Reform history

# COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

#### Article 1a

The list in Annex III shall include tangible assets which are:

(a) used in activities of a destabilising character that endanger or damage critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;

(b) used in activities of a destabilising character that violate national, European or international air, marine or land traffic regulations, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;

(c) are used in activities of a destabilising character, including espionage and surveillance, the transport of weapons or military equipment and personnel, information manipulation and interference, and that are attributable to or benefiting the Government of the Russian Federation;

(d) are owned, chartered or operated by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I, or is otherwise used in the name of, on behalf of, in relation with, or for the benefit of, such persons.

The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any such authorisation within two weeks thereof.

#### Article 1b

It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with:

(a) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that is a credit or financial institution or an entity providing crypto assets services, involved in transactions that facilitate, directly or indirectly, activities by or otherwise supporting persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in Article 2(3), as listed in Annex IV to this Regulation; or

(b) a legal person, entity or body providing technical or operational assistance to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in Article 2(3), as listed in Annex IV to this Regulation.

The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions that are:

(a) necessary for the export, sale, supply, transfer or transport of pharmaceutical, medical, or agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers;

(b) strictly necessary to ensure access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in a Member State, as well as for the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in a Member State, provided that such transactions are consistent with the objectives of this Regulation and those of Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 (¹); or

(c) necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance or for evacuations.

#### Article 1c

(a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefiting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation, or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through any of the following actions:

(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;

(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;

(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;

(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;

(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;

(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;

(vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;

(viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict, in a third country;

(b) associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed under point (a);

(c) supporting the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (a).

(b) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a);

(c) legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annexes IV or V to this Regulation, or legal persons, entities or bodies established outside the Union whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by them;

(d) any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (c) of this paragraph.

14. Anatolii PRIZENKO

Businessman

POB: Moldovan SSR (now Republic of Moldova)

Anatolii Prizenko is a businessman in the Republic of Moldova. In late October 2023, he coordinated the dispatch of several citizens of the Republic of Moldova to France, where they painted the Star of David on the streets in exchange for financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media and had a significant destabilising effect in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas following the attacks on 7 October 2023. Images of that operation were first spread by the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Government of the Russian Federation and used by Russian actors to conduct disinformation campaigns.

Therefore, Anatolii Prizenko is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a Member State and, therefore, in the Union by planning, directing, or engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

16.12.2024

## 15. Alesia MILORADOVICH or Alesya MILORADOVICH or Olesya MILORADOVIC

17. Alik Yuryevich KHUCHBAROV

Alik Yuryevich HUCHBAROV

Alik HUTŠBAROV

(Russian: Алик Юрьевич ХУЧБАРОВ)

Function: GRU operative

DOB: 12.11.1992

Nationality: Russian, Estonian

Gender: male

Tax identification number: 601515903509

Alik Khuchbarov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Alik Khuchbarov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.

20.5.2025

18. Ilya Sergeevich BOCHAROV

Ilja BOTŠAROV

(Russian: Илья Сергеевич БОЧАРОВ)

Function: GRU operative

DOB: 29.6.1991

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Tax identification number: 561410364291

Ilya Bocharov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Ilya Bocharov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.

20.5.2025

19. Elena KOLBASNIKOVA

(Russian: Елена КОЛБАСНИКОВА)

Nationality: Ukrainian, Russian

DOB: 20.3.1975

POB: Dnipro, Ukraine SSR (now Ukraine)

Gender: female

Elena Kolbasnikova is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Kolbasnikova formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. She was sentenced for hate speech in a court of final instance in Germany in regard to her undermining of Ukrainian sovereignty and denouncement of German public institutions. Criminal investigations are ongoing in regard to her support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware, through fundraisers and the provision of aid to separatist groups. Moreover, Kolbasnikova promoted violent acts committed by her husband, Rostislav Teslyuk, against counter-demonstrators, and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany.

She thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. She also supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine), through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by supporting separatist movements in Ukraine.

Elena Kolbasnikova is associated with Rostislav Teslyuk, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.

20.5.2025

20. Hüseyin DOGRU

Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, Türkiye

Nationality: Turkish

Gender: male

Hüseyin Doğru is the founder and representative of AFA Medya A.Ș. which is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ș. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.

RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.

During a violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, RED personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through their online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform, facilitating the violent nature of the protest.

Through AFA Medya, Hüseyin Doğru thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in coordinated information manipulation.

20.5.2025

21. Yulia Sergeevna PROKHOROVA

(Russian: Юлия Сергеевна ПРОХОРОВА)

Nationality: Russian

DOB: 18.2.1992

Address: Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates.

Formerly Landshut, Bavaria, Germany

Gender: female

Yulia Prokhorova is a Russian citizen. She resided in Germany until 2024. Yulia Prokhorova sustains a social media campaign in which she promoted the intentional wasting of energy in Germany, seeking to support Russia’s war of aggression. In parallel, she disseminates misinformation in Russian state media about the energy supply, the rule of law, and Ukrainian refugees in Germany.

In addition, Yulia Prokhorova intimidated Ukrainian refugees in Europe through public assaults and other forms of harassment, which she recorded and disseminated online.

Yulia Prokhorova thus supports actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one Member State by engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and indirectly supporting actions targeted at economic activities and services of public interest.

20.5.2025

22. Rostislav TESLYUK

(Russian: Ростислав ТЕСЛЮК)

Alias

Max SCHLUND

(Russian: Макс ШЛУНД)

Nationality: Russian

DOB: 23.4.1982

POB: Moscow

Gender: male

Rostislav Teslyuk is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Rostislav Teslyuk formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. Criminal investigations in regard to his support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware are ongoing. Rostislav Teslyuk committed violent acts against counter-demonstrators and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany, together with Elena Kolbasnikova.

He thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State (Germany) through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. He is also responsible for actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine) through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by his support for separatist movements in Ukraine.

Rostislav Teslyuk is associated with Elena Kolbasnikova, who is subject to restrictive measures, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.

20.5.2025

23. Alina LIPP

Function: war correspondent

DOB: 17.9.1993

POB: Hamburg

Nationality: German

Gender: female

Alina Lipp runs the blog “Neues aus Russland”, in which she systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment as regards support for Ukraine.

Furthermore, she is using her role as a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine to spread Russian war propaganda. She regularly appears in troop entertainment and propaganda shows on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda.

Thus, Alina Lipp is engaging in and supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten security and stability in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through facilitating an armed conflict in a third country.

20.5.2025

24. Viktor Volodymyrovych MEDVEDCHUK

(Ukrainian: Віктор Володимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)

(Russian: Виктор Владимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)

Function: Politician, businessman, de facto media owner

DOB: 7.8.1954

POB: Pochet, Krasnoyarskyi Krai, Russian SFSR, USSR

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Address: Moscow

Ukrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 1994214296 (void)

Viktor Medvedchuk is a former Ukrainian politician and businessman, who has been the leading proponent of a pro-Russian policy in Ukraine and who has promoted policies and actions intended to erode the credibility and legitimacy of the Government of Ukraine. Viktor Medvedchuk has close personal ties to, and is associated with, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.

Through his associates, including Artem Marchevskyi, Viktor Medvedchuk controlled Ukrainian media outlets and used them to disseminate pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine and beyond. After the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk spread Russian propaganda narratives about the war, undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. To that end, in April 2023, Viktor Medvedchuk founded a political movement in Russia called “Another Ukraine”.

With his associates and associated entities, including Artem Marchevskyi and the Voice of Europe media channel, and in close coordination with the Russian authorities, Viktor Medvedchuk has continued funding and carrying out influence operations targeting political parties and individual politicians in Europe. Those activities aimed to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Those activities included providing financial resources to individual political actors in Europe, including selected candidates in the European Parliament elections, and for cooperation with journalists. Viktor Medvedchuk has directed and maintained control over the malign activities of Artem Marchevskyi and Voice of Europe, using Artem Marchevskyi’s de facto direction of Voice of Europe.

Therefore, Viktor Medvedchuk is responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in a third country, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing, engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

25. Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKYI

Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIJ

Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIY

Artěm Pavlovič MARČEVSKIJ

(Ukrainian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСЬКИЙ)

(Russian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСКИЙ)

Function: Politician, media producer, propagandist

DOB: 5.7.1988

POB: Kyiv, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, (now Ukraine)

Nationality: Ukrainian, Israeli

Gender: male

Address: Hovorčovická 1079, 250 65 Líbeznice, Czech Republic

Ukrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 3232824038

Artem Marchevskyi is a former Ukrainian politician closely associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, a former Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close connections to the Government of the Russian Federation. By virtue of his position in the pro-Russian party “Opposition Platform – For Life” and in a TV channel involved in pro-Russian propaganda, Artem Marchevskyi supported and provided assistance to Viktor Medvedchuk in the years 2018 to 2021. Artem Marchevskyi and Viktor Medvedchuk continued to coordinate after they both left Ukraine following the Russian invasion in 2022, with Viktor Medvedchuk directing and controlling Artem Marchevskyi’s activities facilitating construction of Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States.

Artem Marchevskyi has played an instrumental role in disseminating concerted disinformation and biased narratives aimed at supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and spreading its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, by undermining the credibility and public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression. Artem Marchevskyi played a key role in the acquisition of the media brand “Voice of Europe” and the incorporation of its activity in a company of the same name. As the concealed head of Voice of Europe, Artem Marchevskyi has used the company to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists, and to build an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe.

Therefore, Artem Marchevskyi is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

26. Natallia SUDLIANKOVA

A.k.a.:

Natallia SUDLENKOVA

Natalia SUDLENKOVA

Natalia SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)

Natalija SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)

(Russian: Наталья СУДЛЕНКОВА (ШЕВКО))

Alias:

Natalyia KORNELYUK

(Russian: Наталья КОРНЕЛЮК)

Function: Journalist, Media and PR Consultant, Coordinator

DOB: 9.6.1964

POB: Belarus

Nationality: Belarusian

Gender: female

Address: Borovanského 2381/22, 155 00 Prague, Czech Republic

Identity documents: Travel document: U0002974, valid until 18.3.2031

Residence Permit: 001631077, valid until 13.3.2034

Natallia Sudliankova is a journalist and a media and PR consultant who has been producing custom-made media products that included information manipulation and spreading misleading narratives aiming to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and aiming to undermine the public trust towards Czech national and European Union democratic values and processes. Sudliankova has been receiving assignments over a long period of time and has been financially rewarded.

She plays a significant role in planning and directing coordinated information manipulation intended for the public in the Czech Republic and in other Member States, and cooperates with Russian state entities (Rosatom, Pravfond), entities representing the interests of the Russian Federation (Immortal Regiment of Russia), and Alexey Nikolayevich Shavrov, an officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).

Therefore, Natallia Sudliankova is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation.

20.5.2025

27. Iurie NECULITI

(Russian: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ)

Function: CEO of Stark Industries

Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova

Gender: male

Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova

Iurie Neculiti is CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.

Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.

Therefore, as CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.

Iurie Neculiti is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Stark Industries.

20.5.2025

28. Ivan NECULITI

(Russian: Иван НЕКУЛИТИ)

Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ Hosting

Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova

Gender: male

Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova

Ivan Neculiti is the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.

Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.

Ivan Neculiti is associated with Iurie Neculiti and Stark Industries.

Therefore, as the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Ivan Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and in a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.

20.5.2025

29. Andrei KHARKOVSKY

(Russian: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ)

Function: Leading member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad

Nationality: Russian

POB: Tomsk Region, Russia

Gender: male

Address: Germany

Andrei Kharkovsky is a Russian citizen living in Germany. In Germany, Kharkovsky functions as a representative of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, including by organising military-style gatherings for its members. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad is an entity linked to the Government of the Russian Federation, and partaking in Russia’s war of aggression and acts of violence in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists under the premise of a “historical mission” to reinstate Russian control over southern and eastern Ukraine. As a member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, Kharkovsky is engaging in acts of violence.

Andrei Kharkovsky is therefore supporting actions of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the sovereignty and security of Ukraine by attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of Ukraine.

20.5.2025

30. Anatoli Yurevich ABRAMOV

(Russian: Анатолий Юрьевич АБРАМОВ)

Function: Director of the General Radio Frequency Centre branch in the Northwestern Federal District

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Anatoly Abramov is the director of the General Radio Frequency Centre’s Northwestern Federal District branch. Branch heads are appointed and dismissed by the Director of the GRFC in agreement with Roskomnadzor, and act on behalf of the GRFC.

He oversees the use of radio frequencies and devices in the Kaliningrad region.

Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.

Therefore, Anatoly Abramov is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States, through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure.

20.5.2025

31. Ruslan Vasilyevich NESTERENKO

(Russian: Руслан Васильевич НЕСТЕРЕНКО)

Function: Acting General Director of the GRFC

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Ruslan Nesterenko is the acting general director of the General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC). He oversees the use of radio frequencies and ensures compliance with legislation.

Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, Russia, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States and disrupting civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.

Under Nesterenko’s direction, the GRFC is involved in planning and supporting information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. As per the GRFC Charter, the general director represents the enterprise’s interests within Russia and beyond its borders.

Therefore, Ruslan Nesterenko is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

32. Viktor Aleksandrovitch LUKOVENKO

(Russian: Виктор Александрович ЛУКОВЕНКО)

Alias

Viktor VASILEV

(Russian: Виктор ВАСИЛЬЕВ)

Function: Head of the news agency “African Initiative”

DOB: 6.4.1985

Nationality: Uzbek

Gender: male

Viktor Lukovenko has been active on the African continent for several years, previously as a member of the Wagner Group and now as the head of the news agency “African Initiative”. He is involved in spreading Russian propaganda on the continent. He is linked to well known figures of Russian propaganda in Africa. Additionally, Viktor Lukovenko was sent to Ukraine in 2022 before the war, under the supervision of a GRU colonel, in order to recruit pro-Russian sympathisers.

Viktor Lukovenko is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

33. Oleg Anatoliyovych VOLOSHIN

(Ukrainian: Олег Анатолійович ВОЛОШИН)

(Russian: Олег Анатольевич ВОЛОШИН)

Nationality: Russian

DOB: 7.4.1981

POB: Nikolaev, USSR (now Ukraine)

Passport No.: ET870130

ID-No.: 1981040705733; 2968200719

Gender: male

Oleg Voloshin is a former Ukrainian member of parliament and a member of the pro-Russian political party “Opposition Platform – For Life” (OPFL). He is part of the network behind “Voice of Europe” and is active at Golos.eu and PolitWera, both platforms spreading disinformation and pro-Russian narratives. He was involved in bribe payments made to Western politicians.

Oleg Voloshin has used his position as Ukrainian delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2019-2023) to implement the strategy of Russian interference in Europe led by pro-Russian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who leads OPFL.

In particular, Voloshin has promoted Medvedchuk’s “peace plan” for Ukraine, which is linked to the Russian narrative regarding Russia’s war of aggression. In order to win-over European elected representatives to his cause, he has organised conferences with French and German parliamentarians, arguing that the “Normandy format” (France, Germany, Ukraine, Russia) has a so-called parliamentary dimension outside any official framework. The most recent event was organised by Voloshin at the French Senate on 11 February 2022 (“Peace process in Ukraine: how to break the deadlock”), a few days before the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army.

Thus, Oleg Voloshin is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union and its Member States, including Germany, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, the obstruction and undermining of the democratic political process.

20.5.2025

34. Justin Blaise TAGOUH

(Russian: Жюстин Блез ТАГУ)

Function: CEO of press group International Afrique Media (IAM), which includes the TV channel Afrique Média, IAM press review, and Courrier Confidentiel

DOB: 1959

Gender: male

Justin Tagouh is CEO of the press group International Africa Media. This media group has direct links with the Russian authorities, and spreads Russian narrative and anti-western narrative in African countries.

Justin Tagouh is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

35. Mikhaïl Mikhaïlovich PRUDNIKOV

Alias

“Micha”

(Russian: Михаил Михайлович ПРУДНИКОВ)

Function: Member of Africa Politology, entity responsible for disinformation and Russian propaganda in the Central African Republic

POB: Tambov Oblast

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Mikhaïl Prudnikov is a Russian disinformation activist operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) who has close links with the Wagner galaxy and disinformation campaign holdings in CAR through various newspapers and networks. In particular, he developed a narrative against western countries and participated in communication actions in order to undermine and threaten the Union’s image in the CAR.

Mikhaïl Prudnikov is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

36. Sylvain AFOUA

(Russian: Сильвен АФУА)

Alias

Egountchi BEHANZIN

(Russian: Эгунчи БЕХАНЗИН)

Function: Founder of the pan-African group “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA); influencer/activist known by the pseudonym “Egountchi Behanzin”

DOB: 5.11.1988

POB: Madjikpeto, Togo

Nationality: French, Togolese

Gender: male

Website: www.egountchibehanzin.com

Sylvain Afoua is a pro-Russian activist, founder of the “*Ligue de défense noire Africaine*” (LDNA) (Black African Defence League), a group involved in hit actions on French territory. The structure was dissolved by a French ministerial decree of 29 September 2021 for spreading an ideology calling for hatred, discrimination and violence. Sylvain Afoua spreads Russian narratives and misinformation on the war of aggression against Ukraine, which he carries out in particular on the African continent. His message is transmitted via social networks and his association’s website. He is regularly invited to Russian fora and is, furthermore, financially linked to the Wagner Group.

Sylvain Afoua is therefore responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

37. Thomas RÖPER

(Russian: Томас РЁПЕР)

Function: war correspondent

DOB: 26.11.1971

POB: Bremen

Nationality: German

Gender: male

Thomas Röper is a German blogger. Through his network of online channels named “Anti-Spiegel”, he systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment regarding support to Ukraine.

Furthermore, he legitimises Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory by serving as an election “observer” and participating in a campaign to promote Russia’s illegal referendum on the secession from Ukraine of the Russian-occupied territories. Moreover, he has served as a spokesperson for the Government of the Russian Federationto disseminate Russian propaganda narratives, including at the UN Arria-forum.

Thomas Röper is therefore engaging in and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference and facilitates an armed conflict in a third country.

20.5.2025

4. AFA Media aka RED

AFA Medya Anonim Șirketi aka RED

AFA Медиа

Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, Türkiye

Type of entity: media company

Place of registration: Istanbul

Date of registration: 22.11.2022

VAT Nr.: 0081804196

Registration number 423277-5

Principle place of business: Türkiye

Website: https://thered.stream/imprint/

Founder: Hüseyin Dogru

AFA Medya A.Ș. is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ș. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.

RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.

During the violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, Red personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through RED’s online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform.

AFA Medya Anonim Șirketi thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation that undermine stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in information manipulation.

20.5.2025

5. Voice of Europe

(Russian: Голос Европы)

Address: Krakovská 583/9, 110 00 Prague, Czech Republic

Website: www.voiceofeurope.com, www.voiceofeurope.eu

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company (s.r.o.)

Place of registration: Prague

Date of registration: 14.3.2023

Registration number: CZ05185327

Principal place of business: Czech Republic

Voice of Europe is an online media outlet, engaged in a systematic international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts through its website and accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. Voice of Europe disseminated concerted disinformation related to Ukraine, the Union and its Member States with the aim of supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. It systematically undermined the public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression, and the credibility of the assistance of the Union and its Member States to Ukraine’s defence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections.

Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close ties to the leadership of the Russian Federation, through his associate Artem Marchevskyi. Voice of Europe was used to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists and the building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Voice of Europe was involved in activities facilitating the construction of Viktor Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States.

Through its activities, Voice of Europe is implementing and supporting actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

6. Norebo JSC

Address: Office 510, 43 Schmidta Street, 183038 Murmansk, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Murmansk

Date of registration: 2.11.2007

Registration number: 1201000007889

TIN / KPP: 2901170107 / 519001001

Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage.

Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank.

Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.

Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.

20.5.2025

7. Murman SeaFood

(Russian: Мурман СиФуд, Мурманские морепродукты)

Address: Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 28, Murmansk, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation, 183025

Type of entity: limited liability company

Place of registration: Murmansk

Murman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner.

Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.

MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.

20.5.2025

8. Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Main Radio Frequency Centre”

General Radio Frequency Centre

GRFC

Федеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие “Главный Радиочастотный Центр”

ФГУП “ГРЧЦ”

Address: 7, Derbenevskaya nab. 7 p., Moscow 115114. 15

115114, город Москва, Дербеневская наб, д. 7 стр. 15

Type of entity: Federal agency

Place of registration: Moscow, Russian Federation

Date of registration: 30.3.2001

BIN: 1027739334479

INN: 7706228218

KPP: 772501001

Principal place of business: Russia

The General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC) is responsible for ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies and devices for civil purposes, and monitors compliance with legislation. It is one of the main organisations which contribute to decisions about the use and supervision of the radio frequency sector.

Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.

The electronic warfare centre in Kaliningrad has received new jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.

Therefore, GRFC is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.

20.5.2025

9. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.

Date of registration: 10.2.2022

Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom

(maildrop address)

Registration number: 13906017

Website: https://stark-industries.solutions/

Website: https://pq.hosting/

Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and operated by the Moldavian nationals Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti, through the web hosting service PQ Hosting. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.

Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide those activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.

Therefore, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.

Stark is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti.

20.5.2025

ANNEX II

## [https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner](https://www.regeringen.se/sanktioner)

## European Commission Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA) SPA2 The Pavillion Rue de Spa 2 B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

## ANNEX III

[…]

ANNEX IV

[…]

ANNEX V

[…]