Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1342 of 11 July 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of multilayered wood flooring originating in the People’s Republic of China

(229) In respect of Holz-Richter’s claim relating to a specific range of products, the Commission’s analysis of price comparisons described at recital 238 of the provisional Regulation indicated that a very high degree of like for like matching (over 95 %) was present in the MWF product types sold on the Union market by the Chinese exporting producers and the Union industry. The Commission further notes that Holz-Richter linked its claim on availability to price considerations indicating that such products were not available from Union sources at the same price as the Chinese imports. Although, it cannot be excluded that a small quantity of imports do not have a direct Union industry equivalent, from the detailed price comparisons performed by the Commission in this investigation it is clear that the quantity of Chinese types which are unavailable from Union sources is very low. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(230) In the absence of further comments concerning the effects of the dumped imports, recitals 289 to 296 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(232) In the absence of comments concerning imports from third countries, recitals 297 to 303 of the provisional Regulation, revised by recital 231 of this Regulation, were confirmed.

(233) In the absence of comments concerning the export performance of the Union industry, the conclusions drawn in recitals 304 to 307 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(234) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that that the decrease in consumption in the IP caused the injurious situation of the industry, also in view that, while the market share of Chinese imports declined, those of the Union industry increased.

(235) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The Commission’s analysis in the provisional Regulation acknowledged the important impact of the fall in consumption. Recital 310 of the provisional Regulation stated that ‘It was therefore clear that the Union industry was significantly affected by the fall in consumption in the investigation period’. The Commission’s analysis examined the impact of consumption in 2022 when demand increased by 4 %. As explained in recital 311 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission concluded that since consumption increased in 2022 it could not explain the fall in profitability and other performance indicators of the Union industry in that year. Therefore, although the fall in consumption had a significant impact, the price pressure exerted by a fall in Chinese import prices also played a major role.

(236) CNFPIA returned to the issue of the fall in consumption in the IP in its comments following definitive disclosure. It provided further evidence from FEP, the European Organisation of the Sawmill Industry and the Global Wood Trade Network's Europe Prices in June 2023 to demonstrate the impact of the fall in consumption.

(237) The Commission has already recognised the importance of developments in consumption in section 5.2.3 of the provisional Regulation. The Commission maintains its view that this issue contributed to the injury suffered but that this does not mean that the dumped imports were not a major, genuine and substantial cause of injury. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(238) In the absence of further comments concerning the developments in consumption, recitals 308 to 313 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(239) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that the Commission’s finding that the increases in the costs were only a contributory factor to the injury suffered by the Union industry and that the real cause of the material injury was Chinese price pressure is not correct. The CFPIA referred to several intelligence reports relating to cost increases for Union producers of MWF and to press releases from FEP relating to raw material cost increases and which do not refer to Chinese imports as a concern causing a problem.

(240) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The Commission does not dispute the fact that costs, especially raw material costs, increased over the period considered for various reasons. This fact was acknowledged in section 5.2.4 of the provisional Regulation, which made reference to the actual cost figures of the sampled Union industry in Table 8 of the provisional Regulation. In addition, the Commission reiterates its view that cost increases need to be passed onto customers for industries to remain sustainable. The Union MWF industry suffered big falls in its profitability in 2022 and in the IP because of its inability to pass on cost increases to its customers due to the pressure in terms of both volumes and low prices of the dumped imports from China. It should be noted that the Chinese exporting producers often sourced oak products, which are key raw materials for MWF, from the Union market. Therefore, it was not only the Union industry which suffered such cost increases. Nevertheless, Chinese import prices for MWF fell by 13 % in the investigation period as reported in recital 317 of the provisional Regulation. This led to price pressure for the Union industry and was followed by the fall in profitability, return on investment and cash flow shown in Table 11 in the IP. This fall in import prices is remarkable given the increase in raw material costs which the Chinese exporting producers will have experienced and their need to incur freight costs to ship oak logs to China and return the finished MWF products to the Union. Therefore, the Commission maintains its view that increases in costs did not attenuate the injury caused by the dumped Chinese imports and the claim of the CNFPIA was rejected.

(241) CNFPIA returned to the issue of increases in cost in its comments following definitive disclosure. It provided further evidence from FEP, the Global Wood Trade Network's Europe Prices Report of September 2023 and the International Tropical Timber Organisation to demonstrate increases in raw material costs.

(242) However, the Commission has already recognised the importance of raw material cost increases in section 5.2.4 of the provisional Regulation. The Commission maintains its view, however, that raw material cost increases need to be reflected in sales prices in order for an industry to remain viable and that such price increases were prevented largely due to the prices of Chinese imports. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(243) In the absence of further comments concerning the increases in costs, recitals 314 to 318 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(244) In the absence of comments concerning captive use, recitals 319 to 320 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(245) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that Union industry made poor business decisions as evidenced by the Commission’s finding that the Union industry carried out investments to maintain efficiency but that after 2021 they had less ability to raise capital.

(246) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The facts presented in recital 280 of the provisional Regulation indicate that such investments were not excessive, but rather, modest throughout the period considered. In the years 2022 and 2023 these investments had to be limited only to those investments that were essential because of the falling ability to raise capital.

(247) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA further claimed that the Commission had not assessed their comments in paragraphs 43 to 47 of their submission from 25 July 2024.

(248) The Commission notes that it actually addressed issues related to consumption in section 5.2.3 of the provisional Regulation and issues related to the export performance of the Union industry in section 5.2.2 of the provisional Regulation. As part of this claim CNFPIA alleged that Barlinek had invested excessively during the period considered. The Commission cannot give details of Barlinek’s investment in production capacity for confidentiality reasons. However, the verified information on the sensitive file, shows that the claim is factually incorrect and therefore rejected.

(249) In the absence of comments concerning other factors, recitals 321 to 326 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(250) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that Chinese imports did not cause injury to the Union’s industry and that it should review its finding that no factor other than Chinese imports had any bearing on the situation of the Union industry.

(251) The Commission disagrees with this claim for the reasons provided in its assessment of causation in sections 5.1 and 5.2 above.

(252) In the absence of further comments concerning the conclusion on causation, recitals 327 to 332 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(253) Following provisional disclosure, FEP claimed that the target profit used by the Commission in the calculation of the injury margin was too low because it included a profit margin for a sampled Union producer which was abnormally low due to the particular circumstances that applied to that producer. FEP therefore claimed that the basic profit should be higher than the 7,15 % found in recital 337 of the provisional Regulation because the average profit rate used does not provide an adequate picture of what is required to re-establish fair competition under ordinary market conditions.

(254) The Commission recalls that, as explained in recital 337 of the provisional Regulation, the year 2020 was used as this was prior to the increase in imports at low prices which caused the injury to the Union industry. The Commission re-examined the information on file regarding the Union producer’s whose profit margin was indeed abnormally low in 2020. The name of the company cannot be revealed for confidentiality reasons. The FEP claimed that the respective company’s profitability rate was affected by certain temporary factors in 2020 such as restructuring of the business model of the company and important supply chain issues during the Covid-19 pandemic.

(255) The Commission concluded that this company should be excluded from the calculation of the basic profit, which as a result increased from 7,15 % to [8,7 % – 11 %] (20).

(256) CNFPIA made comments on the target profit used in the injury margin calculations in its submission following the definitive disclosure. CNFPIA challenged the use of 2020 as the base year for the target profit on the grounds that it was too far removed in time from the IP and suggested 2022 as an alternative. Also, 2020 was opposed by CNFPIA because that year may have been affected by the impact of Covid-19 on the Union market. Also, CNFPIA claimed that one company with low profits should not have been excluded from the data.

(257) The Commission recalled that 2020 was selected as a it was a recent year which was not affected by dumped imports. In fact, recital 284 of the provisional Regulation demonstrates that injury began in 2022. Regarding the impact of Covid-19, two of the sampled Union producers demonstrated that the year 2020 was a profitable year. However, the third sampled producer had specific problems, partially linked to impacts of Covid-19, that led to its exclusion from the data as explained at section 6.1 of the definitive disclosure. Therefore, the Commission maintains its view that 2020 was the most appropriate base year for the target profit and that it was justified to limit the data to the two companies with reasonable profits in that year. These claims were, therefore, rejected.

(258) Puderbach commented on the methodology used in the calculation of the underselling margin. Puderbach claimed that the Union industry costs used to calculate underselling were not comparable with the Chinese import prices. It was claimed that ocean freight, Union Customs fees, transport and marketing and distribution costs had not been taken fully into account.

(259) However, the calculation compared the import price at CIF level (plus importation costs such as port fees) with the Union industry’s ex-works (EXW) price meaning that ocean freight and customs fees were already in the import price. In addition, the CIF price to EXW comparison was fair because both prices required onward transport in the Union. Furthermore, the marketing and distribution costs of the Union industry were not taken into account as the Union industry costs did not include those of related traders. The detailed calculations were disclosed to the three sampled exporting producers. Therefore, the claim that the underselling calculations were imbalanced was rejected.

(260) Following provisional disclosure, Fusong and Jinfa claimed that the Commission should not only use the level of trade adjustment for calculating the undercutting margins but also for calculating the non-injurious price. Without this adjustment, Fusong and Jinfa claimed that the non-injurious price and the price of the exporting producers cannot be compared.

(261) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The calculation of the cost of production per product type applicable for the calculation of the underselling margin did not include the costs of the related traders of the Union industry. Therefore, the underselling margin was calculated based on the costs plus normal profit of the Union producers which means that no adjustment of the LoT is necessary. In other words, the LoT of the Union industry was comparable to those of the exporting producers. The claim was therefore rejected.

(262) Following provisional disclosure, Fusong and Jinfa claimed that the target profit used for the underselling calculation was excessive because it was the profitability of the group (producer plus related traders) rather than the profit of the Union producers.

(263) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The profit of both the production companies and the related traders was set according to internal transfer pricing agreements. Therefore, the only profit which was reliable was the consolidated profit at group level. In addition, an analysis of the profits made by the three sampled Union producing groups showed that the producers were taking most of the risks and making most of the profits or losses, whereas the related traders tended to function according to standard profits. Therefore, the consolidated profitability margins used were mainly derived from the production entities, were similar to the profit rates of the group and the claim that such profit rates were excessive was unsubstantiated and factually incorrect.

(264) In its comments following definitive disclosure Fusong reiterated its view that the profitability rates used to calculate the target profit were overstated because they had been calculated on a Group basis.

(265) The Commission confirmed that profits made solely by the Union producing entities were not used because they mainly covered sales to the related parties via transfer pricing arrangements. Therefore, by using the Group profit data, the Commission used the most appropriate data available. In addition, for the reasons given at recital 135 of the definitive disclosure, the Commission was satisfied that the data used was representative for sales to wholesalers. Therefore, the claim that the target profit rate was overstated was rejected.

(267) Following provisional disclosure, FEP claimed that there are raw material distortions in China within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) of the basic Regulation and that the lesser duty rule should be waived. The CNFPIA argued that the lesser duty rule should be applied.

(268) The Commission notes that whether the lesser duty rule should apply is only relevant when the dumping margins applicable to exporting producers are higher than the respective injury margins. Bearing in mind the definitive findings of dumping and injury margins, as provided in recitals 128 and 266 of this Regulation, the application or not of the lesser duty rule is not relevant. Therefore, the Commission concluded that it was not necessary to investigate if there were raw materials distortions as the result would not have any material effect on the investigation.

(270) The Commission then examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, and users.

(271) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that the Union industry was seeking an unfair advantage through these duties.

(272) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The investigation has revealed, as provided in section 4 of this Regulation that the Union industry has suffered injury as a result of the (unfair) dumped Chinese imports. The measures seek to restore the level playing field which had been distorted by the dumped Chinese imports. The claim was therefore rejected.

(273) In their comments following the definitive disclosure Lovelin of London (an importer of MWF) claimed that the Union industry would not benefit from the measures in the long-term as the measures would encourage Chinese exporters to produce MWF in third countries and innovate more than Union producers.

(274) These comments are speculative and were not substantiated by data. Therefore, they were rejected.

(275) In the absence of further comments concerning the interest of the Union interest, recitals 348 to 353 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(276) Following provisional disclosure, Amorim, MEFO Floor, HAI and Puderbach claimed that the measures would harm the business of importers since customers would not accept the pass on of the full costs on sales prices and as a result, demand will drop which would require reducing the number of staff.

(277) The Commission acknowledged in recital 359 of the provisional Regulation that the measures could have detrimental effects on the importing and trading sectors. However, the Commission also noted that these sectors may mitigate the impact on their businesses by sourcing from other third countries or from the Union industry. The Commission found the claims unsubstantiated. In the absence of actual and verified evidence since the Commission’s provisional determination, the Commission has not been in a position to substantiate the extent of the claims of detrimental effects on the importing and trading sectors. The claims were therefore rejected.

(278) Amorim commented on the ‘Interest of unrelated importers and traders’ in its submission made following definitive disclosure. Amorim comments related to i) the burden of proof on importers and traders in the investigation, ii) alternative sourcing options, iii) the long-term impact of trade defence measures, iv) the need for an economic impact assessment prior to the imposition of measures and v) the risk to market competition and supply chain stability. CNFPIA also made general comments on the ‘Interest of unrelated importers and traders’ in its submission following the definitive disclosure. Amorim claimed that importers and traders face practical limitations to defend their interests due to a lack of resources within the timeframe of the investigation between the provisional and final determinations. They claimed that this switched the burden of proof to such economic operators.

(279) The Commission’s policy for all interested parties is to notify all known parties on Day 1 of an investigation and to publish Notice of initiation in the Official Journal in order to promote cooperation so that the views of all parties can be made known and verified if necessary. This approach is in accordance with the basic Regulation. However, as investigations have legal deadlines it is inherent on all parties to come forward with views at as early a stage as possible. The Commission already commented on the low level of cooperation from importers and traders at section 7.2 of the provisional Regulation. Bearing in mind that the Commission must progress investigations in accordance with the basic Regulation, the Commission cannot accept the claim that the timeline of the investigation was detrimental to importers and traders. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 21(5) and (7) of the basic Regulation, it is for interested parties to properly submit information supported by actual evidence which is representative and substantiates its validity. Therefore, the claims were rejected.

(280) Amorim commented that it was an oversimplification to argue that businesses may simply mitigate the impact of measures by sourcing from other third countries or from within the Union industry. Amorim pointed out that traders faced several practical problems in switching suppliers such as extra costs, availability of equivalent products and contractual issues.

(281) The Commission maintained its view that by sourcing from other third countries or from within the Union industry that importers and traders are able to mitigate the effects of measures on their business. The Commission acknowledges the practical issues raised by Amorim but the wide range of MWF products available from the Union industry alone and its spare capacity mean that switching sources of supply remains a viable option for importers and traders. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(282) Amorim commented that the definitive disclosure did not take into account the long-term impact of the detrimental effects of measures. Amorim claimed that the absence of immediately quantifiable damage should not be interpreted as evidence that no damage exists or will occur.

(283) The measures proposed are due to last for 5 years and Amorim did not specify the negative impacts that might impact importers and traders, but simply speculated that there could be some impacts which are foreseen. Article 21 of the basic Regulation clearly states that Union interest arguments need to provide compelling arguments to overturn the need to impose duties. This claim was therefore rejected as it was unsubstantiated.

(284) Amorim also commented that a full economic assessment of interested parties’ interests should be performed and that this was not the case in this investigation. The Commission must again refer to Article 21 of the basic Regulation which explains the nature of the analysis required in an anti-dumping case.

(285) The Commission has followed the procedural requirements, and it is the responsibility of interested parties to come forward to make their views known within the timeframe of an investigation, including the economic impact on importers and traders. This claim was therefore rejected.

(286) Amorim also commented that the measures would discourage diversified sourcing and steering demand toward a narrower pool of suppliers, the measures may inadvertently reduce market competition, raise input costs, and foster supply chain fragility.

(287) The purpose of the measures is to restore fair competition on the market. The imports from China represent unfair competition due to dumping. The Commission does not therefore believe – nor has any evidence – that the measures are anti-competitive. This claim was therefore rejected.

(288) In the absence of further comments concerning the interest of unrelated importers and traders, recitals 354 to 365 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(289) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA disagreed with the Commission’s conclusion that users and retailers would be able to pass on price increases to their customers given the decrease in consumption in the Union. The CNFPIA also disagreed with the Commission’s statement that there will not be shortage of supply.

(290) The Commission found the claim unsubstantiated as there was no new concrete and verified data on file. The claim was therefore rejected.

(291) Following provisional disclosure, HAI claimed that the measures would harm the business of retailers and distributors since customers would not accept the pass on of the full costs on sales prices and as a result, demand will drop.

(292) Although the Commission found this claim unsubstantiated, the Commission had already acknowledged in recital 368 of the provisional Regulation that the measures could have detrimental effects on users and retailers but these would not be disproportionate as they would not suffer from lack of supply, as other sources of supply exist. Since the Commission’s provisional determination, the Commission has not been in a position to substantiate the extent of the claims of detrimental effects on retailers and users, this claim was therefore rejected.

(293) Amorim commented on the ‘Interest of users and retailers’ in its submission made following definitive disclosure. Amorim comments related to i) the problems of switching sources of supply of MWF, ii) the degree of consideration of long-term effects, iii) the alleged lack of a proactive approach iv) the impact on SMEs and specialized retailers v) an alleged inconsistency in the Commission’s approach and vi) broader consumer issues. CNFPIA also made general comments on the ‘Interest of users and retailers’ in its submission following the definitive disclosure.

(294) As with importers and traders Amorim also commented on the issues faced by users and retailers when switching suppliers such as extra costs, availability of equivalent products and contractual issues.

(295) The Commission maintained its view that by sourcing from other third countries or from within the Union industry users and retailers are able to mitigate the effects of measures on their business. The Commission acknowledges the practical issues raised by Amorim but the wide range of MWF products available from the Union industry alone and its spare capacity mean that switching sources of supply remains a viable option for importers and traders. Therefore, the claims were rejected.

(296) Amorim also reiterated its point that users and retailers such as installers, contractors, and developers would be affected by the measures. Amorim claimed that retailers may face declining sales, pressure on margins, and reduced product diversity. In addition, Amorim explained that the construction and renovation industry, already facing elevated costs due to inflation and supply chain pressures, may see delayed or downsized projects.

(297) Although these comments by Amorim provided more detail on their views relating to the impact of the measures on users and retailers, the Commission already accepted at recital 368 that the measures would have some negative impact on these parties. However, the absence of cooperation from these sectors means that the Commission has not been able to evaluate how important MWF is to various kinds of retailers and users in terms of sales turnover, what are their current profitability margins and how important the increased costs would be. The Commission therefore reiterates its view that the claims that these sectors will suffer major detrimental effects as a result of the measures have not been substantiated.

(298) Amorim also commented that the definitive disclosure did not take into account the long-term impact of the detrimental effects of measures on users and retailers. Amorim claimed that the absence of immediately quantifiable damage should not be interpreted as evidence that no damage exists or will occur.

(299) The measures proposed are due to last for 5 years and Amorim did not specify the negative impacts that might impact users and retailers, but simply speculated that there could be some impacts which are foreseen. Article 21 of the basic Regulation clearly states that Union interest arguments need to provide compelling arguments to overturn the need to impose duties. This claim was therefore rejected as it was unsubstantiated.

(300) Amorim also alleged that the Commission’s analysis of users and retailers was ‘passive’ and put the burden of proof on the affected parties. In respect of SMEs Amorim commented that the definitive disclosure did not take into account the interests of SME users and retailers which may have less resources and may be less resilient to market disruption.

(301) The Commission rejects the claim that it was passive in its approach to the Union interest investigation. The views of all parties (including SMEs) were sought in both the Notice of Initiation and the letters despatched to the interested parties on Day 1 of the investigation. In this case very few parties came forward to make their views known and none completed the questionnaire designed for the use by users and retailers. Again, the Commission must refer to Article 21 of the basic Regulation which makes it clear that as part of the Union interest test interested parties need to demonstrate compelling reasons to overturn findings of dumping, injury and causation. The Commission must therefore reject the claim that it acted unfairly or with inadequate thoroughness.

(302) Amorim also alleged that there was an inconsistency in the Commission’s approach pointing out that the provisional Regulation explicitly acknowledges the potential detrimental effects of the measures on users and retailers, yet the definitive disclosure rejects issues based solely on a lack of formal evidence.

(303) The Commission’s provisional Regulation addresses all issues raised at that stage of the investigation whereas at the definitive stage the investigation focuses on new issues and points made following the publication of the provisional Regulation. In order to clarify this matter the Commission continues to acknowledge that certain negative impacts may result on users and retailers as a result of the measures.

(304) Amorim’s comments in this section relating to consequences for consumers are dealt with in the section entitled ‘Interests of consumers’.

(305) In the absence of further comments concerning the interest of users and retailers, recitals 366 to 369 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(306) Following provisional disclosure, Amorim and Barth claimed that the EU timber industry, which was selling raw material to Chinese exporting producers, will see a decrease in their exports.

(307) Although the Commission found this claim unsubstantiated, the Commission indicated in recital 373 of the provisional Regulation that it did not expect the EU timber industry to be disproportionately affected by the measures since they were likely to support EU producers and the production in other third countries. Since the Commission’s provisional determination, the Commission has not been in a position to substantiate the extent of the claims of detrimental effects on the EU timber industry, this claim was therefore rejected.

(308) In its comments following definitive disclosure Holz-Richter claimed that the entry into force of the EU Deforestation Regulation (‘EUDR’) would compound the negative effects of the measures on the Union timber industry, which would lose business with Chinese exporting producers of MWF.

(309) This claim was not substantiated and in the absence of cooperation from the timber industry it was not possible to evaluate this claim or to assess whether the timber industry would increase sales to the Union MWF industry. The claim was therefore rejected.

(310) In the absence of further comments concerning the interest of the Union timber industry, recitals 370 to 373 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(311) Following provisional disclosure, Amorim, MEFO Floor, Puderbach and HAI claimed that consumers will be harmed as a result of increased prices caused by the measures.

(312) The Commission notes that this claim was already addressed in recital 375 of the provisional Regulation. The Commission does not contest that prices in the Union market are likely to increase as a result of this investigation. However, the Commission reiterates that MWF is not a regular purchase for consumers and in fact, MWF does not feature as an important element of most consumers’ budgets. Therefore, the Commission dismissed this claim as there was no evidence that the measures may disproportionately affect consumers.

(313) Amorim commented on the ‘Interest of consumers’ in its submission made following definitive disclosure. Amorim comments related to i) the significance of MWF flooring to consumers, ii) the degree of consideration of long-term effects, iii) the alleged lack of a proactive approach iv) the impact on SMEs and specialized retailers v) an alleged inconsistency in the Commission’s approach and vi) broader consumer issues.

(314) CNFPIA and Holz-Richter also made general comments on the ‘Interest of consumers’ in their submissions following the definitive disclosure.

(315) Amorim and Lovelin of London challenged the Commission’s finding concerning the importance of MWF in consumer’s budgets. Amorim made a distinction between consumers which had recently bought MWF flooring and other consumers. Amorim quoted figures from the European Consumer Research 2023 published by FEP to support its comment that one-time purchases such as MWF flooring can still have significant economic consequences on consumers. The research shows that 17 % of consumers had installed a new floor of some kind in the last 4 years. However, the same research shows that only 13 % of such floors were made of wood. This means that only 2 % of consumers in the research survey had installed a wooden floor in the last 4 years. The Commission therefore maintains its view that MWF does not feature as an important element of most consumers’ budgets.

(316) Amorim also claimed that there would be a disproportionate impact on price-sensitive consumers who would normally buy MWF made in China.

(317) First of all, this claim lends support to the Commission’s finding that Chinese imports undercut the Union producer’s sales price. Furthermore, the Commission believes that such competition should be based on fair trade and therefore rejected the claim that the measures resulting from this investigation disproportionately affect price-sensitive consumers.

(318) Amorim also claimed that the Commission had not performed an adequate consumer impact assessment on the issues which would establish new findings for the investigation. Amorim also argued that the Commission should conduct thorough research in order to ensure that broader EU policy goals would not be undermined by the measures, such as the Green Deal, social equity and affordable housing.

(319) The Commission pointed out that no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the anti-dumping measures proposed in the definitive disclosure would undermine these wider policy goals. Furthermore, the Commission recalled that the anti-dumping investigations are limited in time by strict statutory deadlines. As such the Commission is reliant on interested parties to submit actual, representative evidence and arguments to substantiate their views. The Commission has no choice but to operate within this legal framework. The Commission therefore rejects the claim that it did not operate within the law to identify consumer views and consider the impact on wider issues.

(320) In the absence of further comments concerning the interest of Union consumers, recitals 374 to 376 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

(321) Following provisional disclosure, Amorim, MEFO Floor, Puderbach and the CNFPIA claimed that the measures would lead to the substitution of MWF by cheaper, less sustainable, products.

(322) The Commission cannot exclude that some degree of substitution may take place. However, this claim was unsubstantiated as no evidence was submitted to support the claim or the magnitude of any eventual substitution. The claim was therefore rejected.

(323) Following definitive disclosure Amorim reiterated its comments that the measures would lead to a reduction in demand for MWF and an increase in consumption of cheaper flooring options such as laminate, vinyl and luxury vinyl tiling (LVT). Holz-Richter, Lovelin of London and Puderbach supported these views. Amorim provided data on certain flooring types covering the years 2020 and 2024 to demonstrate that demand for different types of flooring shifted and identified price as a reason for these developments.

(324) The Commission did not contest that some consumers may switch to more affordable flooring alternatives in response to price increases. However, the Consumer Research submitted by Amorim clearly indicates that pricing is just one of factors that affect a consumers’ decision making. In addition, CNFPIA submitted that demand in the MWF sector will increase in the coming years due to reduced inflation of its key costs once the Ukraine War is over. Nevertheless, clearly the Commission has not been presented with compelling evidence that the issue of substitutability demonstrates that measures are not in the Union Interest.

(325) Following provisional disclosure, Amorim and MEFO Floor, Puderbach and HAI claimed that as imports from China will decrease, they will be replaced by imports from other third countries. These parties claimed that the measures would not provide benefits to the Union industry.

(326) The Commission considers this claim unsubstantiated. However, it stems from the Commission’s view in recital 359 of the provisional Regulation that the Union industry would benefit from the measures.

(327) In the absence of comments concerning the conclusion on Union interest, recital 377 of the provisional Regulation was confirmed.

(328) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned.

(330) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation in respect to these companies. These duty rates are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned manufactured by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in China’.

(331) The Commission requested additional documents, such as business licences and articles of association from the non-sampled cooperating exporters to confirm their status as producers of the product concerned. From 63 parties that provided additional information, Huzhou Teya Floor Co., Ltd failed to demonstrate a link with the investigation and the Commission could not concluded that the company is an actual producer of the product concerned. Another company, JILIN XINYUAN WOODEN INDUSTRY CO., LTD, has not provided any additional information or evidence that it is an exporting producer. Therefore, these companies were considered as non-cooperating and deleted from the list of cooperating exporting producers.

(332) Following the definitive disclosure JILIN XINYUAN WOODEN INDUSTRY CO., LTD provided the requested information. Therefore, the company was added to the list of cooperating exporting producers.

(333) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (21). The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(334) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the proper application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in China’.

(335) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States should carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(336) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume, in particular after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances, an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated, provided that the conditions for doing so are met. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(337) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other imports originating in China should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

(338) Exporting producers that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the IP; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

(339) In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duties imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected up to the levels established under the present Regulation.

(340) As mentioned in section 1.2, the Commission made imports of the product under investigation subject to registration.

(341) Following provisional disclosure, FEP claimed that Eurostat statistics show that imports from China had increased massively and that the conditions for retroactive collection of duties were met.

(342) During the definitive stage of the investigation, the data collected in the context of the registration was assessed. The Commission analysed whether the criteria under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation were met for the retroactive collection of definitive duties.

(343) The Commission considers that the imports of the product concerned have been registered in accordance with Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation in compliance with criterion (a).

(344) The Commission considers that importers have been given an opportunity for comment under criterion (b) with the publication of the provisional Regulation.

(345) Pursuant to Article 10(4)(c) of the basic Regulation, there needs to be ‘a history of dumping over an extended period, or the importer was aware of, or should have been aware of, the dumping as regards the extent of the dumping and the injury alleged or found’. In the present case, the Commission considers that the importers were aware, or should have been aware of, the dumping as regards the extent of the dumping and the injury alleged or found since the date of initiation of the investigation.

(346) The Notice of Initiation and the non-confidential version of the complaint contained a number of statements and items of evidence supporting and stating the extent of the dumping and injury alleged. Consequently, the Commission considered that the importers and users were aware, or should have been aware, of the alleged dumping practices, the extent thereof and the alleged injury.

(347) It is thus concluded that this criterion of retroactive collection of duties has been met.

(348) Following definitive disclosure, AUMI and CNFPIA challenged the Commission's decision to retroactively impose anti-dumping duties from the date of registration and submitted that the Commission’s approach failed to meet all cumulative conditions set out in Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation as interpreted by the Court in case T-749/16 (22). The CNFPIA submitted that that the Commission has not provided a duly substantiated justification for its decision to register in the first place. According to CNFPIA the decision to register imports must be duly substantiated in particular when the Commission (like in the present case) acts ex officio. CNFPIA also noted that this is contrary to the Commission’s practice in previous investigations and claimed that the Commission's failure to adequately substantiate its registration decision breaches the legal principles established by the General Court and undermines legal certainty for importers.

(349) The Commission noted that in accordance with Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation imports shall be made subject to registration following a request, from the Union industry, which contains sufficient evidence to justify such action. Imports may also be made subject to registration on the Commission’s own initiative. Whereas it is clear that registration of imports following a request is subject to the existence of sufficient evidence to justify registration, there is no such requirement for registration of imports on the Commission’s own initiative. The Commission also noted that the change in practice has been communicated in the Commission’s press release of 24 September 2024 (23). This claim was therefore rejected.

(350) Moreover, CNFPIA and AUMI submitted that the Commission failed to demonstrate that importers were aware (or should have been aware) of the extent of alleged dumping and injury and that the Commission's approach in the present investigation essentially renders Article 10(4)(c) redundant. By automatically registering all imports as of September 2024 the Commission removed the substantive value of the awareness requirement, making it a procedural formality rather than a legally meaningful condition. AUMI and CNFPIA claimed that the Commission’s presumption that importers should have been aware of dumping following the publication of the Notice of Initiation (NoI) and of the non-confidential version of the complaint has rendered Article 10(4)(c) of the basic Regulation hollow.

(351) Amorim claimed that the mere publication of the NoI was not sufficient for the Commission to claim that parties should have been aware of dumping within the meaning of Article 10(4)(c) of the basic Regulation.

(352) The Commission noted that CNFPIA and AUMI confuse two concepts: registration and retroactive collection. Whereas registration is a customs tool facilitating the identification of the imports on which retroactive collection of duties may be sought and can be done on Commission’s own initiative, retroactive collection can only take place if the conditions set out in Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation are assessed and met. As explained in recitals 345 to 346 above, the Commission assessed and established that importers were aware of, or should have been aware of, the dumping as regards the extent of the dumping and the injury alleged or found’. As confirmed by the Court in case T-749/16 (24) referenced in recital 348 above, the Commission considered that importers were aware or should have been aware of the dumping and the injury alleged since the publication of the NoI and of the non-confidential version of the complaint. Therefore, the Commission rejected this claim.

(353) CNFPIA further argued that the Commission had not proven that there was a substantial post-IP increase in imports. At the outset, the IP (2023) was itself characterized by a significant reduction in imports. In comparison to the particularly low import volumes in 2023, the slight increase in imports in 2024 was simply a rebound to more typical levels of trade, as demonstrated by data from previous years. While Chinese imports increased in 2024, they remained below the levels observed in 2022, when the market conditions were more typical. CNFPIA noted that unlike in its previous investigations, the Commission failed to conduct a thorough analysis of post-IP imports in order to assess how post-IP import volumes have, or even could have, impacted market conditions, particularly in terms of pricing and competition. Furthermore, the Commission failed to assess any potential stockpiling by importers and thus had failed to show that any increase was likely to undermine the remedial effect of the anti-dumping duties. In light of these omissions, the CNFPIA submitted that the Commission had failed to meet the conditions outlined in Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. As such, the retroactive application of duties was unjustified and should be reconsidered as the retroactive collection of duties remains an exception which can only be justified in extraordinary circumstances.

(354) Amorim, Barth, Fusong, Lovelin and Thede&Witte submitted that the Commission should have taken into account the lead-time between the date of the order and the date of the import when assessing if importers should have been aware of dumping. Amorim and Barth claimed that most of the imports following the publication of the NoI had been ordered prior to the NoI. Amorim claimed that the lead-time between the date of the order and the date of import was between 12 and 16 weeks including four to six weeks to manufacture the goods and around 60 days for the shipments to reach the Union. Thede & Witte claimed that the lead-time was of at least three months, Fusong between 3,5 and 4,5 months and Lovelin of at least six months. Barth claimed that the vast majority of the MWF imported after the publication of the NoI had been ordered before the NoI and submitted confidential data to support the claim. AUMI submitted that the Commission did not investigate if stockpiling had occurred and added that during the verification visit of Lamett, the Commission did not enquire or verify the matter. In view of this lead-time, these parties claimed that at the time of the orders they could not have been aware of dumping and therefore, the condition in Article 10(4)(c) of the basic Regulation had not been fulfilled.

(355) At the outset the Commission recalls that, as noted by the General Court in Stemcor, ‘Article 10(4)(d) of the basic regulation requires, for the purposes of retroactively applying a definitive anti-dumping duty, that, “in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period, there is a further substantial rise in imports” which, “in the light of its timing” and volume and other circumstances, is likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive anti-dumping duty to be applied’ (25). It is clear that the provision refers to ‘imports’ and not ‘orders’ that are likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive anti-dumping duty to be applied. The Court further found that ‘the effects of imports made during the registration period cannot be distinguished with certainty from the effects of those made before that period, since the low-priced imports that entered the European Union during the registration period might be added to an increased stockpile of products established beforehand, at a time when importers were already aware of the possibility that anti-dumping duties might be applied retroactively on registered imports, thereby contributing to seriously undermining the remedial effect of the definitive anti-dumping duty to be applied’ (26).

(356) Finally, whilst the importer’s awareness of the initiation of the investigation is decisive for the purposes of applying Article 10(4)(c) (27) of the basic Regulation (28), this Implementing Regulation ‘does not pursue a “punitive” objective. Whilst, […], Article 10(1) of the basic Regulation affirms the principle of non-retroactivity of anti-dumping measures, several provisions of the basic regulation derogate from that principle by permitting, under certain conditions, the application of anti-dumping measures to products released into free circulation before the entry into force of the regulation establishing those measures, those products having been registered in accordance with Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation, and does so with the sole purpose of preventing the remedial effect of the definitive measures from being seriously undermined and those measures thereby being rendered meaningless’ (29). It follows that the likely effect of the relevant imports, rather than the intention of the importers should be in the focus of the assessment under Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. Consequently, ‘the “further substantial rise in imports” within the meaning of Article 10(4)(d) of the basic [R]egulation must be assessed as a whole in order to determine whether the imports, taken as a whole, are likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive duties and thus create additional injury for the Union industry, without considering the individual and subjective position of the importers in question’ (30).

(357) The Commission did not contest that the time elapsed between the order and the import date may have taken several weeks or months. In addition to recalling the principles reproduced in the previous two recitals, and in particular the focus of Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation on the effect of the imports rather than the intention behind the them or timing of their orders, the Commission considered that for pending orders following the publication of the NoI, importers could have considered alternatives to importing such large quantities including reselling to markets outside the EU or renegotiating with their supplier. The Commission assessed the data submitted by Barth and noted that it only represented 14 % of all the imports from China. Therefore, in addition to being essentially irrelevant in view of the principles recalled above, the Commission did not consider the data sufficiently representative to assume that all other importers were in the similar situation. In addition, Barth did not provide a questionnaire reply and its data could not be verified. In relation to AUMI’s claim, the Commission acknowledged that it did not verify if Lamett, which was the only importer that cooperated in this investigation, had been stockpiling in 2024. However, the Commission noted that as imports from Lamett represented only 6 % of all the imports from China in the IP, it could not have been used to draw conclusions. The Commission further noted that the submissions summarised in recital 354 do not contest that the imports rose significantly although the reason provided was to import MWF in advance of the entry into force of the EU Deforestation Regulation (‘EUDR’). Therefore, the Commission rejected these claims.

(358) Pursuant to Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation, there needs to be ‘a further substantial rise in imports in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period’.

(359) The average monthly import volume reported in Eurostat (31) from the PRC during the investigation period was 935 477 m2 (32). The Eurostat data shows that the average monthly import volume from the PRC in the period starting in the first full month after publication of the Notice of initiation of the investigation in the Official Journal of the European Union and ending in the last full month preceding the imposition of provisional measures (June 2024 to December 2024) was 1 457 082 m2, that is, 56 % higher than the average during the full investigation period. This figure was also 66 % higher than the monthly average import volume of those same calendar months during the IP (June 2023 to December 2023).

(360) Taking the period from the first full month following initiation and ending in the last full month preceding the registration of imports (June 2024 to September 2024) results in a monthly average import volume of 1 430 396 m2, which is 53 % higher than the monthly average during the full investigation period. This figure was also 52 % higher than the monthly average import volume of those same calendar months during the IP (June 2023 to September 2023).

(361) Both results demonstrate that there was a substantial increase in import volumes after initiation.

(362) This increase in imports has taken place against a drop in consumption of 5 % in 2024 as compared to 2023, as described in industry publications (33). This is a clear sign of further injury to the Union industry.

(363) Absent any other explanation, the Commission concluded that the substantial increase in import volumes after initiation was indicative of the existence of stockpiling.

(364) Furthermore, the monthly average import price in the period between June 2024 to September 2024 was EUR 22,22 per m2, which was 4,1 % lower than the monthly average price during the full IP. In addition, the monthly average import price in the period between June 2024 to December 2024 was 22,47 per m2, which was 3 % lower than the monthly average price during the full IP. These results indicate that the substantial increase in Chinese imports were at prices lower, in average, than those during the IP.

(365) Following definitive disclosure, Fusong claimed that the Commission should have disclosed the adjusted monthly import data to offer the opportunity to comment on it.

(366) The Commission noted that it already described the methodology to adjust Eurostat import quantities in m2 in recital 227 of the provisional Regulation and has included the results in recitals 359 and 360 above. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(367) Fusong submitted that the Commission should have taken into account the lead-time between order and import when assessing the increase in imports. Amorim, Barth claimed that most quantities imported as of June 2024 corresponded to orders prior to 17 May 2024 and Barth submitted confidential data to support its claim. AUMI, Barth, CNFPIA, Fusong and Thede&Witte added that imports in 2023 were abnormally low and therefore not suitable for comparing them against the figures from 2024. AUMI submitted that the increase in imports resulting from comparing against 2023 data should have been assessed in the light of its timing and volume and other circumstances as required by Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. Fusong suggested comparing the imports in 2024 against the total period considered. Barth and Fusong added that the market conditions had led importers to stockpile in 2022 and following the drop in consumption in 2023, it resulted in a reduction of imports in 2023. AUMI submitted that in the period considered and in 2024, imports in the second half of these years were generally higher than in the first half except in 2023, which AUMI attributed, as did CNFPIA, to the impact of the Red Sea crisis on commercial shipping as of November 2023. Cora Domenica claimed that they had imported less quantity in 2024 than in 2023.

(368) As regards the claims related to the role of the lead time between the date of the order and the date of the import, and as explained in recitals 355 to 356 above, the Commission did not consider relevant to exclude imports ordered before the publication of the NoI from the comparison. As noted by the Court in case T-749/16 referenced in recital 348 above, the ‘further substantial rise in imports’ within the meaning of Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation must be assessed from the moment that importers were aware of the possibility that a duty might subsequently be applied on registered imports, which means that the imports that took place as of the publication of the notice of initiation of investigation must be included in order to determine whether those imports, together with the imports which took place during the registration period, were likely to undermine the remedial effect of the definitive duties to be applied (34). Therefore, that argument must be rejected.

(369) As regards the claims related the representativity of 2023, the Commission considers 2023 appropriate as the Commission has used the IP data not only for comparing import quantities but also for comparing consumption and prices. Furthermore, in view of the submissions from Barth and Fusong regarding stockpiling in 2022, there is no evidence on file to conclude that using 2022 in the calculation would have rendered a more representative result. Regarding the claim from Cora Domenica, the Commission acknowledged that some importers may have imported lower quantities than in 2023. However, the ‘further substantial rise in imports’ within the meaning of Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation must be assessed in their totality in order to determine whether the imports, taken as a whole, are likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive duties and thus create additional injury for the Union industry, without considering the individual and subjective position of the specific importers in question. Therefore, the Commission rejected these claims.

(370) Amorim, Barth, Lovelin, Puderbach, Thede&Witte claimed that the increase in inventories was not in anticipation of potential anti-dumping duties but in anticipation of the entry into force of the EU Deforestation Regulation (‘EUDR’) by the end of December 2024. These parties claimed that this new Regulation introduced certain requirements that would have made compliance difficult. Barth further submitted that the confidential data submitted showed that imports decreased sharply as of November 2024, serving as a proof that the reason for increasing inventories was the entry into force of the EUDR. Holz-Richter claimed that the increase in imported quantities was due to the poor availability of MWF by EU producers, especially in 2021 and 2022. AUMI and Puderbach claimed that increased import quantities from China was also due to the decrease in imports from Ukraine.

(371) The Commission does not consider relevant the reasons for stockpiling since the result, regardless of the reasons, is that goods were imported at significantly higher quantities and lower prices before the provisional duties entered into force. Regardless of their raison d’être, those stocks are ‘likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive anti-dumping duty to be applied’ within the meaning of Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the Commission rejected these claims.

(372) Fusong, Thede&Witte contested the decrease in consumption used by the Commission in the context of assessing the condition under Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation. Fusong indicated that the figure used is a preliminary forecast by FEP and that the Commission should have verified it. Thede&Witte argued that the figure may have included a mix of products such as solid wood and mosaic. Furthermore, it submitted a press release from the German Parquet Association which reported an increase in sales in Germany of 8 %.

(373) The Commission noted that it had used the only document available on file as regards Union consumption in 2024 and other parties had not submitted any other information. The Commission also noted that an increase in consumption in Germany could still result in a decrease in consumption in the Union. The Commission simulated a scenario whereby Union consumption would have increased in 2024 by 8 % as compared to 2023. Using the adjusted Eurostat import quantities in 2024, the results showed that the market share of Chinese imports would still have increased and that the market share of EU industry would have decreased. Therefore, the Commission rejected these claims.

(374) AUMI and Fusong claimed that comparing monthly average prices was too simplistic as it did not cater, for instance, for differences in the product mix and added that the result was insufficient to draw conclusions. Fusong further submitted that the Commission did not disclose the data and therefore could not assess the reported price decrease. Barth submitted that the price decrease used by the Commission is insignificant and could be attributed to differences in factors such as the prices of raw material prices, currency exchange rates or sea freight rates.

(375) The Commission noted that average monthly prices for imports is only available through the Eurostat statistics which do not differentiate between the different types of products concerned. The Commission further noted that in its assessment, it did not use the price difference in isolation but together with the difference in imported quantities and in consumption. The Commission also considered that insofar there is not a major increase in import prices, the extent of the decrease does not have any effect on the assessment. As regards the claim on the availability of the data, the Commission had already addressed it in recital 366 above. Therefore, the Commission rejected these claims.

(376) Amorim claimed that the Commission did not demonstrate that imports post-NoI had harmed the Union industry. Furthermore, AUMI, Amorim, CNFPIA, Fusong and Thede&Witte claimed that the Commission did not prove that imports had undermined the remedial effect of the measures. AUMI and CNFPIA claimed that as in the investigation on Cold-rolled flat steel products (35), the Commission should have i) assessed post-IP import quantities and market shares, ii) analysed price developments and post-IP price undercutting and iii) examined the claims as regards stockpiling. Barth claimed that most of the quantities imported in the second half of 2024 had left its warehouses as it had been sold or distributed and submitted evidence to support the claim. Thede&Witte claimed that the decrease in imported quantities as of November 2024 suggested that earlier imported products had been sold. Therefore, those imports could not have undermined the remedial effects of the measure.

(377) The Commission did not consider that the provisions in Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation required assessing if imports after the publication of the NoI had caused injury to the Union industry. To recall Article 10(4)(d) requires that ‘there is a further substantial rise in imports which, in the light of its timing and volume and other circumstances, is likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive anti-dumping duty to be applied’. Using the adjusted Eurostat import quantities from 2024 and the consumption level, the Commission estimated that the market share of Chinese imports increased from 21,5 % in 2023 to 31,2 % in 2024 notably at the expense of the market share of the EU industry which fell from 67,1 % in 2023 to 57,9 % in 2024. The Commission considered that the increase in inventories had allowed reducing imports after provisional measures and therefore undermined the effect of the measures since the imported quantities and stocks would not include anti-dumping duties and therefore could be resold at lower prices than duty-paid imports. As regards the data submitted by Barth, the Commission considered that it was not sufficiently representative to draw conclusions as indicated in recital 357 above. As regards the claim from Thede&Witte, the Commission does not consider that lower quantities of imports in a given month is an indicator that imports in earlier months had been sold. Therefore, the Commission rejected these claims.

(378) AUMI claimed that the retroactive collection of duties would not be in the Union interest. AUMI, Amorim and Lovelin submitted that the retroactive collection of duties would cause disproportionate harm on importers.

(379) The Commission noted that there is no legal requirement under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation to assess the Union interest. However, although the Commission acknowledged that the retroactive collection of duties will harm some importers all the conditions for the retroactive collection of duties have been met in the case at hand. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

(380) On this basis, the Commission concluded that the conditions as set out in Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation for the retroactive application of the definitive anti-dumping duty are met. A definitive anti-dumping duty should therefore be levied on the product concerned, which was made subject to registration by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2733. The level of the duty to be collected retroactively should be set at the level of the provisional duties imposed under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/78, to the extent that they are lower than the level of the definitive duties imposed under the present Regulation. Where the definitive duty is lower than the provisional duty, the duty shall be recalculated in order to collect the lower amount.

(381) The product concerned currently falls under the CN code 4418 75 00 . The Commission has evidence on the file that, when exported, the product concerned is sometimes declared wrongly under the Chinese customs codes 4412 52 00 and 4412 92 00 . These codes refer to blockboards, laminboards and battenboards with at least one outer ply of non-coniferous wood other than tropical wood. Moreover, the Commission established that even though the product concerned was produced in China, when exported to destinations other than the Union, it was occasionally labelled as originating from another third country. Consequently, to minimise the risk of circumvention, the Commission considered appropriate to monitor imports from China of products declared under CN codes 4412 52 00 and 4412 92 00 , and the imports of the product concerned originating or consigned from other third countries.

(382) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (36), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(383) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

— Panels of bamboo or with at least the top layer (wear layer) of bamboo, and panels for mosaic floors.

Article 2

The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/78 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of on imports of multilayered wood flooring originating in the People’s Republic of China shall be definitively collected. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive rates of the anti-dumping duty shall be released.

Article 3

A definitive anti-dumping duty is levied on imports of multilayered wood flooring, currently falling under CN code 4418 75 00 originating in the People’s Republic of China, which have been registered in accordance with Article 1(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2733.

The rate of the anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the products described in Article 1(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2733 and produced by the companies listed below, shall be as follows:

Article 4

Article 1 (2) may be amended to add new exporting producers from the People’s Republic of China and make them subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:

(a) it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) during the period of investigation (1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023);

(b) it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and which could have cooperated in the original investigation; and

(c) it has either actually exported the product concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation.

Article 5

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 11 July 2025.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj.

(2) OJ C 2024/3186, 16.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3186/oj.

(3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2733 of 24 October 2024 making imports of multilayered wood flooring originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (OJ L, 2024/2733, 25.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2733/oj).

(4) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/78 of 15 January 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of multilayered wood flooring originating in the People’s Republic of China, (OJ L, 2025/78, 15.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/78/oj).

(5) Judgment of 21 June 2023, Guangdong Haomei New Materials and Guangdong King Metal Light Alloy Technology v Commission, T-326/21, EU:T:2023:347, paragraph 134-135.

(6) See for instance: https://www.reuters.com/markets/turkey-raises-monthly-minimum-wage-by-50-2023-2022-12-22/.

(7) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/58 of 14 January 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel originating in the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 10, 17.1.2022, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/58/oj), recital 95.

(8) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2415 of 12 September 2024 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain alkyl phosphate esters originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L, 2024/2415, 13.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2415/oj), recital 162.

(9) The evidence is part of the confidential file of the investigation.

(10) https://www3.tcmb.gov.tr/sektor/#/en/C/162/manufacture-of-products-of-wood-cork-straw-and-plaiting-materials.

(11) This is the measure used by the Commission for its revised calculation of a reasonable amount for profit. See recital 76 below.

(12) Profits in absolute terms are not comparable between different years, also because the number of companies included in the report change from year to year (from 2 346 in 2020 to 3 249 in 2023).

(13) The correlation coefficient measures the strength and direction of a linear relationship between two variables, e.g. inflation rate and profitability. The value of the correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to +1. A positive value implies that the two variables move together and in the same direction, i.e. when one variable increases, the other variable also increases. Conversely, a negative value implies that when one variable increases, the other variable decreases. The formula for the most commonly used correlation coefficient (‘Pearson correlation coefficient’) is r = [ Σ (xi - mean_x)(yi - mean_y) ] / [ sqrt( Σ (xi - mean_x)2 ) * sqrt( Σ (yi - mean_y)2 ) ], where xi and yi are the individual data points from variables X and Y, mean_x is the mean (average) of all the xi values, mean_y is the mean (average) of all the yi values, Σ stands for the sum over all data points (from i = 1 to n), and sqrt means square root.

(*1) Source: Turkish Statistical Institute.

(*2) Source: Turkish Central Bank.

(14) Judgment of 2 October 2024, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (CCCME) and Others v European Commission, T-263/22, ECLI:EU:T:2024:663, para. 73.

(15) Judgment of 2 October 2024, CCCME and Others v Commission, T-263/22, ECLI:EU:T:2024:663, para. 183.

(16) Judgment of 2 October 2024, CCCME and Others v Commission, T-263/22, ECLI:EU:T:2024:663, para. 185.

(17) Judgment of 2 October 2024, CCCME and Others v Commission, T-263/22, ECLI:EU:T:2024:663, para 188.

(18) Judgment of 2 October 2024, CCCME and Others v Commission, T-263/22, ECLI:EU:T:2024:663, para. 184.

(19) For instance, Orma states that it ships to 32 countries in 5 continents: https://www.orma.com.tr/en/about/

(20) The target profit has been provided in ranges as the data used to calculate it stems from sensitive data from only two companies.

(21) Email: TRADE-TDI-NAME-CHANGE-REQUESTS@ec.europa.eu; European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Wetstraat 170 Rue de la Loi, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

(22) Judgment of 8 May 2019, Stemcor London Ltd and Samac Steel Supplies Ltd v European Commission, Case T-749/16, ECLI:EU:T:2019:310.

(23) Commission to register imports of all products under trade defence investigations in bid to fight unfair competition - European Commission, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-register-imports-all-products-under-trade-defence-investigations-bid-fight-unfair-2024-09-24_en.

(24) Judgment of 8 May 2019, Stemcor London Ltd and Samac Steel Supplies Ltd v European Commission, Case T-749/16, ECLI:EU:T:2019:310, see, in particular, paras. 29-59.

(25) Judgment of 8 May 2019, Stemcor London Ltd and Samac Steel Supplies Ltd v European Commission, Case T-749/16, ECLI:EU:T:2019:310, see, in particular, para. 72.

(26) Ibid. para. 75.

(27) Whether ‘there is, for the product in question, a history of dumping over an extended period, or the importer was aware of, or should have been aware of, the dumping as regards the extent of the dumping and the injury alleged or found’.

(28) Ibid. para. 76.

(29) Ibid. para. 87.

(30) Ibid. para. 86.

(31) Volumes have been corrected using the methodology described in recital 227 of the provisional Regulation.

(32) This value is 0,2 % higher than the average obtained using the figure in Table 3 of the provisional Regulation. This immaterial difference is due to the data adjustments in the Eurostat database.

(33) Source: FEP press release from 27 January 2025. https://www.parquet.net/2025/01/european-parquet-market-2024.html#:~:text=At%20the%20occasion%20of%20its,under%205%25%20compared%20to%202023.

(34) Judgment of 8 May 2019, Stemcor London Ltd and Samac Steel Supplies Ltd v European Commission, Case T-749/16, ECLI:EU:T:2019:310, see, in particular, paras. 72-75.

(35) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1328 of 29 July 2016 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain cold rolled flat steel products originating in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, OJ L 210, 4.8.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2016/1328/oj.

(36) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).