Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1724 of 8 August 2025 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of barium carbonate originating in the People`s Republic of China and India

(218) In view of the above considerations, the Commission provisionally established that the material injury suffered by the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports from the countries concerned within the meaning of Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation. Such injury had both volume and price effects.

(220) Imports from third countries were negligible during the period considered and represented almost a 0 % market share between 2021 and the investigation period. The Commission does not consider that the evolution of imports from third countries would in any way affect the causation assessment in this case.

(222) The Union industry performance on the third market showed a more positive trend than on the Union market. Its exports increased by 7 % between 2021 and 2022, decreased by 27 % in 2023 and finally increased again by 16 % in the investigation period. Overall, the volume of sales to third countries decreased by 10 % over the period considered, which was a much milder decrease than its dramatic drop in sales on the EU market.

(223) The average price of exports to unrelated customers outside the EU increased every year over the period considered from 2021 to the investigation period. Moreover, with the exception of 2023, the export price was higher than the domestic prices and they were higher than the cost of production in all years except in the investigation period. However, even in the investigation period, the export prices were 16 % higher than the domestic prices, and therefore the export sales contributed to a lesser extent to the losses of the Union producer.

(224) In view of the above considerations, the export performance was not capable of attenuating the causal link between the dumped imports originating in the countries concerned and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(225) As outlined in recital (165), the Union consumption decreased steadily between 2021 to the investigation period (an overall fall of 35 %) as a result of declining demand for barium carbonate. The Commission notes that despite the downward trend in demand, the Union industry was still able to break even in 2021 and enjoy a weak although positive profitability in 2022 while maintaining its market share. However, as of 2023, the Union industry started losing market share on the Union market (its market share decreased by 24 % over the period considered) while the market share of the Chinese and Indian imports increased by 13 % over the period considered. In a declining market, where consumption gradually decreased over the period considered, Chinese and Indian exporting producers managed to increase their market share due to their low, unfair prices while at the same time the Union industry lost market share. This means that Chinese and Indian exporting producers gained clients, which would have, under normal conditions of competition, likely sourced barium carbonate from the Union industry.

(226) Moreover, shrinking demand, together with the price pressure from Chinese and Indian imports described in recital (180) prevented the Union industry from increasing their prices to cover their increasing costs of production. The costs increase (89 % over the period considered) was due, among others, to the raise of energy costs in the same period. The Commission therefore concluded that the decline in consumption in the EU market was not capable of attenuating the causal link between the dumped imports originating in the countries concerned and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(227) During the period considered, the cost of production of the Union industry increased by 89 % due to a considerable rise in raw material costs (baryte and pet coke) and a significant hike in energy prices in 2022 as a result of the war in Ukraine. In addition, a decrease in production over the period considered resulted in an increase in fixed costs per tonne of production.

(228) In this respect, the Commission noted that the increase in production costs and, in particular, in raw materials should have affected other market players to a similar extent in view of the fact that the Union industry sources the majority of its most important raw material, baryte, from outside the Union. Consequently, such an increase in costs was not an element that should have been unique to the Union industry only, even if this cost increase was reflected in the price of imports from China and India only in 2022, but not in 2023 and the IP when import prices decreased considerably.

(229) In fact, in 2022, despite the rising production costs and the energy prices reaching their highest levels, the Union industry was able to increase its sales prices to absorb its rising unit cost of production and achieved its highest profitability over the period considered at the same time when the prices of Chinese and Indian imports were the highest over the period considered.

(230) However, in 2023 and in the IP, when the price of Chinese and Indian imports dropped by around 50 %, the Union industry was not able to increase its prices to reflect its increasing costs and even had to decrease its prices in the IP. At the same time, the Union industry could sell its products for higher prices on export markets than in the Union (except in 2023) which also points to a higher price pressure on the Union market. This shows that it was due to the low priced dumped imports from China and India that the Union industry was not in position to adjust its prices to cover its growing costs. In fact, the Union industry was forced to decrease its prices due to the price suppression by the dumped imports resulting in further losses, decrease in sales quantities and increase in stocks.

(231) As explained in recitals (207), the Union industry’s increased investments during the period considered were overdue, they were required to comply with health, safety and environmental standards and they were necessary in order to maintain existing production.

(232) The Commission thus concluded that the rising cost of production did not contribute to the injury suffered by the Union industry in the investigation period. Similarly, investments required by law or necessary to maintain safe production cannot be considered to have contributed to the injury of the Union industry.

(233) A causal link was established between the dumped imports from the countries concerned on one hand and the injury suffered by the Union industry on the other hand. There was a coincidence in time between the increase of market share of the dumped imports and the worsening of the Union industry’s performance, visible in particular from 2022 onwards. Indeed, in a context of demand contraction, the increased market share of dumped imports impeded the Union industry’s ability to set prices that would absorb the increasing costs of production. This situation resulted in a lossmaking situation of the Union producer in 2023 and during the investigation period.

(234) The Commission examined other possible factors that may have had an impact on the situation of the Union industry. The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of these factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports.

(235) The export performance of the Union industry did not attenuate the causal link. The export sales volumes decreased significantly less than the Union sales and their prices were substantially higher than the domestic prices over the period considered. In conclusion, the relatively better performance of the Union industry in the export markets, compared to the domestic EU market, did not break the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(236) It is undisputable that the Union industry was faced with numerous challenges over the period considered in particular decreasing demand and increasing production costs. However, had it not been for the price pressure from the dumped imports, the Union industry would have been able to pass on the cost increases and adequately respond to the changing market conditions. Indeed, over all the period considered the average import prices from India and China were below the cost of production of the Union industry. As noted above, dumped imports prevented Union producer from increasing prices in order to pass on cost increases.

(237) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate or break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury. The injury consists namely of reduced market share, production, production capacity utilisation, profitability, closing stocks and cash flow. Furthermore, as explained above in recital (205), the Union industry suffered severe losses caused by price pressure by dumped imports from the countries concerned.

(238) To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether duties lower than the margins of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

(239) In the present case, the complainant claimed the existence of raw material distortions within the meaning of Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation with regard to China. Thus, in order to conduct the assessment on the appropriate level of measures, the Commission first established the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury suffered by the Union industry in the absence of distortions under Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation. Then it examined whether the dumping margin of sampled exporting producers from China would be higher than their injury margin (see recitals (247) and (248) below).

(240) The injury would be removed if the Union industry was able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

(241) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the countries concerned, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

(242) The profit of the Union producer was close to zero or negative over all the period considered, with the exception of 2022, when prices worldwide significantly rose for just one year. Taking into account the profitability of the years preceding the period considered, the Commission established the target profit to determine the non-injurious price at 6 %, in accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. Furthermore, the Union producer did not make a substantiated claim for investments foregone or R&D and innovation costs. In view of those facts, the Commission resorted to the use of the minimum 6 % target profit which was added to the Union industry’s actual cost of production to establish the non-injurious price.

(243) In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2). Based on the evidence available, the Commission established an additional cost of 20-100 EUR/t which was added on the non-injurious price.

(244) On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price of [1 200-1 500] per unit of measurement for the like product of the Union industry by applying the above-mentioned target profit margin (see recital (242)) to the cost of production of the sole Union producer during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) (see recital (243)) on a type-by-type basis.

(245) The Commission then determined the injury margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in China and sole cooperating exporting producer in India as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the Union producer on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

(247) As explained in the Notice of Initiation, the complainant provided the Commission sufficient evidence that there are raw material distortions in China regarding the product under investigation. Therefore, in accordance with Article 7(2a) of the basic Regulation, this investigation examined the alleged distortions to assess whether, if relevant, a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury.

(248) However, as the margins adequate to remove injury are higher than the dumping margins, the Commission considered that, at this stage, it was not necessary to address this aspect.

(250) Having decided to apply Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

(251) As explained in recital (8), the Union industry consist of one producer manufacturing the product under investigation during the investigation period.

(252) The EU barium carbonate production is fundamental to the Union’s industrial base. Barium carbonate is a key ingredient to produce a wide range of special purpose glasses, such as pharmaceutical, optical, reflective, borosilicate and crystal glass. Moreover, it is an essential ingredient for glazes and frits in the ceramic industry as well as for the manufacturing of clay bricks. Barium Carbonate is also a key raw material to produce low energy permanent magnets.

(253) Overall, the imposition of measures would likely lead to a higher volume of sales by the Union producer but also to the possibility for the producer to set prices allowing to fully cover its the cost of production and achieve healthy profit. Therefore, the measures would contribute to a better capacity utilization and a recovery in operating margins and profit. The improved performance would in turn lead to sustained levels of investment and employment and promotion of continued innovation.

(254) Without measures, the future of barium carbonate manufacturing in the Union would be jeopardized. Falling capacity utilisation rates would lead to unsustainably high fixedcosts and to a reduction in investments resulting in potential job losses, which in turn would make the Union producer even less able to compete with dumped imports from the countries concerned.

(255) Eventually, without imposition of measures, the EU may likely face the cessation of production of this important material. This would lead to a dependency on imports of barium carbonate for the Union downstream industry and to very limited sources of supply.

(256) The Commission thus concluded that it would be in the interest of the Union industry to impose anti-dumping duties.

(257) Kimpe and L’Aprochimide, both unrelated importers, cooperated in this investigation and provided a questionnaire reply. Another unrelated importer, Europea de materias primas also came forward. However, it did not provide a questionnaire reply by the additional deadline set by the Commission.

(258) The imposition of measures would impact the purchasing price of barium carbonate for the importers. The importers which are not able to negotiate a contract with an adjustment clause if antidumping measures are imposed, might bear a temporary loss for those sales transactions already negotiated at a price not taking into account anti-dumping duties. However, taking into account the limited share of barium carbonate in the cooperating importers’ business and their healthy profitability, the Commission considers that the measures would have limited impact on them.

(259) The Commission thus concluded that it would not be against the interest of the importers to impose anti-dumping duties.

(260) Four users and one user association participated in this investigation, they all opposed the imposition of duties. Kimpe SAS, (‘Kimpe’), Esmalglass S.A (‘Esmalglass’), Younexa S.A (‘Younexa’) and Fritta S.A (‘Fritta’) provided questionnaire replies. The Spanish national association of frits, glazes and ceramic colours manufacturers (Asociation Nacional de Fabricantes de Firtas, Esmaltes y Colores cerámicos ‘ANFFECC’) submitted comments on Union interest.

(261) One of the users, Kimpe produces liquid barium. The three other users are related to each other, and they produce frits and glazes for ceramic tiles.

(262) Kimpe, in addition to its activity as an importer, also processes barium carbonate to produce liquid barium or slurry (a mixture composed of 70 % barium carbonate in powder form, water and some additives) used in the production of clay bricks and tiles. With respect to this activity, Kimpe is a user in the present investigation.

(263) Kimpe opposed the imposition of measures and claimed that the imposition of duties would be against the Union interest as they would have a negative impact on its business and on the business of its clients who buy liquid barium i.e. the clay brick and tiles producers.

(264) Kimpe also argued that barium carbonate grades produced by the Union industry on the one hand and imported from China and India on the other hand were not technically similar. According to Kimpe, a major part of the market of brick and roof tiles applications have used barium carbonate only in liquid form for 20 years which is the standard technology in this segment and would not switch back to powder barium carbonate. According to Kimpe, the Union industry offers barium carbonate only in powder and granular from and therefore there is no direct competition between liquid barium carbonate and the barium carbonate produced by the Union industry.

(265) First, the Commission notes that liquid barium carbonate does not qualify as product concerned and is therefore not subject to the present investigation. In fact, liquid barium carbonate is a downstream product of powder barium carbonate.

(266) Regarding the impact of duties on users producing liquid barium carbonate, the questionnaire reply of Kimpe showed that barium carbonate represented 80-100 % of it cost of production. Measures against imports of barium carbonate from China and India would therefore have a significant impact on this user. However, given the marginal amount of barium carbonate used in the production of bricks, a price increase due to the imposition of duties would likely not impact the demand for barium carbonate in the bricks sector and thus would not impact Kimpe’s sales volumes in a substantial way. The investigation also showed that Kimpe had healthy profit in the investigation period and in the preceding year.

(267) Kimpe claimed that Kandelium produces barium carbonate in granules form via the calcination process, which was more expensive than pressing used in China. Kimpe maintained that granulated barium, whether via the pressed method or calcination, had the same chemical characteristics but the calcination process increased the cost of production. Kimpe also claimed that calcined barium carbonate had a level of hardness that facilitated its breaking during transport or pouring generating dust which made in unsuitable for producers of liquid barium.

(268) As concluded in recital (23), barium carbonate imported from China and India and barium carbonate produced in the Union have the same characteristics. Calcined barium might not the be first choice for several users, because of its higher price and its physical characteristics, however, it is particularly suitable in the production of certain glass and crystals products.

(269) In view of the findings of the investigation summarized in recital (266), the Commission concluded that the cooperating user of liquid barium would not be significantly negatively affected by the imposition of the duties.

(270) Esmalglass, Younexa and Fritta, are Spanish producers of frits and glazes for ceramic tiles. They opposed the imposition of measures.

(271) The investigation confirmed that barium carbonate accounted for less than 10 % of the cost of production of the cooperating users in the fritz and glazes industry. These users had a healthy profitability of over 15 % on products using barium carbonate.

(272) Based on the verified questionnaire replies of these users, the Commission estimated that the overall impact of the duties on the cost of production of these users would be relatively limited even if they would not be able to pass on the price increase to their customers.

(273) ANFFECC claimed that for certain products barium carbonate represents up to 40 % of the cost of production without, however, providing evidence to support this claim.

(274) ANFFECC also claimed that should measures be imposed, due to their low profit margins, the European producers of frits and glazes would be forced to delocalise to countries without antidumping measures in force on barium carbonate. This claim was not substantiated with evidence and the Commission could not verify it.

(275) ANFFECC also argued that Kandelium was absent from the Spanish market since several years and that the manufacturers of frits and glazes in Spain entirely relied on imports. ANFFECC argued that the higher prices of Kandelium compared to the international prices related to a higher level of service which was however not needed by most of the users in Spain.

(276) Moreover, ANFFECC claimed that potential anti-dumping measures would strengthen even more the monopolistic position of Kandelium in the Union.

(277) ANFFECC also claimed that Kandelium’s survival did not depend only on the production of barium carbonate, since the Union producer is also manufacturing strontium carbonate.

(278) All users and ANFFECC claimed that the Union producer had a limited production capacity for barium carbonate as it had only one production line which produces two products: barium carbonate and strontium carbonate.

(279) Kandelium contested the arguments mentioned in recitals (275) to (278). Kandelium claimed that it had enough production capacity both in terms of technical capacity and from a regulatory perspective to satisfy EU demand and claimed that Kandelium had regular contact with Spanish customers. Kandelium added that during the COVID-19 pandemic and the global supply chain crisis in 2021 and 2022, it was able to cover supply shortages from China and India in a timely manner. In this respect, the Commission found that Union consumption was below the production capacity of the Union industry in 2023 and in the IP. Moreover, imports from the countries concerned had a significant market share of [65-80 %] in the investigation period and these imports can continue to enter the Union market on fair terms after the imposition of anti-dumping measures. The Commission therefore concluded that there was no risk of shortage of supply.

(280) Moreover, should the Union industry cease the production of barium carbonate due to price pressure from dumped imports from China and India, the Union market would depend entirely on imports. Currently users can rely on three main sources of supply of barium carbonate (EU, China and India), while in the absence of measures they might solely depend on China and India. This would lead to a consequent loss of competition, a lesser diversity of supply and would involve serious risks in case of trade disruptions, as observed for instance during the COVID-19 pandemic.

(281) The Commission therefore concluded that it would not be against the interest of the users to impose anti-dumping duties.

(282) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of barium carbonate originating in China and India at this stage of the investigation.

(283) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports.

(285) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in China’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(286) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1 of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in country concerned’.

(287) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1 of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(288) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, a percentage may be introduced, depending on the case, although not advisable such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(289) As mentioned in recital (3), the Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration. Registration took place with a view to possibly collecting duties retroactively under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation.

(290) In view of the findings at provisional stage, the registration of imports should cease/be discontinued.

(291) No decision on a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping measures has been taken/can be taken at this stage of the proceeding.

(292) In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE's website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them.

(293) No comments on the accuracy of the calculations were received.

(294) In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within a fixed deadline.

(295) The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Article 2

Article 3

Article 4

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 8 August 2025.

For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN

(1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj.

(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/482 of 14 March 2025 making imports of barium carbonate originating in the People’s Republic of China and India subject to registration (OJ L, 2025/482, 17.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/482/oj).

(3) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2765.

(4) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959 of 17 July 2024 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of erythritol originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L, 2024/1959, 19.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/1959/oj); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180 of 16 October 2023 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/607 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of citric acid originating in the People’s Republic of China as extended to imports of citric acid consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not, following a new exporter review pursuant to Article 11(4) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L, 2023/2180, 17.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/2180/oj); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752 of 12 April 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 100, 13.4.2023, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/752/oj); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/441 of 11 March 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sulphanilic acid originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 85, 12.3.2016, p. 154, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2021/441).

(5) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959, recitals 161-162; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 89-90; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 70.

(6) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959 recitals 103-113; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 46-50; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 49.

(7) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959 recitals 114-122; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 51-55; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recitals 50-54. While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of the product under review and the suppliers of their inputs.

(8) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959 recitals 123-133; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 64-65; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recitals 55-63.

(9) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959 recitals 134-138; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 66-69; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 64.

(10) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959 recitals 139-142; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 71-72; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 65.

(11) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959 recitals 143-152; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 72-81; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 66.

(12) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 10 April 2024, SWD(2024) 91 final, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2024)91&lang=en, including the previous version of the document: Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017, SWD(2017) 483 final/2, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2017)483&lang=en.

(13) See page 19 of the complaint (open version).

(14) Commission Regulation (EC) No 145/2005 of 28 January 2005 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of barium carbonate originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 27, 29.1.2005, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2005/145/oj), recitals 24-29.

(15) See page 20 of the complaint (open version).

(16) See pages 19-20 of the complaint (open version).

(17) See pages 20-21 of the complaint (open version).

(18) See pages 21-22 of the complaint (open version).

(19) See pages 22-23 of the complaint (open version).

(20) See page 23 of the complaint (open version).

(21) See pages 23-25 of the complaint (open version).

(22) See at: https://www.hota.cn/Home.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(23) See at: https://www.jingyan.com/intro/1.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(24) See at: http://lylchem.com/English/about.asp (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(25) See at: https://www.sinochem.com/sinochem/guwm/qygk/jj/A031002001001Gone1.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(26) See at: http://www.redstarchem.com/intro/4.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(27) See Guizhou Redstar Developing Co., Ltd. annual report 2024, p.116, available at: https://file.finance.qq.com/finance/hs/pdf/2025/04/26/1223321234.PDF (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(28) See at: http://www.redstarchem.com/about.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(29) See at: http://www.sinochemhx.com/shxschina/ywgl/zycp/A074003001Gone1.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(30) See at: http://wap.sasac.gov.cn/n2588045/n27271785/n27271792/c14159097/content.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(31) See at: http://www.hhxj.chemchina.com/s/22260-63719-185778.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(32) See Art. 33 of the CCP Constitution, Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law. See also the Report, Chapter 3, p. 47-50.

(33) See Art. 5 of the Law on Promoting the Private Sector, available at: https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202504/content_7022018.htm (accessed on 13 May 2025).

(34) See CPCIF Articles of Association, Article 3, available at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/detail/40288043661e27fb01661e386a3f0001?e=1 (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(35) Ibid.

(36) See CPCIF Articles of Association, Article 36, available at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/detail/40288043661e27fb01661e386a3f0001?e=1 (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(37) See at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/list/40288043661dc14701661ddbe0980010 (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(38) See at: https://www.cisia.org/ (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(39) See CISIA Articles of Association, Articles 3 and 36, available at: https://www.cisia.org/site/content/62346.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(40) Ibid.

(41) Ibid.

(42) See at: https://www.cisia.org/site/content/6621.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(43) See Section III.8.3 of the 14th FYP and 2035 perspectives, available at: https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(44) See Art.16, Law on Promoting the Private Sector, available at: https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202504/content_7022018.htm (accessed on 13 May 2025).

(45) See at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-04/08/content_5683972.htm#msdynttrid=WRmyf07ph0z74SHmXoOLKjRWl09BdZ4lGdYp9fiI9xU (accessed 12 May 2025).

(46) Ibid., Section I.3.

(47) Ibid., Section III.4.

(48) See p. 87, available at: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/fzggwl/202312/P020231229700886191069.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(49) See p. 111, available at: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/fzggwl/202312/P020231229700886191069.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(50) See p. 8, available at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021-12/29/5665166/files/90c1c79a00b44c67b59c29392476c862.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(51) See Section II.2.4, available at: https://huanbao.bjx.com.cn/news/20211201/1191133.shtml (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(52) Ibid, See Section III.1.4.

(53) See at: http://lylchem.com/English/index.asp# (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(54) See Section VI.1, available at: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/dffzgh/202105/P020210508614699466849.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(55) See Section IV.3 https://fgw.guizhou.gov.cn/ztzl/sswgh_5643328/202109/P020220524636540764870.pdf (accessed on 13 May 2025).

(56) See at: https://vip.stock.finance.sina.com.cn/corp/view/vCI_CorpManagerInfo.php?stockid=600367&Pcode=30038417&Name=%B8%DF%D4%C2%B7%C9 (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(57) See at: https://www.hota.cn/djgzinfo/1608303981866827776.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(58) See at: https://www.hota.cn/Home.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(59) See at: http://www.tzxgt.cn/news/56.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(60) See at: https://www.sinochem.com/sinochem/guwm/zlzz/ds/A031002002002Gone1.html, (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(61) See at: https://www.sinochem.com/sinochem/dzyjj/dj11/A031007001Gone1.html (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(62) The Report, Part III, Chapter 16.

(63) Ibid., Section 16.3.

(64) See Section IV.1.3, available at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021-12/29/content_5665166.htm (accessed on 12 May 2025).

(65) See at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202307/content_6894869.htm (accessed on 13 May 2025).

(66) See at: https://www.tianzhu.gov.cn/zwgk/zdlygk/gyfz/202305/t20230525_79896343.html (accessed on 13 May 2025).

(67) Ibid.

(68) See at: http://gz.news.cn/20241119/b6ef61a4240944419d65127fb59b8e4b/c.html (accessed on 13 May 2025).

(69) Ibid.

(70) See at: https://www.hb.chinanews.com.cn/news/2022/0105/369027.html (accessed on 13 May 2025).

(71) See at: https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202406/19/content_WS6672c84ac6d0868f4e8e8531.html#:~:text=China%20will%20scale%20up%20support,of%20Industry%20and%20Information%20Technology (accessed on 13 May 2025).

(72) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959, recitals 153-157 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 82-84; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 67.

(73) See Section VIII.16, available at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-04/08/content_5683972.htm#msdynttrid=WRmyf07ph0z74SHmXoOLKjRWl09BdZ4lGdYp9fiI9xU (accessed on 13 May 2025).

(74) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income.

(75) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/755/oj) as amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/749 of 24 February 2017 amending Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the removal of Kazakhstan from the list of countries in Annex I thereto (OJ L 113, 29.4.2017, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2017/749/oj).

(76) http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/.

(77) EMRA | Energy Market Regulatory Authority (epdk.gov.tr)=> Press releases => select Electricity electricity market board decisions.

(78) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 on common rules for imports from certain third countries. Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value.

(79) See https://www.imarcgroup.com/barite-pricing-report, last accessed on 6 June 2025.

(80) See https://www.imarcgroup.com/barite-pricing-report, last accessed on 6 June 2025.

(81) The labour costs are available at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/.

(82) https://data.tuik.gov.tr.

(83) EMRA | Energy Market Regulatory Authority (epdk.gov.tr)=> Press releases => select Electricity electricity market board decisions.

(84) https://www.alkim.com.tr/files/file/dosya-Vb5yp4tsYm0EUPq-2024.pdf (last accessed on 22 May 2025) and https://www.sisecam.com/en/s-investor-relations/Documents/Annual%20Reports/SCAM_FRAE_2024_MTB_uyg_23.pdf (last accessed on 22 May 2025).

(85) OJ L 250, 28.9.2017, p. 34.