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The Wireless Telegraphy (Licence Award) Regulations 2025

Type Statutory-Instrument

Publication 2025-06-10

State In force

Department King's Printer of Acts of Parliament

Source legislation.gov.uk

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(iii) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to a 26 GHz double lot winner) which would itself be adjacent to a block in a series of other contiguous blocks of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to 26 GHz double lot winners), provided that one block in this series would include 26 GHz lot 7; and

(d) if the bidder is a 26 GHz lower only lot winner, at least one of the following four conditions would be satisfied—

(i) the block would include 26 GHz lot 1;

(ii) the block would be adjacent to the block of leftover 26 GHz lower lots;

(iii) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to a 26 GHz lower only lot winner) which would include 26 GHz lot 1;

(iv) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to a 26 GHz lower only lot winner) which would itself be adjacent to a block in a series of other contiguous blocks of 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to 26 GHz lower only lot winners), provided that one block in this series would include 26 GHz lot 1; or

(v) the block would be adjacent to a block in a series of contiguous blocks, which comprises the block of leftover 26 GHz lower lots and blocks containing 26 GHz lower lots (assigned to 26 GHz lower only lot winners).

26 GHz lower assignment stage bids

77

(1) In order to bid for a 26 GHz lower assignment stage option, a bidder must specify on the assignment stage form either a value of zero pounds or an amount in whole thousands of pounds that it is willing to pay, in addition to the total 26 GHz lower base price for that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 26 GHz lower lots, for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies corresponding to the block of numbered 26 GHz lower lots that is the 26 GHz lower assignment stage option.

(2) A bidder may make no more than one 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for each 26 GHz lower assignment stage option.

(3) A bidder is not required to make a 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid.

(4) A 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid is a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid if—

(a) the bid is specified on a valid assignment stage form; and

(b) the bidder has paid the full sum of the required first assignment stage round deposit by the deadline specified by OFCOM.

(5) Where a bidder does not make a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for a 26 GHz lower assignment stage option that bidder will be deemed to have made a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 26 GHz lower assignment stage option.

(6) Where there is only one assignment stage option on a bidder’s 26 GHz lower assignment stage options list, that bidder shall be deemed to have made a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 26 GHz lower assignment stage option.

Determination of the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids

78

(1) OFCOM shall determine the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids after the deadline for paying the required first assignment stage round deposit.

(2) The winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids shall be those valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids that comprise the winning combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids.

(3) The winning combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids shall be the valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids having the highest total value of amounts bid.

(4) A combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids is a valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids if—

(a) within that combination there is one valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid from each winning bidder for 26 GHz lower lots;

(b) each of those valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids is for a 26 GHz lower assignment stage option as determined by OFCOM for the bidder;

(c) no numbered 26 GHz lower lot is included in more than one of the 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids included in the combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids; and

(d) the leftover numbered 26 GHz lower lots not included in that combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids, taken together, form a single block of numbered 26 GHz lower lots which would include 26 GHz lot 1.

(5) Where there is more than one valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids for which the total value is equal highest, OFCOM shall employ a method of random selection from amongst those valid combinations of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids for which the value is equal highest to determine the winning combination of valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids.

Determination of 26 GHz lower lot first period additional prices

79

In respect of each winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid, OFCOM shall determine an amount in whole pounds (“26 GHz lower lot first period additional price”) which shall be payable by the relevant winning bidder in accordance with Schedule 5.

CHAPTER 4 — Step two: assignment of 26 GHz upper lots for the first period in the second assignment stage round

Bidding for numbered 26 GHz upper lots for the first period in the second assignment stage round

80

(1) Any 26 GHz upper lot winner may bid for the assignment of 26 GHz upper lots for the first period in the second assignment stage round.

(2) A 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid shall be a bid for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies for the first period corresponding to the particular numbered 26 GHz upper lots in a block of numbered 26 GHz upper lots.

(3) OFCOM shall determine which blocks of numbered 26 GHz upper lots a bidder may bid for, and notify that bidder of its determination.

(4) The list of possible blocks of numbered 26 GHz upper lots provided to each bidder may be different for each bidder.

(5) The list shall be known as the “26 GHz upper assignment stage options list” and each block of 26 GHz upper lots in that list shall be known as a “26 GHz upper assignment stage option”.

Preparing a 26 GHz upper lot assignment stage options list for each bidder

81

(1) OFCOM shall determine which 26 GHz upper assignment stage options shall be included in the 26 GHz upper assignment stage options list for each bidder which is eligible to bid.

(2) A 26 GHz double lot winner (if any), which has already been assigned in the first assignment stage round a block of 26 GHz lower lots which includes 26 GHz lot 7, shall be assigned, without bidding, a block of 26 GHz upper lots (equal to the number of lots won within that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 26 GHz upper lots) which includes 26 GHz lot 8 and that assigned block shall not be included in any 26 GHz upper assignment stage option list.

(3) A bidder’s 26 GHz upper assignment stage options shall be each of those blocks of numbered 26 GHz upper lots which satisfy all of the following conditions—

(a) the number of 26 GHz upper lots contained in the block is equal to the number of lots won within that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 26 GHz upper lots;

(b) if that bidder were assigned the 26 GHz upper lots contained in the block the following two conditions would be satisfied—

(i) each other bidder could be assigned 26 GHz upper lots contained in a block that, in respect of that other bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 26 GHz upper lots, satisfies the condition in subparagraph (a); and

(ii) the leftover 26 GHz upper lots not assigned to that bidder or any other bidder would form a single block of numbered 26 GHz upper lots which would include 26 GHz lot 12;

(c) if the bidder is a 26 GHz double lot winner (except where regulation 81(2) applies), at least one of the following two conditions would be satisfied—

(i) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz upper lots (assigned to a 26 GHz double lot winner) which would include 26 GHz lot 8;

(ii) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz upper lots (assigned to a 26 GHz double lot winner) which would itself be adjacent to a block in a series of other contiguous blocks of 26 GHz upper lots (assigned to 26 GHz double lot winners), provided that one block in this series would include 26 GHz lot 8; and

(d) if the bidder is a 26 GHz upper only lot winner, at least one of the following five conditions would be satisfied—

(i) the block would include 26 GHz lot 12;

(ii) the block would be adjacent to the block of leftover 26 GHz upper lots;

(iii) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz upper lots (assigned to a 26 GHz upper only lot winner) which would include 26 GHz lot 12;

(iv) the block would be adjacent to a block of 26 GHz upper lots (assigned to a 26 GHz upper only lot winner) which would itself be adjacent to a block in a series of other contiguous blocks of 26 GHz upper lots (assigned to 26 GHz upper only lot winners), provided that one block in this series would include 26 GHz lot 12; or

(v) the block would be adjacent to a block in a series of contiguous blocks, which comprises the block of leftover 26 GHz upper lots and blocks containing 26 GHz upper lots (assigned to 26 GHz upper only lot winners).

26 GHz upper assignment stage bids

82

(1) In order to bid for a 26 GHz upper assignment stage option, a bidder must, on the assignment stage form, specify either a value of zero pounds or an amount in whole thousands of pounds that it is willing to pay, in addition to the total 26 GHz upper base price for that bidder’s winning principal stage bid for 26 GHz upper lots, for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies corresponding to the block of numbered 26 GHz upper lots for the first period that is the 26 GHz upper assignment stage option.

(2) A bidder may make no more than one 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for each 26 GHz upper assignment stage option.

(3) A bidder is not required to make a 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid.

(4) A 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid is a valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid if—

(a) the bid is specified on a valid assignment stage form; and

(b) the bidder has paid the full sum of the required second assignment stage round deposit by the deadline specified by OFCOM.

(5) Where a bidder does not make a valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for a 26 GHz upper assignment stage option that bidder will be deemed to have made a valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 26 GHz upper assignment stage option.

(6) Where there is only one assignment stage option on a bidder’s 26 GHz upper lots assignment stage options list, that bidder shall be deemed to have made a valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 26 GHz upper assignment stage option.

Determination of the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids

83

(1) OFCOM shall determine the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids after the deadline for paying the required second assignment stage round deposit.

(2) The winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids shall be those valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids that comprise the winning combination of valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids.

(3) The winning combination of valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids shall be the valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids having the highest total value of amounts bid.

(4) A combination of valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids is a valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids if—

(a) within that combination there is one valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid from each winning bidder for 26 GHz upper lots;

(b) each of those valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids is for a 26 GHz upper assignment stage option as determined by OFCOM for the bidder;

(c) no numbered 26 GHz upper lot is included in more than one of the 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids included in the combination of valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids; and

(d) the leftover numbered 26 GHz upper lots not included in that combination of valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids, taken together, form a single block of numbered 26 GHz upper lots which include 26 GHz lot 12.

(5) Where there is more than one valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids for which the total value is equal highest, OFCOM shall employ a method of random selection from amongst those valid combinations of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids for which the value is equal highest to determine the winning combination of valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids.

Determination of 26 GHz upper lot first period additional prices

84

In respect of each winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid, OFCOM shall determine an amount in whole pounds (“26 GHz upper lot first period additional price”) which shall be payable by the relevant winning bidder in accordance with Schedule 6.

CHAPTER 5 — Step three: assignment of 26 GHz lower lots and 26 GHz upper lots for the second period without bidding

Assignment of 26 GHz lower lots and 26 GHz upper lots for the second period without bidding

85

(1) OFCOM shall assign to any 26 GHz lower only lot winner for the second period the same particular numbered 26 GHz lower lots which were assigned to that bidder for the first period following the first assignment stage round.

(2) OFCOM shall assign to any 26 GHz upper only lot winner for the second period the same particular numbered 26 GHz upper lots which were assigned to that bidder for the first period following the second assignment stage round.

(3) If there is only one 26 GHz double lot winner OFCOM shall assign that bidder for the second period the same particular numbered 26 GHz lower lots and 26 GHz upper lots which were assigned to that bidder for the first period following the first and second assignment stage rounds.

(4) Any 26 GHz lower lots which were left over and not assigned to a bidder for the first period following the first assignment stage round will also be unassigned for the second period and shall relate to the same particular numbered 26 GHz lots as for the first period.

(5) Any 26 GHz upper lots which were left over and not assigned to a bidder for the first period following the second assignment stage round will also be unassigned for the second period and shall relate to the same particular numbered 26 GHz lots as for the first period.

CHAPTER 6 — Step four: assignment of 26 GHz lower lots and 26 GHz upper lots for the second period in the third assignment stage round

Assignment of 26 GHz lower lots and 26 GHz upper lots for the second period with bidding

86

(1) Each 26 GHz double lot winner may bid in the third assignment stage round for the assignment of 26 GHz lower lots and 26 GHz upper lots for the second period.

(2) A 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid shall be a bid for a licence that authorises for the second period the use of frequencies corresponding to the particular numbered 26 GHz lots in a block of such lots.

(3) OFCOM shall determine which blocks of numbered 26 GHz lots a bidder may bid for, and notify that bidder of its determination.

(4) The blocks of numbered 26 GHz lots a bidder may bid for shall not include—

(a) the particular numbered lots comprised in blocks already assigned to 26 GHz lower only lot winners;

(b) any leftover 26 GHz lower lots which were unassigned for the first period following the first assignment stage round;

(d) any leftover 26 GHz upper lots which were unassigned for the first period following the second assignment stage round.

(5) The list of possible blocks of numbered 26 GHz lots provided to each bidder may be different for each bidder.

(6) The list shall be known as the “26 GHz lot second period assignment stage options list” and each block of 26 GHz lots in that list shall be known as a “26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option”.

Preparing a 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage options list for each bidder

87

(1) OFCOM shall determine which 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage options shall be included in the 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage options list for each bidder which is eligible to bid.

(2) Only 26 GHz double lot winners may bid for 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage options.

(3) A bidder’s 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage options shall be each of those blocks of numbered 26 GHz lots which satisfy all of the following conditions—

(a) the number of 26 GHz lots contained in the block is equal to the sum of the number of lots won within that bidder’s winning principal stage bids for 26 GHz lower lots and 26 GHz upper lots;

(b) the block of numbered 26 GHz lots is different from the block of numbered 26 GHz lots assigned, without bidding, to any 26 GHz lower only winner or 26 GHz upper only lot winner; and

(i) each other bidder could be assigned 26 GHz lots contained in a block that, in respect of that other bidder’s winning principal stage bids for 26 GHz lower lots and 26 GHz upper lots, satisfies the condition in subparagraph (a);

(ii) each other bidder could be assigned 26 GHz lots contained in a block that satisfies the condition in subparagraph (b);

(iii) leftover 26 GHz lower lots (if any) could remain unassigned and relate to the same particular numbered lots of 26 GHz lower lots as those leftover 26 GHz lower lots that were unassigned for the first period following the first assignment stage round; and

(iv) leftover 26 GHz upper lots (if any) could remain unassigned and relate to the same particular numbered lots of 26 GHz upper lots as those leftover 26 GHz upper lots that were unassigned for the first period following the second assignment stage round.

26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids

88

(1) In order to bid for a 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option, a bidder must specify, on the assignment stage form, either a value of zero pounds or an amount in whole thousands of pounds that it is willing to pay for a licence that authorises the use of frequencies corresponding to the block of numbered 26 GHz lots for the second period that is the 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option, in addition to—

(a) the total 26 GHz lower base price and the total 26 GHz upper base price for that bidder’s winning principal stage bids for 26 GHz lower lots and 26 GHz upper lots; and

(b) the 26 GHz lower lot additional price (if any) and 26 GHz upper lot additional price (if any) for that bidder’s winning assignment stage bids (if any), in the first assignment stage round and in the second assignment stage round.

(2) A bidder may make no more than one 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for each 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option.

(3) A bidder is not required to make a 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid.

(4) A 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid is a valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid if—

(a) the bid is specified on a valid assignment stage form; and

(b) the bidder has paid the full sum of the required third assignment stage round deposit by the deadline specified by OFCOM.

(5) Where a bidder does not make a valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for a 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option that bidder will be deemed to have made a valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid with a value of zero pounds for that 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option.

Determination of the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids

89

(1) OFCOM shall determine the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids after the deadline for paying the required third assignment stage round deposit.

(2) The winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids shall be those valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids that comprise the winning combination of valid 26 GHz assignment stage bids.

(3) The winning combination of valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids shall be the valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids having the highest total value of amounts bid.

(4) A combination of valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids is a valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids if—

(a) within that combination there is one valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid from each winning bidder for 26 GHz lots;

(b) each of those valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids is for a 26 GHz lot assignment stage option as determined by OFCOM for the bidder; and

(c) no numbered 26 GHz lot is included in more than one of the 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids included in the combination of valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids.

(5) Where there is more than one valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids for which the total value is equal highest, OFCOM shall employ a method of random selection from amongst those valid combinations of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids for which the value is equal highest to determine the winning combination of valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids.

Determination of 26 GHz lot second period additional prices

90

In respect of each winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid, OFCOM shall determine an amount in whole pounds (“26 GHz lot second period additional price”) which shall be payable by the relevant winning bidder in accordance with Schedule 7.

CHAPTER 7 — Procedure for bidding in the assignment stage

Notification to bidders before each assignment stage round

91

Before the start of each assignment stage round, OFCOM shall notify each bidder eligible to make an assignment stage bid in that assignment stage round of—

(a) the assignment stage options that are available to that bidder in that assignment stage round; and

(b) the date on which, and the times on that date within which, the assignment stage round will begin and end.

Assignment stage form

92

(1) Before the first assignment stage round OFCOM shall provide each winning bidder for 40 GHz lots an assignment stage form for 40 GHz assignment stage bids and each winning bidder for 26 GHz lower lots an assignment stage form for 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids.

(2) Before the second assignment stage round OFCOM shall provide each winning bidder for 26 GHz upper lots an assignment stage form for 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids.

(3) Before the third assignment stage round OFCOM shall provide each 26 GHz double lot winner an assignment stage form for 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids.

Submission of assignment stage forms to OFCOM

93

(1) A bidder must submit a completed assignment stage form to OFCOM by using the auction system, except as provided for in regulation 96.

(2) A completed assignment stage form must be received by OFCOM by the time notified to bidders under regulation 91(b) as the end of the assignment stage round.

Valid assignment stage form

94

An assignment stage form is a valid assignment stage form if—

(a) the bidder has complied with regulations 72(1) and 72(2), regulations 77(1) and 77(2), regulations 82(1) and 82(2) or regulations 88(1) and 88(2) as the case may be in respect of the assignment stage bids specified on the form; and

(b) the bidder has submitted the form in accordance with regulation 93 or 96.

Notification that an assignment stage form is not valid

95

Where a bidder submits an assignment stage form which is not a valid assignment stage form, OFCOM shall, after the end of the assignment stage round, notify the bidder of that fact and shall give the reasons why the assignment stage form is not a valid assignment stage form.

Alternative method for submission of assignment stage form

96

(1) Where OFCOM are satisfied that a bidder is unable to submit an assignment stage form by using the auction system because of technical failure (or an event or circumstance with similar effect on the bidder’s ability to use the auction system), OFCOM shall notify the bidder of an alternative method of submitting the assignment stage form and any requirements relating to the authentication of communications made by means of the alternative method.

(2) The bidder must submit the assignment stage form by means of the alternative method and must comply with any requirements which have been notified to it under paragraph (1) relating to the authentication of communications.

Incomplete or defective assignment stage form

97

(1) Where, due to the manner of completion, an assignment stage form is incomplete or defective but OFCOM believe that they can ascertain the bidder’s intention in relation to the making of assignment stage bids, OFCOM shall ask the bidder to confirm in a notice to OFCOM by a deadline specified by OFCOM that OFCOM have correctly ascertained the bidder’s intention in relation to the making of assignment stage bids.

(2) Where the bidder confirms in a notice given to OFCOM by the deadline which is signed by two authorised persons that OFCOM have correctly ascertained the bidder’s intention, the assignment stage form in its entirety shall be accepted by OFCOM on that basis.

(3) Where the bidder does not give such confirmation, the assignment stage form in its entirety shall be rejected by OFCOM and none of the assignment stage bids made on that assignment stage form shall be valid, and regulations 72(5), 77(5), 82(5) or 88(5) shall apply.

Required first assignment stage round deposit

98

(1) A further sum in pounds must be paid into OFCOM’s bank account, with accompanying information which identifies the bidder, by a deadline specified by OFCOM for the first assignment stage round (the “required first assignment stage round deposit”).

(2) The required first assignment stage round deposit shall be an amount such that the total amount that the bidder has on deposit is not less than the amount which is the sum of—

(a) the amount which is the bidder’s total base price for its winning principal stage bids;

(b) the amount which is the bidder’s highest 40 GHz lot assignment stage bid for a 40 GHz assignment stage option; and

(c) the amount which is the bidder’s highest 26 GHz lower lot assignment stage bid for a 26 GHz lower assignment stage option.

Required second assignment stage round deposit

99

(1) A further sum in pounds must be paid into OFCOM’s bank account, with accompanying information which identifies the bidder, by a deadline specified by OFCOM for the second assignment stage round (the “required second assignment stage round deposit”).

(2) The required second assignment stage round deposit shall be an amount such that the total amount that the bidder has on deposit is not less than the amount which is the sum of—

(a) the amount which is the bidder’s total base price for its winning principal stage bids;

(b) the amount which is the bidder’s additional price for its winning assignment stage bid for 40 GHz lots (if any);

(c) the amount which is the bidder’s additional price for its winning assignment stage bid for 26 GHz lower lots (if any); and

(d) the amount which is the bidder’s highest 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for a 26 GHz upper assignment stage option.

Required third assignment stage round deposit

100

(1) A further sum in pounds must be paid into OFCOM’s bank account, with accompanying information which identifies the bidder, by a deadline specified by OFCOM for the third assignment stage round (the “required third assignment stage round deposit”).

(2) The required third assignment stage round deposit shall be an amount such that the total amount that the bidder has on deposit is not less than the amount which is the sum of—

(a) the amount which is the bidder’s total base price for its winning principal stage bids;

(b) the amount which is the bidder’s additional price for its winning assignment stage bid for 40 GHz lots (if any);

(c) the amount which is the bidder’s additional price for its winning assignment stage bid for 26 GHz lower lots (if any);

(d) the amount which is the bidder’s additional price for its winning assignment stage bid for 26 GHz upper lots (if any); and

(e) the amount which is the bidder’s highest 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for a 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option.

CHAPTER 8 — Notification of results of lot assignment

Notification of results of the assignment stage

101

(1) After the end of step one (the first assignment stage round), OFCOM shall notify each bidder of—

(a) the 40 GHz lot assignment stage option (if any) for which the bidder made a winning assignment stage bid; and

(b) the 40 GHz lot additional price (if any) determined for the winning 40 GHz lot assignment stage option;

(c) the 26 GHz lower assignment stage option (if any) for the first period for which the bidder made a winning assignment stage bid;

(d) the 26 GHz lower lot first period additional price (if any) determined for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage option for the first period.

(2) After the end of step two (the second assignment stage round), OFCOM shall notify each bidder of—

(a) the 26 GHz upper assignment stage option (if any) for the first period for which the bidder made a winning assignment stage bid;

(b) the 26 GHz upper lot additional price (if any) determined for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage option for the first period.

(3) After the assignment of 26 GHz lots under step three, if any, OFCOM shall notify each bidder which was assigned lots of the blocks of 26 GHz lots which were assigned for the second period.

(4) After the end of step four (the third assignment stage round), if any, OFCOM shall notify each bidder of—

(a) the 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option (if any) for which the bidder made a winning assignment stage bid;

(b) 26 GHz lot second period additional price (if any) determined for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option.

PART 7 — Grant Stage

CHAPTER 1 — Licences available, the determination of licence fees and the particular frequencies

Interpretation

102

In these Regulations—

(a) a “40 GHz licence” is a licence that authorises a bidder to use particular frequencies corresponding to a block of such number of 40 GHz lots as that bidder has been assigned for the first period and also for the second period;

(b) a “26 GHz lower lot first period licence” is a licence that authorises a bidder to use particular frequencies corresponding to a block of such number of 26 GHz lower lots as that bidder has been assigned for the first period;

(c) a “26 GHz upper lot first period licence” is a licence that authorises a bidder to use particular frequencies corresponding to a block of such number of 26 GHz upper lots as that bidder has been assigned for the first period;

(d) a “26 GHz lot second period licence” is a licence that authorises a bidder to use particular frequencies corresponding to a block of such number of 26 GHz lots as that bidder has been assigned for the second period.

Determination of licences, licence fees and frequencies associated with particular licences

103

After notification of the results of the assignment stage under regulation 101 OFCOM shall determine—

(a) the licences which may be granted; and

(b) for each licence—

(i) the licence fee payable to OFCOM; and

(ii) the particular frequencies.

Licences which may be granted under this award process

104

The licences which may be granted to a bidder under this award process are—

(a) for a bidder which has been assigned 40 GHz lots, a 40 GHz licence;

(b) for a bidder which has been assigned 26 GHz lower lots for the first period, a 26 GHz lower lot first period licence;

(c) for a bidder which has been assigned 26 GHz upper lots for the first period, a 26 GHz upper lot first period licence; and

(d) for a bidder which has been assigned 26 GHz lots for the second period, a 26 GHz lot second period licence.

Licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 40 GHz licence

105

The licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 40 GHz licence shall be an amount equal to the sum of—

(a) that bidder’s total 40 GHz base price; and

(b) that bidder’s 40 GHz lot additional price (if any).

Licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 26 GHz lower lot first period licence

106

The licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 26 GHz lower lot first period licence shall be an amount equal to the sum of—

(a) that bidder’s total 26 GHz lower base price; and

(b) that bidder’s 26 GHz lower lot first period additional price (if any).

Licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 26 GHz upper lot first period licence

107

The licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 26 GHz upper lot first period licence shall be an amount equal to the sum of—

(a) that bidder’s total 26 GHz upper base price; and

(b) that bidder’s 26 GHz upper lot first period additional price (if any).

Licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 26 GHz lot second period licence

108

The licence fee payable by a winning bidder for a 26 GHz lot second period licence shall be an amount equal to that bidder’s 26 GHz lot second period additional price (if any).

Particular frequencies to be included in a 40 GHz licence granted to a winning bidder

109

Where a bidder was assigned 40 GHz lots under step one (in accordance with regulation 73) the 40 GHz licence granted to that bidder shall authorise the use of the frequencies assigned.

Particular frequencies to be included in a 26 GHz lower lot first period licence granted to a winning bidder

110

Where a bidder was assigned 26 GHz lower lots under step one (in accordance with regulation 78) the 26 GHz lower lot first period licence granted to that bidder shall authorise the use of the frequencies assigned.

Particular frequencies to be included in a 26 GHz upper lot first period licence granted to a winning bidder

111

Where a bidder was assigned 26 GHz upper lots under step two (in accordance with regulation 83) the 26 GHz upper lot first period licence granted to that bidder shall authorise the use of the frequencies assigned.

Particular frequencies to be included in a 26 GHz lot second period licence granted to a winning bidder

112

(1) Where a bidder was assigned 26 GHz lots—

(a) without bidding under step three (in accordance with regulation 85) the 26 GHz lot second period licence granted to that bidder shall authorise the use of the frequencies assigned; and

(b) under step four (in accordance with regulation 89) the 26 GHz lot second period licence granted to that bidder shall authorise the use of the frequencies assigned.

CHAPTER 2 — Total auction sum

Determination of the total auction sum payable by winning bidders to OFCOM

113

(1) OFCOM shall determine the total auction sum payable by each winning bidder in accordance with paragraph (2).

(2) The total auction sum payable by a winning bidder shall be the sum of—

(a) for that winning bidder’s 40 GHz licence (if any), the licence fee determined in accordance with regulation 105;

(b) for that winning bidder’s 26 GHz lower lot first period licence (if any), the licence fee determined in accordance with regulation 106;

(c) for that winning bidder’s 26 GHz upper lot first period licence (if any), the licence fee determined in accordance with regulation 107; and

(d) for that winning bidder’s 26 GHz lot second period licence (if any), the licence fee determined in accordance with regulation 108.

Notification of the total auction sum payable by winning bidders to OFCOM

114

Following the determination of the total auction sum payable by each winning bidder to OFCOM, OFCOM shall notify each winning bidder of the total auction sum payable by that winning bidder to OFCOM.

Further payment where the amount of a winning bidder’s deposit is less than its total auction sum

115

Where, after the notification given in accordance with regulation 114, the total amount that a winning bidder has on deposit is an amount that is less than the total auction sum payable by that bidder to OFCOM, the bidder must pay into OFCOM’s bank account, with accompanying information which identifies the bidder, the sum in pounds which is the difference between such amount and the amount the bidder has on deposit, by a deadline specified by OFCOM.

CHAPTER 3 — Grant of licences

Entitlement to the grant of licences

116

(1) Where, following the passing of the deadline under regulation 115, the total amount that a winning bidder has on deposit is an amount that is equal to or more than the total auction sum payable by that bidder to OFCOM, OFCOM shall grant to that bidder the relevant licences referred to in regulation 117.

(2) Where, following the passing of the deadline under regulation 115, the amount of the deposit of a winning bidder remains less than the total auction sum payable by that bidder to OFCOM, that bidder—

(a) shall not be entitled to the grant of any licences under these Regulations and shall not receive a refund of any sum which the bidder has paid as a deposit under these Regulations which shall (where not already forfeited) be forfeited, together with any interest which has accrued on that deposit; and

(b) shall remain liable to pay the amount which is the difference (if any) between—

(i) the amount which is the total auction sum payable by that bidder to OFCOM; and

(ii) the amount the bidder has on deposit.

Grant of licences

117

The licences referred to in regulation 116(1) are—

(a) in respect of a bidder which has been assigned 40 GHz lots, a 40 GHz licence which authorises the use of the frequencies determined in accordance with regulation 109;

(b) in respect of a bidder which has been assigned 26 GHz lower lots, a 26 GHz lower lot first period licence which authorises the use of the frequencies determined in accordance with regulation 110;

(c) in respect of a bidder which has been assigned 26 GHz upper lots, a 26 GHz upper lot first period licence which authorises the use of the frequencies determined in accordance with regulation 111; and

(d) in respect of a bidder which has been assigned 26 GHz lots for the second period, a 26 GHz lot second period licence which authorises the use of frequencies determined in accordance with regulation 112.

CHAPTER 4 — Completion of the award process

Deposit greater than total auction sum

118

Where, following the grant of licences, the total amount a bidder has on deposit at that time is an amount that is greater than the total auction sum payable by that bidder to OFCOM, OFCOM shall refund to that bidder a sum in pounds which is the difference between—

(a) the amount which is the total auction sum payable by that bidder to OFCOM (if any); and

(b) the amount the bidder has on deposit.

Notification to bidders following the grant of licences

119

Following the grant of licences and the refund (if any) of deposits, OFCOM shall notify each winning bidder of the names of all of the winning bidders to whom licences were granted, and, in relation to each of them—

(a) the frequencies in respect of which the licences were granted; and

(b) the licence fees paid, indicating the total base prices and the additional prices.

Completion of the award process

120

OFCOM shall complete the award process by publishing on OFCOM’s website—

(a) the names of the winning bidders to whom licences were granted, and, in relation to each of them—

(i) the frequencies in respect of which the licences were granted; and

(ii) the licence fees paid;

(b) the names of any winning bidders who, following the passing of the deadline under regulation 115, had an amount on deposit which is less than the total auction sum payable by them to OFCOM, and, in relation to each of them—

(i) the frequencies in respect of which, if they held on deposit an amount equal to the total auction sum, licences would have been granted; and

(ii) the total auction sum payable to OFCOM;

(d) details of all valid assignment stage bids for 40 GHz lots, 26 GHz lower lots, 26 GHz upper lots and 26 GHz second period lots; and

(e) details of any lot assignments made without bidding.

PART 8 — Forfeit of deposit and exclusion

Forfeit of deposit and exclusion from award process

121

(1) If, in relation to an applicant which is qualified to bid or a bidder, OFCOM are satisfied that any of the events specified in regulation 123 are occurring (or have occurred) and that the occurrence would materially affect the outcome of the award process—

(a) any sum paid as a deposit under these Regulations shall be forfeited (together with any interest which has accrued on the deposit) by, and not refunded to, the applicant or bidder concerned; and

(b) that applicant or bidder may also be excluded from the award process by OFCOM giving that applicant or bidder notice in writing.

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), if OFCOM are satisfied that any of the events specified in regulations 123(2)(d), 123(2)(e) or 123(2)(g)(ii) are occurring (or have occurred) after the notification to all bidders of the results of the third assignment stage round in accordance with regulation 101(4) OFCOM shall not require any deposit to be forfeited and shall not exclude any bidder.

Bids made by an excluded bidder

122

(1) Where a bidder is excluded from the award process under regulation 121 during the principal stage, OFCOM shall determine whether it should disregard the bids (and other bidding indications) made in any principal stage rounds prior to the exclusion, in order to have a fair and efficient outcome to the award process.

(2) Where OFCOM determine that it is appropriate to disregard the bids (and other bidding indications) made in any principal stage rounds—

(a) OFCOM shall notify bidders of the rounds for which they have determined to disregard the bids (and other bidding indications); and

(b) resume the award process from the start of the principal stage round after the round for which bids are not disregarded under sub-paragraph (a), or, where all bids are to be disregarded under that sub-paragraph, to rerun the award process from the start of the first principal stage round.

(3) Where a bidder is excluded from the award process under regulation 121 during the assignment stage, OFCOM shall determine whether it should disregard the bids (and other bidding indications) made in any principal stage round prior to the exclusion in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2).

Events

123

(1) The events referred to in regulation 121 are the events in paragraph (2).

(2) Events in relation to an applicant or bidder are—

(a) the submission to OFCOM of any information in connection with the award process which is false or misleading;

(b) any member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group colluding or attempting to collude with another person to distort the outcome of the bidding in the award process;

(c) any member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group acting in a way which is likely to distort the outcome of the award process;

(d) any member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group, or any person to whom confidential information has been disclosed, disclosing, or attempting to disclose, or inciting another person to disclose, any confidential information, whether directly or indirectly, to any person, except where the disclosure is—

(i) to OFCOM;

(ii) to a member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group;

(iii) to a provider of finance for the purpose of raising finance for a bid; or

(iv) to a person for the purpose of enabling that person to decide whether to participate as a member of the applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group;

(e) any member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group obtaining or attempting to obtain confidential information relating to another applicant or bidder;

(f) any member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group receiving or attempting to receive services in relation to the award process from any person who has provided or is providing, since the date of submission of the applications, services to OFCOM in relation to the award process;

(g) any person who is a member or a director or employee of a member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group and also a director or employee of a member of another bidder group—

(i) taking part in the preparation of both bidder groups for participation in the award process; or

(ii) receiving confidential information relating to both bidder groups;

(h) a member of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group is or becomes a member of another applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group; and

(i) a change occurring in the membership of that applicant’s or bidder’s bidder group from that notified to OFCOM in its application except as a result of—

(i) a person ceasing to be a member of that bidder group;

(ii) a person joining that bidder group under the procedure in regulation 7(3); or

(iii) a person becoming an associate through merger or acquisition activity provided that such activity is not for a purpose related to the award process.

PART 9 — Miscellaneous

Alternative method for submission of principal stage bids

124

(1) Where OFCOM are satisfied that a bidder is unable to submit bids by using the auction system because of technical failure (or an event or circumstance with similar effect on the bidder’s ability to use the auction system), OFCOM shall notify the bidder of an alternative method of submitting bids and any requirements relating to the authentication of communications made by means of the alternative method.

(2) The bidder must submit the bids by means of the alternative method and must comply with any requirements which have been notified to it under paragraph (1) relating to the authentication of communications.

(3) Where bids have been submitted using an alternative method and due to the manner of submission bids are incomplete or defective, but OFCOM believe that they can ascertain the bidder’s intention in relation to the matters set out in regulation 21, 27, 28, 29 and 30, OFCOM shall ask the bidder to confirm in a notice to OFCOM by a deadline specified by OFCOM that OFCOM have correctly ascertained the bidder’s intention in relation to its decisions.

(4) Where the bidder confirms in a notice given to OFCOM by the deadline which is signed by two authorised persons that OFCOM have correctly ascertained the bidder’s intention, bids shall be accepted by OFCOM on that basis.

(5) Where the bidder does not give such confirmation, the principal stage bids submitted in their entirety shall be disregarded, and—

(a) in respect of a lot type for which it had a notified posted demand of zero for that lot type following the most recent round, the bidder shall be deemed to have submitted a bid to maintain demand; and

(b) in respect of a lot type for which it had notified posted demand greater than zero for that lot type following the most recent round, the bidder shall be deemed to have selected a target number of zero lots, nominated the opening price, and shall be deemed to have submitted a simple set of bids to decrease demand.

General power of exclusion

125

OFCOM may, at any time, notify any applicant or bidder of its exclusion from the award process, if required to do so by any direction given by the Secretary of State to OFCOM under section 5 of the Communications Act 2003[^f00005] or if, after OFCOM’s determination under regulation 8(1) (and notwithstanding that determination), in their opinion the applicant or bidder is not a fit and proper person to hold a licence.

Notification to OFCOM

126

If, in accordance with any provision of these Regulations, an applicant or bidder is required, or wishes, to notify OFCOM of any fact or circumstance, it must do so by notice in writing which is marked for the attention of the OFCOM personnel who are specified by OFCOM for that purpose on OFCOM’s website and must deliver that notice to OFCOM by electronic mail to an electronic mail address dedicated to the award process.

Changes to timing or location

127

(1) Subject to regulations 128 and 129, paragraph (2) applies where OFCOM determine that it is impracticable for any reason—

(a) for any document which is to be delivered to OFCOM under these Regulations to be delivered at the place specified or by the deadline specified under these Regulations; or

(b) for any action which is required to be undertaken in accordance with these Regulations to be completed by the deadline specified.

(2) Where this paragraph applies, OFCOM shall take reasonable steps to notify applicants or bidders that—

(a) delivery must be made on a different day or within different times on that day or at a different place; and

(b) the action must be completed on a different day or by a different deadline.

Changes to round times and use of auction system

128

(1) Where a time for the start of a round has been notified to bidders and OFCOM determine that it is impracticable for any reason to start the round at that time, OFCOM shall take reasonable steps to notify bidders of a revised time for the start of the round.

(2) Where a time for the end of a round has been notified to bidders and OFCOM determine that it is impracticable for any reason for the round to end at that time, OFCOM shall take reasonable steps to notify bidders of a revised time for the end of the round.

(3) Where OFCOM determine that it is impracticable for any reason to use the auction system for any of the purposes specified in these Regulations, OFCOM shall take reasonable steps to notify bidders of an alternative method of participating in the award process and any requirements relating to the authentication of communications made by means of the alternative method.

(4) Bidders must use the alternative method of participating in the award process in accordance with a notification under paragraph (3).

Rerunning rounds

129

(1) Paragraph (2) applies where a round is in progress and OFCOM determine that it is not possible to continue the round because of—

(a) technical failure; or

(b) an event or circumstance with similar effect to technical failure on the continuation of the round.

(2) Where this paragraph applies, OFCOM shall—

(a) take reasonable steps to notify bidders of their determination under paragraph (1);

(b) disregard the bids (and other bidding indications) made in that round; and resume the award process from the end of the most recent round.

(3) Paragraph (4) applies where OFCOM determine that it is not possible to continue the award process in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations because of—

(a) technical failure; or

(b) an event or circumstance with similar effect to technical failure on the continuation of the award process.

(4) Where this paragraph applies, OFCOM shall—

(a) determine the rounds for which bids (and other bidding indications) made in those rounds should be disregarded in order to have a fair and efficient outcome to the award process;

(b) take reasonable steps to notify bidders of their determinations under paragraph (3) and sub-paragraph (a); and

(c) resume the award process from the end of the latest round for which bids (and other bidding indications) are not disregarded under sub-paragraph (a), or, where all bids (and other bidding indications) are to be disregarded under that sub-paragraph, to rerun the award process from the start of the first principal stage round.

Refunds

130

OFCOM may, in such cases as they think fit, refund, in whole or in part, sums which have been paid to them in accordance with any provision of these Regulations.

Deposits

131

In determining under these Regulations the amount that an applicant or bidder has on deposit OFCOM shall disregard any sum forfeited under these Regulations and any interest which may have accrued on any deposit.

SCHEDULE 1 — Lots

In these Regulations—

(a) “26 GHz lot” means any of the 26 GHz lots numbered 1 to 12 in Column (1) of Table 1 or Table 2 comprising the frequencies listed in the corresponding entry in Column (2) of the same table;

(b) “26 GHz lower lot” means any of the 26 GHz lots numbered 1 to 7 listed in Column (1) of Table 1 comprising the frequencies listed in the corresponding entry in Column (2) of the same table;

(c) “26 GHz upper lot” means any of the 26 GHz lots numbered 8 to 12 listed in Column (1) of Table 2 comprising the frequencies listed in the corresponding entry in Column (2) of the same table;

(d) “40 GHz lot” means any of the 40 GHz lots numbered 1 to 15 listed in Column (1) of Table 3 comprising the frequencies listed in the corresponding entry in Column (2) of the same table;

(e) “lot” means a 26 GHz lot or a 40 GHz lot;

(f) a reference to a “type of lot” or “lot type” shall be construed as a reference to any of the three different lot types in paragraphs (b), (c), or (d);

(g) a reference to a numbered 26 GHz lot or a numbered 40 GHz lot means the lot with that number in Column (1) of Table 1, Table 2 or Table 3 (as the case may be); and

(h) a reference to a “block” of 26 GHz lots or 40 GHz lots is to be construed as a reference to a block of sequentially numbered lots.

26 GHz lower lots	Frequencies
26 GHz lot 1	25.1-25.3 GHz
26 GHz lot 2	25.3-25.5 GHz
26 GHz lot 3	25.5-25.7 GHz
26 GHz lot 4	25.7-25.9 GHz
26 GHz lot 5	25.9-26.1 GHz
26 GHz lot 6	26.1-26.3 GHz
26 GHz lot 7	26.3-26.5 GHz
26 GHz upper lots	Frequencies
---	---
26 GHz lot 8	26.5-26.7 GHz
26 GHz lot 9	26.7-26.9 GHz
26 GHz lot 10	26.9-27.1 GHz
26 GHz lot 11	27.1-27.3 GHz
26 GHz lot 12	27.3-27.5 GHz
40 GHz lots	Frequencies
---	---
40 GHz lot 1	40.5-40.7 GHz
40 GHz lot 2	40.7-40.9 GHz
40 GHz lot 3	40.9-41.1 GHz
40 GHz lot 4	41.1-41.3 GHz
40 GHz lot 5	41.3-41.5 GHz
40 GHz lot 6	41.5-41.7 GHz
40 GHz lot 7	41.7-41.9 GHz
40 GHz lot 8	41.9-42.1 GHz
40 GHz lot 9	42.1-42.3 GHz
40 GHz lot 10	42.3-42.5 GHz
40 GHz lot 11	42.5-42.7 GHz
40 GHz lot 12	42.7-42.9 GHz
40 GHz lot 13	42.9-43.1 GHz
40 GHz lot 14	43.1-43.3 GHz
40 GHz lot 15	43.3-43.5 GHz

SCHEDULE 2 — Application form and warranty

1. Details of the applicant

Provide the following details for the applicant—

Applicant’s full name

Registered number of company

Registered office of company

Bank sort code and account number

Name of individual contact within applicant

Contact address (if different from registered office)

Contact telephone number

Contact mobile telephone number

Contact electronic mail address

2. Authorised persons

Provide details of the name and position in the applicant of at least three and no more than five persons, each of whom has authority to bind the applicant for all purposes relating to the award process. Also provide a specimen signature of each of these persons.

3. Directors or members of managing body

Provide the name and job title of each of the directors of the applicant or each of the members of the managing body of the applicant.

4. Applicant group

Provide the names of the applicant’s associates (as defined in the Wireless Telegraphy (Licence Award) Regulations 2025 (“the Regulations”)) and for each provide details of their material interest (as defined in the Regulations) in the applicant.

Provide the names of all other members of the applicant group (as defined in the Regulations) in respect of which the applicant has completed a document in the form set out in Schedule 3 to the Regulations in accordance with regulation 4(3)(a)(ii) of the Regulations.

5. Qualification to bid

In relation to the determination by the Office of Communications (“OFCOM”) under regulation 8 of the Regulations—

(a) provide details of any reason why the applicant may not be a fit and proper person to hold a licence;

(b) state whether any member of the applicant’s applicant group has colluded, or attempted to collude, or is colluding or attempting to collude, with another person to distort the outcome of the award process and provide a description of any such collusion;

(c) state whether any member of the applicant’s applicant group has acted or is acting in a way which is likely to distort the outcome of the award process and provide a description of any such actions;

(d) state whether any member of the applicant’s applicant group, or any person to whom confidential information has been disclosed, has disclosed, or is disclosing or attempting to disclose or has incited or is inciting another person to disclose, any confidential information, whether directly or indirectly, to any person, and provide a description of the circumstances of any disclosure and the information disclosed, except where the disclosure—

(i) is or was to a member of the applicant’s applicant group;

(ii) is or was to OFCOM;

(iii) is or was to a provider of finance for the purpose of raising finance for the applicant’s application; or

(iv) is or was to a person for the purpose of enabling that person to decide whether to participate as a member of the applicant’s bidder group;

(e) state whether any member of the applicant’s applicant group has obtained or is obtaining or attempting to obtain confidential information relating to another applicant and provide a description of any such circumstances;

(f) state whether any member of the applicant’s applicant group is receiving or is attempting to receive services in relation to the award process from any person who has provided or is providing services to OFCOM in relation to the award process and provide a description of the services concerned; and

(g) state whether (and provide a description of any circumstances in which) any person who is a member or a director or employee of a member of the applicant’s applicant group and also a director or employee of a member of another applicant group is—

(i) taking part in the preparation of both applicant groups for participation in the award process; or

(ii) receiving confidential information relating to both applicant groups.

6. Other information

Provide a brief description of the substance of—

(a) agreements (if any) relating to the management of the applicant; and

(b) any criminal investigations or proceedings in the United Kingdom or overseas of which the applicant is aware relating to the applicant or any member of its applicant group or its directors or officers.

7. Warranty

Provide the following warranty—

[Insert name of applicant] (the “applicant”) represents and warrants to the Office of Communications that— (a) the persons authorised in section 2 of this application have read and understood the Regulations, the terms of the licences to be granted under the Regulations, and the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006; (b) the applicant has the legal authority to participate in the award process under the Regulations and to have a licence granted to it, and has in place all necessary consents, permissions and internal approvals for this purpose; (c) the information provided in, or in support of, the application is, to the best of the knowledge and belief of the applicant, true, accurate and complete in all material respects; and (d) the applicant is aware of the provisions in regulations 121 and 123 of the Regulations, including the provisions about disclosure of confidential information (as defined in the Regulations) and obtaining confidential information relating to another applicant or bidder and that any such activities may lead to forfeiture of sums on deposit and exclusion from the award process.

SCHEDULE 3 — Document for member of applicant’s applicant group or bidder group who is not an associate

[Insert name of applicant or bidder] (the “applicant/bidder”) wishes to include [insert name and address of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate] as a member of the applicant/bidder’s applicant or bidder group as defined in the Wireless Telegraphy (Licence Award) Regulations 2025 (“the Regulations”) for the purpose of the award process under the Regulations.

Under regulation 8 of the Regulations an applicant shall not be qualified to bid in the award process where a member of its bidder group is also a member of another applicant’s bidder group. Regulations 121 and 123 contain provisions on disclosure of confidential information (as defined in the Regulations) and obtaining confidential information relating to another applicant or bidder. Under the Regulations such activities may lead to forfeiture of sums on deposit and exclusion from the award process.

Applicant/bidder

In relation to regulations 8, 121 and 123 of the Regulations, the applicant/bidder represents and warrants to the Office of Communications (“OFCOM”) that so far as it is aware, having made all reasonable enquiries, [insert name of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate] is not a member of any other applicant’s or bidder’s applicant or bidder group.

[Insert name of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate]

[Insert name of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate] represents and warrants to OFCOM that it—

(a) consents to be a member of the applicant/bidder’s applicant or bidder group;

(b) is not a member of any other applicant’s or bidder’s applicant or bidder group; and

(c) is aware of the provisions in regulations 8, 121 and 123 of the Regulations about disclosure of confidential information (as defined in the Regulations) and obtaining confidential information relating to another applicant or bidder.

SCHEDULE 4 — Determination of 40 GHz lot additional prices

Additional price

1

(1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.

(2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.

First requirement

2

The additional price for each winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid.

Second requirement

3

(1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—

(a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 40 GHz assignment stage option selected in its winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid”), and

(b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid,

the combination of the reduced winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 40 GHz assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.

(2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.

(3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.

Third requirement

4

Taking the additional prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.

Fourth requirement

5

(1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.

(2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA=∑(pA-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—

(a) “pA” is the additional price for a winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid for winner A; and

(b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid.

(3) The formula is cA= bA– (t – uA)where—

(a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);

(b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids; and

(4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 40 GHz assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 40 GHz assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 40 GHz assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.

(5) Where the amount of a 40 GHz assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 40 GHz assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.

Interpretation

6

In this Schedule “valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 73(4).

SCHEDULE 5 — Determination of 26 GHz lower lot first period additional prices

Additional price

1

(1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.

(2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.

First requirement

2

The additional price for each winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid.

Second requirement

3

(1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—

(a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 26 GHz lower assignment stage option selected in its winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid”), and

(b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid,

the combination of the reduced winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.

(2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.

(3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.

Third requirement

4

Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.

Fourth requirement

5

(1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.

(2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA= ∑(pA-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—

(a) “pA” is the price for a winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for winner A; and

(b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid.

(3) The formula is cA= bA– (t – uA) where—

(a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);

(b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids; and

(4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.

(5) Where the amount of a 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.

Interpretation

6

In this Schedule “valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 78(4).

SCHEDULE 6 — Determination of 26 GHz upper lot first period additional prices

Additional price

1

(1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.

(2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.

First requirement

2

The additional price for each winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid.

Second requirement

3

(1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—

(a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 26 GHz upper assignment stage option selected in its winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid”), and

(b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid,

the combination of the reduced winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.

(2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.

(3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.

Third requirement

4

Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.

Fourth requirement

5

(1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.

(2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA= ∑(pA-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—

(a) “pA” is the price for a winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for winner A; and

(b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid.

(3) The formula is cA= bA– (t – uA) where—

(a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);

(b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids; and

(4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.

(5) Where the amount of a 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.

Interpretation

6

In this Schedule “valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 83(4).

SCHEDULE 7 — Determination of 26 GHz lot second period additional prices

Additional price

1

(1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.

(2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.

First requirement

2

The additional price for each winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid.

Second requirement

3

(1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—

(a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option selected in its winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid”), and

(b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid,

the combination of the reduced winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.

(2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.

(3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.

Third requirement

4

Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.

Fourth requirement

5

(1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.

(2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA= ∑(pA-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—

(a) “pA” is the price for a winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for winner A; and

(b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid.

(3) The formula is cA= bA– (t – uA)where—

(a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);

(b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids; and

(4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.

(5) Where the amount of a 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.

Interpretation

6

In this Schedule “valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 89(4).

Signed

David Willis — Group Director, Spectrum Group — For and on behalf of the Office of Communication — 10th June 2025

Explanatory note

(This note is not part of the Regulations)

EXPLANATORY NOTE

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