in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. Thus, in order to conduct the assessment on the appropriate level of measures, the Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Then it examined whether the dumping margin of sampled exporting producers would be higher than the injury margin.

6.1.   Examination of the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry

  • (345) The injury would be removed if the Union industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.
  • (346) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the PRC, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (‘R & D’) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.
  • (347) The complainant submitted that, based on the prior performance of the Union industry, under normal market conditions a reasonable profit of 10,2 % should be considered. This level of the target profit was, however, not evidenced nor supported by the findings of the investigation.
  • (348) Information relating to the establishment of the normal profit was additionally included in the questionnaire sent to the sampled Union producers. This included the profitability of the like product for the 10 years preceding the investigation period.
  • (349) One of the sampled Union producer provided a target profit of 17,7 % which was however based on standard variable costs and not on realised profit. The Commission thus could not take this profit into account. The Commission thus decided to use the profit achieved for Europe in 2018 by two of the sampled producers that were related, for the MAE sales, since the year, 2018 was according to the MAE producers the last year which preceded the surge of the Chinese imports and it resulted in a target profit of 7 %. The Commission thus provisionally decided to use the target profit of 7 %.
  • (350) In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, two of the sampled Union producers provided information with regard to future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and from the ILO Conventions listed in Annex 1a to the basic Regulation, that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2).
  • (351) The Commission considered that for some of the costs, the companies did not bring sufficient evidence that these costs were based on obligatory requirements under a Multilateral Environmental Agreement or ILO Conventions but that they were rather projects to meet the market demand to produce electrical MAE. The Commission however accepted to add indirect CO2 cost in the energy consumption, and these costs were added to the non-injurious price.
  • (352) On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price for the like product of the Union industry by applying the above-mentioned target profit margin to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period, and then added the adjustments under Article 7(2d) on a type-by-type basis.
  • (353) The Commission then determined the underselling margin level based on a comparison of the weighted average import price of the individual sampled cooperating exporting producers in the PRC, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.
  • (354) The injury elimination level for ‘other cooperating companies’ and for ‘all other companies’ was defined in the same manner as the dumping margin for these companies (see Section 3.7.4).
Company Dumping margin (%) Injury margin (%)
Hunan Sinoboom Intelligent Equipment Co., Ltd. 55,3 64,6
Oshkosh JLG (Tianjin) Equipment Technology Co., Ltd. 54,5 23,6
Terex (Changzhou) Machinery Co., Ltd. 41,1 14,3
Zhejiang Dingli Machinery Co., Ltd. 45,1 31,3
Other cooperating companies 42,0 28,0
All other companies 55,3 64,6

7. UNION INTEREST

  • (355) The Commission examined whether, despite the determination of injurious dumping, the imposition of measures would not be against the Union interest in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, upstream suppliers, users, distributors and unrelated importers.

7.1.   Interest of the Union industry

  • (356) The Union industry producing the mobile aerial platforms is composed according to the complainant of 22 companies and employs according to its information more than 3 000 staff. None of the producers opposed the initiation of the investigation.
  • (357) As concluded in Section 4.4.3.5, the dumped imports from the PRC negatively impacted the situation of the Union producers of the product concerned: despite the increase in consumption on the Union market, the market share of the Union producers did not increase, and its profitability declined.
  • (358) Given the conclusion in Section 4.5.3.5 that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, imposing measures would allow the Union industry to start benefitting from fair trade conditions in the Union market, end the price depression, and will enable the Union industry to improve its profitability towards a sustainable level and to recover. The Union industry would also be able to increase its production and the capacity utilisation which would further positively impact its performance.
  • (359) The absence of measures is likely to have further significant negative effects on the Union industry in terms of lower sales, production volume and the capacity utilisation, and further price suppression leading to further financial deterioration of its economic situation in terms of profitability and investments. The entirety of these circumstances would threaten the viability of the Union industry.
  • (360) The Commission therefore concluded that the imposition of the measures is in the interest of the Union industry.

7.2   Interest of upstream suppliers

  • (361) Beyond the direct employment, the MAE industry also relied on a comprehensive network of upstream suppliers of the different MAE components which are then assembled on the production lines of the Union industry. The complainants alone relied according to their information on at least 280 suppliers, of which an estimated 260 operate in the Union. This would translate according to the estimate of the Union industry in about 32 000 jobs in the EU in at least 14 different Member States: Italy, Poland, France, Germany, Belgium, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland and Romania.
  • (362) In the absence of additional information available to the Commission, based on the above the Commission considered that besides the positive effect on the financial situation of the Union industry, the imposition of anti-dumping duties might positively impact the MAE suppliers, situated across a broad range of Member States.

7.3   Interest of users, distributors and unrelated importers

7.3.1   Rental companies
  • (363) According to the complainant, the vast majority of users (between 75–90 %) are rental companies.
  • (364) Only one of the users in the Union, the rental company Kiloutou, provided a complete questionnaire reply. Kiloutou belongs to a group active in renting an equipment and site machinery to building and construction professionals. The company considered that if anti-dumping duties were imposed on Chinese imports, users on the Union market could experience higher costs for mobile access equipment since this business relied on cost-effective access equipment.
  • (365) The complainant at the other hand considered that as the lifetime of the machines was long and since every machine was rented and used many times, the price fluctuation was diluted. Also, with the average machine price around EUR [35 000–40 000], any price fluctuations were divided over several years and several instances of use, and over different customers. In its view, the size of the fleet of the big rental companies was also relatively big compared to the annual Union consumption. Taken altogether, the size of these fleets, and the relatively slow replacement rate, makes the users much less vulnerable to price fluctuations. Rental companies were in its view also protected by potential increases in price resulting from measure by their ability to pass these effects on to their customers, allowing them to maintain their margins.
  • (366) The complainant also argued that machines were also commonly resold by rental companies or other buyers. These re-sales, even after several years of use, could be done at a considerable portion of the purchase price. Therefore, any increase in price resulting from the measure would also, in turn, increase the re-sale price of the used machines.
  • (367) Based on the above, the Commission considered that the impact on the rental companies were indeed less significant than if they were further ‘processing’ the product concerned. Since machines remained in general the property of the rental companies, any increase of its price would directly reflect in an increase of its assets. The fact that the machines were used over a longer period diminished in the Commission’s view the negative effect of a potential price increase as well.
  • (368) Therefore, the Commission concluded that measures would not have a disproportionate effect on rental companies.
7.3.2.   Other users
  • (369) The other users of MAE are mostly construction companies, industrial and agricultural or companies that are regularly in need of use these machines such as logistical centres and airports. These are in most cases large companies.
  • (370) In the complainant’s view, the impact of price increases on these companies is limited since the mobile aerial platforms only represent a marginal portion of their equipment and of their costs. These end-users are companies with sufficient volume of activities making the investments in the platforms a limited portion of their costs.
  • (371) The Commission considered that the companies that purchase MAE have different core activities and the cost of MAE would in general be marginal compared to the total costs of these companies. Any potential price increase of MAE would add to their costs but not to the extend to have a serious financial impact of its operation. The Commission thus concluded that the impact of the measures on these other users was limited.
7.3.3.   Unrelated importers and traders
  • (372) In the absence of cooperation of importers and traders, the Commission considered that the unrelated importers and traders could continue to source the mobile access equipment from multiple sources, and they could resell them at prices allowing them to maintain their margins. The Commission thus considered that in case the anti-dumping measures are imposed, the impact on unrelated importers and traders was limited.

7.4   Conclusion on the Union interest

  • (373) Although the overall price level of MAE is expected to increase, in view of the above the Commission found that the overall benefits of the measures outweigh the potential negative impact for importers and users. The Commission considered that it was also important for the main users – the rental companies – that production of MAE continues to take place in the Union market, to diversify their fleets. In case the rental companies were entirely dependent on imports, they would face possibly extended lead times and supply disruptions and price increases at longer term.

8. PROVISIONAL ANTI-DUMPING MEASURE

  • (374) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.
  • (375) Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of MAE originating in China, in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins and the dumping margins. The amount of the duties was set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins.
  • (376) On basis of the above, the provisional anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:
Company Provisional anti-dumping duty
Hunan Sinoboom Intelligent Equipment Co., Ltd. 55,3  %
Oshkosh JLG (Tianjin) Equipment Technology Co., Ltd. 23,6  %
Terex (Changzhou) Machinery Co., Ltd. 14,3  %
Zhejiang Dingli Machinery Co., Ltd. 31,3  %
Other cooperating companies 28 %
All other companies 55,3  %
  • (377) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. Following comments received after pre-disclosure, a clerical error related to the volumes used for the calculation of the injury and dumping margin for Terex was corrected and resulted in a downward adjustment of the margins. A clerical error was also corrected for Sinoboom, resulting in a slightly lower dumping margin. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.
  • (378) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.
  • (379) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.
  • (380) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.
  • (381) Statistics of MAE are frequently expressed in pieces. However, there is no such supplementary unit for MAE specified in the Combined Nomenclature laid down in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 92. It is therefore necessary to provide that not only the weight in kg or tonnes but also the pieces for the imports of the product concerned must be entered in the declaration for release for free circulation. Pieces should be indicated for TARIC codes: 8427101010, 8427201910, 8428909020, 8431200060 and 8431390010.

9. INFORMATION AT PROVISIONAL STAGE

  • (382) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE’s website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.
  • (383) Comments on the accuracy of the calculations were taken into account, where appropriate.

10. FINAL PROVISIONS

  • (384) In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission within a fixed deadline.
  • (385) The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.

A provisional anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of mobile access equipment designed for the lifting of persons, self-propelled, with a maximum working height of 6 meters or more, and imports of pre-assembled or ready-to-assemble sections thereof, excluding individual components when presented separately, and excluding person lifting equipment mounted on vehicles of Chapter 86 and Chapter 87 of the Harmonised System, currently falling under CN codes ex 8427 10 10, ex 8427 20 19, ex 8428 90 90, ex 8431 20 00 and ex 8431 39 00 (TARIC codes: 8427101010, 8427201910, 8428909020, 8431200060 and 8431390010), and originating in the People’s Republic of China.

2.

The rates of the provisional anti-dumping duty applicable for the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:

Company Provisional anti-dumping duty TARIC additional code
Hunan Sinoboom Intelligent Equipment Co., Ltd. 55,3  % 89DL
Oshkosh JLG (Tianjin) Equipment Technology Co., Ltd. 23,6  % 89DM
Terex (Changzhou) Machinery Co., Ltd. 14,3  % 89DN
Zhejiang Dingli Machinery Co., Ltd. 31,3  % 89DO
Other cooperating companies 28 % See Annex
All other companies 55,3  % 8999
3.

The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of (product concerned) sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in (the country concerned). I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply.

4.

The release for free circulation in the Union of the product referred to in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provision of a security deposit equivalent to the amount of the provisional duty.

5.

Where a declaration for release for free circulation is presented in respect of the product referred to in paragraph 1, irrespective of its origin, the number of items imported shall be entered in the relevant field of that declaration, provided this indication is compatible with Annex I to Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87.

6.

In cases where goods have been damaged before entry into free circulation and, therefore, the price actually paid or payable is apportioned for the determination of the customs value pursuant to Article 131(2) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 93 the amount of anti-dumping duty, calculated on the basis of the amounts set above, shall be reduced by a percentage which corresponds to the apportioning of the price actually paid or payable.

7.

Customs authorities are hereby directed to discontinue the registration of imports established in accordance with Article 1 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1450.

The data on imports registered in accordance with Article 1 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1450 shall be kept until the entry into force of possible definitive measures, or the termination of this proceeding.

8.

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

1.

Interested parties shall submit their written comments on this regulation to the Commission within 15 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

2.

Interested parties wishing to request a hearing with the Commission shall do so within 5 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation.

3.

Interested parties wishing to request a hearing with the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings are invited do so within 5 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation. The Hearing Officer shall examine requests submitted outside this time limit and may decide whether to accept to such requests if appropriate.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 1 shall apply for a period of six months.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 11 July 2024.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula VON DER LEYEN

2

Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of mobile access equipment (‘MAE’), originating in the People’s Republic of China, (OJ C, C/2023/783, 13.11.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/783/oj).

3

Zhejiang Dingli Machinery Co., Ltd., Hunan Sinoboom Intelligent Equipment Co., Ltd, Fronteq (Changzhou) Machinery Co., Ltd., XCMG Fire-fighting Safety Equipment Co., Ltd, Zoomlion Intelligent Access Machinery Co., Ltd., Jiangsu Liugong Machinery, Co., Ltd, Lingong Heavy Machinery Co., Ltd and Sany Aerial Work Equipment Co., Ltd.

4

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1450 of 23 May 2024 making imports of mobile access equipment originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (OJ L, 2024/1450, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/1450/oj).

5

Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017 (SWD(2017) 483 final/2).

6

For an English version of the full text of the 14th FYP, see for example at: https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-14th-five-year-plan (accessed on 31 May 2024).

7

Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 10 April 2024 (SWD(2024) 91 final).

8

Updated Report – Chapter 2, p. 7

9

Updated Report – Chapter 2, pp. 7–8.

10

Updated Report – Chapter 2, pp. 10, 18.

11

Available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm (accessed on 8 April 2024).

12

Updated Report – Chapter 2, pp. 29–30.

13

Updated Report – Chapter 4, pp. 57, 92.

14

Updated Report – Chapter 6, pp. 149–150.

15

Updated Report – Chapter 6, pp. 153–171.

16

Updated Report – Chapter 7, pp. 204–205.

17

Updated Report – Chapter 8, pp. 207–208, 242–243.

18

Updated Report – Chapter 2, pp. 19–24, Chapter 4, p. 69, pp. 99–100, Chapter 5, pp. 130–131.

19

See the company’s 2022 annual report, p. 89; available at: http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESZ_STOCK/2023/2023-4/2023-04-29/9182574.PDF (accessed on 31 May 2024).

20

See the company’s 2023 annual report, p. 114; available at: http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESZ_STOCK/2024/2024-3/2024-03-30/9930890.PDF (accessed on 31 May 2024).

21

See the company’s 2023 annual report, p. 135; available at: https://q.stock.sohu.com/newpdf/202457231354.pdf (accessed on 31 May 2024).

22

Updated Report – Chapter 2, pp. 24-27.

23

See at: http://www.cncma.org/ (accessed on 31 May 2024).

25

See at: http://www.cncma.org/article/472 (accessed on 31 May 2024).

26

Ibid.

27

See the list of CCMA’s members, available at: http://www.cncma.org//article/478?pageTitle=%E4%BC%9A%E5%91%98%E5%90%8D%E5%BD%95 (accessed on 31 May 2024).

28

Article 33 of the CCP Constitution, Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law. See updated Report – Chapter 3, pp. 47–50.

29

Updated Report – Chapter 3, p. 40.

30

See for example: Blanchette, J. – Xi’s Gamble: The Race to Consolidate Power and Stave off Disaster; Foreign Affairs, vol. 100, no. 4, July/August 2021, pp. 10–19.

31

Updated Report – Chapter 3, p. 41.

33

General Office of CCP Central Committee’s Guidelines on stepping up the United Front work in the private sector for the new era: www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/15/content_5543685.htm (accessed on 8 April 2024).

34

Financial Times (2020) – Chinese Communist Party asserts greater control over private enterprise: https://on.ft.com/3mYxP4j (accessed on 8 April 2024).

35

See the company’s 2022 annual report, p. 45; available at: http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESZ_STOCK/2023/2023-4/2023-04-29/9182574.PDF (accessed on 31 May 2024).

36

See at: https://www.xcmg.com/aboutus/news-detail-1127478.htm (accessed on 31 May 2024).

37

See the company’s 2023 annual report, p. 55; available at: http://file.finance.sina.com.cn/211.154.219.97:9494/MRGG/CNSESZ_STOCK/2024/2024-3/2024-03-30/9930890.PDF (accessed on 31 May 2024).

39

Ibid.

40

See the company’s 2023 annual report, p. 47; available at: https://q.stock.sohu.com/newpdf/202457231354.pdf (accessed on 31 May 2024).

41

See at: https://www.sohu.com/a/474336777_120808812 (accessed on 31 May 2024).

44

Updated Report – Chapter 14, Sections 14.1 to 14.3.

45

Updated Report – Chapter 4, pp. 56–57, 99–100.

46

See Section III.6.3 of the 14th FYP.

47

See Section III and Box I; available at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202307/content_6889718.htm (accessed on 31 May 2024).

49

Ibid

50

Ibid, see Section III.4.2

51

See at: 157823f5651e42ea85038c86b74becca.pdf (zj.gov.cn) (accessed on 30 May 2024).

52

Ibid., Section III.6.

59

Updated Report – Chapter 6, pp. 171–179.

60

Updated Report – Chapter 9, pp. 260–261.

61

Updated Report – Chapter 9, pp. 257–260.

62

Updated Report – Chapter 9, pp. 252–254.

64

Updated Report – Chapter 13, pp. 360–361, 364–370.

65

Updated Report – Chapter 13, p. 366.

66

Updated Report – Chapter 13, pp. 370–373.

67

Updated Report – Chapter 6, pp. 137–140.

68

Updated Report – Chapter 6, pp. 146–149.

69

Updated Report – Chapter 6, p. 149.

70

See official policy document of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission of 28 August 2020: Three-year action plan for improving corporate governance of the banking and insurance sectors (2020–2022): http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=925393&itemId=928 (accessed on 8 April 2024). The Plan instructs to ‘further implement the spirit embodied in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s keynote speech on advancing the reform of corporate governance of the financial sector’. Moreover, the Plan’s section II aims at promoting the organic integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance: ‘we shall make the integration of the Party’s leadership into corporate governance more systematic, standardised and procedure-based […] Major operational and management issues must have been discussed by the Party Committee before being decided upon by the Board of Directors or the senior management’.

71

See CBIRC’s Notice on the Commercial banks performance evaluation method, issued on 15 December 2020: http://jrs.mof.gov.cn/gongzuotongzhi/202101/t20210104_3638904.htm (accessed on 8 April 2024).

72

Updated Report – Chapter 6, pp. 157–158.

73

Updated Report – Chapter 6, pp. 150–152, 156–160, 165–171.

74

OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris. p. 29, available at:

https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-chn-2019-en (accessed on 8 April 2024).

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