Limitation Act 1980

• (2) Sub-paragraph (1) above shall not apply to any lease granted by the Crown.

Accrual of right of action in case of forfeiture or breach of condition

7

• (1) Subject to sub-paragraph (2) below, a right of action to recover land by virtue of a forfeiture or breach of condition shall be treated as having accrued on the date on which the forfeiture was incurred or the condition broken.

• (2) If any such right has accrued to a person entitled to an estate or interest in reversion or remainder and the land was not recovered by virtue of that right, the right of action to recover the land shall not be treated as having accrued to that person until his estate or interest fell into possession, as if no such forfeiture or breach of condition had occurred.

Right of action not to accrue or continue unless there is adverse possession

8

• (1) No right of action to recover land shall be treated as accruing unless the land is in the possession of some person in whose favour the period of limitation can run (referred to below in this paragraph as “adverse possession”); and where under the preceding provisions of this Schedule any such right of action is treated as accruing on a certain date and no person is in adverse possession on that date, the right of action shall not be treated as accruing unless and until adverse possession is taken of the land.

• (2) Where a right of action to recover land has accrued and after its accrual, before the right is barred, the land ceases to be in adverse possession, the right of action shall no longer be treated as having accrued and no fresh right of action shall be treated as accruing unless and until the land is again taken into adverse possession.

• (3) For the purposes of this paragraph—

• (a) possession of any land subject to a rentcharge by a person (other than the person entitled to the rentcharge) who does not pay the rent shall be treated as adverse possession of the rentcharge; and

• (b) receipt of rent under a lease by a person wrongfully claiming to be entitled to the land in reversion immediately expectant on the determination of the lease shall be treated as adverse possession of the land.

• (4) For the purpose of determining whether a person occupying any land is in adverse possession of the land it shall not be assumed by implication of law that his occupation is by permission of the person entitled to the land merely by virtue of the fact that his occupation is not inconsistent with the latter’s present or future enjoyment of the land.

This provision shall not be taken as prejudicing a finding to the effect that a person’s occupation of any land is by implied permission of the person entitled to the land in any case where such a finding is justified on the actual facts of the case.

Possession of beneficiary not adverse to others interested in settled land or land held on trust for sale

9

Where any settled land or any land subject to a trust of land is in the possession of a person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land . . . (not being a person solely or absolutely entitled to the land . . .), no right of action to recover the land shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as accruing during that possession to any person in whom the land is vested as tenant for life, statutory owner or trustee, or to any other person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land . . ..

Part II — Modification of Section 15 where Crown or Certain Corporations Sole are involved

10

Subject to paragraph 11 below, section 15(1) of this Act shall apply to the bringing of an action to recover any land by the Crown or by any spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole with the substitution for the reference to twelve years of a reference to thirty years.

11

• (1) An action to recover foreshore may be brought by the Crown at any time before the expiration of sixty years from the date mentioned in section 15(1) of this Act.

• (2) Where any right of action to recover land which has ceased to be foreshore but remains in the ownership of the Crown accrued when the land was foreshore, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of—

• (a) sixty years from the date of accrual of the right of action; or

• (b) thirty years from the date when the land ceased to be foreshore;

whichever period first expires.

• (3) In this paragraph “foreshore” means the shore and bed of the sea and of any tidal water, below the line of the medium high tide between the spring tides and the neap tides.

12

Notwithstanding section 15(1) of this Act, where in the case of any action brought by a person other than the Crown or a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole the right of action first accrued to the Crown or any such corporation sole through whom the person in question claims, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of—

• (a) the period during which the action could have been brought by the Crown or the corporation sole; or

• (b) twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to some person other than the Crown or the corporation sole;

whichever period first expires.

13

Section 15(2) of this Act shall apply in any case where the Crown or a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole is entitled to the succeeding estate or interest with the substitution—

• (a) for the reference to twelve years of a reference to thirty years; and

• (b) for the reference to six years of a reference to twelve years.

SCHEDULE 2

1

Nothing in this Act shall affect the operation of section 4 of the Limitation Act 1963, as it had effect immediately before 1 January 1979 (being the date on which the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 came in to force), in relation to any case where the damage in question occurred before that date.

2

The amendment made by section 14(1) of the Limitation Act 1963 in section 5 of the Limitation (Enemies and War Prisoners) Act 1945 (which provides that section 5 shall have effect as if for the words “in force in Northern Ireland at the date of the passing of this Act” there were substituted the words “ for the time being in force in Northern Ireland ”) shall continue to have effect notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of section 14(1).

3

It is hereby declared that a decision taken at any time by a court to grant, or not to grant, leave under Part I of the Limitation Act 1963 (which, so far as it related to leave, was repealed by the Limitation Act 1975) does not affect the determination of any question in proceedings under any provision of this Act which corresponds to a provision of the Limitation Act 1975, but in such proceedings account may be taken of evidence admitted in proceedings under Part I of the Limitation Act 1963.

4

• (1) In section 33(6) of this Act the reference to section 1(1) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 shall be construed as including a reference to section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1846.

• (2) Any other reference in that section, or in section 12 or 13 of this Act, to the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 shall be construed as including a reference to the Fatal Accidents Act 1846.

5

Notwithstanding anything in section 29(7) of this Act or in the repeals made by this Act, the Limitation Act 1939 shall continue to have effect in relation to any acknowledgment or payment made before the coming into force of section 6 of the Limitation Amendment Act 1980 (which amended section 23 of the Limitation Act 1939 and made certain repeals in sections 23 and 25 of that Act so as to prevent the revival by acknowledgment or part payment of a right of action barred by that Act) as it had effect immediately before section 6 came into force.

6

Section 28 of the Limitation Act 1939 (provisions as to set-off or counterclaim) shall continue to apply (as originally enacted) to any claim by way of set-off or counterclaim made in an action to which section 35 of this Act does not apply, but as if the reference in section 28 to that Act were a reference to this Act; and, in relation to any such action, references in this Act to section 35 of this Act shall be construed as references to section 28 as it applies by virtue of this paragraph.

7

Section 37(2)(c) of this Act shall be treated for the purposes of the Hovercraft Act 1968 as if it were contained in an Act passed before that Act.

8

In relation to a lease granted before the coming into force of section 3(2) of the Limitation Amendment Act 1980 (which substituted “ten pounds a year” for “ twenty shillings ” in section 9(3) of the Limitation Act 1939), paragraph 6(1)(a) of Schedule 1 to this Act shall have effect as if for the words “ten pounds a year” there were substituted the words “ twenty shillings ”.

9

• (1) Nothing in any provision of this Act shall—

• (a) enable any action to be brought which was barred by this Act or (as the case may be) by the Limitation Act 1939 before the relevant date; or

• (b) affect any action or arbitration commenced before that date or the title to any property which is the subject of any such action or arbitration.

• (2) In sub-paragraph (1) above “the relevant date” means—

• (a) in relation to section 35 of this Act, the date on which that section comes into force in relation to actions of the description in question or, if section 8 of the Limitation Amendment Act 1980 (which substituted the provisions reproduced in section 35 for section 28 of the Limitation Act 1939) is in force immediately before 1st May 1981 in relation to actions of that description, the date on which section 8 came into force in relation to actions of that description; and

• (b) in relation to any other provision of this Act, 1st August 1980 (being the date of coming into force of the remaining provisions of the Limitation Amendment Act 1980, apart from section 8).

SCHEDULE 3

1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

In section 21A of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (debtor who becomes creditor’s executor by representation or administrator to account for debt to estate) the reference in subsection (2) to the Limitation Act 1939 shall be construed as including a reference to this Act.

3

In section 2(1) of the Limitation (Enemies and War Prisoners) Act 1945 (interpretation), for the words “the Limitation Act 1939” in the definition of “statute of limitation” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.

4

In section 3(4) of the Charitable Trusts (Validation) Act 1954 (application of section 31(2) to (4) of the Limitation Act 1939 for purposes of that section), for the words “Subsections (2) to (4) of section thirty-one of the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ Subsections (2) to (6) of section thirty-one of the Limitation Act 1980 ”.

5

In section 5(3) of the Carriage by Air Act 1961 (application of time limit in that Act to arbitrations), for the words “section twenty-seven of the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ section thirty-four of the Limitation Act 1980 ”.

6

In section 7(2)(a) of the Carriage of Goods by Road Act 1965 (appliction of time limit in that Act to arbitrations), for the words “section 27 of the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ section 34 of the Limitation Act 1980 ”.

7

In paragraph 7(6) of Schedule 3 to the Agriculture Act 1967 (conditions applying to amalgamated agricultural units) for the words “the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.

8

In paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 3 to the Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act 1969 (time limits for claims for compensation under that Act to be treated as if contained in Part I of the Limitation Act 1939), for the words “the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.

9

In section 25(5) of the Law of Property Act 1969 (accrual of cause of action to recover compensation for loss due to undisclosed land charges), for the words “the Limitation Act 1939” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.

10

In section 10 of the Animals Act 1971 (application of certain enactments to liability under sections 2 to 4 of that Act) for the words “the Limitation Acts 1939 to 1963” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.

11

In section 2(4) of the Deposit of Poisonous Waste Act 1972 (civil liability under that Act) for the words from “the Limitation Acts 1939 and 1963” to “1954” there shall be substituted the words “ the Limitation Act 1980 ”.

12

In section 88(4) of the Control of Pollution Act 1974 (civil liability under that Act) for paragraph (c) there shall be substituted the following paragraph—

(c) the Limitation Act 1980

.

SCHEDULE 4

Time limits under Part I subject to extension or exclusion under Part II.

4A

The time limit under section 2 of this Act shall not apply to an action for—

• (a) libel or slander, or

• (b) slander of title, slander of goods or other malicious falsehood,

but no such action shall be brought after the expiration of one year from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

Special time limit for certain actions in respect of damage or defects in relation to buildings

11A

• (1) This section shall apply to an action for damages by virtue of any provision of Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987.

• (2) None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act shall apply to an action to which this section applies.

• (3) An action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of ten years from the relevant time, within the meaning of section 4 of the said Act of 1987; and this subsection shall operate to extinguish a right of action and shall do so whether or not that right of action had accrued, or time under the following provisions of this Act had begun to run, at the end of the said period of ten years.

• (4) Subject to subsection (5) below, an action to which this section applies in which the damages claimed by the plaintiff consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person or loss of or damage to any property, shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of three years from whichever is the later of—

• (a) the date on which the cause of action accrued; and

• (b) the date of knowledge of the injured person or, in the case of loss of or damage to property, the date of knowledge of the plaintiff or (if earlier) of any person in whom his cause of action was previously vested.

• (5) If in a case where the damages claimed by the plaintiff consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person the injured person died before the expiration of the period mentioned in subsection (4) above, that subsection shall have effect as respects the cause of action surviving for the benefit of his estate by virtue of section 1 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 as if for the reference to that period there were substituted a reference to the period of three years from whichever is the later of—

• (a) the date of death; and

• (b) the date of the personal representative’s knowledge.

• (6) For the purposes of this section “personal representative” includes any person who is or has been a personal representative of the deceased, including an executor who has not proved the will (whether or not he has renounced probate) but not anyone appointed only as a special personal representative in relation to settled land; and regard shall be had to any knowledge acquired by any such person while a personal representative or previously.

• (7) If there is more than one personal representative and their dates of knowledge are different, subsection (5)(b) above shall be read as referring to the earliest of those dates.

• (8) Expressions used in this section or section 14 of this Act and in Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 have the same meanings in this section or that section as in that Part; and section 1(1) of that Act (Part I to be construed as enacted for the purpose of complying with the product liability Directive) shall apply for the purpose of construing this section and the following provisions of this Act so far as they relate to an action by virtue of any provision of that Part as it applies for the purpose of construing that Part.

Actions in respect of latent damage not involving personal injuries

14A

• (1) This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, other than one to which section 11 of this Act applies, where the starting date for reckoning the period of limitation under subsection (4)(b) below falls after the date on which the cause of action accrued.

• (2) Section 2 of this Act shall not apply to an action to which this section applies.

• (3) An action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period applicable in accordance with subsection (4) below.

• (4) That period is either—

• (a) six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued; or

• (b) three years from the starting date as defined by subsection (5) below, if that period expires later than the period mentioned in paragraph (a) above.

• (5) For the purposes of this section, the starting date for reckoning the period of limitation under subsection (4)(b) above is the earliest date on which the plaintiff or any person in whom the cause of action was vested before him first had both the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage and a right to bring such an action.

• (6) In subsection (5) above “the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage” means knowledge both—

• (a) of the material facts about the damage in respect of which damages are claimed; and

• (b) of the other facts relevant to the current action mentioned in subsection (8) below.

• (7) For the purposes of subsection (6)(a) above, the material facts about the damage are such facts about the damage as would lead a reasonable person who had suffered such damage to consider it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.

• (8) The other facts referred to in subsection (6)(b) above are—

• (a) that the damage was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence; and

• (b) the identity of the defendant; and

• (c) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant.

• (9) Knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (5) above.

• (10) For the purposes of this section a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—

• (a) from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or

• (b) from facts ascertainable by him with the help of appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek;

but a person shall not be taken by virtue of this subsection to have knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.

14B

• (1) An action for damages for negligence, other than one to which section 11 of this Act applies, shall not be brought after the expiration of fifteen years from the date (or, if more than one, from the last of the dates) on which there occurred any act or omission—

• (a) which is alleged to constitute negligence; and

• (b) to which the damage in respect of which damages are claimed is alleged to be attributable (in whole or in part).

• (2) This section bars the right of action in a case to which subsection (1) above applies notwithstanding that—

• (a) the cause of action has not yet accrued; or

• (b) where section 14A of this Act applies to the action, the date which is for the purposes of that section the starting date for reckoning the period mentioned in subsection (4)(b) of that section has not yet occurred;

before the end of the period of limitation prescribed by this section.

Commonhold

19A

An action in respect of a right or duty of a kind referred to in section 37(1) of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 (enforcement) shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.

27A

• (1) None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act applies to any proceedings under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (civil recovery of proceeds of unlawful conduct).

• (2) Proceedings under that Chapter for a recovery order in respect of any recoverable property shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of 20 years from the date on which the relevant person's cause of action accrued.

• (3) Proceedings under that Chapter are brought when—

• (a) a claim form is issued, or

• (aa) an application is made for a property freezing order, or

• (b) an application is made for an interim receiving order,

whichever is the earliest.

• (4) The relevant person's cause of action accrues in respect of any recoverable property—

• (a) in the case of proceedings for a recovery order in respect of property obtained through unlawful conduct, when the property is so obtained,

• (b) in the case of proceedings for a recovery order in respect of any other recoverable property, when the property obtained through unlawful conduct which it represents is so obtained.

• (4A) Subsection (4) is subject to section 13(5) of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (which provides that, in the case of property obtained through unlawful conduct relating to a gross human rights abuse or violation, proceedings cannot be brought after the end of the period of 20 years from the date on which the conduct constituting the commission of the abuse or violation occurs).

• (5) If—

• (a) a person would (but for the preceding provisions of this Act) have a cause of action in respect of the conversion of a chattel, and

• (b) proceedings are started under that Chapter for a recovery order in respect of the chattel,

section 3(2) of this Act does not prevent his asserting on an application under section 281 of that Act that the property belongs to him, or the court making a declaration in his favour under that section.

• (6) If the court makes such a declaration, his title to the chattel is to be treated as not having been extinguished by section 3(2) of this Act.

• (7) Expressions used in this section and Part 5 of that Act have the same meaning in this section as in that Part.

• (8) In this section “ relevant person ” means—

• (a) the National Crime Agency,

• (b) the Director of Public Prosecutions,

• (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

• (d) the Director of the Serious Fraud Office.

• (e) Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, or

• (f) the Financial Conduct Authority.

27B

• (1) None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act applies to any proceedings under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests and Orders) Order 2005 (civil proceedings for the realisation of property to give effect to an external order).

• (2) Proceedings under that Chapter for a recovery order in respect of any recoverable property shall not be brought after the expiration of the period of 20 years from the date on which the relevant person's cause of action accrued.

• (3) Proceedings under that Chapter are brought when—

• (a) a claim form is issued, or

• (b) an application is made for a property freezing order, or

• (c) an application is made for an interim receiving order,

whichever is earliest.

• (3A) If, before an event mentioned in subsection (3) occurs, an application is made for a prohibition order under Part 4A of the Order, the proceedings under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Order are to be treated as having been brought when that application is made.

• (4) The relevant person's cause of action accrues in respect of any recoverable property—

• (a) in the case of proceedings for a recovery order in respect of property obtained, or believed to have been obtained, as a result of or in connection with criminal conduct, when the property is so obtained,

• (b) in the case of proceedings for a recovery order in respect of any other recoverable property, when the property obtained, or believed to have been obtained, as a result of or in connection with criminal conduct which it represents is so obtained.

• (5) If—

• (a) a person would (but for the preceding provisions of this Act) have a cause of action in respect of the conversion of a chattel, and

• (b) proceedings are started under that Chapter for a recovery order in respect of the chattel,

• (c) section 3(2) of this Act does not prevent his asserting on an application under article 192 of that Order that the property belongs to him, or the court making a declaration in his favour under that article.

• (6) If the court makes such a declaration, his title to the chattel is to be treated as not having been extinguished by section 3(2) of this Act.

• (7) In this section—

• (a) “ criminal conduct ” is to be construed in accordance with section 447(8) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and

• (b) expressions used in this section which are also used in Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests and Orders) Order 2005 have the same meaning in this section as in that Part.

• (8) In this section “ relevant person ” means—

• (a) the National Crime Agency,

• (b) the Director of Public Prosecutions,

• (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

• (d) the Director of the Serious Fraud Office.

28A

• (1) Subject to subsection (2) below, if in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by section 14A of this Act—

• (a) the period applicable in accordance with subsection (4) of that section is the period mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection;

• (b) on the date which is for the purposes of that section the starting date for reckoning that period the person by reference to whose knowledge that date fell to be determined under subsection (5) of that section was under a disability; and

• (c) section 28 of this Act does not apply to the action;

the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of three years from the date when he ceased to be under a disability or died (whichever first occurred) notwithstanding that the period mentioned above has expired.

• (2) An action may not be brought by virtue of subsection (1) above after the end of the period of limitation prescribed by section 14B of this Act.

Discretionary exclusion of time limit for actions for defamation or malicious falsehood

32A

• (1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which—

• (a) the operation of section 4A of this Act prejudices the plaintiff or any person whom he represents, and

• (b) any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents,

the court may direct that that section shall not apply to the action or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates.

• (2) In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to—

• (a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the plaintiff;

• (b) where the reason or one of the reasons for the delay was that all or any of the facts relevant to the cause of action did not become known to the plaintiff until after the end of the period mentioned in section 4A—

• (i) the date on which any such facts did become known to him, and

• (ii) the extent to which he acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the facts in question might be capable of giving rise to an action; and

• (c) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, relevant evidence is likely—

• (i) to be unavailable, or

• (ii) to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the period mentioned in section 4A.

• (3) In the case of an action for slander of title, slander of goods or other malicious falsehood brought by a personal representative—

• (a) the references in subsection (2) above to the plaintiff shall be construed as including the deceased person to whom the cause of action accrued and any previous personal representative of that person; and

• (b) nothing in section 28(3) of this Act shall be construed as affecting the court’s discretion under this section.

• (4) In this section “ the court ” means the court in which the action has been brought.

Editorial notes