The Wireless Telegraphy (Licence Award) Regulations 2025

[Insert name of applicant] (the “applicant”) represents and warrants to the Office of Communications that— (a) the persons authorised in section 2 of this application have read and understood the Regulations, the terms of the licences to be granted under the Regulations, and the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006; (b) the applicant has the legal authority to participate in the award process under the Regulations and to have a licence granted to it, and has in place all necessary consents, permissions and internal approvals for this purpose; (c) the information provided in, or in support of, the application is, to the best of the knowledge and belief of the applicant, true, accurate and complete in all material respects; and (d) the applicant is aware of the provisions in regulations 121 and 123 of the Regulations, including the provisions about disclosure of confidential information (as defined in the Regulations) and obtaining confidential information relating to another applicant or bidder and that any such activities may lead to forfeiture of sums on deposit and exclusion from the award process.

SCHEDULE 3 — Document for member of applicant’s applicant group or bidder group who is not an associate

[Insert name of applicant or bidder] (the “applicant/bidder”) wishes to include [insert name and address of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate] as a member of the applicant/bidder’s applicant or bidder group as defined in the Wireless Telegraphy (Licence Award) Regulations 2025 (“the Regulations”) for the purpose of the award process under the Regulations.

Under regulation 8 of the Regulations an applicant shall not be qualified to bid in the award process where a member of its bidder group is also a member of another applicant’s bidder group. Regulations 121 and 123 contain provisions on disclosure of confidential information (as defined in the Regulations) and obtaining confidential information relating to another applicant or bidder. Under the Regulations such activities may lead to forfeiture of sums on deposit and exclusion from the award process.

Applicant/bidder

In relation to regulations 8, 121 and 123 of the Regulations, the applicant/bidder represents and warrants to the Office of Communications (“OFCOM”) that so far as it is aware, having made all reasonable enquiries, [insert name of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate] is not a member of any other applicant’s or bidder’s applicant or bidder group.

[Insert name of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate]

[Insert name of person to be included in applicant or bidder group who is not an associate] represents and warrants to OFCOM that it—

• (a) consents to be a member of the applicant/bidder’s applicant or bidder group;

• (b) is not a member of any other applicant’s or bidder’s applicant or bidder group; and

• (c) is aware of the provisions in regulations 8, 121 and 123 of the Regulations about disclosure of confidential information (as defined in the Regulations) and obtaining confidential information relating to another applicant or bidder.

SCHEDULE 4 — Determination of 40 GHz lot additional prices

Additional price

1

• (1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.

• (2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.

First requirement

2

The additional price for each winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid.

Second requirement

3

• (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—

• (a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 40 GHz assignment stage option selected in its winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid”), and

• (b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid,

the combination of the reduced winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 40 GHz assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.

• (2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.

• (3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 40 GHz assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.

Third requirement

4

Taking the additional prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.

Fourth requirement

5

• (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.

• (2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA=∑(pA-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—

• (a) “pA” is the additional price for a winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid for winner A; and

• (b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid.

• (3) The formula is cA= bA– (t – uA)where—

• (a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);

• (b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bids; and

• (c) “bA” is the amount of the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid for which pA is the price.

• (4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 40 GHz assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 40 GHz assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 40 GHz assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 40 GHz assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.

• (5) Where the amount of a 40 GHz assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 40 GHz assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 40 GHz assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.

Interpretation

6

In this Schedule “valid combination of 40 GHz assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 73(4).

SCHEDULE 5 — Determination of 26 GHz lower lot first period additional prices

Additional price

1

• (1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.

• (2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.

First requirement

2

The additional price for each winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid.

Second requirement

3

• (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—

• (a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 26 GHz lower assignment stage option selected in its winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid”), and

• (b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid,

the combination of the reduced winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.

• (2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.

• (3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.

Third requirement

4

Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.

Fourth requirement

5

• (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.

• (2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA= ∑(pA-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—

• (a) “pA” is the price for a winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for winner A; and

• (b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid.

• (3) The formula is cA= bA– (t – uA) where—

• (a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);

• (b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids; and

• (c) “bA” is the amount of the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for which pA is the price.

• (4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.

• (5) Where the amount of a 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 26 GHz lower assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.

Interpretation

6

In this Schedule “valid combination of 26 GHz lower assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 78(4).

SCHEDULE 6 — Determination of 26 GHz upper lot first period additional prices

Additional price

1

• (1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.

• (2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.

First requirement

2

The additional price for each winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid.

Second requirement

3

• (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—

• (a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 26 GHz upper assignment stage option selected in its winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid”), and

• (b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid,

the combination of the reduced winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.

• (2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.

• (3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.

Third requirement

4

Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.

Fourth requirement

5

• (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.

• (2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA= ∑(pA-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—

• (a) “pA” is the price for a winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for winner A; and

• (b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid.

• (3) The formula is cA= bA– (t – uA) where—

• (a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);

• (b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids; and

• (c) “bA” is the amount of the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for which pA is the price.

• (4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.

• (5) Where the amount of a 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 26 GHz upper assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.

Interpretation

6

In this Schedule “valid combination of 26 GHz upper assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 83(4).

SCHEDULE 7 — Determination of 26 GHz lot second period additional prices

Additional price

1

• (1) OFCOM shall determine an additional price for each winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid by imposition of the requirements that the additional prices must satisfy that are set out in paragraphs 2 to 5.

• (2) Where an additional price so determined includes a fraction of a pound, the additional price shall be that price rounded up to the nearest whole pound.

First requirement

2

The additional price for each winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid shall be no less than zero and no more than the amount of that winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid.

Second requirement

3

• (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids together, the additional prices shall be such that if—

• (a) the amount bid by each winning bidder for the 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage option selected in its winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid had been the additional price rather than the amount of its winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid (“reduced winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid”), and

• (b) subject to sub-paragraph (2), the amount bid by each winning bidder in respect of each other valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid made by that bidder had been reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the amount of its winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid and the additional price for that relevant winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid,

the combination of the reduced winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids submitted by the winning bidders would have been the valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid.

• (2) Where the amount of a bid has been reduced in accordance with sub-paragraph (1)(b) and is less than zero, the amount of that bid shall be treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this paragraph.

• (3) The bids mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (1)(b) shall, after reduction of the amount of those bids in accordance with those paragraphs, be treated as valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids for the purposes of this paragraph.

Third requirement

4

Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids together, the total of those additional prices shall be no greater than the total of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.

Fourth requirement

5

• (1) Taking the additional prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids together, the opportunity cost variance of those additional prices calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) shall be less than the opportunity cost variance, calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), of any other prices for the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids that satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4.

• (2) The opportunity cost variance (“OCVA”) of prices mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula OCVA= ∑(pA-cA)² summing over all winning bidders where—

• (a) “pA” is the price for a winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for winner A; and

• (b) “cA” is the amount calculated in accordance with the formula set out in sub-paragraph (3) in respect of that winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid.

• (3) The formula is cA= bA– (t – uA)where—

• (a) “uA” is the amount calculated in accordance with sub-paragraph (4);

• (b) “t” is the total amount of the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids; and

• (c) “bA” is the amount of the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for which pA is the price.

• (4) The amount calculated in accordance with this sub-paragraph is the total amount of the valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids or one of the valid combinations of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids (as the case may be) having the highest total value of amounts bid where, for each 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid made by the winning bidder that submitted the winning 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for which pA is the price, the amount of that 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero for the purposes of this sub-paragraph.

• (5) Where the amount of a 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid is treated as if it were zero in accordance with sub-paragraph (4), that 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid shall be treated as a valid 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bid for the purposes of that sub-paragraph.

Interpretation

6

In this Schedule “valid combination of 26 GHz lot second period assignment stage bids” shall be construed in accordance with regulation 89(4).

Signed

David Willis — Group Director, Spectrum Group — For and on behalf of the Office of Communication — 10th June 2025

Explanatory note

(This note is not part of the Regulations)

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These Regulations set out the procedure that will apply to the grant of wireless telegraphy licences at frequencies which are set out in Schedule 1.

To apply, a body corporate must deliver the documents required by regulation 4(3) to the Office of Communications (“OFCOM”) on a day specified by OFCOM. An initial deposit of one million pounds must be paid to OFCOM (regulation 4(3)(b)).

OFCOM will determine which applicants are fit to hold a licence, taking into account the matters set out in regulation 8(2). If not disqualified, and if there is no member of its bidder group which is also a member of another bidder group, an applicant shall be qualified to participate (regulation 9(1)).

After giving applicants an opportunity to withdraw, OFCOM will determine the number of bidders (regulation 12), an additional deposit may be paid (regulation 13) and OFCOM will determine an eligibility limit (a term defined in the Regulations) by reference to sums paid on deposit. This limits the bids that can be made.

The first stage, called the principal stage, involves one or more rounds of bidding. The lot prices for the first round are set out in regulation 20 and OFCOM will determine the lot prices for the second and each subsequent round (regulations 26).

Regulation 31 sets out the consequences if a bidder fails to submit bids within the time period for bidding.

The winning principal stage bids are determined by OFCOM in accordance with regulation 59 by reference to bids which are determined to have won lots in the principal stage (this is a defined term).

The second stage, called the assignment stage, is set out in Part 6. This procedure determines the frequencies which will be assigned to each winning bidder. This is determined through further rounds of bidding and winning bidders will be assigned particular frequencies.

The third stage, called the grant stage, is the procedure set out in Part 7. OFCOM will grant licences to winning bidders and refund any sums due to winning bidders.

If, in relation to an applicant which is qualified to bid or a bidder, OFCOM is satisfied that certain events are occurring or have occurred and that the occurrence would materially affect the outcome of the award process, the applicant or bidder concerned will forfeit sums on deposit held by OFCOM and may be excluded from the award process (regulation 121).

A full regulatory impact assessment of the effect of these Regulations is available on OFCOM’s website at www.ofcom.org.uk. Hard copies of this assessment can be obtained free of charge by writing to OFCOM at Riverside House, 2a Southwark Bridge Road, London, SE1 9HA (tel. 020 7981 3000). Copies of this assessment have also been placed in the library of both Houses of Parliament.

Footnotes