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Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008
17 versions
· 2012-10-25
2025-01-01
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2023-11-28
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2023-01-01
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2022-01-01
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2021-04-10
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2021-01-01
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2020-08-12
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2019-01-01
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
Changes on 2019-01-01
@@ -16,39 +16,39 @@
2. This Regulation provides for the following tariff preferences under the scheme:
(a)a general arrangement;
(b)a special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+); and
(c)a special arrangement for the least-developed countries (Everything But Arms (EBA)).
(a) a general arrangement;
(b) a special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+); and
(c) a special arrangement for the least-developed countries (Everything But Arms (EBA)).
#### Article 2
For the purposes of this Regulation:
(a)‘GSP’ means the Generalised Scheme of Preferences by which the Union provides preferential access to its market through any of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2);
(b)‘countries’ means countries and territories possessing a customs administration;
(c)‘eligible countries’ means all developing countries as listed in Annex I;
(d)‘GSP beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the general arrangement as listed in Annex II;
(e)‘GSP+ beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance as listed in Annex III;
(f)‘EBA beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for least developed countries as listed in Annex IV;
(g)‘Common Customs Tariff duties’ means the duties specified in Part Two of Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (<sup>1</sup>), except those duties established as part of tariff quotas;
(h)‘section’ means any of the sections of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87;
(i)‘chapter’ means any of the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87;
(j)‘GSP section’ means a section listed in Annex V and established on the basis of sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff;
(k)‘preferential market access arrangement’ means preferential access to the Union market through a trade agreement, either provisionally applied or in force, or through autonomous preferences granted by the Union;
(l)‘effective implementation’ means the integral implementation of all undertakings and obligations undertaken under the international conventions listed in Annex VIII, thus ensuring fulfilment of all the principles, objectives and rights guaranteed therein.
(a) ‘GSP’ means the Generalised Scheme of Preferences by which the Union provides preferential access to its market through any of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2);
(b) ‘countries’ means countries and territories possessing a customs administration;
(c) ‘eligible countries’ means all developing countries as listed in Annex I;
(d) ‘GSP beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the general arrangement as listed in Annex II;
(e) ‘GSP+ beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance as listed in Annex III;
(f) ‘EBA beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for least developed countries as listed in Annex IV;
(g) ‘Common Customs Tariff duties’ means the duties specified in Part Two of Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (<sup>1</sup>), except those duties established as part of tariff quotas;
(h) ‘section’ means any of the sections of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87;
(i) ‘chapter’ means any of the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87;
(j) ‘GSP section’ means a section listed in Annex V and established on the basis of sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff;
(k) ‘preferential market access arrangement’ means preferential access to the Union market through a trade agreement, either provisionally applied or in force, or through autonomous preferences granted by the Union;
(l) ‘effective implementation’ means the integral implementation of all undertakings and obligations undertaken under the international conventions listed in Annex VIII, thus ensuring fulfilment of all the principles, objectives and rights guaranteed therein.
#### Article 3
@@ -66,9 +66,9 @@
1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the general arrangement referred to in point (a) of Article 1(2) unless:
(a)it has been classified by the World Bank as a high-income or an upper-middle income country during three consecutive years immediately preceding the update of the list of beneficiary countries; or
(b)it benefits from a preferential market access arrangement which provides the same tariff preferences as the scheme, or better, for substantially all trade.
(a) it has been classified by the World Bank as a high-income or an upper-middle income country during three consecutive years immediately preceding the update of the list of beneficiary countries; or
(b) it benefits from a preferential market access arrangement which provides the same tariff preferences as the scheme, or better, for substantially all trade.
2. Points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall not apply to least-developed countries.
@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@
2. By 1 January of each year following the entry into force of this Regulation the Commission shall review Annex II. To provide a GSP beneficiary country and economic operators with time for orderly adaptation to the change in the country’s status under the scheme:
(a)the decision to remove a beneficiary country from the list of GSP beneficiary countries, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article and on the basis of point (a) of Article 4(1), shall apply as from one year after the date of entry into force of that decision;
(b)the decision to remove a beneficiary country from the list of GSP beneficiary countries, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article and on the basis of point (b) of Article 4(1), shall apply as from two years after the date of application of a preferential market access arrangement.
(a) the decision to remove a beneficiary country from the list of GSP beneficiary countries, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article and on the basis of point (a) of Article 4(1), shall apply as from one year after the date of entry into force of that decision;
(b) the decision to remove a beneficiary country from the list of GSP beneficiary countries, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article and on the basis of point (b) of Article 4(1), shall apply as from two years after the date of application of a preferential market access arrangement.
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex II on the basis of the criteria laid down in Article 4.
@@ -130,23 +130,20 @@
1. A GSP beneficiary country may benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in point (b) of Article 1(2) if:
(a)it is considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system, as defined in Annex VII;
(b)it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VIII (the ‘relevant conventions’) and the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions (the ‘relevant monitoring bodies’) do not identify a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;
(c)in relation to any of the relevant conventions, it has not formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of those conventions or which is for the purposes of this Article considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention.
For the purposes of this Article, reservations shall not be considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of a convention unless:
(i)a process explicitly set out for that purpose under the convention has so determined; or
(ii)in the absence of such a process, the Union where a party to the convention, and/or a qualified majority of Member States party to the convention, in accordance with their respective competences as established in the Treaties, objected to the reservation on the grounds that it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention and opposed the entry into force of the convention as between them and the reserving state in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties;
(d)it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof;
(e)it accepts without reservation the reporting requirements imposed by each convention and gives a binding undertaking to accept regular monitoring and review of its implementation record in accordance with the provisions of the relevant conventions; and
(f)it gives a binding undertaking to participate in and cooperate with the monitoring procedure referred to in Article 13.
(a) it is considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system, as defined in Annex VII;
(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VIII (the ‘relevant conventions’) and the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions (the ‘relevant monitoring bodies’) do not identify a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;
(c) in relation to any of the relevant conventions, it has not formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of those conventions or which is for the purposes of this Article considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention.
For the purposes of this Article, reservations shall not be considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of a convention unless:
(i) a process explicitly set out for that purpose under the convention has so determined; or
(ii) in the absence of such a process, the Union where a party to the convention, and/or a qualified majority of Member States party to the convention, in accordance with their respective competences as established in the Treaties, objected to the reservation on the grounds that it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention and opposed the entry into force of the convention as between them and the reserving state in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties;
(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof;
(e) it accepts without reservation the reporting requirements imposed by each convention and gives a binding undertaking to accept regular monitoring and review of its implementation record in accordance with the provisions of the relevant conventions; and
(f) it gives a binding undertaking to participate in and cooperate with the monitoring procedure referred to in Article 13.
2. Where Annex II is amended, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 to amend Annex VII in order to review the vulnerability threshold listed in point 1(b) of Annex VII so as to maintain proportionally the same weight of the vulnerability threshold as calculated in accordance with Annex VII.
@@ -154,9 +151,9 @@
1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be granted if the following conditions are met:
(a)a GSP beneficiary country has made a request to that effect; and
(b)examination of the request shows that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9(1).
(a) a GSP beneficiary country has made a request to that effect; and
(b) examination of the request shows that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9(1).
2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1).
@@ -194,9 +191,9 @@
2. That report shall include:
(a)the conclusions or recommendations of relevant monitoring bodies in respect of each GSP+ beneficiary country; and
(b)the Commission’s conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof.
(a) the conclusions or recommendations of relevant monitoring bodies in respect of each GSP+ beneficiary country; and
(b) the Commission’s conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof.
The report may include any information the Commission considers appropriate.
@@ -212,9 +209,9 @@
4. The Commission shall publish a notice in the *Official Journal of the European Union* and notify the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned thereof. The notice shall:
(a)state the grounds for the reasonable doubt as to the fulfilment of the binding undertakings made by the GSP+ beneficiary country as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), or as to the existence of a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in point (c) of Article 9(1), which may call into question its right to continue to enjoy the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance; and
(b)specify the period, which may not exceed six months from the date of publication of the notice, within which a GSP+ beneficiary country shall submit its observations.
(a) state the grounds for the reasonable doubt as to the fulfilment of the binding undertakings made by the GSP+ beneficiary country as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), or as to the existence of a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in point (c) of Article 9(1), which may call into question its right to continue to enjoy the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance; and
(b) specify the period, which may not exceed six months from the date of publication of the notice, within which a GSP+ beneficiary country shall submit its observations.
5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the period referred to in point (b) of paragraph 4.
@@ -222,9 +219,9 @@
7. Within three months after expiry of the period specified in the notice, the Commission shall decide:
(a)to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; or
(b)to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance.
(a) to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; or
(b) to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance.
8. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based, inter alia, on evidence received.
@@ -272,15 +269,15 @@
1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:
(a)serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Part A of Annex VIII;
(b)export of goods made by prison labour;
(c)serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or failure to comply with international conventions on anti-terrorism and money laundering;
(d)serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the competent WTO body;
(e)serious and systematic infringement of the objectives adopted by Regional Fishery Organisations or any international arrangements to which the Union is a party concerning the conservation and management of fishery resources.
(a) serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Part A of Annex VIII;
(b) export of goods made by prison labour;
(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or failure to comply with international conventions on anti-terrorism and money laundering;
(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the competent WTO body;
(e) serious and systematic infringement of the objectives adopted by Regional Fishery Organisations or any international arrangements to which the Union is a party concerning the conservation and management of fishery resources.
2. The preferential arrangements provided for in this Regulation shall not be withdrawn under point (d) of paragraph 1 in respect of products that are subject to anti-dumping or countervailing measures under Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community (<sup>3</sup>) or Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (<sup>4</sup>), for the reasons justifying those measures.
@@ -288,9 +285,9 @@
4. The Commission shall publish a notice in the *Official Journal of the European Union* announcing the initiation of a temporary withdrawal procedure, and shall notify the beneficiary country concerned thereof. The notice shall:
(a)provide sufficient grounds for the implementing act to initiate a temporary withdrawal procedure, referred to in paragraph 3; and
(b)state that the Commission will monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned for six months from the date of publication of the notice.
(a) provide sufficient grounds for the implementing act to initiate a temporary withdrawal procedure, referred to in paragraph 3; and
(b) state that the Commission will monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned for six months from the date of publication of the notice.
5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the monitoring and evaluation period.
@@ -300,9 +297,9 @@
8. Within six months from the expiry of the period referred to in point (b) of paragraph 4 the Commission shall decide:
(a)to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; or
(b)to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).
(a) to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; or
(b) to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).
9. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure.
@@ -326,17 +323,17 @@
2. The administrative cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 requires, inter alia, that a beneficiary country:
(a)communicate to the Commission and update the information necessary for the implementation of the rules of origin and the policing thereof;
(b)assist the Union by carrying out, at the request of the customs authorities of the Member States, subsequent verification of the origin of the goods, and communicate its results in time to the Commission;
(c)assist the Union by allowing the Commission, in coordination and close cooperation with the competent authorities of the Member States, to conduct the Union administrative and investigative cooperation missions in that country, in order to verify the authenticity of documents or the accuracy of information relevant for granting the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2);
(d)carry out or arrange for appropriate inquiries to identify and prevent contravention of the rules of origin;
(e)comply with or ensure compliance with the rules of origin in respect of regional cumulation, within the meaning of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93, if the country benefits therefrom; and
(f)assist the Union in the verification of conduct where there is a presumption of origin-related fraud, whereby the existence of fraud may be presumed where imports of products under the preferential arrangements provided for in this Regulation massively exceed the usual levels of the beneficiary country’s exports.
(a) communicate to the Commission and update the information necessary for the implementation of the rules of origin and the policing thereof;
(b) assist the Union by carrying out, at the request of the customs authorities of the Member States, subsequent verification of the origin of the goods, and communicate its results in time to the Commission;
(c) assist the Union by allowing the Commission, in coordination and close cooperation with the competent authorities of the Member States, to conduct the Union administrative and investigative cooperation missions in that country, in order to verify the authenticity of documents or the accuracy of information relevant for granting the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2);
(d) carry out or arrange for appropriate inquiries to identify and prevent contravention of the rules of origin;
(e) comply with or ensure compliance with the rules of origin in respect of regional cumulation, within the meaning of Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93, if the country benefits therefrom; and
(f) assist the Union in the verification of conduct where there is a presumption of origin-related fraud, whereby the existence of fraud may be presumed where imports of products under the preferential arrangements provided for in this Regulation massively exceed the usual levels of the beneficiary country’s exports.
3. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, it shall decide in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 39(4) to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2), in respect of all or certain products originating in a beneficiary country.
@@ -370,25 +367,25 @@
Serious difficulties shall be considered to exist where Union producers suffer deterioration in their economic and/or financial situation. In examining whether such deterioration exists, the Commission shall take account, inter alia, of the following factors concerning Union producers, where such information is available:
(a)market share;
(b)production;
(c)stocks;
(d)production capacity;
(e)bankruptcies;
(f)profitability;
(g)capacity utilisation;
(h)employment;
(i)imports;
(j)prices.
(a) market share;
(b) production;
(c) stocks;
(d) production capacity;
(e) bankruptcies;
(f) profitability;
(g) capacity utilisation;
(h) employment;
(i) imports;
(j) prices.
#### Article 24
@@ -424,9 +421,9 @@
1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex V or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00 , 2207 20 00 , 2909 19 10 , 3814 00 90 , 3820 00 00 , and 3824 90 97 where imports of such products, listed respectively in Annexes V or IX, whichever is applicable, originate in a beneficiary country and their total:
(a)increases by at least 13,5 % in quantity (by volume), as compared with the previous calendar year; or
(b)for products under GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex V, exceeds the share referred to in point 2 of Annex VI of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex V from all countries and territories listed in Annex II during any period of 12 months.
(a) increases by at least 13,5 % in quantity (by volume), as compared with the previous calendar year; or
(b) for products under GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex V, exceeds the share referred to in point 2 of Annex VI of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex V from all countries and territories listed in Annex II during any period of 12 months.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to EBA beneficiary countries, nor shall it apply to countries with a share for the relevant products referred to in Article 29(1) not exceeding 6 % of total Union imports of the same products listed in Annexes V or IX, whichever is applicable.
@@ -450,9 +447,9 @@
2. Where Section I of this Chapter is applied to products in Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, originating in beneficiary countries, the period referred to in Article 24(4) of this Regulation shall be reduced to two months in the following cases:
(a)when the beneficiary country concerned does not ensure compliance with the rules of origin or does not provide the administrative cooperation referred to in Article 21; or
(b)when imports of products from Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, under the preferential arrangements granted under this Regulation massively exceed the usual levels of exports from the beneficiary country concerned.
(a) when the beneficiary country concerned does not ensure compliance with the rules of origin or does not provide the administrative cooperation referred to in Article 21; or
(b) when imports of products from Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, under the preferential arrangements granted under this Regulation massively exceed the usual levels of exports from the beneficiary country concerned.
## CHAPTER VII
@@ -745,26 +742,24 @@
| CD | Congo, Democratic Republic of |
| CF | Central African Republic |
| CG | Congo |
| | |
| CI | Côte d'Ivoire |
| ————— | |
| | |
| CK | Cook Islands |
| ————— | |
| | |
| CN | China, People's Republic of (<sup>1</sup>) |
| CN | China, People's Republic of (<sup>*1</sup>) |
| ————— | |
| | |
| CV | Cape Verde |
| DJ | Djibouti |
| EC | Ecuador (<sup>1</sup>) |
| EC | Ecuador (<sup>*1</sup>) |
| ER | Eritrea |
| ET | Ethiopia |
| ————— | |
| | |
| FM | Micronesia, Federated States of |
| ————— | |
| | |
| GH | Ghana |
| ————— | |
| | |
| GM | Gambia |
| GN | Guinea |
@@ -796,7 +791,7 @@
| MM | Myanmar/Burma |
| MN | Mongolia |
| MR | Mauritania |
| MV | Maldives (<sup>1</sup>) |
| MV | Maldives (<sup>*1</sup>) |
| MW | Malawi |
| MZ | Mozambique |
| ————— | |
@@ -812,7 +807,8 @@
| | |
| PH | Philippines |
| PK | Pakistan |
| PY | Paraguay |
| ————— | |
| | |
| RW | Rwanda |
| SB | Solomon Islands |
| SD | Sudan |
@@ -824,12 +820,11 @@
| ————— | |
| | |
| SY | Syrian Arab Republic |
| | |
| SZ | Swaziland |
| ————— | |
| | |
| TD | Chad |
| TG | Togo |
| TH | Thailand (<sup>1</sup>) |
| TH | Thailand (<sup>*1</sup>) |
| TJ | Tajikistan |
| TL | Timor-Leste |
| ————— | |
@@ -881,7 +876,7 @@
| PH | Philippines |
| | |
| PK | Pakistan |
| PY | Paraguay |
| ————— | |
| ————— | |
| | |
@@ -943,7 +938,8 @@
| TZ | Tanzania (Republic of) |
| UG | Uganda |
| VU | Vanuatu |
| WS | Samoa |
| ————— | |
| | |
| YE | Yemen |
| ZM | Zambia |
@@ -1522,11 +1518,10 @@
1.For the purposes of Chapter III a vulnerable country means a country:
(a)of which, in terms of value, the seven largest GSP sections of its imports into the Union of products listed in Annex IX represent more than the threshold of 75 % in value of its total imports of products listed in that Annex, as an average during the last three consecutive years;
and
(b)of which the imports of products listed in Annex IX into the Union represent less than the threshold of 6,5 % in value of the total imports into the Union of products listed in that Annex originating in countries listed in Annex II, as an average during the last three consecutive years.
(a) of which, in terms of value, the seven largest GSP sections of its imports into the Union of products listed in Annex IX represent more than the threshold of 75 % in value of its total imports of products listed in that Annex, as an average during the last three consecutive years;
and
(b) of which the imports of products listed in Annex IX into the Union represent less than the threshold of 7,4 % in value of the total imports into the Union of products listed in that Annex originating in countries listed in Annex II, as an average during the last three consecutive years.
2.For the purposes of point (a) of Article 9(1), the data to be used in application of point 1 of this Annex are those available on 1 September of the year preceding the year of the request referred to in Article 10(1).
2018-03-07
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2018-01-01
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2017-05-19
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2017-01-01
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2016-01-27
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2016-01-01
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2015-01-01
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2014-10-01
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Counc
2014-02-28
Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Co
original version
Text at this date