Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/65 of 6 January 2026 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate originating in Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

	2021	2022	2023	RIP
Russian Federation	277	497	179	169
Index	100	179	65	61
Trinidad and Tobago	244	609	383	241
Index	100	249	157	99
United States of America	-	559	320	210
Index [^ntr*2-L_202600065EN.000101-E0024]	-	-	-	-
The countries concerned	253	563	300	205
Index	100	222	119	81
Source: Eurostat, cross-checked against questionnaire replies for US.	Source: Eurostat, cross-checked against questionnaire replies for US.	Source: Eurostat, cross-checked against questionnaire replies for US.	Source: Eurostat, cross-checked against questionnaire replies for US.	Source: Eurostat, cross-checked against questionnaire replies for US.

• (138) Import prices from the countries concerned decreased by 19 % over the period considered. Import prices increased in 2022 due to prevailing market conditions, notably higher global gas prices which placed a heavier burden on the EU. However, by the review investigation period they had declined to a level below that of 2021 for imports originating from each of the three countries concerned. In the review investigation period, whereas import prices from TT were almost the same as in 2021, Russian import prices shrank by 39 %. US price levels also fell but to a lower extent than Russian imports.

• (139) The Commission determined the price undercutting during the review investigation period by comparing:

• (1) the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and

• (2) the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the cooperating US and TT exporting producers to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a cost, insurance, freight (CIF) basis, including the anti-dumping duty, with appropriate adjustments for customs duties and post-importation costs. For imports from Russia, in the absence of cooperation from exporting producers, the prices were determined on the basis of Eurostat import statistics.

• (140) Similar to in the original investigation, the sales price of the Union producers was adjusted to an ex-works level except for those Union industry sales which incurred sea freight for delivery to ports such as Rouen (France) and Ghent (Belgium). It was found appropriate to use the prices for delivery to that port instead of calculating ex-works prices for sales representing around 5 % of the sales of the Union industry.

• (141) The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the review investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin between 3,5 % and 18 % which was deemed to be significant in view of the price sensitive nature of the UAN commodity.

• (142) In addition, the imports from the countries concerned exercised significant price suppression. Indeed, the price levels were below the cost of production of the Union industry during the review investigation period, thereby not allowing the Union industry to increase its prices to profitable levels.

• (143) Following disclosure, MHTL requested the Commission to establish an injury margin that disregards any projected future costs of the Union industry derived from the compliance with the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The Commission confirmed that such costs are not considered when calculating an undercutting margin and that no underselling calculation was performed in the present investigation.

5.4.   Imports from third countries other than the countries concerned

• (144) The imports of UAN from third countries other than Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America were mainly from Belarus, Ukraine, Serbia and Egypt.

• (145) The (aggregated) volume of imports into the Union as well as the market share and price trends for imports of UAN from other third countries developed as follows:

Table 4

Imports from third countries

Country		2021	2022	2023	RIP
Belarus	Volume (tonnes)	158 783	27 666	19 297	38 512
	Index	100	17	12	24
	Market share	4,7  %	0,8  %	0,7  %	1,5  %
	Index	100	17	14	31
	Average price (EUR/tonne)	203	380	217	174
	Index	100	187	107	86
Ukraine	Volume (tonnes)	92 143	34 187	16 653	11 062
	Index	100	37	18	12
	Market share	2,7  %	1,0  %	0,6  %	0,4  %
	Index	100	37	21	16
	Average price (EUR/tonne)	278	618	350	280
	Index	100	222	126	101
Serbia	Volume (tonnes)	7 942	42 896	10 217	0
	Index	100	540	129	0
	Market share	0,2  %	1,3  %	0,3  %	0,0  %
	Index	100	534	149	0
	Average price (EUR/tonne)	305	646	732	N/A
	Index	100	212	240	N/A
Other third countries	Volume (tonnes)	423	8 226	4 188	9 843
	Index	100	1 945	990	2 327
	Market share	< 0,1  %	0,2  %	0,1  %	0,4  %
	Index	100	1 922	1 145	3 015
	Average price (EUR/tonne)	498	611	488	338
	Index	100	123	98	68
Source: Eurostat.	Source: Eurostat.	Source: Eurostat.	Source: Eurostat.	Source: Eurostat.	Source: Eurostat.

• (146) Imports from third countries other than the countries concerned decreased by 77 % over the period considered. Drops in imports from Belarus and Ukraine can be explained by the geopolitical developments (e.g. the war of aggression against Ukraine and EU sanctions imposed on Belarus). In the review investigation period, the market share of imports from third countries other than the countries concerned was only 2,3 %, thus less than the 4,1 % found in the investigation period in the original investigation.

5.5.   Economic situation of the Union industry

5.5.1.   General remarks

• (147) The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

• (148) As mentioned in recital (32), sampling was used for the assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry.

• (149) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the macroeconomic questionnaire reply submitted by the applicant. The data related to all Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The data related to the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

• (150) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

• (151) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

• (152) Following disclosure, MHTL submitted that the injury assessment was distorted, given the misleading nature of the starting point (2021). The party called for a qualification of the COVID-19 pandemic and circumstances thereafter, and for an acknowledgement that the starting point for the declines identified in the injury assessment was the exceptional year of 2021. The Commission disagreed with MHTL that the injury assessment was distorted. In the Union, the agri-food chain, including the fertilisers sector, was regarded as essential during the COVID-19 pandemic time and UAN supply and distribution continued. The Commission concluded that the fertiliser industry was not particularly affected by the pandemic [^ntr23-L_202600065EN.000101-E0025] and that as such, the starting point of the period considered for the injury assessment did not present a distorted injury picture.

5.5.2.   Macroeconomic indicators

5.5.2.1.   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

• (153) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

	2021	2022	2023	RIP
Production volume (tonnes)	3 649 010	2 107 001	2 142 146	2 299 135
Index	100	58	59	63
Production capacity (tonnes)	8 829 000	8 279 000	8 279 000	8 279 000
Index	100	94	94	94
Capacity utilisation	41 %	25 %	26 %	28 %
Index	100	62	63	67
Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.

• (154) In the Union, UAN is normally produced at integrated chemical sites manufacturing several products. In this context, over the period considered, UAN production dropped by 37 %, from 3 649 010 tonnes to 2 299 135 tonnes, which is around 1,4 million tonnes less than in the investigation period of the original investigation. The unprecedented gas and energy crisis during the period considered resulted in temporary production breaks by Union producers.

• (155) Production capacity declined between 2021 and 2022 and then remained stable until the end of the review investigation period.

• (156) In view of the rather stable capacities and declining production, the capacity utilisation shrank from 41 % in 2021 to 28 % in the review investigation period, which is far below the capacity utilisation in the investigation period of the original investigation (50 %) and definitely unsustainable in the medium to long run.

5.5.2.2.   Sales volume and market share

• (157) The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Sales volume and market share

	2021	2022	2023	RIP
Sales volume on the Union market (tonnes)	2 587 669	1 353 756	1 545 874	1 433 181
Index	100	52	60	55
Market share	76,6  %	39,6  %	52,9  %	54,9  %
Index	100	52	69	72
Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.

• (158) The Union sales volume of the Union industry fell by 45 % over the period considered. This is in sharp contrast with the increasing levels of imports from the countries concerned in a context of declining Union consumption.

• (159) The market share of the Union industry fell by 28 % over the period considered. This development was a result of poor market conditions, especially low prices of imported UAN. The market share of the Union industry was lost to imports from the countries concerned, which market share basically tripled over the period considered.

5.5.2.3.   Growth

• (160) The above figures in respect of production, low capacity utilisation, sales volume and market share demonstrate that the Union industry was not able to grow during the period considered, while imports from the countries concerned increased in absolute terms and in terms of market share.

5.5.2.4.   Employment and productivity

• (161) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Employment and productivity

	2021	2022	2023	RIP
Number of employees	2 272	2 018	2 141	1 845
Index	100	89	94	81
Productivity (tonnes/employee)	1 606	1 044	1 000	1 246
Index	100	65	62	78
Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.	Source: verified questionnaire reply of Fertilizers Europe.

• (162) In view of the deteriorating market circumstances of the Union industry, the number of employees of the Union industry fell by 19 % over the period considered. Nevertheless, given temporary plant closures and as production decreased even more, productivity still fell by 22 % over the period considered. When possible, the Union industry endeavoured to transfer UAN jobs to other parts of their chemical site rather than dismissing valuable employees.

5.5.2.5.   Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

• (163) All dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial given the volume and prices of imports from the countries concerned.

• (164) Continuous unfair pricing by exporters from the countries concerned made it impossible for the Union industry to recover from the dumping practices observed in the original investigation.

5.5.3.   Microeconomic indicators

5.5.3.1.   Prices and factors affecting prices

• (165) The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union

	2021	2022	2023	RIP
Average unit ex-works sales price in the Union on the total market (EUR/tonne)	242	636	307	264
Index	100	263	127	109
Unit cost of production (EUR/tonne)	241	571	332	276
Index	100	237	138	115
Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.

• (166) Sales prices were influenced by the supply-demand dynamics, including temporarily curtailed production by some Union producers which meant an increase of Union sales prices in a context of reduced availability of UAN on the Union market. After prices peaking during the second quarter of 2022, namely due to the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on gas and energy prices, UAN sale prices fell through mid-2023 and then stabilised.

• (167) Sales prices increased by 9 % during the period considered whereas the unit cost of production went up by 15 % during the same period. The increasing cost of production was mainly determined by fluctuations in the price of gas, accounting for most of UAN’s production costs. However, Union producers were unable to cover the UAN production costs in 2023 and the review investigation period by their sales price levels due to the unfair competition of low-priced imports of UAN from the countries concerned. As a result, UAN sales by Union producers on the Union market became loss-making.

5.5.3.2.   Labour costs

• (168) The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Average labour costs per employee

	2021	2022	2023	RIP
Average annual labour costs per employee (EUR/full time employee)	31 139	35 622	32 901	33 197
Index	100	114	106	107
Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.

• (169) The average labour cost per employee of the sampled Union producers increased by 7 % over the period considered, namely due to the fulfilment of salary indexation commitments. Labour costs per employee were higher in 2022, when profitability peaked.

5.5.3.3.   Inventories

• (170) Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Inventories

	2021	2022	2023	RIP
Closing stocks (tonnes)	87 010	112 808	119 370	82 706
Index	100	130	137	95
Closing stocks as a percentage of production	4,3  %	9,4  %	9,4  %	5,3  %
Index	100	219	219	123
Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.

• (171) Closing stock fell by 5 % over the period considered and stock as a percentage of production slightly increased. This factor was not considered to be a meaningful indicator of injury in the original investigation as stock as a percentage of production was low throughout the period and closing stocks are subject to seasonal variations. The Commission considered this to also be the case in the present investigation. In the present investigation, stock levels found were higher than in the original investigation.

5.5.3.4.   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

• (172) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

	2021	2022	2023	RIP
Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)	9,4  %	12,6  %	–25,7  %	–7,7  %
Index	100	134	– 273	–82
Cash flow (EUR)	28 973 972	58 982 610	9 101 778	–9 326 573
Index	100	204	31	-32
Investments (EUR)	6 402 797	4 911 678	2 801 373	4 311 506
Index	100	77	44	67
Return on investments	54 %	144 %	–90  %	–36  %
Index	100	267	– 167	–67
Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaire replies of the sample of Union producers.

• (173) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. Profitability fell from 9,4 % in 2021 to –7,7 % in the review investigation period because of the developments in average sales prices and costs of production described in recitals (166)-(167), lower capacity utilisation and lower production to absorb fixed costs. 2022 was an abnormal year, with high raw material and energy prices but also high UAN prices in a context of disrupted supply. Altered production schedules, the rising cost of production and suppressed sales prices due to imports from the countries concerned caused the Union industry to make losses in 2023 and in the review investigation period. These facts cannot be undermined by improved margins in the nitrogen sector referred to by MHTL in its comments on the disclosure based on data reported by market intelligence for Europe (including Norway) for part of 2025 [^ntr24-L_202600065EN.000101-E0026], i.e. by data for a sector wider than UAN, for a geographic area wider than the Union and for a period following the review investigation period.

• (174) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The net cash flow developed negatively throughout the period considered and followed closely the profitability trend.

• (175) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It developed negatively over the period considered reflecting the trends previously described for profitability and cash flow.

• (176) The Union industry had limited investments in the period considered, even if continuous investment in an integrated chemical plant is essential to long-term survival. The decreasing investment levels were caused by a reduced ability to raise capital as demonstrated by the deteriorating cash flow situation and the poor market conditions. The investments, lower than in the original investigation, focused on reducing energy consumption, rationalisation and efficiency gains.

5.6.   Conclusion on injury

• (177) Over the period considered, the Union industry suffered decreasing sales prices (–9 %) which together with increased costs (+15 %) have caused a profit level of 9,4 % in 2021 to turn into losses in 2023 and the review investigation period. These trends resulted in large falls in cash flow, return on investment and investment levels. Significant negative effects have also been felt in volume indicators such as production, which decreased by 37 %, sales volume, which decreased by 45 %, and market share, that went from 76,6 % in 2021 to 54,9 % in the review investigation period. Also, capacity utilisation levels shrank to worrying levels, too low to recover relevant costs. These developments left the Union industry in an injurious situation. None of the indicators examined showed a recovery or a positive development.

• (178) Following disclosure, MHTL disagreed that the injury indicators examined showed no recovery or a positive development. The Commission dismissed MHTL’s comments because they were based on selected developments on selected years and a misrepresentation of facts. For instance, MHTL submitted that the production volumes of the Union industry increased in the review investigation period to their highest level since the start of the period considered, which was fully incorrect (see Table 5). The party also referred to a ‘notable improvement in capacity utilisation rates of the Union industry’ during the review investigation period (increasing from 25 % to 28 % since 2022), which neglects 2021 and the fact that Table 5 clearly depicts a fall in capacity utilisation during the period considered (–33 %). MTHL considered as a positive development the lower drop in the sales volumes in absolute terms in table 6 between 2023 and the review investigation period (– 112 693) as compared to the higher drop in import volumes from the countries concerned in the same period (– 210 254 tonnes, as shown in Table 2), which misrepresents that, over the period considered, imports from the countries concerned almost tripled their market share whereas the market share of the Union industry fell by 28 %.

• (179) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the review investigation period.

6. CAUSATION

• (180) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. Following disclosure, CFI stated that the Commission had failed to do so and that the Commission should have examined the effects of other known factors that caused the initial deterioration of the Union industry before US imports resumed. The Commission rejected CFI’s claim as unfounded, and ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the countries concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are: effects of imports from other third countries, the export performance of the Union industry, UAN imports by the Union industry, the increasing cost of production and a decreasing Union consumption.

6.1.   Effects of the dumped imports

• (181) During the period considered, the Union industry lost significant sales volumes on the Union market, as its Union sales decreased by 45 %. As consumption dropped by 23 %, the Union industry’s market share dropped from 76,6 % to 54,9 %.

• (182) The fall in the Union industry’s market share can be attributed by imports from the countries concerned, which increased their market share from 15,8 % to 42,8 %. Following the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, prices of energy increased considerably resulting in rapid increase of cost of production. At the same time, import volumes increased exponentially.

• (183) The duties in force are fixed duties established at a time when UAN prices were low as compared to prices in the period considered. The average Union industry sales price stood at EUR 127/tonne in 2017/2018, the period used for calculating the specific duty amount during the original investigation, whereas the average Union industry sales price observed in the review investigation period was more than two times higher due to the strongly increased costs. Consequently, the effectiveness of the specific duty strongly declined, and imports from the countries concerned had devastating volume effects already in 2022, when UAN prices skyrocketed and fixed anti-dumping duties represented a very low share of the final UAN price. After significant volumes and market share were lost in 2022, as from 2023 the Union industry was in addition unable to pass on the cost increases to its selling prices due to the unfair competition of dumped imports and it incurred significant losses in 2023 and the review investigation period.

• (184) It is therefore clear that the large increase in imports at falling prices that were undercutting and suppressing the Union industry’s prices played a major role in the rapid deterioration of the Union industry’s economic indicators. Two product specific factors aggravated this impact. Firstly, UAN is a commodity sold to customers based almost exclusively on price. Therefore, only a small difference in price may have a significant consequence. Secondly, UAN is, unlike the bulk of fertilisers, a liquid product that requires special storage tanks. Therefore, Union producers that reach their UAN storage capacity limit have to move UAN into the distribution chain by selling stock at prevailing prices in the market, even if those prices are low.

• (185) CFI stated that its supply to the EU is demand-responsive, not supply-driven, however whether it is CFI that looks for customers or whether customers look for a supplier is irrelevant for the purpose of the present analysis. CFI further stated that at best there was a weak correlation between US imports and the performance decline of the Union producers, that various unrelated market developments had been erroneously attributed to the effect of imports and that the Commission should conclude similarly to Soy Protein [^ntr25-L_202600065EN.000101-E0027] , in which case the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry was found to be broken. Following disclosure, CFI deemed injury trends incompatible with US imports. In this respect it submitted that the Union industry’s performance declined already in 2021, which is before US imports re-entered the Union. The Commission disagreed and reminded CFI that causation had been established in the original investigation and that the injury analysis in the current expiry review is primarily focused on the matter as to whether the Union industry had recovered from the past injury caused by the dumped imports and if such injury would continue or recur if measures would lapse. Furthermore, contrary to Soy Protein, the present investigation established a clear causal link between the dumped imports from the countries concerned, including the imports from the US, and the material injury suffered by the Union industry. As mentioned in recital (182) above, imports from the countries concerned increased their market share from 15,8 % in 2021 to 42,8 % in the review investigation period. The market share of imports from the US increased from 0 % in 2021 to 20,6 % in the review investigation period. In addition, the dumping margins established were far above de minimis for the three countries concerned.

6.2.   Imports from third countries

• (186) Imports from third countries were more expensive than imports from the countries concerned. Third country imports also decreased strongly in volume, representing a market share of 7,6 % in 2021 but no more than 2,3 % in the review investigation period. The Commission therefore concluded that such imports did not contribute to the injury of the Union industry.

• (187) During the investigation, the cooperating importer Union Invivo noted that the lower import flows from Belarus, following the sanctions imposed by the EU, led to a reorganisation of import flows from other origins, in a context of lower UAN production by Union producers. The Commission acknowledged that imports of Belarussian UAN indeed decreased significantly due to geopolitical reasons and the sanctions imposed by the EU. However, the Commission also noted that imports from Belarus has a market of 4,7 % in 2021, whereas imports from the countries concerned held, in that year, a market share more than three times higher of 15,8 %. Moreover, whereas imports from Belarus dropped by 120 271 tonnes since 2021, i.e. before the sanctions, imports from the countries concerned increased in that same period by 582 869 tonnes, i.e. almost five times that volume. The drop in imports from Belarus do therefore not explain the strong presence and increase during the period considered of imports from the countries concerned.

6.3.   Declining export performance of the Union industry

• (188) During the investigation, cooperating exporting producers attributed the injurious situation of the Union producers to the Union industry’s declining exports.

• (189) The volume of exports of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Export performance of the sampled Union producers

	2021	2022	2023	RIP
Export volume (tonnes)	572 947	422 193	292 937	425 426
Index	100	74	51	74
Average price (EUR/tonne)	276	627	306	224
Index	100	227	111	81
Source: verified questionnaires of Fertilizers Europe and sampled Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaires of Fertilizers Europe and sampled Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaires of Fertilizers Europe and sampled Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaires of Fertilizers Europe and sampled Union producers.	Source: verified questionnaires of Fertilizers Europe and sampled Union producers.

• (190) Exports represent on average 16 % of the Union industry’s UAN production during the period considered. In addition, the decline in export sales was limited as compared to the decline in Union sales, even in relative terms, and prices of the Union industry’s exports fluctuated and were sometimes above its prices on the Union market. The Commission therefore concluded that the export performance of Union producers did not contribute to the injury suffered by the Union industry.

6.4.   Self-inflicted injury by the Union industry

• (191) CFI submitted that the injury eventually suffered by Union producers was self-inflicted because some Union producers purchased UAN from the countries concerned. The investigation found that the sampled Union producer CFI referred to had exceptionally purchased low quantities of UAN, in view of the difficult market circumstances, in order to fulfil certain orders. Those operations had no significant impact on the overall injurious situation of the Union industry to the extent of making the causal link not genuine or not substantial. The claim was therefore rejected.

6.5.   Increasing costs of production

• (192) Cooperating exporting producers, the association AFCOME [^ntr26-L_202600065EN.000101-E0028] and Union Invivo stated that the injury was caused by the fact that (some) Union producers paid a high price for gas/energy and/or were too reliant on Russian gas (which was weaponised) and/or had inefficient cost structures that limited their ability to respond to external shocks and/or low utilisation rates due to temporary shutdowns of ammonia plants. Cooperating exporting producers added that some of these circumstances were unprecedented, exceptional and increasingly unlikely to recur, although at disclosure stage CFI considered that the Union’s supply difficulties were rather structural. MHTL stated that the circumstances in which the negative performance of Union producers took place were exceptional in nature, while available data (in the request) strongly indicated that the Union industry was recovering well from this, and that its situation continues to increase in strength. Following disclosure, AFCOME, INOXA [^ntr27-L_202600065EN.000101-E0029] and Union Invivo insisted on the fact that the countries concerned had access to gas at lower prices than Union producers, whereas CFI asked for an analysis that the fertiliser sector’s performance in the Union mirrored an alleged broader collapse across EU natural gas-intensive industries, including steel, cement, glass and paper.

• (193) The claims are dismissed as, in a level playing field, no matter the situation of natural gas-intensive industries other than UAN, Union producers of UAN should have in any case been able to increase their sales prices to a sustainable/profitable level, which the present investigation was showed not to be the case. It is also noted that the evolution of gas/energy prices and costs in the period considered could not explain shrinking profits in this case, as in 2022, when gas/energy prices and costs peaked, the Union industry was profitable. A price difference between gas in the Union and in the countries concerned does not justify the dumping practices found.

• (194) Following disclosure, MHTL contested the Commission’s assessment above. For the party, all things considered equal, it does not automatically follow in all circumstances that a seller will be able to increase its sales price ad infinitum in order to cover its own costs because other constraints influence the seller’s ability to raise prices, such as supply-demand and the prospects of losing customers to competitors. The Commission dismissed MHTL’s considerations, which ignore that in a level playing field Union producers should have been able to pass on cost increases rather than making losses once gas prices dropped (in the second part of the period considered).

6.6.   Decrease of Union consumption

• (195) Table 1 shows that the consumption on the Union market fell by 23 % overall. The decreasing trend in demand is common for the nitrogen fertilisers, which have been experiencing stable decline in the consumption rates in the recent past due to challenging climate situations, changing environmental regulatory frameworks and geopolitical factors. It is unclear whether the downward trend is likely to continue in the future, in particular as far as UAN is concerned. With respect to future trends, CFI noted that, while UAN demand has fluctuated between 2020-2024, both global and Union UAN demand are projected to increase (although no quantification was provided).

• (196) Following disclosure, CFI asked for an analysis of whether the drop of UAN sales volume by Union producers in the Union derived from a fall in demand and of whether the decrease of Union consumption reduced the Union producers’ capacity utilisation, fixed costs absorption and profitability. In this respect, the Commission recalls that Sections 5.2, 5.5.2.1, 5.5.2.2 and 5.5.3.4 above analysed trends in Union consumption, capacity utilisation in the Union, sales in the Union by Union producers, and their profitability.

• (197) The Commission found that, despite the overall decrease in UAN consumption in the Union during the period considered, imports from the countries concerned increased steadily during that period at the expense of other imports and Union industry sales. It was therefore concluded that, while the development of demand might have contributed to the material injury suffered by the Union industry, dumped imports remained the main cause of such injury. In other words, the effects of the decrease in Union consumption were not capable of making the causal link between dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry as non-genuine or not substantial.

6.7.   Conclusion

• (198) On the basis of the above, the Commission therefore concluded that imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry, whilst the decrease in consumption might have contributed to it. Other factors were found not to have contributed to the found injury.

7. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OF INJURY

• (199) The Commission concluded in recital (179) that the Union industry suffered material injury during the review investigation period. Therefore, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of continuation of injury caused by the dumped imports from the countries concerned if the measures against were allowed to lapse.

• (200) In this respect the following elements were analysed by the Commission: the production capacity and spare capacity in the countries concerned, the likely price levels of imports from the countries concerned in the absence of anti-dumping measures, and their impact on the Union industry, and the attractiveness of the Union market.

• (201) The Commission noted that the analysis of the above-mentioned elements clearly supports the finding of continuation of injury. Regardless, the same elements, combined with the existence of imports from the countries concerned during the period considered despite the imposition of anti-dumping duties, clearly indicate that injury would reoccur absent the renewal of the measure.

7.1.   Production capacity and spare capacity in the countries concerned

• (202) As mentioned in recitals (94), (99) and (103), in the three countries concerned there is significant unutilised production capacity. All the exporters in the countries concerned have the capacity to increase their exports to the Union rapidly, as shown by the significant increase of imports from all three countries concerned between 2021 and 2022. Their collective spare capacity was estimated at some two million tonnes, which is two thirds of the consumption in the Union in the review investigation period. It should also be noted that in the two countries concerned holding the bulk of spare capacities (Russia and Trinidad and Tobago) there is little to no domestic market.

7.2.   Likely price levels of imports from the countries concerned

• (203) Imports from the countries concerned undercut the Union industry’s prices in the Union during the review investigation period. The weighted average undercutting margin was 18 % for imports from Russia, 12 % for imports from Trinidad and Tobago and 3,5 % for imports from the US. Should the measures lapse, undercutting and price suppression is expected to continue, thus further aggravating the injury suffered by the Union industry. The undercutting and price suppression levels for the US would increase if the circumstances referred to in recital (209) below would materialise.

• (204) Cooperating exporting producers exported UAN to a handful of third countries, as detailed in the next section, at prices depending on prevailing market conditions. In the absence of anti-dumping measures in the Union, the price of imports from the countries concerned into the Union will be lower and gain attractiveness. It is noted that CFI was the only cooperating exporting producer with a significant domestic market to serve.

• (205) With the prevalence of distorted artificially low State-fixed gas prices in Russia, and with a deliberate gas dual pricing policy, Russian gas is sold at artificially low prices to the local domestic UAN industry while selling at very high export gas prices to the Union. The effects of the gas dual pricing policy were exacerbated by the unprecedented gas-crisis in the Union. Consequently, Russia is expected to continue any exports of UAN at low prices undercutting Union industry prices.

7.3.   Attractiveness of the Union market

• (206) As mentioned in Section 4, the Union market is attractive in terms of its size and prices. UAN is only used in West-Central Europe, the United States of America, Canada, Argentina and Australia and globally only 4 to 5 million tonnes are traded annually [^ntr28-L_202600065EN.000101-E0030]. The Union is the second largest UAN market in the world. CFI noted that, while demand has fluctuated between 2020-2024, both global and Union UAN demand are projected to increase. The Union market remains attractive in terms of price with farmers who consume fertilisers having access to valuable sources of financing, precision fertilisation techniques infrastructure and other resources. Measures in force did not prevent the countries concerned from increasing their market share from 37,7 % in the investigation period of the original investigation to 42,8 % in the review investigation period of this investigation.

• (207) In general, exporters have well-established fertilisers distribution channels in the Union, which logistically facilitates the exports. Their capacity to quickly send significant volumes to the Union was particularly strong in 2022, a year when import volumes into the Union from the countries concerned was some 1,5 times more than in 2021. Russia established quotas for exporting mineral fertiliser in late 2021, but their implementation and extension had little impact on export volumes [^ntr29-L_202600065EN.000101-E0031].

• (208) In addition, consumption of UAN, which requires specific infrastructure, already existing in the Union, cannot be easily created in new markets.

• (209) Furthermore, the attractiveness of the Union market will increase if customs tariffs on UAN coming from the US are dropped from the current 6,5 % to zero [^ntr30-L_202600065EN.000101-E0032]. Additional UAN volumes from the US could be expected due to a recent shift in the US trade policy [^ntr31-L_202600065EN.000101-E0033], finally removing tariffs that the US intended to apply on certain imports, including UAN. That is likely to result in reinvigorated competition in the US domestic UAN market, then a saturation of that market and a consequent redirection of UAN from the US to the Union premium market.

7.4.   Conclusion

• (210) In view of the above, the Commission concluded that the repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from the countries concerned at injurious price levels, and therefore further aggravating the injury suffered by the Union industry. As a consequence, the viability of the Union industry would be at serious risk.

• (211) Cooperating exporting producers considered the increasing production or market share of Union producers in the review investigation period as compared to 2023 as a sign of recovery of the Union industry. Following disclosure, MHTL pointed at improved operating conditions for the Union industry resulting from falling natural gas prices after the review investigation period, a situation that, in the party’s view, would contradict any conclusion regarding the likelihood of a continuation of material injury to the Union industry. These considerations cannot undermine the conclusion in the above recital in light of the analysis in Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 above.

• (212) Material injury would in any event be likely to recur if measures lapse. Specifically, in the absence of renewed measures, there will be in all likelihood a surge of dumped imports from the countries concerned at injurious prices. Following final disclosure, CFI put into question both statements insofar US imports are concerned on the grounds of a flawed dumping analysis. CFI’s allegations in this regard were addressed in Section 4.3.3 above. The Commission concluded that the risk of surging injourious dumped imports from the countries concerned is made material by the existence of significant spare capacities in the exporting countries. Available data on export prices further suggest that UAN prices in the Union will continue to be attractive bearing in mind that no other destination can absorb the volume sold by cooperating exporting producers in the Union. As mentioned in recital (206), there are very few UAN consuming countries.

8. UNION INTEREST

• (213) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users and other economic operators.

8.1.   Interest of the Union industry

• (214) There are some 20 known producers of UAN across the Union. Union producers covering close to 70 % of Union production volume cooperated with the investigation. None opposed the investigation.

• (215) In the context of a challenging fertilisers market as regards supply and fluctuating prices, the expected effect of the measures in force was diluted by the high UAN prices and, as a result, did not lead to a major recovery of the Union industry. The repeal of measures is likely to have a negative effect on the Union industry due to the likely increase of injurious imports of the countries concerned causing lower sales volumes and prices, thus aggravating the financial losses and further undermining the Union industry’s capability to invest. The extension of the measures would allow the Union industry to pursue operations, offer regular supplies of the product under review, keep jobs, invest to become greener and improve profitability to sustainable levels.

• (216) Representatives of German farmers stated that CBAM [^ntr32-L_202600065EN.000101-E0034] would make the anti-dumping duties unnecessary. The Commission dismissed the claim as CBAM addresses matters other than dumping (namely to counter carbon leakage). Furthermore, nothing suggests that CBAM will stop UAN imports, even if a chilling effect can be reasonably expected, according to the AGPB [^ntr33-L_202600065EN.000101-E0035] and Union Invivo.

8.2.   Interest of unrelated importers

• (217) Two unrelated importers submitted a questionnaire reply and agreed to further co-operate with the investigation. Both supported the renewal of the measures as regards imports of UAN from Russia for geopolitical reasons.

• (218) UAN activities represented a minor share of the activities of one of the two co-operating importers, which is a union of cooperatives acting on behalf of its members and served over 20 % of the Union market of the product under review in 2023. The other importer, more reliant on UAN, adapted its selling prices depending on the evolution of the UAN market. The two co-operating importers offered a wide range of services and/or products and had several sources of supply.

• (219) Any negative consequences for importers in the Union stemming from the extension of the measures cannot outweigh the positive consequences of the latter on the Union industry. The extension of the measures is intended to support a level playing field that all parties can benefit from. Moreover, importers offer in general a wide range of fertilisers and/or services and have several sources of supply. Most parties, including both co-operating importers, stated that in the end it would be UAN’s ultimate users, i.e. farmers, that were to be the parties affected by price increases (if any) stemming from measures.

8.3.   Interest of users

• (220) No parties representing the interests of users submitted questionnaire replies.

• (221) Associations representing relevant agri-cooperatives and/or farmers in the Union (Copa-Cogeca) and in Austria, Belgium (Wallonia), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Poland and Portugal came forward. None contested the renewal of the measures as regards imports of UAN from Russia for geopolitical reasons. They contested however the renewal of the measures as regards imports of UAN from the other countries concerned on the grounds that the measures harmed farmers. Co-operating exporting producers expressed a similar view and submitted documents in this regard. Some French unions/groups of cooperatives acting as purchase platforms buying agricultural supplies on behalf of farmers commented on the negative impact of measures on French farmers and suggested that farmers finance the absence of gas on the EU territory by paying anti-dumping duties on UAN.

• (222) Associations representing farmers claimed that there are limited/no substitutive products for farmers (and/or other economic operators) because there is not enough production of nitrogen fertilisers in the Union. However, some supporting datasets presented by the parties, namely as regards Union UAN production, were incomplete.

• (223) Certain comments concerned the importance of UAN costs in a farm (although the quantification varied from party to party [^ntr34-L_202600065EN.000101-E0036]) and/or indicated that farmers have been suffering for years for various reasons (such as bad crops, low sale prices, bad weather or high market competitiveness) and underlined the jobs at stake. According to these parties, the maintenance of anti-dumping measures would force some farmers to stop producing and/or further deteriorate a sector that operates in a volatile market, since farmers cannot pass on costs and need to remain competitive in a globalised market. Following disclosure, AGPB stated there were thousands of specialised cereals farms in the Union with thousand of jobs, including in upstream and downstream activities. However, no party quantified the number of jobs that could be concerned or substantiated if, how and/or how many could be, based on actual evidence, in danger.

• (224) While acknowledging that the impact of the measures could vary depending on the type of farm or on the farming practice, it is noted that in the original investigation the Commission found that UAN represented less than 1 % of overall farming costs in the Union. This percentage remained uncontested in the present investigation. In its comments on the disclosure, AGPB stated that the percentage represented a significant amount.

• (225) Any price increase derived from measures was not found to have a significant impact on the farming sector as a whole in the Union, nor in the exports of the main crop in the Union consuming UAN, i.e. wheat. In fact, the Union wheat exports increased from 32,3 million tonnes in 2021/2022, to 35,1 million tonnes in 2022/2023 and then to 38,9 million tonnes in 2023/2024 [^ntr35-L_202600065EN.000101-E0037]. In this respect, in its comments on the disclosure, AGPB stated that the Commission had overlooked that the Union wheat exports fell in 2024 due to manifold reasons, namely the increase in fertilisers prices, and that many specialised cereals farms would have had negative income in 2024 and 2025. The Commission found AGPB’s last statement contradictory with AGPB’s considerations about a lack of correlation between the increase in wheat exports in 2021/2022, 2022/2023 and 2023/2024, and fertilisers prices (fertilisers being purchased 18 months before harvest). The Commission finally recalled its finding in the original investigation regarding a lack of correlation between the cost variation of farm inputs and the income of farmers.

• (226) Given that UAN as a fertiliser covers very diverse realities and its use varies a lot from crop to crop, from region to region, etc., like in the original investigation, the Commission focused it analysis on the potential impact of maintaining the measures for farms specialised in common wheat (i.e. the main crop using UAN) in France (the main wheat-producing country in the Union) that use UAN as a sole source of nitrogen fertiliser. It is recalled that France is the second largest consuming country of the product under review in the world and that in 2023 it accounted for 52 % of the European consumption of the product under review [^ntr36-L_202600065EN.000101-E0038].

• (227) In 2023, for French fieldcrops specialised farms fertilisers represented 22,7 % of total intermediate inputs [^ntr37-L_202600065EN.000101-E0039]. French specialised farmers whose main output (over 30 %) was wheat, devoted 27,3 % of their total costs of production to fertilisers. For those farms, UAN represented some 19,1 % of the total costs of production, out of which 1,53 % would derive from the current anti-dumping duties [^ntr38-L_202600065EN.000101-E0040]. COPA-COGECA contested the 1,53 % finding for the review investigation period, but provided no alternative calculation.

• (228) The Commission thus concluded that, notwithstanding numerous other factors affecting the economic situation of farmers, the cost impact of the current UAN anti-dumping measures remained limited for farmers in the ‘worst case scenario’, also bearing in mind that many farms in the Union rely on several crops.^. In its comments on the disclosure, AGPB disagreed with this conclusion on the grounds that, by definition, the farms considered were specialised in cereals and oilseeds (i.e. not in other crops). For the Commission, such specialisation does not exclude other revenues [^ntr39-L_202600065EN.000101-E0041]. In all, it cannot be put into question that the 1,53 % costs explained in the recital above calls for qualifying the impact of the current UAN anti-dumping measures for farmers in the ‘worst case scenario’ as ‘limited’.

8.4.   Other factors

• (229) Associations representing the interest of farmers, cooperating Union importers and CFI conceded on the renewal of the measures for Russia on the grounds that the Union wanted to reduce dependence on Russia for critical agricultural inputs and that Russia converts gas into nitrogenous fertilisers to bypass EU sanctions [^ntr40-L_202600065EN.000101-E0042]. The Commission acknowledged the broad range of measures put in place against Russia since 2022 for geopolitical reasons. Additional levies on nitrogenous chemical fertilisers from Russia and Belarus including UAN apply since July 2025 [^ntr41-L_202600065EN.000101-E0043].

• (230) Associations representing the interest of farmers, cooperating unrelated importers and cooperating exporting producers opposed the renewal of the measures for countries other than Russia on the grounds that imports of the product under review are necessary, that some non-Union suppliers became unavailable, that production in the Union cannot meet domestic demand, that numerous Union producers serve only their local markets, that there were disruptions in the UAN supply chain and/or that Union producers favour value-added products other than the product under review. MHTL noted that it is essentially the production facility of a Swiss company, that it had significant investments in storage capacities in various Member States, and asked to be regarded as a reliable source of supply established in a friendly and politically stable partner to the Union, in contrast to the growing instability of its political relationships with Russia and the United States of America, and a complement to the Union industry.

• (231) Following disclosure, COPA-COGECA stated that nutrient affordability was under pressure in 2025. AFCOME pointed at a decrease in the supply of UAN mid-2025. AGPB echoed similar concerns while adding that new legislation in the US could attract imports of fertilisers overseas (to the detriment of the Union). Some parties, such as INOXA, stated that Union producers had a structural inability to meet demand, particularly in France.

• (232) The Commission dismissed the arguments summarised in the two recitals above. Some comments were too general, i.e. concerned fertilisation in general but not necessarily UAN. The Commission considered that, overall, there are enough sources of supply, including several Union producers as well as imports. Measures in force did not prevent the countries concerned from increasing their market share from 37,7 % in the investigation period of the original investigation to 42,8 % in the review investigation period of this investigation. Dumping practices cannot be justified by fact that (i) there was temporarily limited production in the Union and some disruptions in the supply chain; and/or (ii) the fact that some Union producers became momentarily less cost-efficient compared to others or compared non-Union producers; and/or (iii) not all Union producers serve the Member State consuming the most UAN in the Union. The investigation showed the benefits for the Union of preserving several sources of supply in a challenging and ever-changing global market, including Union UAN producers, rather than increasing dependence on third countries with unfair trade practices and/or a higher carbon footprint. It also showed that Union producers (some capable of making strategic allocation decisions of capacity amongst different forms of nitrogen fertilisers) have the capacity/possibility to increase UAN production when a level playing field is ensured and satisfy the needs of farmers and their associations that in the course of the investigation were calling for a diversification of UAN supply sources. Following disclosure, MHTL found this last statement at odds with other Commission initiatives, namely the rationale for the graduated increase in the applicable tariffs in recital (9) of Regulation (EU) 2025/1227 of the European Parliament and of the Council [^ntr42-L_202600065EN.000101-E0044]. The Commission found however all its various initiatives to be consistent and noted that the recital (9) quoted by MHTL clearly considered that the graduated increase in the tariffs would step up production in the Union.

• (233) Following disclosure, MHTL called for the Commission to carefully ensure consistency in its external action and for a repeal of the measures as far as Trinidad and Tobago is concerned. CFI called for a repeal of the measures as far as the US is concerned. The Commission dismissed the claims as groundless, because the parties did not specifically and adequately substantiate them. In effect these claims were based mainly on their other arguments concerning the conditions of cumulation according to Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation. As specified in Section 5.3.1, the Commission concluded that the conditions of competition between the dumped imports from Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America, as well as between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the like product of the Union industry were similar. Therefore, there is no ground to exclude exports from any of the countries concerned from the scope of this proceeding and the underlying measures.

• (234) Union Invivo claimed that the product under review became an expensive form of nitrogen fertiliser and that the renewal of the measures will negatively affect stakeholders involved in the nitrogen solution distribution chain. The harm, if any, could not be quantified. The Commission dismissed this point. No parties representing storage at ports, distributors or farms, tank trucks of the spraying businesses submitted questionnaire replies or any other verifiable data in this respect.

• (235) MHTL alleged that the imposition of the original measures had a significant impact on downstream industries in the Union, driving up costs and threatening their viability. The Commission dismissed the claim, which was unsubstantiated.

• (236) With a view to diversify supply, AFCOME asked for the Union to import finished UAN and not only gas to produce UAN. Union Invivo stated that importing CNG-based [^ntr43-L_202600065EN.000101-E0045] UAN had less impact on the environment than making UAN in the Union manufactured from LNG [^ntr44-L_202600065EN.000101-E0046] imports on the grounds that UAN production with LNG emits 16 % more greenhouse gas emissions than CNG, while calling for a diversification of the Union supplies, whether of gas or finished products synthesised from gas. The Commission acknowledges that raw materials influence the environmental impact of UAN but dismissed the claim to the extent it is in the Union interest to preserve in the Union several sources of gas supply and of UAN production, including domestic UAN producers.

• (237) Cooperating exporting producers claimed that food security and affordability was at stake, with consumers suffering the most due to increased food prices and the effects of a prolonged cost-of-living crisis. In this context, MHTL stated that the US had let good sense prevail by deciding in August 2022 not to impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties on imports of UAN into the United States of America from Trinidad and Tobago [^ntr45-L_202600065EN.000101-E0047]. The Commission dismissed these arguments. The claims were unsubstantiated as to the extent of the impact of the existing measures on food security and affordability and on consumers. Nothing on file showed that the measures in force affected food security and affordability for the last five years. As to the non-imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties in the US in 2022, the conditions and circumstances differ from those in the present investigation. The Commission recalled that the aim of the extension of the measures is to have a level playing field all parties can benefit from.

• (238) Following disclosure, CFI called for a relief to farmers by lowering input costs, improving supply availability and reducing strategic dependence on Russian producers. Parties such as Interore and COPA-COGECA showed concern about the cumulative effect of manifold initiatives, namely CBAM, on the agricultural sector. According to INOXA, all levies (anti-dumping duties, CBAM and customs duties together) account for more than 30 % of the final price of nitrogen fertilisers for farmers, while maintaining the measures would harm yields and cereal quality. For INOXA and CFI, extending the measures would contradict the Union’s strategic objectives (namely Common Agricultural Policy, Farm to Fork Strategy, Strategic opening objectives and/or Building strategic stocks). Although the Commission did not recognise the unsubstantiated quantification provided by INOXA, the Commission acknowledged that the levies mentioned by INOXA all have an impact on cost for the agricultural sector. The Commission found the claims as to yields and cereal quality unfounded, noted that the levies mentioned serve different objectives and concluded that anti-dumping duties are needed to the extent trade defence, having resilient fertilisers production in the Union and sanctioning Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine are amongst the Union’s priorities.

8.5.   Conclusion on Union interest

• (239) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of the Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of UAN originating in the countries concerned.

• (240) AFCOME and Union Invivo put into question the validity of the conclusion as the implementation of CBAM (and, for AFCOME, also the revision of the ETS) will also have an impact on farmers. The Commission found the claims premature and unsubstantiated, thereby dismissing them.

• (241) Notwithstanding the conclusion in recital (239), the Commission notes the importance of the farming sector in the Union and the manifold challenges it is confronted with. Should the price of UAN increase to a level substantially higher than in 2024 and the impact of the current measures on the cost structure of farmers become unsustainable, the Commission shall consider suspending the measures in accordance with Article 14(4) of the basic Regulation.

• (242) Following disclosure, AGPB deemed any potential suspension of the measures ineffective on the grounds that temporary measures do not allow for market adaptation. The Commission recalled that any action taken (temporary or on a more-permanent basis) would have to account for all the interests at stake.

• (243) Following disclosure, associations representing the interests of farmers challenged the conclusion on the grounds of UAN price increases in 2025 and/or a fluctuation of the gap between cereal prices and UAN prices. The Commission noted that the datasets provided (sometimes absent, sometimes with the source missing, sometimes for only a share of 2025, etc.) could not put into question the conclusions of a fully fledged investigation with dumping and injury findings for the periods referred to in recital (7) and which concluded on injurious dumping practices and the likely continuation thereof if measures were repealed.

9. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

• (244) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on continuation of dumping, continuation of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on UAN from the countries concerned should be maintained.

• (245) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates for Russia, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in Russia’.

• (246) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

• (247) Should the exports by one of the Russian companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

• (248) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation for the Russian companies are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in Russia and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in Russia’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.