Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1919 of 25 September 2025 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Egypt, Japan and Vietnam, and terminating the investigation on imports thereof originating in India

• (136) After the final disclosure, Hoa Phat Group submitted that the Commission rightfully concluded that the complainant’s claims on the existence of a particular market situation in Vietnam within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the basic Regulation were without merit, and that the evidence contained in the complaint with regard to the alleged particular market situation in Vietnam was not adequate nor accurate. It considered that the raw materials in Vietnam could not be subject to distortions, given that such raw materials were not affected at all by domestic prices.

• (137) The Commission considered that the claim of EUROFER was not based on any new evidence on the existence of the particular situation in Vietnam, nor it could be established the prices of the inputs were distorted – to the contrary, the prices were found in line with international prices. Therefore, it was not appropriate to replace these costs. The Commission thus rejected the claim.

3.4.2.   Export price

• (138) In the absence of any comments regarding the export price, recitals (150) to (151) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

3.4.3.   Comparison

• (139) In the absence of any comments regarding the comparison, recitals (152) to (156) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

3.4.4.   Dumping margin

• (140) In the absence of any accepted claim concerning the dumping margin calculation, recital (161) of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.

• (141) The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Company	Definitive dumping margin
Formosa Ha Tinh Steel Corporation	12,1 %
Hoa Phat Dung Quat Steel Joint Stock Company	0 %
All other imports originating in Vietnam	12,1 %

4. INJURY

4.1.   Definition of the Union industry and Union production

• (142) In the absence of any comments regarding the definition of the Union industry, recitals (162) to (167) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.2.   Union consumption

4.2.1.   Captive consumption on the Union market (tonnes)

• (143) The term ‘captive consumption’ included both ‘captive sales’, (i.e. transfer within the Group at non-market prices (i.e. not at an arm’s length)) and ‘captive use’, (i.e. internal transfer of HRF for the production of downstream steel products such as tubes for examples). In the absence of any comments regarding the Union captive consumption, recitals (172) to (178) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.2.2.   Free market consumption in the Union

• (144) The verification visit held at the premises of EUROFER and referred to in recital (19) revealed that certain sales between related parties, which were made at arm’s length and thus could not be considered as captive, during the IP for one of the 22 Union producers, had erroneously not been taken into account as free market sales. Therefore Tables 4, 5, 6 and 10 of the provisional Regulation were revised and disclosed to parties in the General Disclosure Document (GDD) to include those non-captive sales volumes.

• (145) In a further analysis, the Commission revised its assessment whereby the methodology used for calculating the consumption in the Union free market as presented in the provisional Regulation was actually correct as non-captive sales, at arm’s length, to related parties such as traders and Steel Service Centres had correctly been included in the assessment of the Union free market consumption in Table 5 of the provisional Regulation for all Union producers and confirmed in Table 3 below.

• (146) In any case, it has been investigated and confirmed that these non-captive sales are indeed sales at market prices and that the related buyer had a free choice of supplier, irrespective of whether this supplier was related or not.

• (147) In this regard, the Commission has included all non-captive sales in the Union free market data on top of the sales by the Union producers to unrelated customers and the imports from third countries. This limited change had no material impact on the conclusions outlined in the provisional Regulation as explained below.

• (148) Nippon Steel and JFE submitted that Union producers have been importing the product under investigation into the EU in considerable volumes throughout the investigation. This point is addressed in detail, in Section 4.3.2, recitals (173) to (180). The Commission noted that while cross-checking the information on imports of HRF, the Commission found a clerical error in recital (191) of the provisional regulation with regard to the evolution of the total market share of the imports from the countries concerned into the Union. While the market share indeed went up by almost 4.1 percentage points, the increase in market share amounted to 87 % and not 56 % in the period considered as erroneously indicated (see Table 2).

4.2.3.   Overall consumption

• (149) In light of the corrections described in recital (146), the overall consumption table was revised and overall consumption (including non-captive sales) evolved as follows during the period considered:

Table 1

Union overall consumption (free sales (including non-captive sales between related parties) and captive consumption market) (tonnes)

	2021	2022	2023	Investigation period
Overall Union Consumption	[70 785 251 – 81 095 403 ]	[60 606 914 – 72 927 115 ]	[60 726 141 – 71 931 644 ]	[61 426 794 – 72 709 091 ]
Index (2021=100)	100	87	86	87
Including captive market	[35 289 645 – - 43 224 546 ]	[29 094 190 – 36 000 359 ]	[29 005 256 – 36 224 147 ]	[29 143 141 – 36 224 968 ]
	100	84	84	84
Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply, sampled Union producers.	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply, sampled Union producers.	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply, sampled Union producers.	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply, sampled Union producers.	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply, sampled Union producers.

• (150) The overall Union consumption in 2022 dropped by 13 % as compared to 2021. Captive consumption represented 49,9 % of overall Union consumption in the investigation period and dropped by 16 %.

• (151) Following the imposition of provisional measures, FHS stated that the Commission should use the same CN codes to extract Eurostat import data as the ones used to establish EUROFER’s production figures. FHS argued that in taking such asymmetric approach, the Commission artificially enlarged the consumption denominator and automatically diluted the calculated market shares of both the Union industry and the countries concerned.

• (152) The Commission established the import statistics for HRF on the basis of Eurostat data by applying the CN codes under which the like product would be falling. The Commission also ensured that the same specific CN code was used by the sampled Union producers and EUROFER to report micro and macro-indicators and in particular production volume.

• (153) FHS argued that the share of captive consumption (i.e. internal transfers for further processing of the product under investigation without invoicing and entering into free market, and ‘captive sales at non-arm’s length transactions with related companies for further processing’) should be considered in the overall production of hot-rolled flat steel products. In the view of this exporting producer, almost three-quarters of the overall contraction in apparent consumption originated inside vertically integrated groups. According to FHS, captive demand fell by more than 6 million tonnes, whereas free-market demand shrank by fewer than 2 million tonnes.

• (154) Therefore, in the view of this exporting producer, before attributing any injury to imports from the countries concerned, the Commission should have first demonstrated that those imports gained a disproportionate share in a context of overall declining market demand. In the view of this exporting producer this would have strong impact on the final injury determination.

• (155) The Commission has closely examined the question of ‘captive consumption’ (see recital (143)) and ‘captive sales’ which is highly relevant in the investigation at hand. In the provisional Regulation, it has considered sales in the open market (without including non-captive sales as explained in recital (146)) separately from the captive consumption in its injury assessment, as the latter was not considered to be subject to free market conditions.

• (156) The Commission noted that while some of the Union producers have related companies either trading or processing the like product, also their sales to these related entities are done at arm’s length and that these related entities are allowed to purchase from all suppliers, including those from the countries concerned and not just from a related primary steel makers and all these purchases are done at market price. Thus, all non-captive sales to related parties were included in the volume or value thereof.

• (157) The claims that almost three-quarters of the overall contraction in EU consumption originated inside vertically integrated groups was found to be correct, however, they did not affect the conclusions that the EU sales volumes, including non-captive sales to related parties declined by 15 % as shown in the revised Table 2 (Table 4 in this Regulation).

• (158) FHS argued that the 13 % drop in the Union overall consumption between 2021 and the IP as reported in Table 5 of the provisional Regulation coincided with a ‘well-documented’ slowdown in the EU construction, automotive and pipeline sectors following the 2022-2023 energy-price shock.

• (159) However, no underlying evidence was given with regard to the fact that HRF is solely used in those sectors and in which quantities. According to FHS, that macro-shock affected every supplier equally. Before attributing any injury to imports from targeted countries, the Commission should have first demonstrated that those imports gained a disproportionate share within the shrinking pie —something, which in FHS view was not established on the basis of the data in Table 6 of the provisional Regulation.

• (160) The Commission disagreed with this statement. First, the statistics reported in Table 6 of the provisional Regulation showed that the trend of imports from the countries concerned did not follow the same trend as the overall Union industry's production volume, which, as shown in Table 9 of the provisional Regulation, decreased by 16 % as a consequence of the combined decrease in sales in the free markets. Secondly, FHS did not provide any evidence regarding these alleged ‘well-documented’ slowdown in the EU construction, automotive and pipeline sectors following the 2022-2023 energy-price shock or that HRF was only used in these sectors. These claims were therefore rejected.

• (161) After final disclosure, FHS pointed to the fact that the Commission had offered ‘at least three different estimates of the Union industry’s market share loss’ and argued that the Commission should disclose ‘the revised spreadsheet that underpins Tables 2 – 4 of the GDD and clearly identify which market share figure it considers to be authoritative’.

• (162) First, the alleged lack of clarity regarding the methodology used for calculation of the respective market shares of the Union industry and third countries was explained in detail in recital (189) of the provisional Regulation and Section 4.2 of the final General Disclosure Document. Second, some information could not be disclosed and had to be presented using ranges in order to ensure the confidentiality of the data pertaining to other parties, including from other exporting producers originating in Vietnam. In any case, all reported figures show a similar downward trend when it comes to the market share of the Union industry. The arguments of FHS were therefore rejected.

• (163) The changes mentioned above in recital (144) with respect to Union consumption, did not affect the conclusions set out in recitals (168) to (182) of the provisional Regulation.

4.3.   Imports from the countries concerned

4.3.1.   Cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from the countries concerned and import volumes and import prices from the countries concerned

• (164) Following the imposition of provisional measures and after the final disclosure, Ezz Steel argued that the imports from Egypt to the European Union should be considered negligible both in terms of volumes and market shares, with in addition a low-level increase in percentage of 4 % from 2021 to the IP. Furthermore, there were different conditions of competition between imports from Egypt and the hot-rolled flat products produced by the Union industry as according to this exporting producer, Egypt should be considered as a price follower as it had the highest average import prices compared to Japan and Vietnam from 2022 to the IP, and Egyptian imports did not undercut EU sales prices in the IP. Ezz Steel also argued that the market shares should be calculated on the basis of the Union’s overall consumption set out in Table 5 of the provisional Regulation which includes sales on the free and captive consumption markets.

• (165) The Commission noted that some of these allegations with regard to the conditions set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation and to the cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from the countries concerned had already been submitted by Ezz Steel and addressed by the Commission at provisional stage, in particular recitals (183) to (188).

• (166) First the Commission noted that, in this particular case, imports of the product under investigation originating in the countries concerned accounted individually for at least [2,2 – 2,9] % of market share in the investigation period and for [7,6 – 10,1] % when considered together during the investigation period, as reported in Table 2 below. Furthermore, the Commission disagreed with the claim of Ezz Steel that its market shares should be calculated on the basis of the Union’s overall consumption and not on the total Union free market consumption. The Commission considered that the imports from Egypt should be compared with the total free market, excluding captive consumption which are not subject to the same conditions of competition as in the free market.

• (167) As per its standard practice in anti-dumping investigations, the Commission established the Union free market consumption on the basis of (a) the sales on the Union free market of all known producers in the Union; and (b) the imports into the Union from all third countries as reported by Eurostat, thereby also considering the data submitted by the cooperating exporting producers in the countries concerned. In the absence of new claims in the comments submitted on the GDD, the conclusions were maintained.

• (168) After final disclosure Ezz Steel highlighted a discrepancy in the Commission’s approach regarding the calculation of the market share of the volume of imports of the product concerned from Egypt during the investigation period. According to this exporting producer, the Commission’s approach to consider the total Union free market consumption instead of the overall consumption as a basis to calculate the market share of imports from Egypt contradicted the methodology adopted in the safeguard regulation ²⁴, where it included captive sales in its determination of consumption for all product categories including HRF.

• (169) In the present investigation, the Commission conducted a detailed analysis of the Union market, assessing both the free and captive markets of HRF. Therefore, it is incorrect to imply that the Commission disregarded the situation in the combined market in the present case. The same approach was followed in previous anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigation concerning Brazil, China, Russia, Iran, Türkiye or Ukraine. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

• (170) Ezz Steel referred to its previous submission made at initiation stage which included figures set out in a ‘CRU Report’ ²⁵ on EU HRC Market Consumption, arguing that by not addressing this point raised by Ezz Steel, the Commission breached its obligation to state reason. However, as explained in recitals (162) to (164) and (171) of the provisional Regulation, as well as in recital (152) above, the Commission used the verified sales data of no less than 22 companies producing the like product which was coupled to Eurostat data regarding imports from third countries to allow it to obtain data for the entire consumption of the like product in the Union. Hence, there was no need to revert to other commercial unverified sources as reputable they may be.

• (171) Ezz Steel furthermore argued that by using the overall consumption, the market share of Ezz Steel would be no more than 1,25 %. It furthermore alleged that the Commission’s approach led to inaccurate results that do not reflect normal market conditions insofar as those shares would be largely dependent on the unilateral conduct of the EU HRF primary steel producers, either by taking over downstream processing companies or by deciding to divest its related downstream processing companies. Therefore, the Commission artificially overinflated the EU market share of Egyptian imports of HRF when in fact it could be considered as warranting a termination of the investigation as was the case for Serbia in a previous anti-dumping investigation ²⁶.

• (172) First, in accordance with its standard practice, the Commission assessed the imports from the countries concerned in the free market, on which they are in competition with the Union industry. Against the background of Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation which refers to the effects of the imports from the countries concerned, the Commission failed to see how the share of imports from the countries concerned should not be compared with the free market sales of the Union industry, with which they compete, to assess the cumulation of imports from the countries concerned and their effects on the performance of the Union industry. The Commission found that Egypt was not in the situation as Serbia in that case. The Commission found in the case concerning Serbia ²⁷ that 1,04 % was still negligible under Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation, because 0,04 percentage points (pp) should be regarded as immaterial, in particular when, in relative terms, Serbian import volumes were considerably lower than the volumes from each of the four other countries investigated. Conversely, in the present case, using the same methodology to calculate consumption as that followed in the Serbian case, the Commission established that Egypt had [2,2 – 2,9] % market share during the investigation period, which is more than double the threshold established in Article 5(7); it cannot therefore be considered as ‘negligible’. Furthermore, the dumped imports from the other two countries concerned in this case had similar market share, in particular Vietnam ([2,3 – 3,3] %). Thus, unlike claimed by Ezz Steel, the situation in the two cases is clearly different, and does not justify treating Egypt the same way as Serbia. The claim was therefore rejected.

4.3.2.   Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned

• (173) As mentioned in Recital (19), Table 6 of the provisional Regulation had to be updated to take into account the non-captive sales volumes to related parties in the IP of one of the Union producers.

• (174) Furthermore, as mentioned in recital (19), a clerical error was found in recital (191) of the provisional Regulation with regard to the evolution of the total market share of the imports of the countries concerned into the Union, which went up by 3,5 percentage points, an increase of 74 % in the period considered.

Table 2

Import volume (tonnes) and market share

	2021	2022	2023	Investigation period
Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt
Volume of imports from Egypt	[757 029 – 914 743 ]	[508 554 – 614 503 ]	[738 891 – 888 162 ]	[741 336 – 906 077 ]
Market share Egypt	[2,0 – 2,7 ] %	[1,3 – 1,8 ] %	[2,0 – 2,5 ] %	[2,2 – 2,9 ] %
Japan	Japan	Japan	Japan	Japan
Volume of imports from Japan	592 624	1 049 208	1 072 332	1 080 049
Market share Japan	[1,4 – 2,0 ] %	[3,0 – 3,6 ] %	[3,1 – 3,7 ] %	[3,1 – 3,9 ] %
Vietnam	Vietnam	Vietnam	Vietnam	Vietnam
Volume of imports from Vietnam (excluding Hoa Phat Group)	[376 064 – 452 812 ]	[391 091 – 475 197 ]	[791 275 – 956 124 ]	[791 008 – 957 536 ]
Market share Vietnam (excluding Hoa Phat Group)	[0,8 – 1,4 ] %	[1,0 – 1,6 ] %	[2,1 – 3,0 ] %	[2,3 – 3,3 ] %
Countries concerned	Countries concerned	Countries concerned	Countries concerned	Countries concerned
Volume of imports from the countries concerned	[1 676 689 – 2 029 676 ]	[1 801 528 – 2 219 425 ]	[2 457 927 – 2 988 514 ]	[2 654 306 – 3 201 585 ]
Market share countries concerned	[4,2 – 6,1 ] %	[5,3 - 7,0 ] %	[7,2 – 9,2 ] %	[7,6 – 10,1 ] %
Index (2021=100)	100	126	169	187

• (175) Nippon Steel and JFE argued that the decline of market shares of only 2 percentage points during the period considered should not be considered as an ‘indicator of the deterioration of the competitive position of the Union steel producers’ as stated in recital (212) of the provisional Regulation. Both parties raised in particular the fact that the Union industry maintained a dominant position on the EU market, with a market share of 70,2 % by the end of the IP, declining by only 0,6 percentage points from 2023.

• (176) As explained in recital (212) of the provisional Regulation, the decrease in sales volume in the Union free market and the loss of Union industry's market share significantly exceeded the decrease of consumption in the Union free market, which is an indicator of the deterioration of the competitive position of the Union steel producers. Furthermore, as clarified in recital (190) of the present Regulation, the drop in market share of the Union industry on the free market amounted to 3,4 percentage points as mentioned in the revised Table 5 below and not 2 percentage points as mentioned in the provisional Regulation.

• (177) Nippon Steel and JFE noted that Union producers have in fact continued to import hot-rolled coils (‘HRC’) and slabs into the EU since the initiation of the investigation, despite the allegation made in the complaint that imports from Japan, Egypt and Vietnam were preventing them from increasing their production. According to these two parties, Union steel primary and secondary producers imported over 220 000 tonnes of HRC and in total, the Union industry imported almost 4 million tonnes in 2023 from the countries concerned out of a total of 8 million tonnes from the rest of the world. No evidence was provided by these parties regarding the imports of slabs by Union primary steel producers and the investigation did not reveal any information in this regard.

• (178) FHS argued that the alleged methodological errors mentioned in recitals (20) and (151) exaggerated both the scale and the competitive impact of imports from Vietnam. FHS reiterated that the choice of 2021 as the index base year distorted the picture as import volumes recorded that year were abnormally depressed because Russian and Turkish supplies were still flowing freely, while Asian mills were struggling with pandemic-related freight bottlenecks. The 56 % increase of imports during the period considered therefore reflected only the replacement of trade flows from these two countries which were subject to either sanctions for the previous or anti-dumping measures for the latter.

• (179) The Commission contended that the replacement of imports by the countries concerned, might indeed be the result of measures taken against Russian and Türkiye. However, it remains that those imports from the countries concerned were found to increase in significant quantities to the detriment of the Union industry, be dumped and injurious to the Union industry.

• (180) In the absence of any other comments regarding the imports from the countries concerned, recitals (189) to (191) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.3.3.   Prices of the imports from the countries concerned price undercutting and price suppression

• (181) In recitals (192) to (197) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission detailed the methodology to determine the price undercutting, and it concluded that the imports from the countries concerned undercut and suppressed the Union industry prices.

• (182) The dumped imports from the majority of the sampled exporting producers concerned were found to undercut the Union industry prices in a range between – 3,3 % and 10,1 % as can be seen in Table 8 of the provisional Regulation.

• (183) Following the imposition of provisional measures, Ezz Steel considered that the average prices of imports from Egypt were relatively high and did not undercut EU sales prices. Therefore, these imports could have not caused injury to Union producers. Given the nature of these comments, they are addressed in Section 5.1 below.

• (184) FHS argued that the 3,3 % undercutting established for its imports corresponded to the freight differential and currency fluctuations that routinely separated FOB offers in Asia from EU steel mills quotes and therefore, could not be considered as injurious for the Union industry. After final disclosure, FHS further argued that the Commission failed to provide a thorough analysis as to why such undercutting margin of 3,3 % for FHS was economically significant in the context of the EU HRF market.

• (185) As mentioned in recital (242), the investigation also revealed that the Union industry’s prices were suppressed by the low-priced imports originating inter alia in Egypt. In the context of price suppression, it is not surprising that the undercutting is not significant as the Union industry is prevented from increasing its price due to the price pressure incurred.

• (186) The Commission recalled that as explained in recital (194) of the provisional Regulation, the price undercutting during the investigation period was assessed by comparing: the weighted average sales prices per product type of the three Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the free Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and the corresponding weighted average prices at CIF Union frontier level per product type of the imports from the cooperating producers of the countries concerned to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) basis, with appropriate adjustments for post-importation costs. While the price undercutting may have various causes, the undercutting calculation was made based on the verified data provided by FHS.

• (187) On this basis, the Commission confirmed the undercutting margin established in recital (196) of the provisional Regulation. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (188) In the absence of any other comments regarding the imports from the countries concerned, recitals (192) to (197) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

4.4.   Economic situation of the Union industry

• (189) In the provisional Regulation (Section 4.4), the Commission detailed the macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators of the Union industry in the period considered. It concluded, in recital (238) of the provisional Regulation, that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

• (190) As mentioned in recital (19) and (131) to (142), the verification visit held at the premises of EUROFER, revealed that the non-captive sales data to related parties by one of the complainants had not been included in the overall non-captive sales data pertaining to the IP. The Commission also made some adjustments to the relevant tables in order to include non-captive sales in the free market consumption. This had consequences for Tables 5 and 6 of the provisional Regulation as mentioned above, but also for Tables 4 and 10 of the provisional Regulation. The captive consumption table of the provisional Regulation remained unchanged.

• (191) After final disclosure, quoting Article 3.2 of the WTO ADA, FHS claimed that the Commission should have either included captive volumes in all injury indicators or re-calculated them on a consistent free-market-only basis. Furthermore, according to FHS, the Commission did not meet the transparency and disclosure obligations under Article 6.5.1 of the WTO ADA and Article 3(2) of the Basic Regulation by not disclosing the exact amount and percentages which were changed.

• (192) The Commission first noted that it followed the same consistent approach as in previous investigation concerning HRF whereby captive volumes were only taken into account where warranted, i.e. where no distinction could be made regarding the destination of the products given the nature of the indicator. Hence, as investments or production relate to both captive and free market operations, they could only be assessed jointly regardless of the destination of the products. On the contrary, profitability was assessed based on the free market sales to reflect free market mechanisms and to take account of the competition faced by Union producers due to the imports from third countries entering the Union market. Second, the Commission was not able for confidentiality reasons to provide exact figures, but provided ranges and indexes for all the necessary data. In addition, in response to NSC and JFE’s comments, the Commission provided further clarification as explained in recital (194) below.

• (193) The revised Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 3

Union free market consumption including non-captive sales (tonnes)

	2021	2022	2023	Investigation period
Free market consumption	[33 097 951 – 39 993 358 ]	[30 245 156 – 36 452 883 ]	[29 127 073 – 36 275 456 ]	[30 192 346 – 37 690 752 ]
Index (2021=100)	100	90	88	89
Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply, sampled Union producers, Eurostat.	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply, sampled Union producers, Eurostat.	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply, sampled Union producers, Eurostat.	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply, sampled Union producers, Eurostat.	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply, sampled Union producers, Eurostat.

Table 4

Sales volume and market share of the Union industry on the Union free market

	2021	2022	2023	Investigation period
Sales volume in the Union free market (tonnes)	27 729 413	25 319 395	24 045 946	23 570 313
Index (2021=100)	100	91	87	85
Market share	74,3  %	68,2  %	72,8  %	70,8  %
Index (2021=100)	100	102	98	95
Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply and Eurostat,	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply and Eurostat,	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply and Eurostat,	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply and Eurostat,	Source: EUROFER questionnaire reply and Eurostat,

• (194) After final disclosure, NSC and JFE contested the Commission’s finding with regard to some injury factors in relation to the economic situation that prevailed during the period 2020 and 2021. This led the Commission to revisit once more the situation regarding the market consumption in the Union and the sales volume and market share of the Union industry on the Union free market. The Commission acknowledged that the error mentioned in recital (19) had no effects on Tables 2, 3 and 4 and in fact, made a double counting of the non-captive sales es as noted in recital (146). In fact, the figures reported in these tables in the provisional regulation already included the non-captive sales. Following the final disclosure, the relevant tables and content were therefore revised, back to the previous volumes, with the exception of the data of one of the 22 Union producers, which remained similar to that used for the GDD.

• (195) With regard to NSC and JFE comments regarding the situation that prevailed during the period 2020 and 2021, they argued that the year 2021 was exceptional and highly specific following the COVID-19 crisis which affected the market demand and prices in the previous year. Therefore, whilst the Union industry benefitted from the recovery of the economy after the COVID-19 crisis, using this year as a basis to determine the evolution of the economic situation of the Union industry would automatically and artificially lead to an injurious situation.

• (196) NSC and JFE referred in particular to a previous expiry review case concerning China ²⁸. In their submission, they noted that in accordance with the sales volumes reported in the GDD: ‘the sales volume of 30 578 495 tonnes identified by the Commission for 2021 in the present Investigation constitutes a remarkable performance — representing an increase of 21 % on the 2019 figure’ ²⁹. However, following the correction made after the final disclosure as explained in recital (194), the Commission confirmed that unlike what could be indeed deducted from the figures disclosed in the GDD, the correct sales volume of 27 729 413 tonnes reported in Table 4 for 2021 only represented an increase of 9,2 % on the 2019 figure and not 21 % as alleged by the NSC and JFE. This showed that the year 2021 was actually in line with normal market conditions since after dropping to 20 020 000 tonnes in 2020 as found in the expiry review case regarding China, the sales volumes could not be qualified as a ‘remarkable performance’ as claimed by NSC and JFE. Furthermore, the free market consumption in the IP was 33,268 million tonnes, which is also in the range of the consumption observed in 2019. The claim was therefore rejected.

• (197) The Union industry sales volume in the Union free market (i.e. excluding captive sales) decreased by 15 % during the period considered from 27,729 million tonnes to 23,570 million tonnes.

• (198) During the period considered, the Union industry’s market share in terms of Union consumption went down by 3,44 percentage points, from 74,29 % to 70,85 %. The decrease in sales volume in the Union free market and the loss of Union industry’s market share significantly exceeded the decrease of consumption in the Union free market, which is an indicator of the deterioration of the competitive position of the Union steel producers.

• (199) FHS argued that since the production capacity of the Union industry remained unchanged during the period considered, the Commission wrongly attributed the decrease of capacity utilisation resulting from the lower production level to the imports from the countries concerned instead of recognising that the drop of the production was linked to the overall decrease of demand of the product under investigation. Moreover, the decline was concentrated in the captive segment, which went down by 16 % (from 39,2 to 33,1 million tonnes), whereas free-market consumption fell only by 6 %. By the same token, FHS considered that the data indicated that sales volumes fell because the EU market shrank, especially on the captive side, not because suppliers in the countries concerned displaced business from Union producers. Furthermore, considering that the Union Industry controlled about 70 % of the free market and more than 85 % of total consumption, a two percent decrease in market share should be considered as an ordinary competitive variation and could not reasonably be viewed as import-driven injury.

• (200) As showed in Table 4 above, and contrary to what FHS erroneously claimed, during the period considered, the Union industry sales volume in the Union free market (as revised after the imposition of provisional measures) and the Union industry captive transfers in the Union market both followed a downward trend dropping respectively by 15 % and 16 % over the period considered in line with the drop in total production of the Union industry as reported in Table 9 of the provisional regulation. However, the percentage of captive consumption compared to the total production remaining stable throughout the period considered ranging from 55,7 % to 56,1 %, this confirmed the existence of sales displacement of the sales of the Union producers in the free market by the exporting producers from the countries concerned which saw their market share increasing at a time when the overall demand was shrinking. This is also confirmed by the sharper decrease in sales on the free than on the captive market which resulted in a loss of 3,4 % percentage points of market share. Furthermore, the loss of Union industry’s sales in the free market significantly exceeded the decrease of consumption in the Union free market, which, as mentioned in recital (212) was an indicator of the deterioration of the competitive position of the Union steel producers.

• (201) After final disclosure FHS reiterated its claim that the similar decline level of both the Union industry sales volume in the Union free market and the Union industry captive transfers in the Union market resulted first and foremost from a contracted demand on the Union free market and not from imports from the countries concerned.

• (202) Whilst invoking this argument in favour of using the total Union consumption which thus included both captive and free-market transactions as the denominator for the calculation of the market shares, FHS however disregarded the existence of a displacement of the sales of the Union producers in the free market by the exporting producers from the countries concerned which saw their market share increase at a time when the overall demand was shrinking as showed in table 2. On this basis, this claim was rejected.

• (203) In a context where the Union Industry controlled about 70,8 % of the free market and more than 85 % of total consumption, the Commission confirmed its findings that a 3,4 % decrease in market share could not be considered as an ordinary competitive variation. The updated figures confirmed that the Union industry had no other choice but to follow the price level set by the dumped imports to avoid losing further market share. This resulted in a deterioration of the situation of the Union industry as showed by various macro and micro indicators such as profitability, sales volume, market share, employment and cash flow. On this basis, these claims were rejected.

• (204) Nippon Steel and JFE noted that according to Table 12 of the provisional Regulation, employment levels in the Union industry have increased from 2023 to the IP, by 3,4 %, however, the Commission only highlighted the reduction of 7,0 % over the period considered.

• (205) Nippon Steel and JFE pointed to the information provided by the Union industry, that showed that average labour costs started to stabilise, falling significantly from their peak in 2023.

• (206) The Commission first considered that certain injury indicators should not be interpreted in isolation to determine whether the Union industry suffered material injury. On the contrary, injury should be determined by assessing all injury indicators. Furthermore, not all injury indicators should show a deterioration of the Union industry’s performance to conclude that it suffered material injury.

• (207) As far as employment is concerned, the Commission considered that the increase from 2023 to the IP, by 3,4 % was mostly due to the adjustments made by some of the Union producers after the COVID-19 crisis, which deeply affected the market demand and prices.

• (208) The Commission referred to the recitals (45) and (224) to (226) of the provisional Regulation, where it explained that all the indicators of the Union industry were affected, as those of many other industries, by the pandemic situation in 2020. The temporary more favourable situation observed in 2021 and 2022 was due to an unusual supply-demand imbalance in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Once the supply-demand situation became more balanced, the Union producers found themselves under renewed pressure from imports from the countries concerned, which affected their market share and economic performances.

• (209) On this basis, the claims were rejected.

4.5.   Conclusion on injury

• (210) Since the revised tables as modified after final disclosure showed the same trends, the findings regarding injury were definitively confirmed.

• (211) The above revised figures to include non-captive sales on the free market to related parties confirmed that the Union Industry as a whole could not maintain its production and sales volumes and improve its capacity utilisation rate. The production and sales volumes actually decreased more than the consumption on the Union market. In view of the decreasing production, the Union industry took concrete actions to improve efficiency by keeping a tight grip on cost of production (mainly raw materials and labour costs) and by increasing the production per employee when the situation of the Union industry started to deteriorate. Nonetheless, the cost of production increased by 18 % when the unit sales price remained stable, with the exception of the year 2022, during the period considered. Consequently, the profitability of the Union industry deteriorated significantly going from 12 % in 2021 and 2022, when the Union industry benefitted from the recovery of the economy after the COVID-19 crisis, to a loss-making situation in 2023 and the IP. The sampled Union producers could still make investments throughout the period considered showing its dynamism despite a deteriorating financial situation.

• (212) In the light of the foregoing, it is definitively concluded that the above data show that the Union industry has suffered material injury during the period considered within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

5. CAUSATION

5.1.   Effects of the dumped imports

• (213) In recital (265) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission concluded that the material injury of the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports of the product concerned originating in the countries concerned.

• (214) Following provisional and final disclosure, the GOJ and FHS disagreed with the conclusions in Section 5.1 of the provisional Regulation.

• (215) The GOJ submitted that, as a result of the ‘Tariff Rate Quotas’ (‘TRQ’s’) of the safeguard measures, the overall volume of hot-rolled steel imports did not increase and argued therefore that there have only been substitutions of the origins of the imported products within the volume of TRQ’s allowed. On this basis, GOJ considered that imports originating in Japan could not have caused material injury to the EU’s domestic industry. The GOJ further claimed that the market share of the imports from Japan has consistently remained below 4 %, and even the market share of the subject imports as a whole had been low at around [8,0-8,5 %].

• (216) The GOJ finally argued that the volume of imports of products from Japan in the second half of 2024 had fallen by 51,2 % compared to the previous year, due to the maximum cap of 15 % per single country, which was introduced in June 2024 ³⁰. Therefore, the GOJ questioned the injury analysis which was not properly considering the above-mentioned circumstances and could not be considered as an objective examination in the sense of Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.

• (217) The Commission noted that safeguard and anti-dumping measures address different situations. In this case, safeguard measures have indeed been imposed under the form of a TRQ, on the basis of traditional trade flows and with a view to avoid trade diversion. However, the safeguard measure does not prevent the imposition of measures to remove the effects of unfair trade practices, in particular within the limits of the TRQ, i.e. before any safeguard duty would apply. Thus, the reference to volume caps unaffected by an additional safeguard duty cannot put into question the causation between the subject imports and the injury to the Union industry. The Commission also recalled that its analysis covered the investigation period ending on 30 June 2024. Hence, the inclusion of post-IP elements in its causation analysis, such as a decrease in imports in the second half of 2024, would not ensure an objective examination of the facts. On this basis, this claim was rejected.

• (218) As mentioned in recital (194), FHS argued that the negative effects on macro and micro economic indicators such as capacity utilisation, production capacity, production, sales volumes and market share could not result from the imports from Vietnam as the quantities were too small.

• (219) The Commission rejected this argument on the grounds that the conditions for assessing the imports from the countries concerned cumulatively were fulfilled so that dumped imports from Vietnam were assessed together with imports from the other countries concerned.

• (220) FHS stated that while acknowledging that the recent profitability and cash-flow results of the Union industry were weak, it was not established whether the losses arising from lower demand, higher energy and input costs, an ambitious investment timetable, or other structural factors had negatively influenced these micro economic indicators.

• (221) The Commission disagreed with this view. The list of factors raised by FHS were already considered by the Commission as mentioned in recitals (240) and Section 5.7 of the provisional Regulation. Whilst FHS did not present any new elements contradicting the analysis made by the Commission on how these factors influenced the micro economic indicators. These claims were therefore rejected.

• (222) FHS stated that the Commission failed to carry out an objective examination of each of several elements, which contributed to the Union industry’s difficulties such as weakened global demand.

• (223) In the absence of more precise and substantiated claims regarding the alleged lack of objectivity in the Commission’s assessment, the Commission referred to Section 5 of the provisional Regulation and more specifically Section 5.8 which addresses this factor in particular.

• (224) Ezz Steel argued after final disclosure that Egypt could not have caused injury to the Union industry as it had low production capacity compared to other third countries such as Japan, India or Vietnam. In addition, it stated it could not increase its exports to the EU due to the implementation of safeguard measures and that it only supplied HRF according to specific purchase orders ‘under fair and transparent conditions’.

• (225) The Commission considered these elements as irrelevant when assessing the effect of the dumped imports from the countries concerned. While the production capacity of Egypt may be lower than that of the other countries concerned, it remained that individual production capacity is not an element to assess the injury caused. Equally, the statement that Egypt cannot allegedly increase its exports to the Union because of the safeguard measures is factually incorrect since the measures do not prohibit imports from entering the Union market, even after Egypt’s quota has been exhausted. In order to assess the effect of the dumped imports, the Commission analysed inter alia the increase in market share and the price level of the dumped imports originating in Egypt and the other countries concerned after the conditions for a cumulative assessment of their effects had been fulfilled, as provided in Section 4.3.1 of the provisional Regulation.

• (226) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (241) and (242) of the provisional Regulation.

5.2.   Low-capacity utilisation

• (227) After final disclosure, FHS argued that reduction in capacity utilisation resulted from the weakening of both captive and free market demand which could not be automatically caused by the imports from the countries concerned. FHS further noted that its imports did not compete with the Union industry on the captive market.

• (228) The Commission disagreed with this view, as in fact, the Union primary and secondary industry were in direct competition with non-related steel trader and processing companies in the Union which are sourcing HRF in the countries concerned. It was therefore only logic that the reduced capacity utilisation showed a decline, which could only be attributed to the countries concerned, since the Union industry’s output, whether used for captive or free market consumption was similarly affected by the dumped imports from the countries concerned as confirmed by the loss of market share.

• (229) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (243) and (244) of the provisional Regulation.

5.3.   Export sales performance of the Union producers

• (230) The volume of exports of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Export sales of the sampled Union producers

Total exports to unrelated customers	2021	2022	2023	Investigation period
Total exports (EUR)	650 898 419	633 788 344	473 973 825	477 671 676
Index (2021=100)	100	97	73	73
Total exports (tonnes)	736 702	659 023	577 824	590 812
Index (2021=100)	100	89	78	80
Average unit price (EUR/tonnes)	883	961	820	808
Index (2021=100)	100	109	93	92
Source: Questionnaire reply of sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire reply of sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire reply of sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire reply of sampled Union producers.	Source: Questionnaire reply of sampled Union producers.

• (231) The sampled Union producers export volumes decreased by 20 % over the period considered to remain below 600 000 tonnes in the IP. Overall, the volumes exported by the Union industry accounted for only about 2,3 % of their total sales in the free market during the investigation period and an even smaller proportion of total production in the same period.

• (232) The GOJ claimed that while export sales have decreased by 20 % over the investigation period compared to 2021 as shown in Table 17 of the provisional Regulation and Table 5 above, Union producers have significantly increased their investments in 2023 as shown in Table 16 of the provisional Regulation. The GOJ considered that it was this business strategy of the producers has led to reduced profit margins.

• (233) FHS claimed that Union producers’ deteriorating export performance has itself contributed to the alleged material injury, particularly through reduced volumes, lower international prices, and lost economies of scale.

• (234) These claims have been examined by the Commission and the findings reached in the provisional Regulation that the export sales accounted for a minor share of total sales were confirmed. Their decrease could not have a significant impact on the performance of the Union industry as a whole.

• (235) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (245) to (247) of the provisional Regulation.

5.4.   Imports from countries other than the countries concerned

• (236) Following the reassessment of the total free market consumption to include non-captive sales to related parties, as explained in recital (189) and (190), the volume of imports from other third countries over the period considered was re-assessed. It developed as follows:

Table 6

Volumes, unit prices and market shares from third countries

Country	2021	2022	2023	Investigation period
India	India	India	India	India
Volume of imports from India	1 376 560	658 720	1 063 077	1 376 471
Index (2021=100)	100	48	77	100
Unit import prices from India	678	966	698	685
Index (2021=100)	100	143	103	101
Market share in total Union free consumption	5,0  %	2,6  %	4,4  %	5,8  %
South Korea	South Korea	South Korea	South Korea	South Korea
Volume of imports from South Korea	471 645	728 997	810 335	745 900
Index (2021=100)	100	155	172	158
Unit import prices from South Korea	773	957	729	723
Index (2021=100)	100	124	94	93
Market share in total Union free consumption	1,7  %	2,9  %	3,4  %	3,2  %
Taiwan	Taiwan	Taiwan	Taiwan	Taiwan
Volume of imports from Taiwan	702 961	845 353	1 045 768	1 038 571
Index (2021=100)	100	120	149	148
Unit import prices from Taiwan	773	922	716	702
Index (2021=100)	100	119	93	91
Market share in total Union free consumption	2,5  %	3,3  %	4,3  %	4,4  %
Vietnam (Hoa Phat Group)	Vietnam (Hoa Phat Group)	Vietnam (Hoa Phat Group)	Vietnam (Hoa Phat Group)	Vietnam (Hoa Phat Group)
Volume of imports from Vietnam (Hoa Phat Group)	0	[33 856 – 36 489 ]	[645 812 – 660 826 ]	[763 125 – 789 249 ]
Index (2021=100)	-	100	1 852	2 189
Unit import prices from Vietnam (Hoa Phat Group)	-	[680 – 690 ]	[601 - 625 ]	[586 – 614 ]
Index (2021=100)	-	100	89	87
Market share in total Union free consumption	-	[0,1  % –0,2  %]	[2,3  % –2,9  %]	[3,0  % –3,5  %]
Total of all third countries except the countries concerned	Total of all third countries except the countries concerned	Total of all third countries except the countries concerned	Total of all third countries except the countries concerned	Total of all third countries except the countries concerned
Volume of imports from all other countries	7 831 765	6 187 938	6 338 382	6 961 632
Index (2021=100)	100	79	81	89
Average unit import prices	755	915	702	687
Index (2021=100)	100	121	93	91
Market share in total Union free consumption	21,0  %	18,5  %	19,2  %	20,9  %
Index (2021=100)	100	88	91	100
Market share of all third countries including the countries concerned	Market share of all third countries including the countries concerned	Market share of all third countries including the countries concerned	Market share of all third countries including the countries concerned	Market share of all third countries including the countries concerned
Market share in total Union free consumption	25,7  %	24,4  %	27,2  %	29,2  %
Index (2021=100)	100	95	106	113
Market share of countries concerned in all third countries imports	Market share of countries concerned in all third countries imports	Market share of countries concerned in all third countries imports	Market share of countries concerned in all third countries imports	Market share of countries concerned in all third countries imports
Market share in total Union free consumption	18,4  %	24,4  %	29,4  %	28,2  %
Index (2021=100)	100	133	160	153
Source: Eurostat, Formosa, Hoa Phat Group.	Source: Eurostat, Formosa, Hoa Phat Group.	Source: Eurostat, Formosa, Hoa Phat Group.	Source: Eurostat, Formosa, Hoa Phat Group.	Source: Eurostat, Formosa, Hoa Phat Group.

• (237) The investigation revealed that the market share of imports from India, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam (Hoa Phat Group) increased over the period considered and except for India, both in absolute and relative terms. On the contrary, the Commission observed that the imports from other third countries did not increase over the same period, but in fact decreased by 11 %. In contrast, imports from the countries concerned increased significantly. However, the share of imports from the countries concerned in all third countries imports increase by 53 percent over the period considered, which therefore indicated that the imports from the countries concerned increased comparably more than the imports from all countries which only increased by 14 %.

• (238) After final disclosure, FHS argued that the Commission had failed to assess the fact that, during the investigation period, exporting producers in India, South-Korea, and Taiwan together supplied approximately 3,2 million tonnes of HRF to the Union market; more than three times the combined volumes from Egypt or FHS. FHS also stressed that the Commission did not provide any undercutting analysis nor CIF price trends and no market-behaviour differentiation was made between the countries concerned and other third countries.

• (239) The Commission noted that while a thorough analysis of the level and prices of imports from other third countries has been done, there was no legal obligation to proceed to any price undercutting analysis or CIF prices from countries not covered by the investigation at hand. Although the Commission assessed imports from these countries, producers in these countries not being interested parties to this investigation, the Commission was not in a position to request such information from them, nor was it the purpose of this investigation.

• (240) The Commission also analysed the evolution of import prices from third countries. Except for the year 2021, the average import prices from each of the four countries, as well as all third countries taken globally, were on average higher than the import prices from the countries concerned. On this basis, the Commission considered that the evolution of imports from third countries did not attenuate the causal link.

• (241) Following the imposition of provisional measures, FHS considered that by omitting any structured attribution analysis of these formally non-dumped yet clearly injurious volumes originating in other third countries, the provisional Regulation overstated the causal role of the imports from Egypt, Japan and Vietnam, while understating broader market dynamics that are demonstrably more influential in shaping price trends and competitive pressures. The Commission recalled that these aspects had been examined in detail in recitals (248) to (252) of the provisional regulation. The claim was rejected.

• (242) As noted in recital (183), Ezz Steel considered that the average prices of imports from Egypt were relatively high and did not undercut EU sales prices. Therefore, these imports could have not caused injury to Union producers.

• (243) After final disclosure, Ezz Steel further argued that the Commission failed to consider the approach taken in Council Regulation (EC) No 1420/2007 ³¹ imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silico-manganese originating in the People’s Republic of China and Kazakhstan and terminating the proceeding on imports of silico-manganese originating in Ukraine, in which it found that the effect of imports from Ukraine should be assessed separately in view of the absence of undercutting. The Commission first noted that the said regulation was adopted in 2007, whereby the concept of price suppression which refers to prices that are kept artificially low had not been considered at that time, and second, as mentioned in recital (197) of the provisional regulation, the investigation also revealed that the Union industry’s prices were suppressed by the low priced imports originating in Egypt, which followed similar trends and trade patterns. On this basis, this claim was rejected.

• (244) As noted in recital (197) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission concluded that, although imports of HRF were not undercutting Union industry prices, there was price suppression whereby they were impacting negatively the performance of the Union industry.

5.5.   Imports from the countries concerned by the Union industry

• (245) Nippon Steel and JFE considered that the production figures could not be taken as evidence that the Union industry was suffering material injury, given the refusal to increase production even in the particularly favourable environment created by the investigation and that imports were evidently an important source of supply for the EU market – including for the Union producers themselves.

• (246) With regard to the import volume, the Commission considered that Nippon Steel and JFE overstated the volume of imports from the countries concerned by including imports from India in their analysis although the Commission’s causation analysis was limited to Egypt, Japan and dumped imports from Vietnam. The verified information received from the sampled EU producers, confirmed that the 220 000 tonnes of HRF were in fact mostly imported in limited quantities by Union steel secondary producers related to Union primary producers. The vast majority of imports from the countries concerned were made by Union non-related trader and processors. Referring to recital (253) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission reiterated that, Union producers’ related entities are not required to buy from their related companies and purchase on an arm’s length basis. As mentioned in recital (313) of the provisional Regulation, the objective of anti-dumping duties is not to close the Union market from any imports, but to restore fair trade by removing the effect of injurious dumping. Imports from the countries concerned are therefore not expected to come to an end, but to continue, albeit at fair prices.

• (247) After final disclosure, FHS considered that the Commission could not conclude that the imposition of duties could still allow users to imports HRF from diversified sources and at the same time, improve the market shares and profitability of the Union industry. The Commission disagreed with this analysis and recalled that it had explained in detail in recitals (313) to (325) of the provisional Regulation why the impact of the imposition of the duties would not be significant and not outweigh the positive effects of measures on the Union industry. On this basis, this claim was rejected.

• (248) In the absence of any other comments than those already addressed in recitals (177) to (179) with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recital (253) of the provisional Regulation.

5.6.   Impact of the situation of a sampled Union producer on the injury picture

• (249) In the absence of any comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (254) to (256) of the provisional Regulation.

5.7.   Increase in cost of the main raw materials, energy prices and environmental investments

• (250) After final disclosure, FHS claimed that the Commission failed to make a quantitative assessment of the cost of energy prices by using publicly available energy price information as this cost shock should have been measured and netted out before imports from the countries concerned were made responsible for the injury. In view of FHS, this cost-price squeeze led directly to the erosion of profitability and was wrongly attributed by the Commission to the imports from the countries concerned.

• (251) The Commission recalled that it conducted an analysis of the increase of costs of electricty, which results were outlined in recital (259) of the provisional Regulation. Rather than using publicly available information, which would have been disconnected from the actual situation of the sampled Union producers, the Commission used the information requested and verified from the Union producers. On this basis, this claim was rejected.

• (252) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (257) to (262) of the provisional Regulation.

5.8.   Reduced demand

• (253) In the absence of any comments other than those addressed in recitals (158) and (160) with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (263) to (264) of the provisional Regulation.

5.9.   Conclusion on causation

• (254) The Commission assessed the impact of all other known factors, taking into account the comments of interested parties, and concluded that those factors did not attenuate the causal link. Therefore, the Commission confirmed the conclusions in recitals (265) to (267) of the provisional Regulation that there was a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from the countries concerned which was not attenuated by the factors mentioned above.

6. LEVEL OF MEASURES

6.1.   Injury margin

• (255) In the provisional Regulation (recitals (272) to (287)), the Commission detailed the methodology used to establish margins adequate to remove injury to the Union industry.

• (256) Following provisional disclosure, Nippon Steel claimed that an amount for the out-of-quota duties paid under the safeguard measures should be added when establishing the landed export price for the purpose of the injury margin calculations, as any other normal customs duties.

• (257) The Commission disagreed with Nippon Steel. The Commission recalled that the anti-dumping measures and the safeguard duties are not cumulative contrary to conventional customs duties. Rather, the anti-dumping measures will apply to imports made under the available tariff free quota, i.e. on imports that are not subject to the safeguard tariff measure. As to imports made once the relevant tariff quota is exhausted, they would be subject to a total duty level (excluding the conventional customs duty) equivalent to the higher of the safeguard tariff measure or the anti-dumping measure, as the case may be. In other words, when the anti-dumping duty exceeds the level of the safeguard measure, the safeguard measure is effectively deducted from the applicable anti-dumping duty to be collected. As a result of the mechanism put in place to avoid any cumulation of safeguard or anti-dumping measure beyond the higher of the two measures, increasing the landed import price of Nippon Steel with the paid safeguard tariff measures during the investigation period to determine the level of anti-dumping duty would result in reducing the anti-dumping duty to a level insufficient to address the injury caused by the said dumped imports, either because the safeguard measure is not applied or because it is effectively deducted from the applicable anti-dumping duty. For these reasons, the Commission concluded that the allegation made by Nippon Steel was factually incorrect and conceptually wrong. In any case, it was found that, during the investigation period, safeguard duties were paid on less than 6 % of the imported volume of HRF originating in Japan and therefore the impact of not considering the safeguard duties in this particular case was marginal, that is around 0,1 percentage point. On this basis, this claim was rejected.

• (258) After final disclosure, Nippon Steel reiterated that in order to comply with the basic Regulation, the landed prices should be based on the situation in the investigation period (i.e. NSC’s sales prices including safeguard duties are competing with the prices of the Union industry). This claim was already addressed in the GDD and we therefore rejected.

• (259) Furthermore, Nippon Steel submitted that the injury margin calculations did not take delivery time into account. It alleged that, although not quantifiable, buyers in the EU were willing to pay a price premium for short delivery times. According to Nippon Steel, it takes on average approximately 43 days for shipments to arrive to the Union border from Japan. Furthermore, because of the EU Steel Safeguard Measure, there might be an additional waiting time until the start of the following quarter of the EU Steel Safeguard Measure to be able to customs clear imports. The exporting producer further stated that this explained the gradually increasing undercutting and underselling margins the farther the country of export was located from the EU – the higher the injury margins were found for Japanese exporters.

• (260) The Commission concurred with the view that such ‘price premium for short delivery times’, even if demonstrated, was not quantifiable. Furthermore, if short delivery times were a factor increasing the selling price, the Commission failed to see how this could gradually increase the undercutting and underselling margins the farther the country of export was located from the EU. Nippon Steel’s reasoning was also contradicted by the low underselling margin found for JFE, another Japanese exporting producer in the country concerned.