Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1342 of 11 July 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of multilayered wood flooring originating in the People’s Republic of China

• (110) The General Court then held that it should be noted that although the practice of making adjustments may prove to be necessary, under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation, to take account of differences between the export price and the normal value which affect their comparability, such deductions cannot be made with respect to a value which has been constructed and which is not, therefore, genuine. That value is not generally affected by factors which might damage its comparability, because it has been artificially established ¹⁹. Moreover, as in the case of CCCME, in the case at hand the construction of the normal value per product type on an ‘ex-works’ basis included a reasonable amount for SG&A costs and there was no concrete evidence showing whether (and if so to what extent) the SG&A costs used included concrete transport and distribution expenses. Consequently, in view of the Commission’s discretion in the application of Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation ²⁰, the Commission’s approach adhered to the most recent case-law concerning unsubstantiated claims that amounts for SG&A costs used in the construction of the normal value under Article 2(6a)(a), which are considered by the Commission to be reasonable for the ex-works level of trade, contain transport costs. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (111) Moreover, as explained in recital 49, the data published by the Central Bank of Türkiye lacked detailed information on these costs. Furthermore, the Commission noted that the ratio of transport and distribution expenses over the overall operating expenses, provided that they have been included in the first place which was not demonstrated by the interested parties in the present proceeding, may vary considerably depending on factors such as the location of the factory, the destinations to which the product is shipped ²¹, and the terms of delivery. In the absence of any specific information on these factors in data published by the Central Bank of Türkiye, the Commission considered that an adjustment on the basis of the financial data of Orma was not appropriate.

• (112) Moreover, the Commission considered that including the transport expenses in the export price would not allow for a fair comparison. This is because doing so would imply that the transport and distribution expenses incurred by Turkish companies in the broader wood sector are similar to those of Chinese exporting producers of MWF. However, there is no basis for such assumption.

• (113) Following additional disclosure, Fusong and Forest reiterated their claims on the downward adjustment of the SG&A costs on the basis of the transport costs incurred by Orma, without however making new arguments. These claims were therefore rejected.

• (114) In conclusion, the Commission considered that in view of the information available to it, an adjustment of SG&A costs for transport costs was not warranted and the parties’ claims were rejected.

• (115) Following definitive disclosure, two groups, the Fusong and the Forest, commented the findings based on which the normal value had been adjusted for non-refundable VAT.

• (116) Firstly, both parties claimed that the Commission does not have a competency to assess the Chinese tariff classification. Besides, they claimed that the Commission's assessment is incorrect, and in China, the product concerned can be classified under the code 4412 52 or 4412 92 . Forest presented the Chinese customs notes - Customs Tariff Goods and Tariff Item Notes, notes for chapter 44 with subheadings’ notes. On this basis Forest claimed that product concerned should be classified under heading 4412 . Furthermore Forest noted that the Commission did not pursue any explanation or confirmation from the Chinese customs authorities in this regard.

• (117) Secondly, Forest claimed that the Commission should provide the exact legal basis for the adjustment and elaborate on the fulfilment of the criteria for its application, namely that the export price and normal value are not on a comparable basis, and that there is a specific factor affecting the prices and price comparability.

• (118) Lastly, both parties claimed that irrespective of the assessment of the codes applicable to the product concerned, the Commission should compare the normal value and export price with actual tax refunded as the export price was actually net of VAT.

• (119) Regarding the first claim, the Commission did not take any position in evaluation or assessing the Chinese tariff classification. The Commission noted that the product concerned is classified under the HS code, the description of which is harmonized and therefore the same in both in the EU and China. For this reason, the Commission concluded that the product concerned falls under the HS code 4418 75 . The Commission did not interfere in the Chinese tariff nomenclature, but established that the code and the description of HS code 4418 75 aligns with the product under investigation. Based on this finding, it has been established that the product concerned falls under the HS code 4418 75 in PRC, for which there is no VAT refund in case of export sales. Regarding the allegation that the Commission did not consult GOC in this regard is groundless. As it has been described in recital 16 of the Provisional Regulation GOC did not cooperate in this investigation and, despite providing the GOC with the provisional regulation, and definitive disclosure document, the GOC did not provide any comments, let alone evidence to the contrary, on this matter.

• (120) Forest claimed in their comments that according to the explanatory notes to the Chinese Customs Tariff, heading 4418 does not refer to the product under investigation although it quoted that this code includes ‘assembled flooring, (including parquet flooring) or [...]’ which precisely is the product under investigation. Moreover, Forest omitted to mention in its comments, that in the same explanatory notes, there is an exclusion of some products, namely: This heading does not include: (1) Plywood, veneered panels, and similar laminated wood, which have a thin wood veneer attached to the surface to mimic the assembled flooring of heading 44.18 (heading 44.12). Therefore, only products with a thin face veneer that are imitating the product under investigation but are not the product under investigation fall under the code used by the exporters which is 4412 52 and 4412 92 .

• (121) Moreover, according to the Forest’s interpretation some other products can be classified under the heading 4418 , like for instance multi-strip wear layers. The Commission noted that the Forest exported also products classified as multi-strip and still did not apply the HS 4418 for these sales. These sales have been reported without any taxes. It is then apparent that even based on the explanatory notes, the codes applied by the company for the products sold for export do not correspond to the product description. Therefore, the Commission did not change its conclusion that the product concerned falls under the heading HS 4418 .

• (122) Secondly, the Commission hereby confirms that the legal basis used is the Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation, which refers to other factors that could affect the price comparison. The companies claimed that non-refundable VAT for the export sales of the products under code 4418 75 does not affect the price comparison as the exporters actually received the refunded VAT for these sales. According to the exporting producers, the fact that the companies received the VAT refund because the goods were classified under HS code of products other than the product under investigation is irrelevant, and only the fact of the actual received refund should be taken into consideration for price comparison and adjustments under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation. The Commission reiterated that based on the finding in the investigation, the product under investigation does not benefit from the VAT refund; therefore, the normal value has been adjusted accordingly. Therefore, an adjustment under Article 2(10)(k) was justified.

• (123) Also, Forest’s claim that Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation requires a higher legal and evidentiary standard for adjustments in comparison to those applicable under points (a) – (j) is not accurate. The standard required under point (k) always aims at ensuring the fair comparison between the export price and the normal value, as set out in general terms in the chapeau of Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, the legal and evidentiary standard for adjustments under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation is the same as that applicable under other letters of that provision. Thus, the Commission rejected the claim and stayed with the assessment in recitals 104 – 107.

• (124) The companies’ claims that their export price is net of VAT have not been accepted due to the reasons mentioned in recitals 116-118 above, using the HS code that is not in line with the product description in the customs nomenclature. None of the companies substantiated their claims with sufficient evidence showing that the classification under other code should be applied to the product under investigation.

• (125) Therefore, the Commission concluded that the product under investigation falls under HS code 4418 75 and the normal value should be adjusted accordingly for the non-refundable VAT for the fair comparison. The companies' claims in this regard were rejected.

• (126) Following the additional disclosure, which did not concern the claims on the adjustment for non-refundable VAT, both parties requested the Commission to reconsider its assessment in this regard refereeing to their previous comments on definitive disclosure. The Commission’s assessment remained unchanged.

3.5.   Dumping margins

• (127) Following the revision of the benchmarks for the SG&A and for profit as described in recitals 46 to 51, the Commission revised the dumping margins.

• (128) The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company	Definitive dumping margin
Forest group	32,1 %
Fusong group	36,1 %
JINFA group	21,3 %
Other cooperating companies	28,0 %
All other companies originating in the PRC	36,1 %

4. INJURY

• (129) Most of the claims received did not follow, or followed partially, the structure of the provisional Regulation. The Commission did its utmost to include the claims received under the appropriate sections of the Regulation. Furthermore, the Commission notes that many of the claims submitted by CNFPIA under the heading ‘injury’ were actually related to arguments on causation. Therefore, the Commission has addressed such claims under section 5 of this Regulation.

4.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

• (130) In the absence of comments concerning the definition of the Union industry and Union production, recitals 216 to 217 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.2.   Determination of the relevant Union market

• (131) In the absence of comments concerning the determination of the relevant Union market, recitals 218 to 221 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.3.   Union consumption

• (132) In the absence of comments concerning the Union consumption, recitals 222 to 226 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.   Imports from the country concerned

4.4.1.   Quantity and market share of the imports from the country concerned

• (133) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that the import quantities in square meters (m²) published by Eurostat showed a sharper decrease of imports during the period considered than the decrease of imports shown by the Eurostat data adjusted by the Commission in Table 3 of the provisional Regulation.

• (134) The Commission recalls that it has already justified in recital 227 of the provisional Regulation the need to adjust Eurostat’s import quantities in square metres in view of the flaws in the unadjusted Eurostat data. Therefore, the Commission does not find merits in in discussing the trends followed by the unadjusted data.

• (135) Following definitive disclosure, the CNFPIA stated that it questioned the need for an adjustment to import data and considered that the methodology used by the Commission failed to be based on objective, verifiable and credible evidence.

• (136) The adjustment made by the Commission was justified in recital 227 of the provisional Regulation. However, CNFPIA’s comments were rejected as no reason was supplied to support the view that the adjustment was questionable or that the methodology was not based on objective, verifiable and credible evidence.

• (137) CNFPIA also criticised the use made of the import data (in absolute terms and in relation to consumption) in the injury findings. CNFPIA focussed almost exclusively on the fall in import quantities in the IP and the fall in market share in that year.

• (138) In its analysis in the provisional Regulation (in section 4.4.1 which includes Table 3) the Commission presented a more balanced assessment of the import data over the period considered and explained its context. In fact, the fall in consumption in the IP (29 %) means that the market share data gives a better reading of import volume trends than absolute figures. As stated at recital 231 of the provisional Regulation imports from China increased from 16,8 % in 2020 to 22,5 % which represented an increase of 34 %. The fall in market share in 2023 was due to high levels of importers’ stocks at the end of 2022. In addition, when assessing the injurious nature of imports the CNFPIA did not consider that prices from China fell sharply in 2023 and suppressed Union industry prices. Therefore, the claim that the levels of imports from China in the period considered and the IP were not injurious was rejected.

• (139) In the absence of further comments concerning the quantity and market share of imports from China, recitals 227 to 231 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

• (140) The CNFPIA submitted a claim on import quantities as regards their impact on the causation of injury. This claim has been discussed in section 5.1 below.

4.4.2.   Prices of the imports from the country concerned and price undercutting

• (141) Following provisional disclosure, Amorim, Barth, the CNFPIA, MEFO Floor and Puderbach claimed that the level of trade adjustment (LoT) used by the Commission in recital 242 of the provisional Regulation should be increased as it does not cover all the warehousing, logistics, sales and marketing expenses faced by a distributor in the Union market. In particular, Amorim proposed using the SG&A of a company in Türkiye (the Reference country), as indicated in recital 199 of the provisional Regulation, and which amounted to 19,5 % of the cost of goods sold.

• (142) The Commission found this claim unsubstantiated as these parties did not submit any evidence to support the claim. In section 7.2 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission referred to the lack of verified data available to the Commission from the importing and trading sector. Only one importer representing 6 % of imports from China in the IP, fully co-operated with the investigation. As a result, there is insufficient data available to justify increasing the LoT adjustment indicated in recital 242 of the provisional Regulation. Furthermore, the Commission considered that Amorim’s claim concerning the use of a 19,5 % SG&A of a company in Türkiye is incorrect since the adjustment to the LoT cannot be based on SG&A data from the representative country and expressed as a percentage of COGS rather than turnover. Amorim’s argument is in any event also devoid of purpose, as the Commission changed the level of SG&A as indicated in recital 51 of this regulation. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (143) In the absence of further comments concerning the prices of imports from China and price undercutting, recitals 232 to 244 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

• (144) Following definitive disclosure, Amorim commented that the Commission’s undercutting analysis was flawed because it did not take adequate account of differences in product characteristics such as grading and branding.

• (145) However, the comments made do not provide any detail to explain any asymmetry that may have been made in respect of grading or branding or how such perceived asymmetries could be addressed. In respect of grading the Commission refers to recital 240 of the provisional Regulation which explains the method used by the Commission to take account of grading in its calculations to the extent possible. The Commission concluded that, as it had no information on file to demonstrate that the grading issue was not properly addressed, it was not in a position to adjust the calculations for this reason in favour of either the Union industry or the Chinese exporting producers. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (146) Holz-Richter and Barth also commented on issues of price comparability in their comments following the definitive disclosure. These parties commented that the Commission’s undercutting analysis was flawed because it did not take adequate account the fact that Chinese imports consisted mainly of low-quality grades.

• (147) The Commission took into account grading in the price comparisons and disclosed its calculations to the exporting producers concerned. Indeed, the Commission does not contest that a high quantity of Chinese imports was of non-prime grades, but these imports were compared solely to the non-prime grades of the Union industry. The Commission refers to recital 240 of the provisional Regulation which explains the method used by the Commission to take account of grading in its calculations to the extent possible. All prices used in the calculations (in respect of both Chinese exports and Union industry sales) were verified on spot. There was no evidence that large quantities of very low graded Chinese products were sold on the Union market or that such very low-grade products were more prevalent than within those sold by the Union industry. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (148) Amorim also commented that the Commission’s undercutting analysis was flawed because the 5 % LoT adjustment made did not take adequate account of differences in LoT. Holz-Richter also made claims related to the impact of sales chains on the calculations. Amorim stated that it did not agree with the Commission’s rebuttal of its original comments (described above in recitals 141 and 142) because the comment had only been rejected on ‘technical grounds’ – i.e. due to a lack of evidence to support the claim. The Commission maintains its view that no verifiable evidence was submitted to support an increase in the LoT adjustment.

• (149) In recital 142 the Commission further explained that the higher adjustment suggested by Amorim (19,5 % of CoGS based on Turkish data) was not just rejected based on a lack of evidentiary support, it was also from a non-Union source. Furthermore, this figure would have to be reduced as it was a percentage of COGS, not turnover, and, as it would only be applied to Union sales which were made through related traders (around 67 %), would have to be reduced even further.

• (150) The resulting LoT adjustment suggested by Amorim when put in its proper context would result in an adjustment of around 10 %. Amorim claimed in its submission that the LoT adjustment was not adequate and this risked to distort the undercutting margin (upwards), so that its impact on the causation analysis would be overstated. However, an adjustment of 10 % would not be effective to reduce the undercutting margins found in recital 238 of the Provisional Regulation to levels which would change the injury and causation findings. The claims made on undercutting were therefore rejected.

• (151) Holz-Richter commented on bonuses or early payment discounts offered by Union producers that are not offered by Chinese exporters.

• (152) As the calculations were made using prices net of all discounts, the Commission is satisfied that this issue did not distort the calculations. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (153) Holz-Richter also commented on other issues which could have distorted the undercutting calculations such as bonuses or early payment discounts, freight rates and credit costs.

• (154) As the calculations were made using prices net of all discounts, the Commission is satisfied that this issue did not distort the calculations. Regarding freight rates and credit costs, the calculations were made at a CIF level for exporting producers. In addition, credit costs were not deducted from the CIF prices of the exporting producers. These claims were therefore rejected.

• (155) The CNFPIA also made claims on import prices as regards their impact on the causation of injury. These claims are discussed in section 5.1 below.

4.5.   Economic situation of the Union industry

4.5.1.   General remarks

• (156) In the absence of comments concerning general remarks on the economic situation of the Union industry, recitals 245 to 249 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

4.5.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

• (157) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that the decrease in production, production capacity and capacity utilisation in the IP was caused by the decrease in consumption. The claims related to causation are discussed in section 5 below.

• (158) In the absence of further comments concerning production, production capacity and capacity utilisation, recitals 250 to 253 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.2.2.   Sales volume and market share

• (159) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA disagreed with the Commission’s finding that there is a link between the decrease in Union sales quantities of the Union industry and the market penetration of the Chinese imports. In particular, the CNFPIA argued that i) the Commission did not admit that that Chinese imports in 2023 fell by a larger percentage than the Union industry, which CNFPIA considers as an indicator that these trends were caused by the decrease in consumption and by the increase in production costs and ii) that the Commission has given less weight in its assessment to this factor than to the decrease in Union sales.

• (160) The Commission disagreed with this claim. Regarding point (i), the Commission gave a transparent presentation of the data and where appropriate a year-by-year analysis of the development of sales, volumes and market shares. Regarding point (ii), the Commission made a comprehensive analysis of all injury indicators and its conclusions on injury were fully explained. This claim was therefore rejected.

• (161) In the absence of further comments concerning sales volume and market share, recitals 254 to 259 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

• (162) The implications of the claim on causality is addressed in section 5.1 below.

4.5.2.3.   Growth

• (163) In the absence of comments concerning growth, recital 260 of the provisional Regulation was confirmed.

4.5.2.4.   Employment and productivity

• (164) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that developments in employment and productivity should be attributed to the fall in production and sales quantities.

• (165) The Commission did not find merit in this claim as recital 286 of the provisional Regulation already stated that finding.

• (166) In the absence of further comments concerning employment and productivity, recitals 261 to 263 in the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

• (167) In the absence of comments concerning the magnitude of the dumping margin and the recovery from past dumping, recitals 264 to 265 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.3.   Microeconomic indicators

4.5.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices

• (168) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that it was only in the year 2023 when the Union industry was not able to pass on cost increases in their sales prices.

• (169) The Commission disagrees with this claim. As stated in recital 276 of the provisional Regulation, the profitability of the Union industry started to decline in 2022, which was a year when costs were increasing as shown in Table 8 of the provisional Regulation. As a result, the Union industry’s ability to pass on cost increases to their customers started to decline in 2022. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (170) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that the comparison between Union industry prices and costs in Table 8 of the provisional Regulation did not support the finding in Table 11 of that Regulation, that is, that Union sales were loss-making in 2023.

• (171) The Commission disagrees with this claim. As stated in recital 267 of the provisional Regulation, sales’ prices were those made by the Union industry to unrelated parties (including the sales made by their related traders), whereas the unit costs reported were only the cost of production incurred solely by the sampled Union producers. The Union industry was loss-making in 2023 because such sales incurred further costs, that is, those of the related traders referred to in recital 18 of the provisional Regulation. This claim was therefore rejected.

• (172) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA contested the finding of price suppression mentioned in recitals 267 to 270 of the provisional Regulation. In particular, the CNPFIA claimed that the Commission did not assess whether domestic prices would have increased in the absence of the allegedly dumped imports from China.

• (173) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The Commission’s assessment in the provisional Regulation mainly relies on the impact of Chinese import prices on the situation of the Union industry, for instance in sections 4.5.4 and 5.1 of the provisional Regulation (‘conclusion on injury’ and ‘the effects of the dumped imports’ respectively). Therefore, the Commission not only fully analysed price suppression, but concluded that the fall in profitability in 2022 and 2023 was due mainly to Chinese imports. In the absence of large quantities of low-priced Chinese imports, the Union industry would have been in a much better position to face the challenges of rising costs and falling consumption in 2022 and 2023. This claim was therefore rejected.

• (174) Amorim returned to the issue of prices and factors affecting prices (section 4.5.3.1 of the provisional Regulation) in its comments following the definitive disclosure. Amorim commented that the Commission’s analysis did not properly take into account that ‘other factors’, such as cost increases and a fall in consumption, had an impact on price suppression and falling profits.

• (175) The Commission disagreed that these factors were not taken into account. In fact, both issues are included in the analysis at section 4.5.3.1 and more detailed analysis was included in sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 of that Regulation. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (176) Amorim also commented that the analysis of production costs at Table 8 was flawed because it covered only production costs.

• (177) In fact, Table 8 of the provisional Regulation covers all costs of the production entity of the sampled Union producers. This includes their SG&A costs for direct sales. By presenting the costs in this way the Commission was able to demonstrate the importance of cost increases relative to the full costs of the production companies. The main cost increases related to raw materials as stated at recital 268 of the provisional Regulation which are of course production costs. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (178) In addition, Amorim claimed that the profitability analysis was flawed because it did not take into account the sales costs of the related traders.

• (179) However, the profitability data at Table 11 of the provisional Regulation covered the sales turnover and costs of the three sampled Union producers and their related traders. Table 11 of the provisional Regulation makes it clear that the sales turnover is to unrelated customers in the Union. The Commission disclosed the calculation of profitability to each sampled Union producer, which showed a breakdown of turnover and costs by Group entity. The calculation also demonstrated that the profitability trend only related to Union production, not production of other group entities which could be located outside the Union. There being no mismatch between revenue and costs the Commission maintains its profitability figures are accurate and the claim of Amorim was rejected.

• (180) Amorim and CNFPIA also commented that the Commission failed to perform a counterfactual analysis of the factors affecting price suppression. They claim that to establish price suppression under WTO and EU law, a counterfactual analysis is essential. By this they mean if Union prices would have increased in the absence of allegedly dumped imports.

• (181) First, the Commission recalled that the analysis performed in the causation section of the provisional Regulation discussed the issue of increased prices and the Union industry’s response to those increases. Similarly, the provisional Regulation also discussed the reduction in consumption and its impact on the Union industry. It was stated at recital 316 of the provisional Regulation that producers must be able to adapt to increases in raw material and energy costs by passing on such increases to customers. If not, such producers would not have a viable business. The Commission identified the magnitude of cost increases in Table 8 of the provisional Regulation but noted that the reason why such cost increases could not be fully passed on to its customers was mainly due to dumped imports. This kind of analysis was performed on a year-by-year basis for both cost increases and the reduction in consumption. The Commission was able to demonstrate that dumped imports played a major role in suppressing prices and in losses in sales volume and market share. Therefore, the Commission can reasonably conclude that, absent the significant price suppression as shown in the underselling margins, price increases would have occurred in the absence of imports of MWF from China. The Commission therefore rejects the claim that its analysis was not compatible with WTO rules or EU law.

• (182) In respect of Amorim’s claim that intra-Union competition was the cause of price suppression the Commission points out that this claim does not stand up to scrutiny based on data held on the case file. The product types of the three Union producers were often in competition with each other but were at a higher level than the prices of the comparable types of MWF sold by the sampled Chinese exporting producers. In addition, all three exporting producers were found to undercut the Union industry. This claim was therefore rejected.

• (183) In their comments following the definitive disclosure CNFPIA considered that the Commission failed to base its injury determination on positive evidence and failed to conduct a price effect analysis as required by the basic Regulation. As part of its motivation for this view CNFPIA stated ‘The Commission has failed to analyse the effect of imports of MWF from China on EU prices of MWF. It has not analysed if there has been a significant price undercutting compared with prices in the EU or the effect of imports of MWF from China has depressed EU prices of MWF or prevented their increase’.

• (184) These claims completely ignore the assessments made by the Commission at sections 4.4.2 and 4.5.3.1 of the provisional Regulation and are therefore rejected.

• (185) Also, in respect of price effects CNFPIA compared the price and costs data shown at Table 8 of the provisional Regulation and concluded that Chinese imports could not be a cause of injury because the delta between prices and costs narrowed in the IP.

• (186) This analysis could not be accepted because it ignored the substantial price undercutting established by the Commission in the IP. In addition, the costs quoted related solely to those of the production entity of the sampled producer. Additional costs were incurred by the related traders of each producer. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (187) In the absence of further comments concerning prices and factors affecting prices, recitals 266 to 270 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

• (188) The impact of the claims on prices and costs as regards causation are discussed in section 5 below.

4.5.3.2.   Labour costs

• (189) In the absence of comments concerning labour costs, recital 271 to 272 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.3.3.   Inventories

• (190) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that inventory increases were not caused by Chinese imports but by inflation, increasing production costs and the decrease in Union consumption.

• (191) The Commission disagrees with this claim. While the factors listed by the CNFPIA played a role in inventory increases, the Commission also concluded in recital 284 of the provisional Regulation that increases in Chinese market shares and price depression over the period considered were also important factors. This claim was therefore rejected.

• (192) In the absence of further comments concerning inventories, recitals 273 to 274 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.5.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

• (193) Following provisional disclosure, apart from the claim discussed in recital 168 above, the CNFPIA did not challenge the figures relating to profitability of the Union industry. The CNFPIA’s claim on the cause of the development of profitability is discussed in section 6 below.

• (194) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA also claimed that the ability of the Union industry to invest significantly in their business operations constitutes a strong indication that they are not at all materially injured.

• (195) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The Commission concluded in recital 280 of the provisional Regulation that investments during the period considered were modest and were limited by a decreasing ability to raise capital. This claim was therefore rejected.

• (196) In the absence of further comments concerning profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital, recitals 275 to 280 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.6.   Conclusion on injury

• (197) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that the Commission should give ‘special importance’ in the injury analysis to the most recent data available, that is, the data from the IP, and that the Commission has erred in its analysis for failing to do so. For this reason, CNFPIA claimed that the Commission’s analysis was subjective and unfair.

• (198) The Commission disagrees with the claim. Although, the Commission agrees that the analysis of the data in the IP is essential to the analysis of injury, the Commission must assess in its appropriate context. Therefore, the Commission has followed its normal policy of performing a four-year trend analysis for most injury indicators. In drawing conclusions from this trend analysis, the Commission noted that most volume indicators (production and sales quantities, market shares and employment) followed an improving or stable trend from 2020 to 2022 and suffered a decline in 2023, while the performance indicators (profitability, cash flow and return on investments) started to deteriorate already in 2022. Therefore, the Commission’s analysis was thorough, took into account the development of each indicator and the developments in the IP were commented on specifically and in their appropriate context. The Commission therefore maintains its view that injury began in 2022 and worsened in the IP. The Commission has therefore rejected the claim.

• (199) Following definitive disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that the Commission’s determination of injury was neither based on positive evidence nor involved an objective examination of (a) the volume of imports of MWF from China and their effects on prices in the EU market for MWF; and (b) their impact on EU producers of MWF.

• (200) The Commission has reviewed and rebutted all of the comments made by CNFPIA and therefore rejects the general point made that the Commission’s analysis was not objective or based on positive evidence.

• (201) In the absence of further comments concerning the conclusions on injury, recitals 281 to 287 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5. CAUSATION

5.1.   Effects of the dumped imports

• (202) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that the Commission’s analysis of the causal link between Chinese imports and the injury of the Union’s industry was flawed. In particular, the CNFPIA argued that i) the Commission did not consider the decrease in import quantities as a decisive factor to dismiss the causal link between Chinese imports and the injury of the Union industry; ii) the Commission relied primarily on the alleged low prices of imports to reach its conclusions; iii) that the Commission was wrong in concluding that there was a coincidence in time between the deterioration of the economic situation of the Union industry and the significant presence of imports from China as the deterioration occurred at a time when imports from China were decreasing; and iv) that even if they coincided in time, this coincidence would not have been sufficient to establish causation as there were other factors that were causing the injury.

• (203) The Commission disagreed with this claim.

• (204) As regards point (i), Table 3 of the provisional Regulation showed imports from China and their market share. Although the quantity of imports in the IP fell, this was due to the fall in consumption. Therefore, the market share of imports is a more accurate indicator of the effect on the market. The market share of Chinese imports increased from 16,8 % in 2020 to 25,4 % in 2022, an increase of 51 %. However, in the IP, the market share of these imports fell to 22,5 % which still represented an increase of 34 % as compared to 2020. The slight fall in market share in the IP also has to be put into context of the development of their prices and impact on the Union industry as explained in the following recital. Furthermore, in view that the analysis made at section 8.3 of this Regulation, the fall in Chinese import quantities in the IP has not been maintained in 2024. Despite a further fall in consumption in 2024 of 5 %, import quantities have increased substantially.

• (205) As regards point (ii), the Commission’s analysis took into account, not only the quantity of imports, but also the development of sales prices, the suppressive effect and undercutting of such imports and their market share. The Commission’s view that the dumped imports was a primary cause of injury was not therefore based only on price issues. Table 4 of the provisional Regulation showed that prices of Chinese imports in EUR/kg increased by 30 % from 2020 to 2022. However, these prices fell by 13 % in the IP. Prices in the IP were only 13 % higher than those in 2020. Further context is provided by Table 8 of the provisional Regulation which showed that the costs per unit of the Union industry rose throughout the analysis period by 42 %. In addition, Table 11 recorded that the Union industry’s profitability fell in 2022 and became negative in the IP. These facts demonstrate that the Chinese exporters exerted substantial price pressure on the Union industry because there is a clear link in terms of cause and effect, including a correlation in time, between the fall in profits of the Union industry and the Chinese prices in the Union at market shares which remained high in the IP.

• (206) As regards point (iii) the Commission clearly established that injury began in 2022, a year when consumption was increasing. The Union industry suffered from price suppression in that year because the raw material cost increases could not be fully passed on to its customers due to the price effects of the dumped imports.

• (207) As regards point (iv), the Commission does not contest that other factors played a role in the injury suffered by the Union industry in 2022 and 2023. These factors, including costs increases and the fall in consumption in 2023, were fully explained in the provisional Regulation. Nevertheless, the Commission maintains its conclusion that the dumped imports were a major cause of the injury in 2022 and 2023 and that other factors did not attenuate the causal link.

• (208) Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (209) Following definitive disclosure, Amorim claimed that the Commission had provided a misleading interpretation of import volumes and market share, overstated conclusions about price effects and suppression and provided an incorrect timeline of injury versus imports behaviour.

• (210) The comments made by Amorim in these respects provided no new facts but simply repeated arguments which were already rebutted in the definitive disclosure.

• (211) In respect of the development of import volumes and market shares Amorim objects to the Commission’s analysis because Amorim believes the Commission should only consider the fall in Chinese import market shares in 2023, without looking into their overall context such as the significant fall in price in that year or by comparing market shares across the period considered. The Commission disagrees that the analysis of import volumes and market shares was misleading.

• (212) In respect of price effects and suppression the Commission already at the stage of the provisional Regulation considered that the fall in consumption in 2023 and increases in cost had significant impact on the Union industry. However, the Commission maintains its view that the level of dumped imports from China at injurious prices was a genuine and substantial cause of the injury suffered in 2022 and 2023.

• (213) Regarding the use of post IP data on Chinese imports, the Commission did not rely on such data at all in its provisional Regulation. However, the data was collected in order to assess the retroactive collection of duties and therefore was used in the definitive disclosure in order to respond to the comments of parties.

• (214) In respect of ‘other’ injury factors no new issue was raised by Amorim except it alleges that intra-Union competition was a cause of injury. This issue was already rebutted earlier in this Regulation at recital 182.

• (215) Therefore, these claims were rejected.

• (216) CNFPIA also commented on the effects of Chinese imports on the situation of the Union industry. The first comment related to production, capacity and capacity utilisation. CNFPIA claimed that the evolution in Union consumption, the production quantity, sales quantity and market share of the Union industry and Chinese imports showed similar trends meaning that Chinese imports could not be considered injurious.

• (217) However, this analysis ignores the impact of price effects and was therefore rejected.

• (218) CNFPIA also commented that a year-by-year market share analysis of the Union industry also demonstrated a lack of injury as the Union industry market share increased in the IP.

• (219) This development is factually correct, but conclusions drawn from this fact alone are flawed because they do not take into account price effects. Also, the Commission’s analysis at recital 257 and 286 of the provisional Regulation already took into account the fall in market share of the Chinese imports in the IP. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (220) CNFPIA also commented that the developments in employment and productivity do not show injury caused by Chinese imports.

• (221) Recital 286 of the provisional Regulation already explained that the developments of these indicators were injurious when considered alongside other indicators and developments in Chinese imports. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (222) CNFPIA also commented that the developments in average Union industry sales prices, costs and profitability do not show injury caused by Chinese imports as Chinese imports fell in the IP.

• (223) Recital 291 of the provisional Regulation already explained that the developments of these indicators were injurious because of the price effects (suppression) of the Chinese imports. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (224) CNFPIA also commented the developments in inventories in order to show that they do not show injury caused by Chinese imports.

• (225) Recital 284 of the provisional Regulation already explained that the developments of this indicator was injurious when considered together with other factors. In addition, recital 274 of that Regulation explained why inventories are important in the MWF industry. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (226) CNFPIA also reiterated their comments that the alleged high level of investments made by the Union industry had caused the injury they suffered. However, no new arguments were presented here. In addition, no attempt was made to rebut the Commission’s comments at recital 280 of the provisional Regulation concerning the modest nature of these investments. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (227) Holz-Richter GmbH made comments on causation in a submission following the definitive disclosure. They claimed that their imports from China were made because of the alleged poor availability of the Union industry products. Holz-Richter supplied ‘sensitive’ data to support its claim that the measures were likely to disrupt its business due to the fact that it purchased a range of MWF products from China at a certain price which it sold on the Union market.

• (228) The Commission has already dealt with the issue of an alleged shortage of supply at recitals 363 and 364 of the provisional Regulation. These recitals explain that there are many sources of supply of MWF and Chinese imports are expected to continue (at reduced quantities) as a result of these measures. Nevertheless, the aim of the measures is to restore fair competition on the Union market by raising Chinese import prices.

• (229) In respect of Holz-Richter’s claim relating to a specific range of products, the Commission’s analysis of price comparisons described at recital 238 of the provisional Regulation indicated that a very high degree of like for like matching (over 95 %) was present in the MWF product types sold on the Union market by the Chinese exporting producers and the Union industry. The Commission further notes that Holz-Richter linked its claim on availability to price considerations indicating that such products were not available from Union sources at the same price as the Chinese imports. Although, it cannot be excluded that a small quantity of imports do not have a direct Union industry equivalent, from the detailed price comparisons performed by the Commission in this investigation it is clear that the quantity of Chinese types which are unavailable from Union sources is very low. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (230) In the absence of further comments concerning the effects of the dumped imports, recitals 289 to 296 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.   Effects of other factors

5.2.1.   Imports from third countries

• (231) The Commission identified a mistake in Table 13 of the provisional Regulation relating to the prices of imports of all third countries. The following Table corrects the figures. The correction has no impact on the Commission’s overall conclusions on the impact of ‘Imports from Third Countries’.

Imports from Third Countries – Correction of Table 13 of Provisional Regulation

		2020	2021	2022	Investigation period (2023)
Total of all third countries except the country concerned (Table 13 of the provisional Regulation)	Average price (EUR/ square meter)	6,9	7,0	6,6	7,4
	Index	100	101	96	107
Total of all third countries except the country concerned (corrected figures)	Average price (EUR/ square meter)	18,7	20,4	24,9	23,3
	Index	100	109	133	125

• (232) In the absence of comments concerning imports from third countries, recitals 297 to 303 of the provisional Regulation, revised by recital 231 of this Regulation, were confirmed.

5.2.2.   Export performance of the Union industry

• (233) In the absence of comments concerning the export performance of the Union industry, the conclusions drawn in recitals 304 to 307 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.3.   Developments in Consumption

• (234) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that that the decrease in consumption in the IP caused the injurious situation of the industry, also in view that, while the market share of Chinese imports declined, those of the Union industry increased.

• (235) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The Commission’s analysis in the provisional Regulation acknowledged the important impact of the fall in consumption. Recital 310 of the provisional Regulation stated that ‘It was therefore clear that the Union industry was significantly affected by the fall in consumption in the investigation period’. The Commission’s analysis examined the impact of consumption in 2022 when demand increased by 4 %. As explained in recital 311 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission concluded that since consumption increased in 2022 it could not explain the fall in profitability and other performance indicators of the Union industry in that year. Therefore, although the fall in consumption had a significant impact, the price pressure exerted by a fall in Chinese import prices also played a major role.

• (236) CNFPIA returned to the issue of the fall in consumption in the IP in its comments following definitive disclosure. It provided further evidence from FEP, the European Organisation of the Sawmill Industry and the Global Wood Trade Network's Europe Prices in June 2023 to demonstrate the impact of the fall in consumption.

• (237) The Commission has already recognised the importance of developments in consumption in section 5.2.3 of the provisional Regulation. The Commission maintains its view that this issue contributed to the injury suffered but that this does not mean that the dumped imports were not a major, genuine and substantial cause of injury. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (238) In the absence of further comments concerning the developments in consumption, recitals 308 to 313 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.4.   Increases in Costs

• (239) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that the Commission’s finding that the increases in the costs were only a contributory factor to the injury suffered by the Union industry and that the real cause of the material injury was Chinese price pressure is not correct. The CFPIA referred to several intelligence reports relating to cost increases for Union producers of MWF and to press releases from FEP relating to raw material cost increases and which do not refer to Chinese imports as a concern causing a problem.

• (240) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The Commission does not dispute the fact that costs, especially raw material costs, increased over the period considered for various reasons. This fact was acknowledged in section 5.2.4 of the provisional Regulation, which made reference to the actual cost figures of the sampled Union industry in Table 8 of the provisional Regulation. In addition, the Commission reiterates its view that cost increases need to be passed onto customers for industries to remain sustainable. The Union MWF industry suffered big falls in its profitability in 2022 and in the IP because of its inability to pass on cost increases to its customers due to the pressure in terms of both volumes and low prices of the dumped imports from China. It should be noted that the Chinese exporting producers often sourced oak products, which are key raw materials for MWF, from the Union market. Therefore, it was not only the Union industry which suffered such cost increases. Nevertheless, Chinese import prices for MWF fell by 13 % in the investigation period as reported in recital 317 of the provisional Regulation. This led to price pressure for the Union industry and was followed by the fall in profitability, return on investment and cash flow shown in Table 11 in the IP. This fall in import prices is remarkable given the increase in raw material costs which the Chinese exporting producers will have experienced and their need to incur freight costs to ship oak logs to China and return the finished MWF products to the Union. Therefore, the Commission maintains its view that increases in costs did not attenuate the injury caused by the dumped Chinese imports and the claim of the CNFPIA was rejected.

• (241) CNFPIA returned to the issue of increases in cost in its comments following definitive disclosure. It provided further evidence from FEP, the Global Wood Trade Network's Europe Prices Report of September 2023 and the International Tropical Timber Organisation to demonstrate increases in raw material costs.

• (242) However, the Commission has already recognised the importance of raw material cost increases in section 5.2.4 of the provisional Regulation. The Commission maintains its view, however, that raw material cost increases need to be reflected in sales prices in order for an industry to remain viable and that such price increases were prevented largely due to the prices of Chinese imports. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

• (243) In the absence of further comments concerning the increases in costs, recitals 314 to 318 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.5.   Captive use

• (244) In the absence of comments concerning captive use, recitals 319 to 320 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.2.6.   Other factors

• (245) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that Union industry made poor business decisions as evidenced by the Commission’s finding that the Union industry carried out investments to maintain efficiency but that after 2021 they had less ability to raise capital.

• (246) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The facts presented in recital 280 of the provisional Regulation indicate that such investments were not excessive, but rather, modest throughout the period considered. In the years 2022 and 2023 these investments had to be limited only to those investments that were essential because of the falling ability to raise capital.

• (247) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA further claimed that the Commission had not assessed their comments in paragraphs 43 to 47 of their submission from 25 July 2024.

• (248) The Commission notes that it actually addressed issues related to consumption in section 5.2.3 of the provisional Regulation and issues related to the export performance of the Union industry in section 5.2.2 of the provisional Regulation. As part of this claim CNFPIA alleged that Barlinek had invested excessively during the period considered. The Commission cannot give details of Barlinek’s investment in production capacity for confidentiality reasons. However, the verified information on the sensitive file, shows that the claim is factually incorrect and therefore rejected.

• (249) In the absence of comments concerning other factors, recitals 321 to 326 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

5.3.   Conclusion on causation

• (250) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that Chinese imports did not cause injury to the Union’s industry and that it should review its finding that no factor other than Chinese imports had any bearing on the situation of the Union industry.

• (251) The Commission disagrees with this claim for the reasons provided in its assessment of causation in sections 5.1 and 5.2 above.

• (252) In the absence of further comments concerning the conclusion on causation, recitals 327 to 332 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

6.1.   Injury margin

• (253) Following provisional disclosure, FEP claimed that the target profit used by the Commission in the calculation of the injury margin was too low because it included a profit margin for a sampled Union producer which was abnormally low due to the particular circumstances that applied to that producer. FEP therefore claimed that the basic profit should be higher than the 7,15 % found in recital 337 of the provisional Regulation because the average profit rate used does not provide an adequate picture of what is required to re-establish fair competition under ordinary market conditions.

• (254) The Commission recalls that, as explained in recital 337 of the provisional Regulation, the year 2020 was used as this was prior to the increase in imports at low prices which caused the injury to the Union industry. The Commission re-examined the information on file regarding the Union producer’s whose profit margin was indeed abnormally low in 2020. The name of the company cannot be revealed for confidentiality reasons. The FEP claimed that the respective company’s profitability rate was affected by certain temporary factors in 2020 such as restructuring of the business model of the company and important supply chain issues during the Covid-19 pandemic.

• (255) The Commission concluded that this company should be excluded from the calculation of the basic profit, which as a result increased from 7,15 % to [8,7 % – 11 %] ²².

• (256) CNFPIA made comments on the target profit used in the injury margin calculations in its submission following the definitive disclosure. CNFPIA challenged the use of 2020 as the base year for the target profit on the grounds that it was too far removed in time from the IP and suggested 2022 as an alternative. Also, 2020 was opposed by CNFPIA because that year may have been affected by the impact of Covid-19 on the Union market. Also, CNFPIA claimed that one company with low profits should not have been excluded from the data.

• (257) The Commission recalled that 2020 was selected as a it was a recent year which was not affected by dumped imports. In fact, recital 284 of the provisional Regulation demonstrates that injury began in 2022. Regarding the impact of Covid-19, two of the sampled Union producers demonstrated that the year 2020 was a profitable year. However, the third sampled producer had specific problems, partially linked to impacts of Covid-19, that led to its exclusion from the data as explained at section 6.1 of the definitive disclosure. Therefore, the Commission maintains its view that 2020 was the most appropriate base year for the target profit and that it was justified to limit the data to the two companies with reasonable profits in that year. These claims were, therefore, rejected.

• (258) Puderbach commented on the methodology used in the calculation of the underselling margin. Puderbach claimed that the Union industry costs used to calculate underselling were not comparable with the Chinese import prices. It was claimed that ocean freight, Union Customs fees, transport and marketing and distribution costs had not been taken fully into account.

• (259) However, the calculation compared the import price at CIF level (plus importation costs such as port fees) with the Union industry’s ex-works (EXW) price meaning that ocean freight and customs fees were already in the import price. In addition, the CIF price to EXW comparison was fair because both prices required onward transport in the Union. Furthermore, the marketing and distribution costs of the Union industry were not taken into account as the Union industry costs did not include those of related traders. The detailed calculations were disclosed to the three sampled exporting producers. Therefore, the claim that the underselling calculations were imbalanced was rejected.

• (260) Following provisional disclosure, Fusong and Jinfa claimed that the Commission should not only use the level of trade adjustment for calculating the undercutting margins but also for calculating the non-injurious price. Without this adjustment, Fusong and Jinfa claimed that the non-injurious price and the price of the exporting producers cannot be compared.

• (261) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The calculation of the cost of production per product type applicable for the calculation of the underselling margin did not include the costs of the related traders of the Union industry. Therefore, the underselling margin was calculated based on the costs plus normal profit of the Union producers which means that no adjustment of the LoT is necessary. In other words, the LoT of the Union industry was comparable to those of the exporting producers. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (262) Following provisional disclosure, Fusong and Jinfa claimed that the target profit used for the underselling calculation was excessive because it was the profitability of the group (producer plus related traders) rather than the profit of the Union producers.

• (263) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The profit of both the production companies and the related traders was set according to internal transfer pricing agreements. Therefore, the only profit which was reliable was the consolidated profit at group level. In addition, an analysis of the profits made by the three sampled Union producing groups showed that the producers were taking most of the risks and making most of the profits or losses, whereas the related traders tended to function according to standard profits. Therefore, the consolidated profitability margins used were mainly derived from the production entities, were similar to the profit rates of the group and the claim that such profit rates were excessive was unsubstantiated and factually incorrect.

• (264) In its comments following definitive disclosure Fusong reiterated its view that the profitability rates used to calculate the target profit were overstated because they had been calculated on a Group basis.

• (265) The Commission confirmed that profits made solely by the Union producing entities were not used because they mainly covered sales to the related parties via transfer pricing arrangements. Therefore, by using the Group profit data, the Commission used the most appropriate data available. In addition, for the reasons given at recital 135 of the definitive disclosure, the Commission was satisfied that the data used was representative for sales to wholesalers. Therefore, the claim that the target profit rate was overstated was rejected.

• (266) The conclusion in recital 342 of the provisional regulation is confirmed. Therefore, the final injury elimination level for the cooperating exporting producers and all other companies is as follows:

Country	Company	Definitive injury margin (%)
China	Forest Group	51,5
China	Fusong Group	47,8
China	Jinfa Group	55,0
China	Other cooperating companies	52,3
China	All other imports originating in China	55,0

• (267) Following provisional disclosure, FEP claimed that there are raw material distortions in China within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) of the basic Regulation and that the lesser duty rule should be waived. The CNFPIA argued that the lesser duty rule should be applied.

• (268) The Commission notes that whether the lesser duty rule should apply is only relevant when the dumping margins applicable to exporting producers are higher than the respective injury margins. Bearing in mind the definitive findings of dumping and injury margins, as provided in recitals 128 and 266 of this Regulation, the application or not of the lesser duty rule is not relevant. Therefore, the Commission concluded that it was not necessary to investigate if there were raw materials distortions as the result would not have any material effect on the investigation.

6.2.   Conclusion on the level of measures

• (269) Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:

Country	Company	Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
China	Forest group	32,1
China	Fusong group	36,1
China	JINFA group	21,3
China	Other cooperating companies	28,0
China	All other companies originating in the PRC	36,1

7. UNION INTEREST

7.1.   Union interest under Article 21 of the basic Regulation

• (270) The Commission then examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, and users.

7.1.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (271) Following provisional disclosure, the CNFPIA claimed that the Union industry was seeking an unfair advantage through these duties.

• (272) The Commission disagrees with this claim. The investigation has revealed, as provided in section 4 of this Regulation that the Union industry has suffered injury as a result of the (unfair) dumped Chinese imports. The measures seek to restore the level playing field which had been distorted by the dumped Chinese imports. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (273) In their comments following the definitive disclosure Lovelin of London (an importer of MWF) claimed that the Union industry would not benefit from the measures in the long-term as the measures would encourage Chinese exporters to produce MWF in third countries and innovate more than Union producers.

• (274) These comments are speculative and were not substantiated by data. Therefore, they were rejected.

• (275) In the absence of further comments concerning the interest of the Union interest, recitals 348 to 353 of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

7.1.2.   Interest of unrelated importers and traders

• (276) Following provisional disclosure, Amorim, MEFO Floor, HAI and Puderbach claimed that the measures would harm the business of importers since customers would not accept the pass on of the full costs on sales prices and as a result, demand will drop which would require reducing the number of staff.

• (277) The Commission acknowledged in recital 359 of the provisional Regulation that the measures could have detrimental effects on the importing and trading sectors. However, the Commission also noted that these sectors may mitigate the impact on their businesses by sourcing from other third countries or from the Union industry. The Commission found the claims unsubstantiated. In the absence of actual and verified evidence since the Commission’s provisional determination, the Commission has not been in a position to substantiate the extent of the claims of detrimental effects on the importing and trading sectors. The claims were therefore rejected.

• (278) Amorim commented on the ‘Interest of unrelated importers and traders’ in its submission made following definitive disclosure. Amorim comments related to i) the burden of proof on importers and traders in the investigation, ii) alternative sourcing options, iii) the long-term impact of trade defence measures, iv) the need for an economic impact assessment prior to the imposition of measures and v) the risk to market competition and supply chain stability. CNFPIA also made general comments on the ‘Interest of unrelated importers and traders’ in its submission following the definitive disclosure. Amorim claimed that importers and traders face practical limitations to defend their interests due to a lack of resources within the timeframe of the investigation between the provisional and final determinations. They claimed that this switched the burden of proof to such economic operators.

• (279) The Commission’s policy for all interested parties is to notify all known parties on Day 1 of an investigation and to publish Notice of initiation in the Official Journal in order to promote cooperation so that the views of all parties can be made known and verified if necessary. This approach is in accordance with the basic Regulation. However, as investigations have legal deadlines it is inherent on all parties to come forward with views at as early a stage as possible. The Commission already commented on the low level of cooperation from importers and traders at section 7.2 of the provisional Regulation. Bearing in mind that the Commission must progress investigations in accordance with the basic Regulation, the Commission cannot accept the claim that the timeline of the investigation was detrimental to importers and traders. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 21(5) and (7) of the basic Regulation, it is for interested parties to properly submit information supported by actual evidence which is representative and substantiates its validity. Therefore, the claims were rejected.