Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/58 of 15 January 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Type Implementing Regulation
Publication 2025-01-16
State In force
Text As published
Department European Commission, TRADE
Source EUR-Lex
articles 2

This is the act as published. Later amendments are not folded into the text below: each one is a separate act in this repository and an entry in this law's history.

Reform history JSON API
  • (271) Based on the financial statements available, the Commission removed the transportation expenses from the total SG&A amount (as established based on the methodology described above). Due to the absence of quarterly information, the Commission estimated the transportation expenses during the RIP based on the financial statements for January-June 2023. The estimated transportation expenses accounted for a percentage of the total SG&A amount. As a result of this revision, the SG&A percentage decreased from 22,0 % to 18,5 % when expressed as a percentage of the cost of goods sold (13 % when expressed as a percentage of total revenue).
3.3.15.   Calculation of the normal value
  • (272) Based on the above, the Commission constructed the normal value per product type on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation.
  • (273) First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. The Commission applied the undistorted unit costs to the actual consumption of the individual factors of production of the cooperating exporting producers. These consumption ratios provided by the cooperating exporting producers were verified during the verification visit. The Commission multiplied the consumption ratios by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country, as described in Section 3.3.14.
  • (274) Once the undistorted manufacturing cost established, the Commission applied the manufacturing overheads, as described in recital (255).
  • (275) The Commission then added SG&A of 18,5 % and profit of 10,8 %, as explained in recital (271).
3.3.15.1.   Export price
  • (276) The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers and/or through related companies acting as an importer.
  • (277) If the exporting producers export the product under review directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product under review when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.
  • (278) If the exporting producers export the product under review to the Union through related companies acting as an importer, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits accruing.
  • (279) In absence of cooperation from an unrelated importer, the Commission relied on the profit established during the original investigation for an unrelated importer, that is 6,7 %.
3.3.15.2.   Comparison
  • (280) The Commission compared, per product type, the constructed normal value established in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation and the export price of the sampled exporting producers on an ex-works basis as established above.
  • (281) Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for freight costs in the Union, Customs duties, quantity discounts credit costs and bank charges.
3.3.15.3.   Dumping margins
  • (282) For the sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product under review covering all export transactions, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.
  • (283) On this basis, the weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, was in the range of around 7 % to around 22 % for the sampled cooperating producers. It was therefore concluded that dumping continued during the review investigation period.

4. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OF DUMPING

  • (284) Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures be repealed.
  • (285) The following additional elements were analysed: the production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC; relation between export prices to third countries and the price level in the Union and the attractiveness of the Union market.

4.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC

  • (286) In the absence of cooperation, the Commission established production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC on the basis of information provided in the expiry review request.
  • (287) According to the data provided in the request by the applicant, CRIA reported a production output of 122,39 million tyres in 2021, for an estimated production capacity of 141,76 million tyres in the same year, which marks an increase in tyres produced of 2,72 million with the preceding year. Capacity utilisation rates derived from these figures would stand at around 86 %. In 2022, at least 1,5 million units of additional tyres production capacities had already been added, as reported by CRIA. This puts the total tyres production capacity at around 143,25 million units for 2022. If the same capacity utilisation rates are taken as for the year 2021, this would bring output at around 123,67 million tyres produced. The available unused capacity in China in 2022 therefore amount to almost 20 million units, almost equivalent to the total consumption on the EU market 117.
  • (288) Chinese producers, in line with the GOC's and CCP's industrial policies outlined above, have continued to increase their already overdeveloped production capacities since the original IP. Recent foreign trade defence investigations concluded to the significance of the existing production capacity in China. The Brazilian antidumping investigation published in May 2021 already highlighted the existence of significant production capacities, with evidence of several investments in production capacities by the biggest companies, which would be able to overcome the Brazilian consumption. 118 The South African antidumping investigation published in August 2022 equally considered the significant production capacities of Chinese producers that would be able to increase their production for export demand. 119

4.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market and export prices to third country markets

  • (289) The Commission examined whether it was likely that PRC exporting producers would continue their export sales at dumped prices on the Union market should measures be allowed to lapse. Therefore, the Commission analysed the price level of Chinese exports to third country markets and compared them to the price level of Chinese exports to the Union market, to determine whether the Union market was attractive in terms of price levels.
  • (290) The Commission examined the level of prices during the RIP reported by the sampled exporting producers and found that for comparable transactions (i.e. commercial invoice set on FOB incoterms) the unit price of truck tyres exported to third countries represented around 80 % of their unit price in the EU. Moreover, the attractiveness of the Union market was demonstrated by the fact that despite the anti-dumping measures in force, Chinese export volumes to the Union remained at around 30 % of the volume of imports during the initial investigation.
  • (291) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Union market constituted an attractive market for Chinese exporting producers of truck tyres both in terms of its prices and its size.

4.3.   Possible absorption capacity of third country markets

  • (292) In addition to the above, the Commission found that trade defence measures on exports of the product under review from PRC are in force in Armenia, Botswana, Brazil, Egypt, Eswatini, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Namibia, Russian Federation, South Africa, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States of America 120. As a consequence, these third country markets, which are significant consumers of truck tyres, are less attractive for the Chinese exporting producers. This is an additional element which supports the finding that PRC’s current production capacity would most likely end in the Union market, should measures be repealed.
4.3.1.   Conclusion
  • (293) The investigation showed that the imports from the PRC continued to enter the Union market in high volumes (compared to the size of the market) at dumped prices during the RIP.
  • (294) In addition, the spare capacity in the PRC was significant in comparison with the Union consumption (recital (301)) during the RIP. Moreover, the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of size and prices pointed to the likelihood that Chinese exports would be directed towards the Union market, should the measures lapse, and spare capacity would also be used to increase production and exports to the Union.
  • (295) Consequently, the Commission concluded that there was a likelihood that the expiry of the anti-dumping measures would result in a significant increase of dumped imports of the product under review from the PRC to the Union due to the large spare capacity in the PRC and the price level of the Union market compared to other export destinations.
  • (296) In the light of the above, the Commission concluded that the expiry of the anti-dumping measures would likely to lead to a continuation of dumping.

5. INJURY

5.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

  • (297) The like product was manufactured by more than 400 producers in the Union during the period considered. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.
  • (298) The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at around 18 million tyres. The Commission established the total Union production figure on the basis of the information provided by European Tyre & Rubber Manufacturers Association (‘ETRMA’), the applicant and Eurostat statistics. As indicated in recital (27), five Union producers in the final sample represent more than 25% of Union production and sales of the like product. Therefore, the microeconomic indicators were examined on the basis of data obtained from the replies of those five Union producers.
  • (299) Some of the sampled producers were found to import and resell the product concerned on the Union market from the PRC. However, by comparison to their overall sales, the imports remain marginal (less than 1% of their overall sales) and do not affect their qualification as Union producers.

5.2.   Union consumption

  • (300) The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of information provided by the ETRMA and Eurostat.
  • (301) Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 2

Union consumption (in items)

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Total Union consumption (in items) 18 264 516 21 646 928 22 568 607 20 325 009
Index 100 119 124 111
Source: ETRMA, Eurostat comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat comext
  • (302) Consumption on the Union market increased by 11% over the period considered. There was a notable increase from 2020 to 2022. This is likely to be linked with the recovery from the Covid crisis and is explained by the fact that consumption of tyres is intrinsically linked to kilometres travelled by the fleets which, in turn, is very dependent on the overall economic activity and notably of the volume of goods transported by road. The increase in consumption peaked in 2022 and slowed down during the review investigation period.

5.3.   Imports from the country concerned

5.3.1.   Volume and market share of the imports from the country concerned
  • (303) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat. The market share of the imports was established on the basis of the Union consumption in Table 1.
  • (304) Imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Import volume (in items) and market share

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Volume of imports from the country concerned (in items) 900 897 966 311 1 112 883 1 095 084
Index 100 107 124 122
Market share 4,9  % 4,5  % 4,9  % 5,4  %
Index 100 91 100 109
Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext
  • (305) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat. The market share of the imports on the basis of the Union consumption is found in Table 3.
  • (306) Import volumes from the PRC increased by 22 % during the period considered, from around 900 thousand tyres in 2020 to around 1,1 million tyres in the investigation period. The increase of Chinese imports was particularly significant in 2022 when the original measures were partially annulled by General Court of the European Union as described in the recital (4). The import volumes remained at the same level also during the review investigation period despite the decrease in demand. This resulted in an increase of the market share of Chinese imports from 4,9 % to 5,4 % during the period considered.
5.3.2.   Prices of the imports from the country concerned and price undercutting
  • (307) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat.
  • (308) The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the country concerned developed as follows:

Table 4

Import prices (EUR/item)

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
The People’s Republic of China 136 156 208 218
Index 100 115 153 161
Source: Eurostat Comext, neither anti-dumping not countervailing duty included Source: Eurostat Comext, neither anti-dumping not countervailing duty included Source: Eurostat Comext, neither anti-dumping not countervailing duty included Source: Eurostat Comext, neither anti-dumping not countervailing duty included Source: Eurostat Comext, neither anti-dumping not countervailing duty included
  • (309) Over the period considered, the average Chinese import prices into the Union (all tiers) increased by 61 %.
  • (310) As the sampled exporting producers exported predominantly Tier 1 and Tier 2 tyres, the Commission lacked detailed information about Chinese exports in Tier 3, where the primary injury occurred during the original investigation, subsequently causing a reverse cascade effect into the other two tiers.
  • (311) For that reason, the Commission estimated the price undercutting for the totality of imports on the basis of import statistics.
  • (312) The Commission thus made a comparison between:
  • — the weighted average sales price per piece of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and
  • — the average Chinese landed import price of the Chines imports based on import statistics, including the anti-dumping and countervailing duties, customs duties and importation costs.
  • (313) This comparison showed that the average Chinese landed import price (270 EUR/item) was below the Union industry’s average selling price (281 EUR/item) and only slightly above the Union industry’s average cost of production (260 EUR/item). Should the landed price be established without the anti-dumping duties, it would amount to 254 EUR/item, which would significantly undercut the Union industry’s average selling price and would be also below the Union industry’s cost of production.
  • (314) The Commission thus concluded that, overall, the prices of Chinese imports were lower than the average selling price of the Union industry.
  • (315) Following final disclosure, Hankook claimed that the Commission had incorrectly changed its undercutting calculation methodology compared to the original investigation. Hankook claimed that instead of estimating the price undercutting for the totality of imports on the basis of import statistics the Commission should have carried out an analysis on a type-by-type or tier-by-tier basis. In the sensitive version of its submission Hankook also brought forward data on its export volumes and prices and claimed that by using this data the Commission could have deduced the import prices for all tiers and carried out a tier-by-tier undercutting analysis.
  • (316) The Commission disagreed with these claims. First, due to non-cooperation of the Chinese exporting producers operating in tier 3 and as stated in the recital (310), the Commission lacked detailed information about Chinese exports especially in tier 3 and was unable to carry out a tier-by-tier undercutting analysis. Thus, there was a change in the underlying data available to the Commission. Second, the data brought forward by Hankook on its own export volumes and prices was insufficient for carrying out any further undercutting analysis. Even according to this data, it remains that there are other operators in tier 1, 2 and 3 on which there is no detailed information available and, in contrary to what Hankook claims, this data is not sufficient to bring any further information on the undercutting on tier-by-tier level or to invalidate any of the results of the undercutting analysis made by the Commission. Therefore, this claim is rejected.

5.4.   Imports from third countries other than China

  • (317) The imports of tyres from third countries other than China were mainly from Thailand, Türkiye and Vietnam.
  • (318) The volume of imports into the Union as well as the market share and price trends for imports of tyres from other third countries developed as follows:

Table 5

Imports from third countries

Country 2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Thailand Volume (items) 960 744 984 929 1 533 961 1 816 634
Thailand Index 100 103 160 189
Thailand Market share 5,3  % 4,5 % 6,8 % 8,9 %
Thailand Average price (EUR/item) 157 175 200 163
Thailand Index 100 111 128 104
Türkiye Volume (items) 1 105 850 1 487 639 1 773 851 1 696 256
Türkiye Index 100 135 160 153
Türkiye Market share 6,1  % 6,9 % 7,9 % 8,3  %
Türkiye Average price (EUR/item) 178 176 213 239
Türkiye Index 100 99 120 134
Vietnam Volume (items) 477 928 541 921 957 806 964 077
Vietnam Index 100 113 200 202
Vietnam Market share 2,6 % 2,5 % 4,2 % 4,7 %
Vietnam Average price (EUR/item) 155 178 207 193
Vietnam Index 100 115 134 125
Other third countries Volume (items) 2 287 192 2 898 840 2 849 801 2 340 028
Other third countries Index 100 127 125 102
Other third countries Market share 12,5 % 13,4  % 12,6 % 11,5 %
Other third countries Average price (EUR/item) 185 195 222 245
Other third countries Index 100 105 120 132
Total of all third countries except the country concerned Volume (items) 4 831 594 5 913 076 7 115 419 6 816 995
Total of all third countries except the country concerned Index 100 122 147 141
Total of all third countries except the country concerned Market share 26,5 % 27,3  % 31,5 % 33,5 %
Total of all third countries except the country concerned Average price (EUR/items) 175 185 213 214
Total of all third countries except the country concerned Index 100 106 122 122
Source: Eurostat Comext Source: Eurostat Comext Source: Eurostat Comext Source: Eurostat Comext Source: Eurostat Comext Source: Eurostat Comext
  • (319) During the period considered, imports from other third countries increased by around 2 million items, i.e. by 41 %. This is faster than the progression of the Union consumption and resulted in the market share increase from 26,5% to 33,5%.
  • (320) The main increase took place from imports from Thailand (856 thousand items), Türkiye (590 thousand items) and Vietnam (486 thousand items). For other third countries the increase was only modest (53 thousand items).
  • (321) The price level of imports from other third countries, especially from Thailand and Vietnam, was markedly below the Union industry selling prices.

5.5.   Economic situation of the Union industry

5.5.1.   General remarks
  • (322) The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.
  • (323) As mentioned in recitals (15) to (17), sampling was used for the assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry.
  • (324) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the review request, Eurostat statistics and submissions from ETRMA. The data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The data related to the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.
  • (325) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.
  • (326) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.
  • (327) The original investigation conducted analysis of the economic situation of the Union industry on an aggregated basis and, in certain microeconomic indicators, also at the level of tiers given the Union market segmentation. In the current investigation the Commission first analysed the economic situation of the Union industry on an aggregated basis.
  • (328) The Commission also conducted the analysis of certain indicators at the tier level. As shown in recitals (370) to (377), this analysis confirms that the trends for the product concerned considered as a whole in general correspond to those for the tiers considered separately.
  • (329) In the original investigation, the Commission weighted the results of the sampled Union producers in accordance with their share in the total Union sales of the Union producers to ensure that the SMEs were represented according to their share in the total Union sales in all micro-indicators. As SMEs are active only in tier 3 segment, this adjustment had as a direct consequence to increase the share of tier 3 sales within the set of data originating from the sampled Union producers.
  • (330) In the current investigation, the Commission considered that the original weighting was not needed in order to make an objective assessment of the state of the Union industry in the context of the expiry review. Indeed, the investigation found that the injury picture of the SMEs operating only in Tier 3 was even worse than the injury picture of the Tier 3 overall. Moreover, the Commission found that, even without weighting the data of the sampled Union producers, the Union industry suffered injury in all tiers (see recitals (370) to (377)). Thus, logically, any weighting would only increase the negative trends currently observed in the overall injury picture.
5.5.2.   Macroeconomic indicators
5.5.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation
  • (331) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Production volume (in items) 18 323 204 21 701 759 20 380 261 18 047 419
Index 100 118 111 98
Production capacity (in items) 22 867 574 24 008 277 24 237 586 21 907 693
Index 100 105 106 96
Capacity utilisation 80 % 90 % 84 % 82 %
Index 100 113 105 103
Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext and information supplied by applicant Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext and information supplied by applicant Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext and information supplied by applicant Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext and information supplied by applicant Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext and information supplied by applicant
  • (332) Along with the growth of the market and the sales in the Union market, the production volumes increased from 2020 to 2021. After that, the production declined in 2022 and decreased even further in the review investigation period. The decrease of the production volumes was attributable to the decreased sales volumes, which in turn was linked to the decrease of Union consumption and resulted in the loss of market share of the Union industry. In the review investigation period, the Union industry’s production volumes returned to the same level as in 2020. The Union industry was however able to adapt its capacity to the changes in production volumes, tempering the fluctuations of the capacity utilisation rate - which even improved slightly (by 3 %) over the whole period considered.
5.5.2.2.   Sales volume and market share
  • (333) The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Sales volume and market share

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Total Sales volume in the Union market (in items) 12 531 905 14 767 288 14 338 944 12 412 930
Index 100 118 114 99
Market share 69 % 68 % 64 % 61 %
Index 100 99 93 89
Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext Source: ETRMA, Eurostat Comext
  • (334) In the growing market, the Union industry’s sales volumes increased from 2020 to 2021. During 2022, the sales volumes of the Union industry declined despite the growth of the market and decreased further in the review investigation period. In the review investigation period, the Union industry’s sales volumes had returned to the same level as 2020. Because the sales of the Union industry lagged behind the increase of the market in 2022 and deteriorated faster than the market in the review investigation period, the market share fell from 69% to 61% during the period considered.
  • (335) In its comments on initiation Hankook group claimed that the sales of the Union industry as well as its market share remained essentially stable across the period considered and that the slight decrease from 2022 to the review investigation period could be explained by the decrease in consumption.
  • (336) The findings of the investigation do not support this claim. Albeit the sales of the Union industry were on the same level in the review investigation period compared to 2020, there was an important decrease (13 %) from 2022 to the review investigation period. Also, the Union industry’s market share decreased from 69% to 61% during the period considered.
  • (337) Therefore, this claim was rejected.
5.5.2.3.   Growth
  • (338) The Union consumption first increased from 2020 to 2022 in line with the increase of economic activity after the Covid. The increase in consumption peaked in 2022 and slowed down during the review investigation period, resulting in an overall increase of 11% during the period considered. Only during 2021 the Union industry sales could follow the positive trend of the market. In 2022 the Union industry’s sales did not increase in the same pace as the market and they deteriorated faster than the market in review investigation period. This resulted in decrease of 8 percentage points of market share (from 69% to 61%) during the period considered.
5.5.2.4.   Employment and productivity
  • (339) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Employment and productivity

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Number of employees 21 148 21 614 20 291 18 425
Index 100 102 96 87
Productivity (unit/employee) 866 1 004 1 004 979
Index 100 116 116 113
Source: ETRMA and information supplied by applicant Source: ETRMA and information supplied by applicant Source: ETRMA and information supplied by applicant Source: ETRMA and information supplied by applicant Source: ETRMA and information supplied by applicant
  • (340) During the period considered the Union industry lost over 2 700 direct jobs. When the Union industry’s production volumes increased from 2020 to 2021 also the employment increased. However, as the Union industry was also able to improve its productivity, the employment did not increase at the same rate as the production volumes. The falling production volumes from 2021 to the review investigation period resulted in decrease of jobs and also some loss of productivity.
5.5.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping
  • (341) During the review investigation period, the individual dumping margins found for the cooperating exporting producers were still substantial (see recital (283) above).
  • (342) However, despite the fact there was still dumping from China the analysis of the injury indicators shows that the measures in place had a positive impact on the Union industry at the beginning of the period considered. This positive situation however reversed in 2022 when the situation of the Union industry deteriorated again.
5.5.3.   Microeconomic indicators
5.5.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices
  • (343) The average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union (EUR/item)

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Average unit sales price in the Union (all tiers) 224 241 274 281
Index 100 107 122 125
Unit cost of production 186 193 249 260
Index 100 104 134 140
Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers
  • (344) Sales prices of tyres to unrelated customers in the Union market increased by 25% during the period considered. From 2020 to 2021 the increase of prices coincided with an increase of demand. In this situation the Union industry was able to increase its sales prices more (by 7%) than the cost of production increased (by 4 %).
  • (345) This favourable situation changed in 2022, after which the Union industry was unable to pass-on the cost increases to its selling prices. Although the sales prices increased by 18 percentage points between 2021 and the review investigation period these price increases were not in line with the increase of cost of production.
  • (346) Overall, the cost of production increased by 40 % during the period considered. The most significant increase took place from 2021 to 2022 when the cost of production increased by 30 %.
  • (347) The key injury indicators were also analysed for the three tiers.
  • (348) In tier 1, the average unit selling price increased by 55 EUR while unit costs increased by 75 EUR over the same period. The average selling price increased by 24 % while the cost of production increased by 39% over the period considered.

Table 10

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union (EUR/item) – Tier 1

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Average unit sales price in the Union on the total market 235 250 283 290
Index 100 106 120 124
Unit cost of production 191 196 256 266
Index 100 102 134 139
Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers
  • (349) In tier 2, the average unit selling price increased by 60 EUR while unit costs increased by 68 EUR over the same period. The average selling price increased by 29% while the cost of production increased by 39% over the period considered.

Table 11

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union (EUR/item) – Tier 2

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Average unit sales price in the Union on the total market 205 224 258 265
Index 100 109 126 129
Unit cost of production 173 184 228 241
Index 100 106 132 139
Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers
  • (350) In tier 3, the average unit selling price increased by 40 EUR while unit costs increased by 58 EUR over the same period. The average selling price increased by 24 % while the cost of production increased by 34 % over the period considered.

Table 12

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union (EUR/item) – Tier 3

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Average unit sales price in the Union on the total market 170 176 206 210
Index 100 104 121 124
Unit cost of production 171 187 223 229
Index 100 109 130 134
Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers
5.5.3.2.   Labour costs
  • (351) The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 13

Average labour costs per employee

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Average labour costs per employee (EUR) 50 250 54 950 64 650 64 862
Index 100 109 129 129
Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers
  • (352) The average labour cost per employee increased by 9% from 2020 to 2021 and then by 20 % from 2021 to 2022, remaining on the same level in the review investigation period.
5.5.3.3.   Inventories
  • (353) Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 14

Inventories

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Closing stocks (Index 2020 = 100) 100 123 130 155
Closing stocks as a percentage of production 14 % 15 % 16 % 21 %
Index 100 102 110 143
Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers
  • (354) Compared to the production, the closing stock remained on the same level from 2020 to 2022 (being 14 % – 16% of the production volume). An increase (to 21% of the production volume) was observed when comparing the closing stock at the end of the investigation period (30 June 2023) with the year-end stock levels in 2020 – 2022. This increase is however largely explained by seasonality. Higher volumes of tyres are sold during the second half of the year compared to the first half, whereas the production is less seasonal. Due to this seasonality, the stock volumes are usually higher at end June compared to end December. Therefore, as such, the apparent increase of stock levels during the review investigation period is not indicative of the financial situation of the Union producers.
5.5.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital
  • (355) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 15

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) 7,9 % 13,4  % 1,8 % 1,3  %
Index 100 170 23 16
Cash flow (EUR) 95 814 284 29 530 055 -57 192 051 -94 989 994
Index 100 31 -60 -99
Investments (EUR) 50 269 926 48 233 290 56 308 570 66 447 814
Index 100 96 112 132
Return on investments (%) –2,1 % 3,9 % –15,2  % –16,3  %
Index - 100 182 - 712 - 763
Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers
  • (356) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales.
  • (357) The overall profitability first improved from 2020 to 2021 when the demand of tyres increased following the recovery of road transports from the Covid crisis and when overall imports had not yet increased to the same extent as afterwards. As explained in the recital (344), the Union industry was able to increase its sales prices in 2021 more than the increase of cost of production which contributed to increased profit margins from 7,9% to 13,4 %.
  • (358) The situation changed in 2022, when the Union industry was unable to increase its prices in line with the cost increases. As a consequence, the Union industry’s profitability dropped to low levels (1,8% in 2022 and 1,3 % in the review investigation period).
  • (359) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow was declining during the whole period considered. It was influenced by two main factors. On one hand, the overall profitability of the Union industry contributed positively to the cash flow at the beginning of the period considered. This contribution was practically exhausted after the drop in profitability in 2022. On the other hand, the increase of production volumes and closing stock levels absorbed working capital and had thus a negative impact to cash flow already from 2021. Overall, the cash flow decreased from positive 96 million EUR to negative 95 million EUR during the period considered.
  • (360) Over the period considered, investments increased from 50 million EUR to 66 million EUR, i.e. by 32 %. Overall, their level remained below 10 % of the total turnover during the whole period considered.
  • (361) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It first increased from –2,1 % to 3,9 % from 2020 to 2021, in line with the improved profitability. Thereafter, when the overall profitability of the Union industry deteriorated, the return of investments decreased to –15,2 % in 2022 and –16,3 % in the review investigation period.
  • (362) The Union industry is fragmented between large groups of multi-national companies and over 400 SMEs throughout the Union and heterogeneous in relation to their ability to raise capital.
  • (363) A separate analysis on the same methodology as described was made for profitability in the three tiers.
  • (364) Development of the profitability in tier 1 during the period considered was similar to the fluctuation of the profitability of the Union industry considered as a whole. It first improved from 2020 to 2021 and then dropped to low levels (1,9% in 2022 and 1,3 % in the review investigation period).
  • (365) In tier 1, the net cash flow decreased from positive 85 million EUR to negative 56 million EUR during the period considered. The return of investment first increased from 1,1% to 7,6% and then decreased to –14,0 % in the review investigation period.

Table 16

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments – Tier 1

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) 9,4  % 15,2  % 1,9 % 1,3  %
Index 100 162 20 14
Cash flow (EUR) 85 042 290 35 716 163 -43 640 531 -56 302 048
Index 100 42 -51 -66
Investments (EUR) 38 607 861 38 181 656 45 748 927 53 222 683
Index 100 99 118 138
Return on investments (%) 1,1 % 7,6 % –13,6 % –14,0  %
Index 100 677 -1 213 -1 252
Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers
  • (366) Development of the profitability in tier 2 during the period considered first improved from 2020 to 2021, then dropped to 3,5% in 2022 and further to 2,5% in the review investigation period.
  • (367) In tier 2, the net cash flow decreased from positive 5,5 million EUR to negative 34,5 million EUR during the period considered. The return of investment decreased from 15,8% in 2020 to –28,0 % in the review investigation period.

Table 17

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments – Tier 2

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) 4,6 % 9,3  % 3,5 % 2,5 %
Index 100 203 76 55
Cash flow (EUR) 5 482 431 -2 889 233 -13 209 945 -34 464 853
Index 100 -53 - 241 - 629
Investments (EUR) 9 439 555 9 080 411 9 167 506 11 950 064
Index 100 96 97 127
Return on investments (%) –15,8 % –14,3  % –22,5 % –28,0  %
Index - 100 -91 - 143 - 178
Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers
  • (368) Tier 3 was unprofitable during the whole period considered. During the period considered the situation worsened and the negative profitability of –1,6% in 2020 decreased to –3,5% in the review investigation period. The situation was even worse for the SMEs operating in tier 3 for which the profitability fluctuated between 4,6% and –7,0% during the period considered. The slight “improvement” between 2022 and the review investigation period showed the limited success of the efforts of the industry to adapt to the difficult situation.
  • (369) In tier 3, the net cash flow decreased from positive 5,3 million EUR to negative 4,2 million EUR during the period considered. The return of investment was negative during the whole period considered, decreasing from –5,9% to –20,0 % during the period considered.

Table 18

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments – Tier 3

2020 2021 2022 Review Investigation period
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) –1,6 % –1,5 % –6,1 % –3,5 %
Index - 100 -92 - 374 - 212
Cash flow (EUR) 5 289 563 -3 296 875 - 341 574 -4 223 093
Index 100 -62 -6 -80
Investments (EUR) 2 222 510 971 223 1 392 137 1 275 067
Index 100 44 63 57
Return on investments (%) –5,9 % –10,8 % –35,4  % –20,0  %
Index 100 17 - 401 - 139
Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers Source: Verified questionnaire replies of sampled Union producers

5.6.   Conclusion on injury

  • (370) The investigation found that the Union industry as a whole showed recovery from past dumping during 2021. Between 2022 and the review investigation period, there was a reverse of this recovery.
  • (371) This is particularly evident in the Union industry’s decreased profitability, loss of market share and inability to increase prices in line with rising costs. In addition, indicators related with the profitability, such as cash flow and return of investment, also deteriorated. This was especially observed among tier 3 producers, who are particularly exposed to price pressure from low-priced imports, which in turn adversely affects the higher tiers through the reverse-cascading effect described in the original investigation 121.
  • (372) Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.

6. CAUSATION

  • (373) During the period considered the Union industry lost its market share to imports from other countries, notably Thailand, Vietnam, Türkiye and also China.
  • (374) The deterioration of Union industry’s the market share was partly attributable to the increase of Chinese imports following the partial annulment of the anti-dumping duties and more importantly due to increase of imports from other countries at low prices. The lower priced imports have made it difficult for the Union industry to increase its prices and maintain its market share in the environment of increased costs.
  • (375) Following the start of Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, prices of input materials and energy increased considerably resulting in rapid increase of cost of production. At the same time, import volumes increased and from 2022 the Union industry was unable to pass-on the cost increases to its selling prices. Although the sales prices increased by 18% between 2021 and the review investigation period, these price increases were insufficient to compensate the increase of cost of production.
  • (376) As a result, the Commission also notes that the injurious situation in which the Union industry is found comes at a time when other factors such as significant cost increases and substantial increase of low-priced imports from other countries, especially Thailand, Vietnam and Türkiye took place. As shown in recitals (317) to (321) above, the imports from Thailand and Vietnam increased substantially and their price levels were markedly below the Union industry’s prices.
  • (377) For this reason, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from China contributed to the material injury to the Union industry during the review investigation period; however, other factors in particular the cost increase and imports from other countries, were capable of putting into question the genuine relationship between the dumped imports and the effects on the Union industry. Thus, the Commission decided to further assess whether injury caused by the dumped imports from China would likely recur if measures were allowed to lapse.
  • (378) Following final disclosure, Hankook claimed that injury suffered by Union industry is not caused by Chinese imports. Hankook claimed that the Chinese imports do not undercut the Union industry prices in tier 3 nor in tier 1. To support its claim, Hankook submitted sensitive data on its export prices and volumes.
  • (379) The Commission disagreed with this claim. As stated in recital (316) the data provided by Hankook is insufficient for carrying out any further undercutting analysis as it does not contain sufficient information on other operators active in tier 1, 2 and 3. Consequently, this data could not invalidate any of the results of the undercutting analysis made by the Commission. The Commission therefore considered that the premise of this claim, i.e. that there is no undercutting in tier 1 or tier 3, is incorrect, and therefore, this claim is rejected.
  • (380) Following final disclosure Hankook also claimed that the injury suffered by the Union industry is not caused by Chinese imports but by tyres imported from other third countries.
  • (381) As stated in the recital (377), the Commission concluded that dumped imports from China contributed to the material injury to the Union industry but also other factors, in particular the cost increase and imports from other countries, were capable of putting into question the genuine relationship between the dumped imports and the effects on the Union industry. Therefore, the Commission considers that this claim does not invalidate the conclusion above and is therefore rejected.

7. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY

  • (382) The Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from China if the measures against were allowed to lapse.
  • (383) In this respect the following elements were analysed by the Commission: the production capacity and spare capacity in China, attractiveness of the Union market and export prices to third country markets and relationship between prices in the Union and China, possible absorption capacity of third country markets, likely price levels of imports from China in the absence of anti-dumping measures, and their impact on the Union industry, including undercutting and injurious level and increase of Chinese imports following temporary annulment of the anti-dumping duties.

7.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC

  • (384) As set out in recitals (286) - (288), there is substantial production capacity and spare capacity in China to increase exports to the Union market rapidly in the event that the anti-dumping measures are allowed to expire. As established in recital (287) the available unused capacity in China in 2022 amount to almost 20 million units, almost equivalent to the total consumption on the EU market.

7.2.   Attractiveness of the Union market and export prices to third country markets

  • (385) As set out in recitals (289) - (291), the Union market, which is the second largest market in the world after the United States, is an attractive market both in terms of its prices and its size. In 2023, the price level of Chinese exports to the Union was significantly higher compared to the Chinese average export prices to other main destinations, including the USA. Moreover, despite the anti-dumping measures in force, Chinese imports into the Union remained at around 30 % of the volume of imports during the initial investigation.

7.3.   Possible absorption capacity of third country markets

  • (386) As set out in recital (292) trade defence measures on exports of the like product from PRC are in force in most of the third country markets which are significant consumers of truck tyres. This makes these markets less attractive for the Chinese exporting producers. This is an additional element which supports the finding that PRC’s current production capacity would most likely end in the Union market, should measures be repealed.

7.4.   Likely price levels of imports from China in the absence of anti-dumping measures, and their impact on the Union industry, including undercutting and injurious level.

  • (387) As shown Table 4, import prices into the Union from China during the review investigation period were 218 EUR/item which is materially lower than the average sales price of the Union industry 281 EUR/item shown in Table 9, and also below their cost of production 260 EUR/item.
  • (388) Therefore, it is likely that without anti-dumping duties, the Chinese imports would materially undercut the Union prices.

7.5.   Increase of Chinese imports following partial annulment of the anti-dumping duties

  • (389) As shown in Table 3 and set out in recital (306), the increase of Chinese imports was particularly significant in 2022 when the original measures were partially annulled by General Court of the European Union.
  • (390) This indicates that the Chinese exporting producers remain interested in the Union market and imports would be likely to increase again, should the measures be repealed.
  • (391) In its comments upon initiation, the Hankook group claimed that import trends indicate that there is no threat of continuation or recurrence of injury. According to Hankook group the current market share of the Chinese imports could not have significant impact in the future of the Union industry. Also, the Hankook group claimed that the increased Chinese production capacity was not dedicated to the Union market but to other markets.
  • (392) The Commission disagreed with this view. Even if, to certain extent, the current duties somewhat shield the Union industry from the dumped imports from the PRC, Chinese imports were still able to increase their market share during the period considered. Given Chinese price levels without duties and the spare capacity available in China, it is likely that the market share of the Chinese imports would increase substantially should measures be allowed to lapse. Also, the claim that the increased Chinese capacity has been mainly directed to other markets during the period considered was not substantiated. Even if correct, the Commission considers that the Union market remains attractive to Chinese imports.
  • (393) Therefore, these claims were rejected.
  • (394) Following final disclosure Hankook claimed that there is no sufficient evidence of likelihood of recurrence of injury. In particular, Hankook claimed that the increase of imports in 2022 cannot be linked to the partial annulment of measures in 2022 and is not indicative of behaviour of the Chinese exporting producers. Hankook also claimed that there was no undercutting in tier 3, that the Chinese producers would rather increase their profits than lower their prices should the measures be allowed to lapse and, that given that Union market represented only 4% of the total Chinese export volume, the Union market cannot be considered attractive.
  • (395) The Commission disagreed with these claims. First, the partial annulment of the measures by the General Court did send a signal to the market on the possibility of partial cancellation and subsequent reimbursement of duties, making the imports potentially more attractive. Second, as explained in the recitals (316) and (379) above, the premise of the claim that there is no undercutting in tier 3 is incorrect. Third, Hankook did not submit any evidence to support its claim that the Chinese producers would rather increase their profits than lower their prices should the measures be allowed to lapse. Finally, the current level of Chinese exports to the Union when duties are in force, cannot invalidate the fact that Union market remains attractive for the reasons listed in the recitals (289) - (291) and (385) above. Therefore, this claim is rejected.

7.6.   Conclusion of the likelihood of recurrence of injury

  • (396) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that should the measures lapse, it is likely that this will result in a significant increase of dumped imports from China at injurious price levels, and therefore further aggravating the injurious situation of the Union industry.

8. UNION INTEREST

  • (397) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and end users.

8.1.   Interest of the Union industry

  • (398) Union producers representing more than 25% of the Union production volume cooperated with the investigation.
  • (399) The investigation showed that the Union industry was in a vulnerable situation where it was not able to fully pass-on the cost increases to its selling prices and its profit margins had diminished.
  • (400) The Commission concludes that given that the Union industry is already suffering injury and in case of lapse of the measures there is a strong likelihood of increase of dumped imports from China at injurious price levels this would lead to increasing price pressure on the Union market and would further aggravate the injury suffered by the Union industry.
  • (401) The continuation of the measures is therefore clearly in the interest of the Union industry.

8.2.   Interest of unrelated importers and users

  • (402) No importers or users cooperated with the investigation.
  • (403) The original investigation concluded that while the measures were not in the interest of importers that predominantly rely on the import of very cheap tyres from China, importers with broader portfolio are unlikely to be severely affected by the restoration of fair competition.
  • (404) In the absence of new evidence, the Commission therefore concluded that, like in the original investigation, the continuation of measures will not affect importers or users to any significant extent.

8.3.   Other interests

  • (405) The original investigation found that measures protecting the Union industry’s premium tyre manufacturers producing new high-quality tyres which are designed to have along life cycle and can be retreaded, and also the retreaders active in the tier 3 market, are in the interest of the Union's policy to reduce waste and to manage raw materials in a sustainable way. Moreover, given that it is mostly SMEs which are active in the retreading business, the imposition of measures would also be in line with the important Commission objective to support SMEs 122.
  • (406) In the original investigation treads suppliers had made submissions supporting the imposition of anti-dumping measures alleging such measures are essential for the survival of the retreading industry and stating that without retreading activities, their business will be severely affected. Subsequently, the Commission concluded that measures would be in the interest of treads suppliers.
  • (407) In the absence of new evidence, the Commission therefore concluded that, like in the original investigation, the measures would be in the interest of treads suppliers.

8.4.   Conclusion on Union interest

  • (408) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons under Article 21 of the basic Regulation that it would not be in the interest of the Union to maintain the existing measures on imports of tyres originating in the People’s Republic of China.

9. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

  • (409) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on continuation of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on tyres from China should be maintained.
  • (410) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.
  • (411) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of the Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.
  • (412) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.
  • (413) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in the People’s Republic of China and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.
  • (414) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission 123. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
  • (415) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure.
  • (416) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509of the European Parliament and of the Council when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.
  • (417) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1.

A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121, currently falling under CN codes 4011 20 90 and ex 4012 12 00 (TARIC code 4012 12 00 10) and originating in the People's Republic of China.

2.

The definitive anti-dumping duties applicable in euros per item of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:

Country of origin Company Anti-dumping duty TARIC additional code
China Xingyuan Tire Group Co. Ltd; Guangrao Xinhongyuan Tyre Co., Ltd 4,48 C331
China GITI Radial Tire (Anhui) Company Ltd.; GITI Tire (Fujian) Company Ltd.; GITI Tire (Hualin) Company Ltd.; GITI Tire (Yinchuan) Company Ltd. 35,74 C332
China Chongqing Hankook Tire Co., Ltd; Jiangsu Hankook Tire Co., Ltd 17,37 C334
China Aeolus Tyre Co., Ltd, Aeolus Tyre (Taiyuan) Co., Ltd; Qingdao Yellow Sea Rubber Co., Ltd; Pirelli Tyre Co., Ltd 0 C877
China Zhongce Rubber Group Co., Ltd 0 C379
China Weifang Yuelong Rubber Co., Ltd 4,48 C875
China Hefei Wanli Tire Co., Ltd 4,48 C876
China All other companies subject to re-imposition following Regulation (EU) 2023/737124 listed in Annex I 10,29
China Other cooperating companies listed in Annex II 21,62
China Other cooperating companies listed in Annex III 0
All other imports originating in People’s Republic of China 4,48 C999
3.

The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 or in Annexes I, II or III shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (number of items) of (product under review) sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in [country concerned]. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ Until such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply.

4.

Article 1(2) may be amended to add new exporting producers from the People’s Republic of China and make them subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:

  • (a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) originating in People’s Republic of China during the period between 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 (‘original investigation period’);
  • (b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and which have or could have cooperated in the investigation that led to the duty; and
  • (c) it has either actually exported the product under review originating in People’s Republic of China or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the original investigation period.

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